

AD706346

Date February 1970

TITLE

NATIONAL SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE
OBSERVATION OPERATIONS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Volume IV

ACDA/IR-161

PREPARED FOR
THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

PREPARED BY

Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research
School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

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This study project was prepared under Contract ACDA/IR-161 with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments set forth in the study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other agency of the United States Government.

IR-161 IV

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**The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research
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IR-161 IV

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F O R E W O R D

Compiled in five volumes, the study "National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations" consists of the Summary Report and Final Report in Volumes I and II, respectively; the three remaining volumes contain the background papers which analyze in detail the support arrangements for the major peacekeeping and peace observation operations undertaken by the United Nations and under other auspices.

Volume III examines the national support aspects of the major United Nations peace observation missions. Arranged in chronological order, the papers in this volume identify and assess the significant problems of these missions.

The policies and problems of national support of the major United Nations peacekeeping operations are examined in detail in the case studies included in Volume IV. These explore the significant manpower, financial and logistical, as well as political problems, in mounting and sustaining United Nations peacekeeping forces, with emphasis on the role played by the United States.

The background papers of Volume V investigate in the same manner the national support experience in peacekeeping and peace observation operations undertaken by regional organizations and under ad hoc arrangements. These cases cover the experiences of the Organization of American States and the Arab League, as well as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, and the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam created under the Geneva Accords of 1954. These cases afford an opportunity to analyze and contrast the methods of approach between the United Nations and non-United Nations operations.

Many of these missions have been either explicitly or implicitly entrusted with arms control functions. The manner in which these mandates have been carried out is dealt with in some detail and provides insights into the kinds of organizational and operational problems that are likely to arise for any future arms control agreement that encompasses a verification system requiring on-the-spot inspection.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
IAPF	Inter-American Peace Force (Dominican Republic)
ICC	International Commission for Supervision and Control (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam)
IPKO	International Information Center on Peacekeeping Operations
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (Korea)
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo
UNCI	United Nations Commission on Indonesia
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIPOM	United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNSCOB	United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UNSF	United Nations Security Force (West Irian)
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (West Irian)
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNWNG	United Nations in West New Guinea
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

ABBREVIATIONS FOR UN DOCUMENTS

Budget Estimates, 1969

Budget Estimates for Financial
Year 1969 and Information
Annexes (appears annually as
GAOR Supplement No. 5)

Financial Report, 1968

Financial Report and Accounts
for the Year Ended 31 December
1968 (appears annually as GAOR
Supplement No. 6)

GAOR

General Assembly Official Records

A/

General Assembly Documents
C.5 refers to the Fifth
Committee

SCOR

Security Council Official Records

S/

Security Council Documents

UNPR

United Nations Press Release
Office of Public Information
LEB (Lebanon), PAL (Pales-
tine), WNG (West New Guinea)

UNTS

United Nations Treaty Series

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(UNEF)

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THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

I

GENERAL

A. GENESIS

Three factors stand out in the period which saw the deterioration of the troubled armistice system over which the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization was watching and the launching of the United Nations Emergency Force: Nasser's ascendancy and his eventual nationalization of the Suez Canal; increasing fedayeen raids and Israeli reprisals; and British withdrawal matched by growing USSR involvement in the Middle East on the side of the Arabs.

Article One of the Constantinople Convention signed on 29 October 1888 states that: "The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." With the end of the British mandate on 15 May 1948, the Arab League initiated an economic boycott of Israel including denial to it of use of the Suez Canal. Israel repeatedly attempted to secure UN help in achieving her right to use the Suez Canal. Egypt also controlled the Strait of Tiran and, in 1950, denied Israel access to the Gulf of Aqaba and her port at Eilat. In 1951 the Security Council had called upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Canal and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force. In 1954 the USSR vetoed a Council resolution calling for compliance with the 1951 resolution. Soon after that there followed the Egyptian seizure of the Israeli freighter, Bat Galim. The Security Council failed to take any action on the Israeli complaint and Egypt continued to block even Israel-bound cargo on ships of other nationalities. This confiscation of "contraband" cargoes began in February 1950.

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On 25 May 1950, France, U.K. and the United States issued the Tripartite Declaration promising immediate action if any Middle East country should violate frontiers or armistice lines. The U.S. lifted its embargo on arms to Israel and a policy of balance of arms began. The General Assembly passed the "Uniting for Peace" resolution on 3 November 1950 as a means of permitting peacekeeping measures to be taken when the Security Council failed to act. In October of 1951, Egypt abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 under which the U.K. was permitted to maintain troops in the Suez Canal zone but it was only on 19 October 1954 that the two countries reached agreement on the evacuation of the troops. This agreement declared that the canal was an "integral part of Egypt." The U.K. had 20 months to withdraw but retained for seven years the right to reoccupy the Suez base in the event of attack on any Arab League state or Turkey. Both parties further pledged to uphold the 1888 Constantinople Convention. The last British soldiers left Egypt on 13 June 1956. This period also saw the removal of General Glubb from command of the Jordan Army--an act attributed to pressure from Nasser.

The Egyptian Society of Free Officers, headed by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, overthrew King Farouk in July 1952. The following year saw intensified border clashes between Israel and Jordan and a major Israeli retaliatory raid on Qibya. In April 1954, Nasser became Premier of Egypt and by 4 April 1955 the repeated fedayeen attacks from Gaza had caused Israel to complain to the Security Council. She complained again in August 1955 while Egypt in the same period announced to the Council that Israel had launched a large-scale attack on Khan Yunis in the Gaza region.

In 1955, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the U.K., established the Baghdad Pact, the purpose of which was a mutual defense agreement against communist aggression in the Middle East. The Pact was denounced by the USSR as a method "to achieve colonial enslavement" of Middle East countries. In a secret agreement in 1954, France began supplying Mystère fighters to Israel. Nasser, having failed to get arms from the West announced, on 27 September 1955, the signing of an agreement with Czechoslovakia for supply of arms to Egypt in exchange for cotton. Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense treaty and in January 1956 entered into an arms deal with the

USSR. It was on 16 December 1955 that the U.S. and U.K. offered to help finance the Aswan High Dam, followed on 9 February 1956 by an agreement on International Bank assistance. Egypt recognized the Peoples Republic of China on 16 May 1956, perhaps as an alternative source of arms in the event that an agreement between the West and the USSR should close off his present sources.¹ The U.S., U.K. and International Bank offers on Aswan High Dam financing were withdrawn on 19, 20, and 23 July, and on 26 July Nasser decreed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

September 1956 saw the rejection by Nasser of the plan drawn up by the British-sponsored London Conference, a warning by Khrushchev to the U.K. and France that if war broke out in the Middle East "the Arabs would not stand alone," and intensive Security Council and Secretary-General negotiations to try to find a compromise between the positions of Egypt and its opponents. With secret advance collusion between Israel, France and the U.K.,² Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October 1956 and subsequently took over the Gaza Strip. On 30 October, the U.K. and France issued an ultimatum for a cease-fire and ten-mile withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian forces. On the same date they vetoed a U.S. cease-fire proposal in the Security Council. The following day British and French bombers attacked Egyptian airfields although it wasn't until 6 November that their forces landed at Port Said.

In the meantime the Security Council had adopted on 31 October a Yugoslav resolution calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly as provided for in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The Assembly met on 1 November, adopted a U.S. resolution calling for cease-fire, withdrawal and reopening of the Canal but did not adopt two further U.S. resolutions which embodied long-range solutions of Suez and Palestine problems. It was soon clear that the cease-fire resolution would be ignored and on 4 November 1956 the session adopted the

¹ This possible reason for the timing of Nasser's action is put forward by Peter Calvocoressi in his article, "Suez: Ten Years After," The Listener, 14 July 1966, p. 45.

² For a participant's version see: Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson, (New York: Potter, 1967).

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Canadian-sponsored resolution (GA Res. 998, ES-I) which called upon the Secretary-General to "submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force...." The first installment of Hammarskjold's plan was ready in scarcely 12 hours and in the early hours of 5 November, General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I) was adopted establishing a "United Nations Command for an emergency international Force."

B. MANDATE

The basic mandate given to UNEF is contained in the following resolutions:

GA Res. 997	(ES-I)	- 1 November 1956
GA Res. 998	(ES-I)	- 4 November 1956
GA Res. 999	(ES-I)	- 4 November 1956
GA Res. 1000	(ES-I)	- 5 November 1956
GA Res. 1001	(ES-I)	- 7 November 1956

In essence the mandate was four-fold:

1. to secure the cessation of hostilities and supervise the cease-fire;
2. to ensure the orderly withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces;
3. to patrol the border area between Egypt and Israel; and
4. to oversee the observance of the Egypt-Israel Armistice provisions.

A further provision of GA Res. 997 urged that "upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation." The clearance of the Canal was carried out separately from UNEF by the UN Suez Clearance Organization, headed by Lieutenant-General Raymond A. Wheeler, U.S. Army (ret.). Freedom of navigation through the Canal for Israel was never secured (even for Israeli-bound cargo) although UNEF was able to give some satisfaction with respect to the Strait of Tiran.

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As regarded arms control in the area, this same resolution recommended "that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities" but UNEF was not directed to assume any functions in this respect.

The development of UNEF is characterized by Assembly endorsement of interpretations of his mandate which were submitted to it by the Secretary-General. However, it is worth noting that these early enabling resolutions contained some specific references as to how the mandate was to be implemented. These are:

1. The plan for setting up the Force was to be done "with the consent of the nations concerned" (998).
2. The Secretary-General was made responsible for the plan and its execution (998, 999, 1000, 1001).
3. The Assembly itself appointed the UNEF Commander (1000).
4. The Commander was authorized to recruit directly the military personnel needed, in consultation with the Secretary-General, who himself, in fact, held the discussions with the Member governments concerned (1000, 1001).
5. The military personnel were to be drawn from "countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council" (1000).
6. The Force should have a "balanced composition" (1001).
7. An Advisory Committee was named, at the request of the Secretary-General, to assist him in his responsibilities.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that GA Res. 1001 (ES-I) requested "all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functioning, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved."

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C. PHASES

UNEF may be viewed as having three main phases:

Phase I - the period from November 1956 to March 1957 was one of initiation and movement during which the extent of UNEF action was being worked out and during which the first two parts of the four-fold mandate given above were accomplished.

Phase II - the period from March 1957 to May 1967 was one of relative stability, efforts reducing the size of the force, and a continuing role in carrying out the latter two parts of its mandate.

Phase III - the period of May-June 1967 was that of withdrawal of UNEF although property disposal problems continued after that period.

D. FUNCTIONS

The main operational functions of UNEF--which carry in their train the various administrative support, liaison, communications, transport, reporting, etc. requirements--were as follows:

For Phase I:

1. Occupying and patrolling a buffer zone between Anglo-French and Egyptian forces and, in cooperation with local civilian authorities, ensuring the normal facilities and security of this zone.
2. Guarding key installations or facilities (i.e. power plants, oil fields).
3. Guarding the off-loading of stores and vehicles for UNEF.
4. Clearing or marking mine fields.
5. Exchange of prisoners, detainees, and internees.

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6. Providing protection for the Suez Clearance Organization.
7. Successive temporary take-overs of zones left by the Israelis in a staged withdrawal.
8. Clearing and repairing roads.
9. Temporary civilian/military administration of the Gaza Strip.
10. Manning joint Egyptian-UNEF checkpoints controlling access between Gaza and Egypt.
11. Deployment through posts and patrolling along the Egypt-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) and Egyptian-Palestine International Frontier (IF) as well as manning an observation post at Sharm el Sheikh overlooking the Strait of Tiran.
12. Investigating complaints of cease-fire violation, smuggling, and missing personnel.

For Phase II:

1. To observe and prevent incidents at and infiltration of the ADL/IF through the manning of observation posts (and watch towers) and the conducting of foot, motor and air patrolling. This included the right to apprehend ground violators. The types of incidents involved included:
 - a. Crossing (or attempted crossing) of the ADL/IF with or without firing, theft or kidnapping.
 - b. Firing across the ADL/IF.
 - c. Violation of the Restricted Zones along the ADL/IF.
 - d. Tampering with border markers.
 - e. Air violations.
 - f. Sea violations.
2. The observation of freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran through the manning of the observation post/camp at Sharm el Sheikh and observation of the surrounding area.

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3. The investigation of and reporting on incidents and, in certain cases, complaints.
4. To assist the investigations of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) of UNTSO.
5. To guard its own installations.
6. To maintain liaison with the Egyptian and Israeli authorities and in particular with the UAR Liaison Staff to UNEF (UARLS).
7. To man the "King's Gate" checkpoint on the Ashkelon road controlling traffic between Gaza and Israel.
8. The marking and/or demolition of mines.

II

FACTORS CONDITIONING NATIONAL SUPPORT

A. AUTHORIZATION CONSENSUS

Consensus had not been possible in the Security Council due to the British and French vetoes. In the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, consensus was quickly reached on the Pearson initiative that there ought to be an "emergency international United Nations Force;" even before it was clear as to exactly what the force would do, the move had the support of the United States, which had made sure that the resolution gave the Secretary-General executive responsibility for the Force. It also had the tolerance of the USSR and its allies although they consistently maintained that the initiative was contrary to the Charter. The Middle East intervention had taken them off the hook in Hungary. By 6 November, the U.K. reluctantly followed by the French, had decided not to see their intervention through and to try to make the best of the bad situation and the isolated position in which they found themselves. For awhile they hoped to be "deputized" by the UN as its peacekeeping operation. In the background was the famous Russian rocket threat, followed soon after by reports of volunteers in Moscow and Peking. Fears of escalation of the conflict and resentment of the exercise of what was viewed as outmoded imperial power vastly outweighed what sympathy existed for the Anglo-French-Israeli frustrations with Nasser.

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This is not to say that there was not a great deal of attention focused on the desirability of trying to deal with the basic causes of Middle East tension. Mr. Pearson, in explaining the Canadian abstention on Resolution 997, said that "peace is far more than ceasing to fire," that a cease-fire alone would be "of temporary value at best." As it turned out, there was a clear consensus that UNEF supervision of withdrawal of the invading forces was the first essential step, but there was no consensus as to major changes in the status quo ante with the exception of a more effective inter-positioning on the Egyptian-Israeli borders. There was no consensus that Nasser should be made to reverse his nationalization of the Canal although there was a degree of consensus, not explicitly stated in the enabling resolutions but built upon by Hammarskjold, that Israel should have the right of passage through the Strait of Tiran. Nasser was not formally forced to make the concession but was willing to make it on the basis that he could withdraw it at any time.

In the light of these shifting concepts as to what UNEF was to accomplish, there was no early consensus as to how long UNEF was to last. That a Force would be needed during the "emergency" period was agreed. However, it wasn't until 2 February 1957 that the General Assembly finally specified that the situation required a continuing stationing of UNEF on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line in order to carry out the purposes of the original mandate. No one voted against this decision but 22 members abstained.

On the five original enabling resolutions listed above there were negative votes on only two--997 and 999. In each case these were cast by France, Israel, and the U.K. joined by Australia and New Zealand. The USSR voted for these two resolutions, neither of which mentioned the Force itself, and abstained on the other three. With 76 countries voting, abstentions on the five resolutions ranged between 6 and 19, with a variety of reasons being given for abstention. A key element in reaching a consensus was obtaining India's support. Whether or not Mr. Krishna Menon would have given this support had he arrived a few days earlier is claimed by some to be a matter of reasonable doubt.

In this atmosphere, Hammarskjold had already secured offers of troops before the Force had even been formally approved on 5 November. The same three countries who sponsored the author-

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izing resolution--Canada, Colombia, and Norway--had already made their offers in writing on 4 November. Sweden, Denmark and Pakistan offered troops on 5 November and Finland, Ceylon, India, Czechoslovakia and Romania did likewise the next day. Before the crisis was over, twenty four countries had offered to participate and only persuasion kept further countries from doing so.

It is perhaps stating the obvious, but in view of later events it needs stating: there was clearly a consensus within the General Assembly that they were acting within their legitimate powers when they authorized UNEF. Some elements of the consensus would have welcomed action which would have had less respect for Egypt's sovereign rights and others would have wished action which had less respect for Israeli-French-British willingness to comply. However, there was never any real doubt that this Assembly-authorized action was a "consent" operation, undertaken only when Security Council action was evidently not possible.

It was only because Egypt consented to UNEF that the Soviet Union abstained on its being created rather than voting against it. The USSR and its allies carried their negative attitude toward UNEF further, however, by refusing to pay for the operation. In this financially-based rejection they were joined much later by France. The eventual attack against the residual authority of the General Assembly to authorize peacekeeping missions was to all intents and purposes carried not by direct assault on the constitutional question but rather on the question of the Assembly's right to assess members for the costs of such operations as "expenses of the Organization." A large majority accepted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice upholding this right but the decision not to enforce Article 19, even mixed as it was with the more controversial Congo operation, is more indicative of the erosion of the UNEF consensus. This event was the climax, but the financing of UNEF had been a matter of increasing discontent in the Assembly--a sentiment UNEF opponents used to advantage. The "economically less developed countries" made it clear that they felt they had a "relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures."¹

¹ GA Res. 2115 (XX), 21 Dec 1965, 3rd para. preamble.

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There were strong annual pressures to reduce the size and cost of UNEF.

One of the most controversial elements of U Thant's decision to withdraw UNEF in 1967 is that he did not refer the matter to the General Assembly. Many feel that this would have been a more appropriate political and legal procedure for the Secretary-General to have followed, and that it would have allowed time for pressures and testing of Egyptian resolution to follow the course they had embarked upon. If indeed, Egyptian resolve to withdraw their consent to UNEF was firm, we believe few persons would differ with U Thant's assessment that the UNEF authorization consensus in the Assembly had shrunk to the point where it would have made the same decision as he made himself. In defense of his decision he has stated that even following his consultations, first with the UNEF contingent contributors, then with the UNEF Advisory Committee, "no representative of any Member government requested a meeting of either the Security Council or the General Assembly immediately following the Secretary-General's reports (A/6730 and S/7896)."¹ He had convened the Advisory Committee (supplemented by Sweden, Denmark and Yugoslavia) at 5 P.M. on 18 May 1967. Their views were divided but the results, and U Thant's attitude, are best summed up by the following:

At the conclusion of the meeting, it was understood that the Secretary-General had no alternative other than to comply with the United Arab Republic's demand although some representatives felt the Secretary-General should previously clarify with that government the meaning in its request that withdrawal should take place 'as soon as possible.' The Secretary-General informed the Advisory Committee that he intended to reply promptly to the United Arab Republic and to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on the action he had taken. It was for the Member States to decide whether the competent organs should or could take up the matter and to pursue it accordingly.²

¹ A/6730/Add 3, 26 June 1967, para. 44.

² Ibid. para. 23.

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It was immediately following that meeting that U Thant sent the message agreeing to the withdrawal albeit "with serious misgivings."

Another indication of his assessment of the situation at the time as regards consensus is given in his discussion about the practicality of bringing the issue before the Assembly. He stated that it would have taken a two-thirds majority of the special session of the General Assembly meeting at that time¹ to have added the question to their agenda and that:

It is questionable, to say the least, whether the necessary support could have been mustered for such a controversial item.... Furthermore, the information available to the Secretary-General did not lead him to believe that either the General Assembly or the Security Council would have decided that UNEF should remain on United Arab Republic territory, by force if necessary, despite the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic that it should leave.²

The fact that the subsequent irresolution on action in response to Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran would appear to bear out U Thant's assessment of the consensus of the moment, does not remove his decision from controversy. Many continue to feel he should have put the consensus to a more formal test rather than shouldering the interpretive burden on his own.

B. ATTITUDES OF THE DISPUTING PARTIES

U.K. and France: Along with their hopes of toppling Nasser and reversing his Suez Canal nationalization, the British and

¹ The Fifth Special Session of the General Assembly had convened on 21 April to consider the question of South West Africa; to make a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects; and the postponement to 1968 of the UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space.

² A/6730/Add 3, 26 June 1967, paras. 42 and 44.

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French had claimed that their action was being undertaken on behalf of the international community in order to separate the belligerents. Having decided not to see this intervention through and thus failing in the former objectives, the latter ostensible rationale of their action provided them with a means of face-saving which UNEF helped meet. They initially thought that perhaps they could be deputized by the UN but the violent reaction in the UN, U.S. and USSR alignment against them, and U.S. economic and political pressure made such an alternative unrealistic very early in the game. They hung on, however, until it was agreed that an international force would be created and, in their view, would "take over" from them.¹ Thus in the original enabling resolutions they could abstain or even vote for the ones setting up the force but voted against those which set forth the objectives of the force. In subsequent resolutions deploring the reluctance of Israel to withdraw, France and the U.K. parted company. France joined Israel in voting against them while the U.K. voted for them.

The British-French force did not penetrate far enough into Egypt to constitute a very viable bargaining factor. In their attempt to salvage what they could from their intervention, the two countries hoped that the UN force could be placed in occupation of the Canal zone and its eventual withdrawal could become a bargaining factor for advancing their objectives. While they may have had little hope of much success to this end, they did have some support in the Assembly for this concept and it was worth a try. Therefore, due to this and their need for face-saving, they assisted in the launching of UNEF. The U.K. in particular, provided essential help and not only paid its financial assessments but made voluntary contributions. France also initially paid more than its assessed share but with the

William R. Frye in his book, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957) cites on page 8 the joint British-French statement read to the House of Commons on 3 November 1956 by Prime Minister Eden. According to this, the two countries would "most willingly stop military action" as soon as these things had happened: Egypt and Israel had accepted a UN peace force; the UN had set up such a force and decided to maintain it until Suez and Palestine settlements had been achieved; and finally, Israel and Egypt (in effect, Egypt) had agreed to let British and French troops occupy the canal area temporarily until the United Nations force was constituted.

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negative view of De Gaulle toward UN peacekeeping, focused initially on the Congo operation, it ceased paying for UNEF in 1965.

Israel: While Israel shared the U.K. and French objectives, it had two further objectives more specifically its own. It wanted to stop the Egyptian-inspired fedayeen raids largely based in Gaza and it wanted freedom of navigation at least through the Strait of Tiran (no matter what its hopes also were as regards the Canal). It held out against withdrawal for a long time in hopes of achieving these two objectives. In the event the UNEF operation helped them achieve these objectives for a period of ten years, they failed in their attempt to secure administration of the Gaza Strip for themselves and their hopes regarding the UN's own attempts to take over administration of the Strip were also disappointed. However a semi-autonomous status for the area--albeit under Egyptian control--was achieved and Egyptian troops did not enter it. Nasser also was willing to let UNEF neutralize the Strait of Tiran through its occupation of Sharm el Sheikh. President Eisenhower, in his famous statement of 20 February 1957 had affirmed the U.S. position that the Gulf of Aqaba constituted international waters and that no nation had the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf. He announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right. On the other hand, he went on to deny that Israel, as the aggressor, had any right to demand firm guarantees as a condition of withdrawal.

Israel's position is perhaps best exemplified by the statement of its representative at the 592nd meeting of the Assembly on 23 November 1956:

If we were to accept . . . that the Force would separate Egyptian and Israel troops for as long as Egypt thought it convenient and should then be withdrawn on Egypt's unilateral request--we would reach reduction to absurdity. Egypt would then be in a position to build up, behind the screen of this Force, its full military preparations and, when it felt that those preparations had reached their desired climax, to dismiss the United Nations Emergency Force and stand again in close contact and proximity with the territory of Israel....

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However, the UN was not willing or able then or in 1967 to impose its will in contravention to Egypt's sovereign rights, so the "reduction to absurdity" lasted for 10 years and was in fact most useful for Israel. The operation was not popular in Israel and she would not allow UNEF to be stationed on her soil but since it did serve her objectives, even though in an impermanent way, she was glad to have it there and cooperated with it. She could have given it more of a permanent nature and solid basis by allowing it to operate on her own territory. A real question for speculation is whether or not U Thant would have considered himself obliged to honor a unilateral request for UNEF withdrawal from Egypt (including the critical area of the Strait of Tiran) if Israel had shared host-state status with Egypt. However, even on 18 May 1967 when she was faced with, and strongly objected to, withdrawal of UNEF by unilateral Egyptian request, she held to her policy. As reported by U Thant: "The question of stationing UNEF on the Israel side of the line was raised by the Secretary-General and this was declared by the Permanent Representative of Israel to be entirely unacceptable to his Government."¹ Of course, even if UNEF had been able to cross over to Israel territory at that time, this would not have met Israel's demands as regards the Strait of Tiran. Also by the time Israel attacked on 5 June 1967, she had come to doubt the willingness of the maritime powers to bring about her free access to Eilat and this in turn gave way to her larger concern over the menace presented by an Arab world mobilized behind Egypt. Egypt had rushed seven divisions into the Sinai and King Hussein of Jordan had reached a spectacular rapprochement with President Nasser on 30 May.

Egypt:² UNEF was to begin and continue on Egyptian or Egyptian-controlled territory and was to take place only with her consent. It rescued her from defeat but the Israeli-British-French action had in effect canceled out most, if not all, international sympathy with their side of the case. Once

¹ A/5730/Add. 3, para. 21.

² It is usual in writings on UNEF for the name of Egypt to be retained even though it took the new name of the United Arab Republic in 1958. The same procedure will be followed here.

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the potential of defeat was essentially removed with the agreement on a cease-fire the day after British and French forces landed at Port Said, Egypt was in a position to call the tune as to what the Force should be, what it should do, and even to a large extent what countries should make up the Force.¹ The conclusion seems valid that Nasser decided that the policy of provocation of Israel was not viable and that the Egyptian military establishment needed vast improvement before it could be considered capable of coping with Israel's forces. A buffer which would be somewhat effective in itself and also a protection against domestic and fellow Arab pressure for anti-Israel action was welcome and the right to unilaterally secure its withdrawal was retained in spite of Hammarskjold's best efforts at incorporating "good faith" to protect against this. The evolution of the "good faith" agreement and the interpretation which Hammarskjold put upon it are contained in his private aide-memoire of 5 August 1957. This was not an official document and Egypt did not, in the event, feel bound by any prior reference to the General Assembly as to whether UNEF's tasks were complete as a conditioning of withdrawal. What Hammarskjold felt was tacit acceptance by Nasser of the restriction on Egypt's sovereign rights left much to be desired as to explicit agreement. In this regard it is worth quoting the following from the 5 August 1957 aide-memoire:

The most desirable thing, of course, would have been to tie Egypt by an agreement in which they declared, that withdrawal should take place only if so decided by the General Assembly. Put in this naked form, however, the problem could never have been settled. I felt that the same was true of an agreement to the effect that withdrawal should take place upon agreement on withdrawal between the UN and the Egyptian Government. However, I found it worthwhile to try a line, very close to the second one, according to which Egypt could declare to the United Nations that it would exert all its sovereign rights with regard to the troops on the basis of a good faith interpre-

¹ See the following section.

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tation of the tasks of the Force. The United Nations should make a reciprocal commitment to maintain the Force as long as the task was not completed.¹

While UNEF's tasks were certainly not completed, it had worked well during its life, and while Egypt refused to help pay for UNEF, she cooperated fully with it. It seemed to fill Nasser's assumed purposes so well that his 1967 request for withdrawal came as a surprise and many quarters refuse to believe that he really meant it. Few question that he had the right to request withdrawal; the debate centers around whether or not time gained through procedure, and pressure applied during this time, could have brought a reversal. The debate cannot be settled but events suggest Nasser was not bluffing.

By 18 May, the Egyptian Army had by-passed UNEF positions and was deployed along the line in the Sinai. It was reported that they had forced Yugoslavs from several of their positions and had delivered ultimatums that they leave others. Contingent countries' representatives in Cairo had been summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and told that UNEF must depart. The Egyptian Permanent Representative to the UN had informed U Thant of the "strong feeling of resentment in Cairo at what was then considered to be attempts to exert pressure and to make UNEF an 'occupation force.'" With regard to U Thant's intention to appeal urgently to Nasser to reconsider his decision, the Permanent Representative consulted his Foreign Minister by telephone and informed U Thant that he was urgently advised not to make such an appeal "and that, if he did so, such a request would be sternly rebuffed."² At this point U Thant raised the question of a possible visit by him to Cairo and was told he would be welcome as soon as possible. He left on 22 May, after having agreed to withdraw UNEF, and was informed on the way to Cairo of Nasser's announcement of his intention to reinstitute the Strait of Tiran blockade. U Thant reports that in answer to his questioning Nasser on the timing of this announcement the latter "explained that his Government's decision to

¹ International Legal Materials: Current Documents, May-June 1967, pp. 595-602.

² A/6730/Add. 3, 26 June 1967, para. 22.

resume the blockade had been taken some time before U Thant's departure and it was considered preferable to make the announcement before rather than after the Secretary-General's visit to Cairo."¹ There seems no doubt that Egypt knew Israel would consider such a blockade a cause for war.

C. SELECTION CRITERIA OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SECRETARIAT

In this novel experiment in setting up the UN's first international force, it was Secretary-General Hammarskjold, "threading his way through the many conflicting pressures,"² who established the essential principles upon which UNEF was organized. Some of these were incorporated in resolutions, others were endorsed by resolutions referring to his proposals and some were just practiced. These principles were largely incorporated in Hammarskjold's well-known "Summary Study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force."³ They provide the framework within which further UN peacekeeping was undertaken and they still dominate the thinking in this field at present. The key concepts are those of consent of the states involved and neutrality of the force.

Consent: UNEF was not a Chapter VII operation which meant that national participation in it was not to be considered as obligatory--"the consent of a Member nation is necessary for the United Nations to use its military personnel or material."⁴ Further, since the Force could not be stationed in the territory of a Member State without the consent of the government concerned, the UN should "take fully into account the view of the host Government as one of the most serious factors which should guide the recruitment of the personnel."⁵ This latter principle

¹ A/6730/Add. 3, 26 June 1967, para. 36.

² Frye, op. cit., p. 10.

³ A/3943, 8 October 1958.

⁴ Ibid., para. 155.

⁵ Ibid., para. 161.

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meant that UNEF, in its composition, was not to be a fighting force beyond the allowed function of self-defense.¹ It was not to have "military objectives." This in turn implied a great dependence upon the host state for assistance, not only in accommodating the Force, but also in its supply and maintenance arrangements.

Neutrality: Hammarskjold emphasized that there was "no intent. . . to influence the military balance in its present conflict and, thereby, the political balance effecting efforts to settle the conflict." Nor was the Force to be "used so as to prejudge the solution of the controversial questions involved." Accordingly, the operation was not to conduct activities "either in competition with representatives of the host Government or in cooperation with them on the basis of any joint operation."

Under the above two main concepts, the size and equipment of the Force were thus determined by the role assigned to it and its non-fighting nature. As to its national composition, Hammarskjold had specified in his first report on 4 November 1956 that the permanent members of the Security Council were not to be a source of manpower. After all, France and the U.K. were parties to the dispute. China as a source was not viewed as relevant, and U.S. and USSR exclusion provided a buffer against Cold War competition. This did not, however, exclude these powers as sources of logistical support, which in the case of the U.S. and the U.K., was an essential element of launching UNEF. It should be noted, however, that this was the reason that the U.S. airlift operated to the Naples staging area rather than seeing the transportation requirements through to their arrival in Egypt.²

Hammarskjold had offers of contingents from 24 countries and could have had more. The 24 countries were: Afghanistan,

¹ General Burns, not wishing to be thrust aside or ignored by the parties as he had been in his UNTSO experience, had originally asked for a division sized Force, with a brigade of tanks, and attached reconnaissance and fighter-aircraft units.

² According to Frye, op. cit., page 24: "It was not possible under the terms of the resolution, to send American personnel directly into Egypt."

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Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The aim was to secure units of battalion strength which would be as "self-contained" as possible and logistically compatible. Units were not to be drawn from countries which "because of . . . geographical position, or for other reasons, might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation," and the Force was to have a "balanced composition." The concept of "balance" is inevitably, and no doubt usefully, ambiguous. It was evidently applied in four ways: geographic, political, functional (operational vs. support units) and scale. On the latter, Hammarskjold said that "differences in size of units should not be so great as to lead to excessive dependence on any one state."

There remained the question of the role of the disputing parties as regards the national composition of the Force. Hammarskjold rejected the Franco-British proposal to have a say in this, nor does there appear to have been consultation with Israel. He granted, however, that this was a matter of major concern to the country in which the Force operates. He said: "Thus, the United Nations must give most serious consideration to the views of the host Government on such matters without, however, surrendering its right to take a serious difference, should one develop, to the political level for resolution."

Therefore, while the Secretary-General was able to notify Egypt on 7 November that the Force was ready to begin entering its territory, it was not until 15 November that it was able to do so. Egypt delayed the entry in part for reasons connected with its mission but also very notably for reasons of objection to contingent nationality. In the UN's initial exclusions, General Burns has stated that the inadvisability of accepting Eastern European Russian allies was counterbalanced by not taking contingents from the NATO "Mediterranean powers" with a strategic interest in the Suez Canal--Turkey, Greece and Italy.¹ These three are not in fact shown as having made formal offers. It is understood that among those who did offer,

¹ E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto: Clarke, and Irwin, 1962), p. 190.

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Egypt objected to Pakistan and New Zealand. As stated earlier, New Zealand had been voting with France and the U.K. in the General Assembly. As regards Pakistan it has been pointed out that "the Pakistani prime minister had attacked Nasser publicly; Pakistan was a member of the Baghdad Pact; and India was not eager to have Pakistani troops in UNEF."1

The nations proposed by Hammarskjold were therefore: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Of these there was evidently some objection to Denmark and Norway as being members of NATO. To this, General Burns reports: "The Secretary-General reacted against this attempted exclusion in the strongest terms, saying that if Denmark and Norway were kept out, Sweden and Finland would probably not join in either, and without Scandinavian participation there was a strong probability that UNEF could not be organized at all."2 The most well-known exclusion, which to all effects became a diplomatic incident, was Nasser's objection to the "Queens Own Rifles," ostensibly on the basis that Canadian infantry troops, speaking English and uniformed in the British fashion, would be difficult for Nasser to explain to his populace and would have operating problems due to mistaken identity. Heavy pressure was brought to bear on Nasser, including an assist from India, and a compromise agreement was reached to include Canadian support units. This has in fact been labeled as a blessing in disguise because evidently the UN had not requested and no one else had offered the logistical, engineering, signal and transport units without which UNEF could not have functioned. It should also be added that agreement was later reached to have Canada supply an armored reconnaissance squadron. Difficulties were also experienced over Brazilian participation. Along with Canada, they were not included in those countries Nasser had agreed to as of 12 November and it was only after further negotiation that they joined UNEF. Thus, out of the ten countries proposed by the UN there were host State clearance problems on four of them.

A great deal of technical equipment and a large number of technical personnel were needed over and above what the UN could supply from its own resources. Needless to say, there

1 Frye, op. cit., p. 23.

2 Burns, op. cit., p. 204.

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are not abundant sources of supply for such specialized needs. As regards the much more readily available live infantry soldier, however, one sees the beginning of a question which remains one of great differences of opinion today. General Burns, who admittedly had more of a "fighting force" concept in the beginning, was concerned that the level of the discipline and training of the troops, particularly those drawn from countries utilizing short-term national service manpower might be deficient. He noted afterwards, however, that "as it turned out, the UNEF was not called upon to carry out any very complicated operations, and the degree of training and discipline of the troops was adequate."¹ Similarly, Hammarskjold points out that "UNEF has been able to use enlisted men with short military experience under the command of experienced officers."² Not only experienced line officers are needed, it must be stressed, but also experienced staff officers and Burns had sent out an immediate request to the contingent nations for candidates to supplement or replace the UNTSO officers he had brought with him.

On the initial airlift, the vital U.S. role could only be employed as far as Naples.³ The non-controversial, if limiting, choice was then made of Swissair to handle the Naples to Egypt portion. Later this was taken over by the Royal Canadian Air Force with an assist on supplies from the Italian Air Force. In sealoift, "ships under some flags could not be used,"⁴ however, all heavy equipment for UNEF was brought in by ship. As regards selection criteria for supplies and equipment, it is obvious that in the emergency launching period, presumed suitability to the needs of the existing troops, availability and willingness to supply were the important factors and the U.S. the essential supplier in supplement to what the contingent units brought with them. The longer range supply policy was:

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 189.

² A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 153.

³ Presumably due to Council permanent member exclusion from UNEF in the authorizing resolutions but possibly also due to other factors. At some stage it was decided that the U.S. could fly some troops (Indians and Indonesians) directly to Beirut.

⁴ A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 39.

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- a. A good part of the requirements is furnished by the participating Governments directly to their own troops;
- b. United Nations Headquarters procures and ships those supplies that can be economically secured through its own procurement channels;
- c. The UNEF supply office in Italy procures and ships other supplies from military sources in Europe (sic) when authorized by United Nations Headquarters under standing arrangements with Governments of Member States;
- d. Supplies are purchased locally when the exigencies of the situation so demand or when price comparisons show that this is the most economical course.¹

D. DURATION

How long was UNEF expected to go on? It may have originally been understood by some to have been proposed as a temporary measure but realistically its longer-range buffer role was soon evident. Even on 6 November 1956, Hammarskjold had noted that the length of UNEF's assignment was to be determined "by the needs arising out of the present conflict." In his "good faith" aide-memoire resulting from his 16-18 November negotiations with Nasser, the Secretary-General put the UN on record as "reaffirming its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed." However, the duration of UNEF depended mainly upon the willingness of its host to consent to its presence - whether this consent was due to "good faith," to various pressures, or to its own assessment of national interest, it existed for a period of over ten years.

How long was a contingent participant expected to maintain its commitment? Participation was a voluntary act. Hammarskjold only asked, in his letter to participating countries of 21 June 1957, for "assurance that the national contingent provided by your Government will not be withdrawn without adequate prior notification to the Secretary-General, so as to avoid the impairment of the ability of the Force to discharge its functions."

¹ A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 92.

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Indonesia, Finland and Colombia withdrew from UNEF on 12 September 1957, 5 December 1957 and 28 October 1958. In the case of the first two, the reason given was that they had only committed themselves to a temporary operation and not to one of an indefinite nature as UNEF had become. Rather than call on new countries the UN expanded the size of some existing contingents to fill the gap.

Upon the Egyptian request for UNEF's withdrawal in 1967, India and Yugoslavia quickly let the Secretary-General know that their contingents would be withdrawn. U Thant further made the judgment that: "there can be little doubt that other such notifications would not have been slow in coming if friction had been generated through an unwillingness to comply with the request for withdrawal."¹ We know that some of the other participants objected to the method by which the withdrawal was decided and the quickness of the decision. On the other hand, had the resolve of Egypt on withdrawal been more formally tested and still have been maintained, we doubt that the other contingent participants would have insisted on staying, let alone been willing to reinforce their existing contingents against Egyptian resistance.

E. INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND CONTROL

While the constitutional legality of UNEF was challenged by the USSR and its allies (later reinforced by France) this had no serious effect upon the availability of national contingents for UNEF. Czechoslovakia in fact announced that it would take part and Romania also asked to be included. Soviet opposition may well have played a role, however, in the Finnish decision to withdraw. In any event, it was not this dispute that brought UNEF to an end; it was the withdrawal of consent to the operation by Egypt. It was upon this consent, in fact, that the international status of UNEF depended.

The initial resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956 requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan for the setting up of an emergency force "with the consent of the nations concerned." Three nations could be viewed in three categories: (1) Egypt, (2) those with troops to be withdrawn

¹ A/6730/Add. 3, para. 50.

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(France, Israel and the U.K.), and (3) those contributing contingents to the Force. Of these three categories, the international status of the Force depended mainly on Egypt and those supplying contingents. Hammarskjold made a distinction between the two:

While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country.¹

Thus, in theory, the Force could be located elsewhere than Egypt and have an independent existence--as indeed it had, in a sense, at Capodichino as a means of bringing pressure on Nasser for its acceptance. However, in fact if the consent of the Host State for a Force was withheld, one doubts how long the Force would continue its "established" existence elsewhere. In 1967 the Force could not have stood to one side as an observer of renewed fighting without invalidating the purpose of its existence. Such a theoretical possibility was a political impracticability. Once consent was in fact withdrawn--leaving to one side the argument of whether or not enough was done to test resolve or reinstate consent--the international status of the Force was undercut and to have acted otherwise than was the case would have meant moving into the realm of Chapter VII.

Within Hammarskjold's consent concept, the Force was recognized as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, established under the authority of Article 22 of the Charter. The Secretary-General was explicitly vested with executive responsibility for the Force. The international status of the Force was mainly detailed in the Force Regulations² which he drew up and in the Status of Forces Agreement which he negotiated with Egypt.³ Some key features of these are as follows:

¹ A/3302, 6 November 1956, para. 9.

² ST/SGB/UNEF/1.

³ A/3526, 8 February 1957.

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1. The immunities and privileges of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations applied generally to UNEF and specifically to the Commander and his international civilian and military staff. It was not as clear that it applied specifically to the personnel of the national contingents and therefore their rights were not claimed except in so far as they were provided in the separate agreements between Egypt and the UN. Local employees were only covered to the extent that immunity could be claimed in respect of their official acts. It was further provided that the UN immunities were to apply to the "property, funds, and assets of Participating States used in a Host State in connection with the national contingents serving in the Force."
2. The Commander had full command authority over the Force. The members of the Force, although remaining in their national service, were, during their period of assignment to the Force, subject to the instructions of the Commander through the chain of command.
3. Responsibility for disciplinary action in national contingents, however, rested with the commanders of the national contingents. Both the Commander and the Host States had a right to have reports on disciplinary action.
4. The members of the Force had the duty to respect the laws and regulations of the Host State and to refrain from any activity of a political nature or other action incompatible with the international character of their duties. They were not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the Host State. They could be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the courts of the Host State but not in any matter relating to their official duties.
5. In the event of death, injury, or illness attributable to service with the Force, the individual was to have the benefits or compensation due in accordance with his national regulations or laws. At first this was made to be the responsibility of the individual's

own State but the UN came to a policy of reimbursing the respective claims made to it by the State concerned.

These arrangements were formalized in a letter Hammarskjold sent to the Participating States on 21 June 1957 to which he appended the Regulations and Status of Forces Agreement. In this he pointed out that the immunities granted to the members of the Force and the arrangement for retention of disciplinary authority by the national contingent commander, were based upon the assumption of jurisdiction and action by the national contingents government. He asked for assurance that this would be carried out.

F. NATIONAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL FACTORS

Among the countries which offered to participate in UNEF, the decision was evidently one which enjoyed domestic popular support. There were even instances of domestic embarrassment when an offer was not accepted by the United Nations. One also had the interesting phenomenon of participation offers from: one country which had voted against or abstained on four of the five original enabling resolutions (New Zealand); one country who had voted against or abstained in three cases (Laos); and two countries who had abstained in three cases (Czechoslovakia and Romania).

Twenty four countries offered troops and three further countries offered services in communications addressed to the Secretary-General between 4 November and 27 November 1956. The conditions placed by these countries, no doubt, varied a good deal and would not necessarily all have been placed in writing in these communications. Nevertheless, those conditions which do appear are instructive.

Nearly all the offers, eighteen out of twenty seven, referred to specific resolutions (two further countries referred to "the resolution") as an indication of the purpose for which their offer was made. Some used such identification, no doubt, mainly as a matter of form but others clearly used it in a restrictive sense. India, for instance, even appended a listing of the "conditions and circumstances of participation" which Krishna Menon had formulated after an interview with Hammarskjold and then cleared with him to confirm its exactness.

Among other things, the listing stressed the Anglo-French and Israeli withdrawals and that the Force was not in any sense to be a successor to the "invading Anglo-French forces." It further specified that the Force was to be a balanced one and of a temporary nature. Finland also stated that the Force was not to be used for "any other objective than the one set out in the above resolutions," and Sweden made a very similar condition. Sweden pointed out that this objective "should not imply that the Force should remain on watch duty in the area for an unspecified period of time or pending the solution of the political questions affecting that area," while Finland stressed that the assignment of the Finnish unit was to be "for a limited time only." Yugoslavia reiterated that "all armed forces will be withdrawn from Egyptian territory." These four countries (India, Finland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia) were all among the original participants in UNEF and all four specified in their letters the condition of the Force only being stationed in foreign territory with the consent of the State concerned. New Zealand mentioned its "clear understanding that the New Zealand contingent would be of a para-military character and not an operational entity."

Four countries (Colombia, New Zealand, Ecuador and Italy) mentioned generally that further practical arrangements or conditions would have to be worked out; however, two further countries (Sweden and Finland) specifically mentioned the need to work out cost arrangements. Ceylon mentioned the need for provision of continuing logistic support and was joined by Denmark and India in asking about arrangements for transport.

The need for compliance with various constitutional processes in making the commitments was evident in many of the communications, most notably those of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Norway and the United States.¹ However, there is no doubt that Hammarskjold greatly eased these problems by the immunities and disciplinary system adopted for UNEF. In his Summary Study he notes that to confer punishment

¹ This was also a specific feature put forward by Lebanon in the later UNEF Leave Center Agreement with that country. See UNTS, Vol. 266, p. 125.

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authority upon the Commander "would probably require specific legislation in most participating states." Further in this same study, he states that experience had shown that the retention of jurisdiction by a participatory state over criminal acts with which their UNEF personnel might be charged, was a principle which was "essential to the successful recruitment by the United Nations of military personnel not otherwise under immunity rules, from its Member countries." Lastly, he notes that some governments had organized special volunteer units to serve with UNEF because "national laws precluded the assignment of members of the regular armed forces to service overseas other than in defense of the homeland."

G. MILITARY FACTORS

UNEF was the first peacekeeping force assembled by the United Nations and the military problems of support that it highlighted will be covered in Section VI of this paper. As far as is known, however, the complete absence of advance military planning and preparation did not condition the offers of national support. The tasks to be undertaken were judged politically essential and the military and civilian elements charged with implementation were left to do the best they could. UNEF is accordingly usually viewed as a marvel of improvisation.

The troops arrived before the means of supporting them had been arranged and before their mission had been fully agreed upon. As a non-fighting force, the fact of their essential dependence upon the cooperation of Egypt in support arrangements was established very early. The members of the Force were armed, however, so that a definition as to when they could use their arms was needed. The formulation arrived at, which Hammarskjold called a "clear delineation," was that:

...men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupy under orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the Assembly and within the scope of its resolutions.¹

¹ A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 179.

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The need to define the freedom of movement allowed the Force was either not possible or required for the period of UNEF supervision of Allied withdrawal in the first phase of UNEF, but it was provided for the latter part of this phase as regarded the continuing role UNEF was to play. Thus the Status of Forces Agreement with Egypt states:

The Force and its members shall enjoy together with service vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, freedom of movement between Force headquarters, camps and other premises, within the area of operations, and to and from points of access to Egyptian territory agreed upon or to be agreed upon by the Egyptian Government and the Commander....the Government of Egypt recognizes the right of the Force and its members to freedom of movement across armistice demarcation lines and other military lines in the performance of the functions of the Force and the official duties of its members.¹

As to the length of tour that national contingents would be expected to serve, General Burns says that one year tours of duty by contingents were requested. On this whole question as it conditioned national support, one cannot do better than to quote the most pertinent paragraph of Hammarskjold's Summary Study:

When the Contingents were being accepted, it was impossible to determine or to foresee the duration of the UNEF mission. National terms of military service, the nature of the mission, conditions of weather and terrain, and considerations of morale and efficiency, gave strong support to the principle and practice of rather frequent periodic rotation. The exact rotation policies adopted by contributing Governments, however, have varied somewhat, and in some cases the length of service has been shorter than would be dictated exclusively by considerations of efficiency and economy. Full responsibility for the cost of transportation is accepted by the United Nations.²

¹ A/3526, 8 February 1957, para. 32.

² A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 48.

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For the main part of UNEF's existence, the rotation policies that were followed were for the contingents of Brazil, Canada and India to serve for one year while those of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia served for six months.

As to the elementary lack of basic information needed for military planning there is no more telling illustration than the list of questions presented to General Burns by the committee of military representatives of the contributing countries on his arrival in New York on 16 November 1956--a time by which the national composition of the Force had in fact been decided.

The questions covered the following points:

1. general organization of the Force and its headquarters;
2. whether the equipment of the contingents was suitable;
3. what accommodation was available in the theatre--barracks, tents, stores, hospitals, etc.;
4. what could be procured locally in the way of food, fuel and lubricants, labor, repair facilities and so forth;
5. what ports of entry, airfields, rail and road transport could be used;
6. where the Force Headquarters, the troops and the logistical base would be located;
7. whether there was a field bakery UNEF could use;
8. what arrangements should be made for supply of rations, clothing, spare parts, and ammunition which were peculiar to the several contingents;
9. rest areas;
10. arrangements for the handling of mail;
11. interpreters;
12. special equipment needed for road repair, ports and airfields;

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13. arrangements for pay in local currencies, and equalization between the varying rates of pay of the contingents;
14. the legal status of the Force, disciplinary powers and powers of command;
15. press correspondents;
16. requirements for special clothing for the climate in the theatre of operations;
17. what should be put in a booklet of information for the troops.¹

Burns--named to the post, only eleven days before having only briefly visited Cairo subsequently, and having brought with him to UNEF from UNTSO only an improvised nucleus of a staff--did not deny the validity of the questions. All these had to be dealt with and eventually were "as the problems became sufficiently pressing to require action." However, all he could give the representatives at the time was his "views on what the organization of the Force should be, and how the main administrative problems raised should be dealt with in principle."

Under such circumstances, representation of national contingents on the Commander's staff was not only a sound normal organizational principle for international operation but one in which the national units were vitally interested so that their needs did not become lost in the shuffle. The Company Commander of the original Finnish contingent obviously counts the achievement of a direct command relationship to UNEF Headquarters as having been very important since it gave the unit equal status with the other countries.² Evidently some of the countries carried this representational need even further and appointed "liaison officers" to represent their interests on the scene of operations of UNEF. In his Summary Study, Hammarskjold

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 209.

² IPKO Documentation Series No. 9, June 1967, p. 5.

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objects to this practice since these officers, not under the authority of the Commander, were not members of UNEF and therefore had an "anomalous" status.¹

H. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. National Contingent Expenses: In his "Second and final report" of 6 November 1956 on the plan for establishing UNEF, Hammarskjold had proposed that a provisional basic rule would be "that a nation providing a unit would be responsible for all costs for equipment and salaries, while all other costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United Nations." The General Assembly approved this "provisionally" on the following day and it was on this basis that the original offers of participation were made. By 21 December 1956, however, this formula had been changed in Resolution 1089 (XI) as follows, to indicate that the participating state's responsibility for equipment and salaries was to be considered a voluntary act and that otherwise the UN itself was responsible:

Decides that the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without charge by Governments of Member States, shall be borne by the United Nations and shall be apportioned among the Member States, to the extent of \$10 million, in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the Organization for the financial year 1957...

The report of the Fifth Committee of 25 February 1957 was the next step in the development in which it was noted that some countries felt arrangements would be appropriate regarding reimbursement of the "extra costs" arising from participation in UNEF. Hammarskjold's letter of 21 June 1957, formalizing the UN-Participant State relationship, further indicated the unsettled nature of the matter by proposing that questions involving the allocation of expenses should be dealt with in a supplemental agreement. By 9 October 1957, with UNEF almost a year old, he had arrived at the famous formula of the UN paying those "extra and extraordinary costs" which UNEF Participating States would not "normally have incurred in any event."

¹ A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 82.

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He recognized that the participants might have had a much shorter duration of contribution in mind originally and he indicated that he was aware that continuation was endangered by "the absence of any firm assurance that identifiable direct expenses thereby incurred will be borne by the United Nations." For the initial six months "emergency period" only "reasonable" special allowances would be reimbursed but, following that, he proposed the new formula be applied to pay and allowances. He stated that the prolongation also had caused the governments unforeseen costs in connection with the equipment, material and supplies initially furnished to their contingents and that therefore the Assembly might also consider the UN assuming financial responsibility for the replacement of equipment that was destroyed or worn-out and for such deterioration beyond that provided for under normal depreciation schedules "as can be assessed at the conclusion of the total period of service of a Government's force ." These principles were approved by the Assembly on 22 November 1957.

Some of the problems of applying these principles were indicated in Hammarskjold's "Summary Study." What, for instance, was a "special allowance"? Government practices in this regard varied widely. Further, his formulation had been based on the assumption that countries would be providing units of their regular forces. Instead of that many had organized special volunteer units to serve with UNEF and still others had had to organize new domestically-based units to replace regular units they had sent to UNEF. Responsibility for destroyed or worn-out equipment was authorized, but was "equipment" to be interpreted in the wider sense of "equipment, material or supplies"? He also listed the items for which the UN assumed direct costs, when they were not otherwise provided for:

- a. Billeting, rations and summer clothing for the troops including the rental, reconditioning and maintenance of premises;
- b. Payment to each member of the Force of a daily overseas allowance, equivalent to 86 cents, in accordance with a decision by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly at its 541 meeting on 3 December 1956;
- c. Costs of the rotation of contingents;
- d. Travel and subsistence allowances of military personnel proceeding on official business to points outside the area of operations;

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- e. Operation and maintenance of a suitable leave center and other welfare expenses, such as rental of films, periodic contracting for live shows for the entertainment of the troops, and postage for personal mail;
- f. Miscellaneous supplies and services such as cobbling, tailoring, laundering and haircutting;
- g. Motor transport and heavy mobile equipment;
- h. Miscellaneous non-expendable operational equipment such as barrack stores, tentage, workshop equipment, water and petroleum cans and generators;
- i. Spare parts, maintenance and petrol, oil and lubricants for motor transport and other mobile equipment;
- j. Stationery, photographic and other miscellaneous supplies;
- k. Payment for the use of Royal Canadian Air Force planes comprising the UNEF Squadron, at specified rates per flying hour.

By 1960 there were three and one half years of accruals of potential claims against the UN for loss or deterioration of government-owned equipment and supplies and it was felt impractical to continue the policy of having these claims held until "the conclusion of the total period of service of a Governments' forces." The Secretary-General, therefore, proposed¹ that reimbursement should take place at the end of the period of service of any one contingent and that reimbursement should be made at agreed standard rates for destruction, loss or depreciation of the following categories:

- a. Personal clothing of members of the contingents;
- b. Personal equipment of members of the contingents such as rucksacks, kit bags, sleeping bags, canteens, cooking and eating utensils, etc.;

¹ A/4486, 13 September 1960, paras. 66-70.

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c. Small arms;

d. Ammunition

While stressing that world-wide direct UN purchasing of standard items in quantity had increasingly offered the possibility of maximum economy in procurement, he noted that there are other items than those above which a contingent required which were peculiar to its national military establishment. He, therefore, proposed that such additional items of supplies, material and equipment should be paid for in full and become UN property at the time of delivery and presentation of government invoices referencing the UN requisition number. It was further proposed that if such items became surplus to the needs of the Force these could, if value warranted, be returned to the issuing government, subject to reimbursement of the depreciated value as determined between the government and the United Nations. Lastly, he felt it might be appropriate to establish a property survey board to determine offset values against the above government claims for loss or damage to UN equipment arising from the gross or wilful negligence of members of their contingents. These proposals were considered by the Fifth Committee and approved on their recommendation by the General Assembly in Resolution 1575 (XV) on 20 December 1960.¹

The system was evidently further refined early in 1961. In a letter of 14 June 1962 to the Secretary-General, the Danish Permanent Representative to the United Nations referred to discussions held in Copenhagen on 17 April 1961 which had arrived at supplementary principles. According to this letter, the fixed per-man per day amount of the four categories of largely personal items listed above was to have a standard basis for calculation but the actual amount was to be variable according to special circumstances for each individual country. The agreed amount further was to be the basis for earlier and future claims and was to be paid "from the formation of the individual contingents until their disbandment." As to the provision for

¹ The practice had grown up that the Fifth Committee resolutions on UNEF financing were proposed by States participating in UNEF. As of 1962 they were joined as proposers by ONUC participants.

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additional equipment and supplies, this formulation was not to be applied to "combat type" items. Such items were considered to have only been "temporarily made available to UNEF." For such items, reimbursement was to be granted on the basis of fixed depreciation percentages for each period of service.

The system was being simplified even further by the Scandinavians near the end of UNEF. Beginning 1 October 1965 (Denmark) and with calendar year 1966 (Sweden and Norway), these three countries no longer were to seek reimbursement for a wide range of costs previously agreed as reimbursable. One such major item was air transportation and semi-annual rotation costs.¹ They also ceased claiming for post-UN service, medical treatment, staging and training costs, pay to substitute for those called up for UN tours of duty, welfare and entertainment, etc. The new policy was to request reimbursement only for:

- Pay to non-regular military personnel
- Overseas allowances and costs of materiel (including initial and continuing cost of individual clothing and equipment).

In the continuing struggle to reduce UNEF expenditures, attention came to be focused, perhaps unjustly, on the six-month rotation policies (especially of the Scandinavian countries) and the comparative contingent costs. Deference was paid to the fact that cost alone was not the basis of selection and that the potential sources of UNEF participants was limited. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted in 1961 that "several Governments have recently revised the pay and allowance scales for their contingents and that one Government has decided to substitute volunteers for conscripts in its contingent" (thus making the UN liable for the full cost of pay and allowances). It said that:

In regard to the level of claims for pay and allowances for members of contingents, the Committee continues to be struck by the marked disparity

¹ One notes in paragraph 30 (c) of the final report on UNEF (A/6672, 12 July 1967) that Denmark, Norway and Sweden had "agreed to absorb the cost of one of the two annual rotations."

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between the various national scales applicable to contingents composing the Force. In many cases, of course, these scales have a legislative basis which must be observed.¹

The Survey Team, appointed by the Secretary-General in November 1965 to study "the acute and uncertain financial situation affecting UNEF," reported that:

39. The cost of reimbursing Governments in respect of the extraordinary expenses incurred by them relating to pay and allowances of the contingents they provide represents in the 1966 cost estimates \$8.6 million out of the \$18.5 million total. These reimbursements are unequally divided between the contingents, the largest share of the \$8.6 million total being absorbed by three of four contingents. It is, therefore, obvious that if the Secretary-General were able to change the composition of the Force either by retaining only those contingents whose Government's claims are relatively low, or by replacing "expensive contingents" by less costly ones, very substantial savings would be made.

40. The Survey Team is well aware of the numerous political and other problems involved in this situation. The Team, therefore, feels that it is not in a position to recommend to the Secretary-General a drastic change in the composition of UNEF based on the complete elimination of one or two contingents, or the replacement of the more expensive contingents, although, theoretically, a reorganization of UNEF on this basis would be the surest way of rapidly obtaining important reductions in expenditure. Nevertheless, these considerations should be borne in mind in considering the proposal for streamlining the Force outlined in section III above, where a change in the present composition of the Force is suggested without actually eliminating any of the present contingents, but rather by arranging for the presence of some of them in rotation. The success of this

¹ A/4812, 24 July 1961.

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proposal in reducing expenditure, while at the same time maintaining UNEF at the necessary strength, will be dependent in some measure upon the extent to which Governments providing contingents are prepared to agree to the changes suggested.¹

By the end of UNEF, there was an approximate total of \$24,000,000 in unliquidated claims of the participating countries. Of this, about \$13,800,000 represented Norwegian-Danish-Swedish claims. The Scandinavians were told late in 1968 that any future payments would be based upon the extent that Israel and Egypt would accept claims against them for seized materiel and on the amounts that could be realized from the sale of materiel. An optimistic estimate was that this might yield some \$4 to \$5 million to be applied against the claims.

2. Apportionment among Member States: The total of the proposed budget for the United Nations itself for 1957 was \$48,250,700. The costs of the UNEF operation from November 1956 through December 1957 were estimated to be some \$30,000,000. Hammarskjold decided not to handle UNEF's expenses under the regular budget but instead proposed to establish a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account and to use the Working Capital Fund as a source of advances pending receipt of funds for the Special Account. This method was approved by the Assembly in Resolution 1122 (XI) on 26 November 1956. When this authority was renewed in February 1957, the Secretary-General was also granted the right to arrange loans for the Special Account. The system of a yearly authorization for the UNEF Special Account was continued throughout its existence. One cannot help noting, however, that the 1958 estimates were not approved until 13 December 1957, the 1959 estimates on the same date in 1958, etc. The level of expenses for 1965 was not authorized until 18 February 1965.

Funds for the Special Account proper were raised from two major sources--assessments according to the scale set for the regular budget, and voluntary contributions. Thus UNEF has never been financed solely by assessments. The practice that developed was one of authorizing a total figure for the Special Account, inviting voluntary contributions toward this figure and apportioning the resulting difference among the Member States.

¹ A/C.5/1049, 13 December 1965.

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In fact, it was not that simple; some ingenious formulas were applied to meet the objections of the less developed states without reducing the assessments of the developed states while still retaining the regular budgeting scale as a basis. Thus, in 1959, voluntary contributions toward 1960 expenses (made before 31 December 1959) were applied beginning with the lowest percentage contributors of the scale and progressing upward to reduce their assessment by 50%, as far as the voluntarily contributed sums would go. Again for 1961, the total \$19 million authorized was assessed on the regular scale of assessments but voluntary contributions were to be applied in a 50% reduction progressing upwards, but this time the reduction qualification also included the condition that the country concerned was a recipient of assistance from the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.

By this time defaults were becoming a major problem and the launching of the Congo operation was also at hand. The problems of financing the two operations became joined with the much more expensive and controversial Congo Operation playing the dominant role in the crisis that followed. For the 1962 application of the voluntary contributions for UNEF there were two categories of states who were eligible for an 80% reduction and a further category which might get a 50% reduction. It was also in 1961 that the Secretary-General was authorized to issue bonds at 2 per cent interest, with the principal repayable over 25 years.

From 1963 to the end of UNEF further formulae were adopted which involved division of members into two groups--the "economically less developed countries" and the others, which were specified by name. The arrangements were characterized as "ad hoc" and it was stipulated that they were not to constitute a precedent for the future. Appeals were made for contributions from non-UN members who belonged to the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was also decided that voluntary contributions could be credited "in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connection with the United Nations Force." However, these various methods could not meet the basic problem.

The basic problem was not only the reluctance of the "economically less developed countries" to expend their scarce resources on peacekeeping, it was also the refusal of the Soviet Union and its allies, joined later by France, to pay for

operations they opposed on political/constitutional grounds. The Soviet bloc had from the beginning not only denied the legality of UNEF itself but also contended that the only reasonable and fair system of financing it would be for the "aggressors"--the United Kingdom, France and Israel--to pay the costs involved.

The Secretary-General had stated on 26 November 1956 that he wished to make it clear "that while funds received and payments made with respect to the Force are to be considered as coming outside the regular budget of the Organization, the operation is essentially a United Nations responsibility, and the Special Account to be established must, therefore, be construed as coming within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter."¹ An overwhelming majority of Member States backed this position with their votes and in the survey conducted by the Secretary-General in 1959. The principle of collective financial responsibility for General Assembly's apportioning of the "expenses of the Organization" was to be maintained at least in word. In practice, even by November 1957 only 33 members had paid their contribution toward the initial \$10 million authorized in December 1956. By 31 July 1961, 80 members still owed in full their 1961 assessments (authorized on 20 December 1960) and 3 further countries owed them in part. Voluntary contributions had come from Austria, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.² However, after 1961 only the United Kingdom and the United States continued to make such financial contributions. Therefore, it was decided, on 20 December 1961 by a vote of 52 to 11, with 32 absentions, to try to clear up the legal issue involved in the controversy by asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on whether the authorized expenditures constituted "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. On 20 July 1962 the Court found that they did.

¹ GAOR, 11th Session, 596 Meeting.

² John G. Stoessinger, and Associates, Financing the United Nations System (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), p. 112.

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At this point in time, there had been a total of \$102,594,514 assessed for UNEF. Of this, \$72,712,462 had been received or credited, leaving a balance due of \$29,822,051.¹ Meeting in the autumn of 1962, the Assembly rejected a Soviet proposal that it merely "note" the Court's Opinion and instead, by a large majority "accepted" it. The showdown over the Article 19 deprivation of voting rights was under way. By the 19th Session in 1964, France and the USSR had reached the position of being sufficiently in arrears for Article 19 to become applicable. The vote which would have tested the USSR's indicated intention to leave the UN if deprived of her vote in the Assembly did not take place. By agreement of all but Albania, the Assembly acted by unanimity without formal vote. Very little was accomplished outside of a reinforcement of fears that another such Assembly could mean the end of the UN. By the 20th Session, the U.S. had decided not to press the issue. Ambassador Goldberg announced on 16 August 1965 that the U.S. did not concede its position on the Article 19 applicability but "had regretfully concluded that, at the present stage in the development of the United Nations, the General Assembly was not prepared to carry out the relevant provisions of the Charter..."

...it agreed that the Assembly must proceed with its work. At the same time, if any Member State could make an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain United Nations activities, the United States reserved the same option to make exceptions if, in its view, there were compelling reasons to do so. There could be no double standard among the Members of the Organization.²

III

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT

A. NEW YORK

The General Assembly established UNEF and appointed its Commander. It also, at Hammarskjold's request, appointed an

¹ Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 179.

² A/AC. 121/SR 15, 16 August 1965.

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Advisory Committee composed of representatives of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan to work with the Secretary-General. In fact, however, the Assembly mainly occupied itself over the years in financial discussion of UNEF rather than political direction. The political problems of UNEF itself were fairly cut and dried after the initial period, although the "toil and trouble" of the Arab-Israeli dispute continued to bubble along. The Advisory Committee was undoubtedly of political assistance to Hammarskjold in the early days of UNEF; however, until it was called together by U Thant on 18 May 1967, it had reportedly not previously met since 1958. In the 1967 crisis it did not exercise its right to request a convening of the General Assembly and the decision to comply with Egypt's request for UNEF withdrawal was taken by the Secretary-General himself. No other country, including Denmark and Sweden, who, as contributors, met with the Advisory Committee took such an initiative either.

So UNEF was largely "left to Dag." In paragraph 15 of the UNEF Regulations it is stated:

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have authority for all administrative, executive and financial matters affecting the Force and shall be responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with Governments concerning the Force. He shall make provisions for the settlement of claims arising with respect to the Force.¹

From the beginning the personnel, facilities and procedures of the Secretariat were utilized to the maximum to organize and maintain the Force. Andrew Cordier and Ralph Bunche were the key individuals in this task. The latter was made responsible for direct supervision of the organization and operation of the Force and the coordination of administrative actions relating to it. In his Summary Study, Hammarskjold says:

Most of the major units of the Secretariat were called upon to make their contribution to the total task in one way or another, with the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the Office of General Services,

¹ ST/SGB/UNEF/1, 20 February 1957.

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the Office of the Controller, the Office of Legal Affairs and the Office of Personnel rendering especially important assistance.

He felt that UNEF had demonstrated that, "by and large," the requirements of an operation of this kind could be met by the existing services of the Secretariat modestly expanded in certain sections to meet the heavier work loads and aided by military administrative assistance "as may be implicit in the nature of the organization." Many would, and do, dispute the appraisal that this is a satisfactory system.

Nevertheless, the civilian and military men involved threw themselves into the situation and worked around the clock on UNEF's launching. One writer describes it as "an exercise in pure good will."¹ The situation they were dealing with was the reverse of normal military practice. The unopposed line troops were to be on the scene in advance of the means to support and sustain them. The urgent demand was to establish a UN "presence" as soon as possible. Egypt was stalling on allowing them to enter its territory. The need to bring the Force into being nearby as a means of exerting pressure on Egypt for their acceptance, combined with a dependence upon a U.S. airlift which it was decided was excluded from landing in Egypt, brought forth a suggestion of an Italian staging area. This was broached to Italy in the expectation that three to four days would be required for its decision. Instead, within one day Italy had agreed to make the Capodichino airport at Naples available to the UN. Within two hours of the decision a young Secretariat officer was on his way to organize the base and reached it on 10 November just in time to receive the first airlift of Danes and Norwegians.

To help handle the administration of UNEF some 31 overload posts were established in New York and Geneva. These were carried in the UNEF budget and continued for the life of the operation although they diminished in number to about 20 at the end (see Annex A).

On the military side, the countries whose offers of troops had been accepted were asked to rush military attaches to New

¹ Patrick O'Donovan, "How the U.N. Troops Were Mobilized," The Reporter, 10 January 1957.

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York. Joined by three Americans¹ they formed an informal staff which worked day and night on the problems of launching UNEF. General Burns flew back to New York for consultations and they presented him with the list of questions mentioned earlier. On this occasion (18 November 1956) Burns was also able to meet with the Canadian Chief of Air Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the Army who came down to New York and here the foundation was laid for the vital switch of Canadian participation to largely support elements.

Also on the military side, while Burns was in New York, Major General I.A.E. Martola of Finland² had been appointed on 19 November as Special Military Adviser to the Secretary-General. General Martola served in this function until his assignment ended on 31 August 1957. He had a staff of 3 military officers (from Brazil, Italy and Pakistan) who were paid subsistence by the UN but not "honoraria." Two of these officers left in September 1957 but one stayed on as Military Consultant. The Budget Estimates for 1958 show a provision of \$6,000 subsistence allowance for the Military Consultant and he is mentioned again in the UNEF Budget Estimates for 1960 but not thereafter. This is, no doubt, because the position was put on a different basis when the Congo operation was launched. It was on 23 July 1960 that Major General Indarjit Rikhye left the position of UNEF Chief of Staff to come to New York as the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General. He retained this post until his recent resignation in December 1968 even though in the meantime he also served as the last Commander of UNEF. Annex B is a chart, provided by General Rikhye, showing how his office fitted into the Secretariat structure.

B. FIELD

1. Commander: The UNEF Commander held office through appointment by the General Assembly. His status was that of an international civil servant, administratively integrated with the United Nations structure. In practice, he functioned as the principal agent of the Secretary-General in the area of

¹ Col. R.F.C. Vance, Col. John Gormley and C.H. Owsley.

² Lt. General Martola is now serving as Force Commander of UNFICYP.

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operations. He thus led both the military and civilian sides of the operation, being the military commander and also the representative of the United Nations.

In his Summary Study, Hammarskjold notes that this "fusion of military and civilian activities requires considerable understanding as well as knowledge on the part of the Commander." It was up to the Commander to "set the tone for civil-military relationships."

In the crucial initial phase of UNEF, the United Nations was fortunate in being able to enlist the extremely competent services of General E.L.M. Burns, who had a deep knowledge of the problems of the area due to the fact that he was serving as Chief of Staff of UNTSO at the time. He was respected by both sides and his service in the Allied Forces in Europe during World War II was undoubtedly of help in the touchy problems of arranging Anglo-French withdrawal. It is interesting to note that General Burns, in moving to UNEF, brought with him the UNTSO Chief of Staff functions with respect to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement.¹ At some point the separation between the two operations was restored although close cooperation and coordination between the UNTSO Chief of Staff and the UNEF Commander was maintained.

During its existence UNEF had five Commanders and two Acting Commanders. These were:

Lt. General Burns	Canada	Nov 1956 - Dec 1959
Maj. General Gyani	India	Dec 1959 - Jan 1964
Col. E.C. Condil (Acting)	Denmark	Sep 1963 - Nov 1963
Maj. General Chaves	Brazil	Jan 1964 - Jan 1965
Col. L. Musicki (Acting)	Yugoslavia	Aug 1964 - Jan 1965
Maj. General Sarmiento	Brazil	Jan 1965 - Jan 1966
Maj. General Rikhye	India	Jan 1966 - Jun 1967

2. Bases, Accommodation and Liaison: In being launched, UNEF first acquired a Commander, a small nucleus staff, and promises of troops, transportation and logistical supplies. Obviously its next need was a place at which its components could be assembled. This was initially solved by Italy's

¹ A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 73.

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prompt action in making Capodichino airport available as a staging area on 9 November 1956 and the troops started arriving on 10 November.

On 12 November, General Burns saw President Nasser who introduced him to Brigadier Amin Hilmy. Hilmy had been designated as the chief Egyptian liaison officer to UNEF to help with arranging for landing facilities, quarters, barracks stores and any other help the Force might immediately require. Burns states that: "His help to UNEF was invaluable, and one does not like to think of the difficulties we might have met had an officer of another type been appointed."¹ In peace-keeping the character of liaison with the host state is crucial so it is worth describing Brigadier Hilmy's background.

He had had extensive experience in staff appointments and also in dealing with other departments of the Egyptian government. He had previously been the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Eastern Command and carried into his new job an authority derived from that. He and President Nasser had served together as instructors at the Egyptian Staff College. "Courteous, friendly and good-humored, he also was quick in action and showed an ability to get results, to produce the cooperation UNEF needed."²

At the meeting with President Nasser and Brigadier Hilmy, it was agreed that the best airfield for the UNEF troops to land at in Egypt would be Abu Sueir. A British-built air station, it had extensive barracks surrounding the field and, in spite of heavy damage from Anglo-French bombing, it was serviceable. Subsequently, the first emergency headquarters of UNEF were set up in a rented apartment in the Garden City quarter of Cairo, near the Semiramis Hotel. This was soon overcrowded and headquarters were moved to El Ballah, near the Suez Canal. At Abu Sueir, the barracks and tents could only handle six or seven hundred troops so three camps were found--at Ciba, Omar and Karnak-- in the El Ballah area. These had not been used since World War II and much repair was necessary. The Anglo-French forces were occupying Port Said but

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 205.

² Ibid., p. 205.

agreement was readily reached for its use in disembarking UNEF personnel equipment and supplies.

These were the initial bases for UNEF but as the stages of withdrawals of Anglo-French-Israeli forces took place, UNEF and its headquarters moved to the Gaza Strip, the area along the Egyptian-Israel border and to Sharm el Sheikh as can be seen from the maps of Annexes C and D. These show the deployment as of 19 May 1967 when some of the original camps had been closed and after adjustments had been made over the years of national assignments to particular portions of the line. Camps were initially mainly of tents and the sites were given national names for purposes of identification. Due to the changes mentioned, one finds at the end of UNEF that the Indian battalion has a camp named Falkenberg and the Brazilians are in Fort Saunders.

UNEF Headquarters was established in a building in Gaza town and a hospital was also located there for awhile. A large complex of warehouses at Rafah was used as the maintenance base. An airport at El Arish was used as the air base with a nearby former British group of barracks being used to house the personnel of the air unit. Until January 1958 there was also a communication flight unit at Naples/Capodichino. In addition, UNEF had a movement control and port detachment at Port Said. There was provision for 9 military personnel in this Port Said detachment in 1962, and 12 in 1966. In 1962, there were 24 military personnel administering the UNEF Leave Center which rotated between Beirut and Cairo. By 1966 the number had decreased to 7. Over the period, two to four military personnel were stationed in Cairo for liaison purposes. Liaison with Tel Aviv came to be handled directly from Gaza.

In addition to the communication flight unit at Capodichino mentioned above, there were further UNEF personnel in Italy handling liaison, movement control and logistics. In 1958, they moved to Pisa. In addition to the military personnel, there were 10 international civilians stationed there at that time. By 1962 at Pisa there were 5 military and 5 international civilians provided for. This had been reduced to provision for 3 military and 2 international civilians by 1966.¹ Another UNEF

¹ The UNEF office in Pisa was renamed the "United Nations Supply Depot" Pisa, Italy following the end of UNEF.

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unit was located in Beirut which had liaison and movement control duties and also included a postal unit. In 1962 there was provision for 6 military and 4 international civilians there. By 1966 the international civilians had been reduced to two.

Land and buildings owned by the Egyptian government were provided rent free but a large number of claims on UNEF for compensation or rentals soon came to be presented through the Egyptian Liaison Office. While rentals for living accommodations, messes, offices, warehouses, cold storage and other premises in the Gaza area, Port Said, Cairo and Beirut appeared in the 1958 Budget Estimates, it wasn't until the following year that a line item was carried for rental of land. This included provision for "land used for operational purposes, such as camp and platoon sites, tracks and land used for convenience purposes such as playing fields." It was noted in 1961 that a detailed mapping of areas used by UNEF had been completed and one means of saving on compensation had been the reduction in the width of roads used exclusively by UNEF.

In 1960 UNEF began a program of replacing its tents with a masonry-type structure and a new weather proof type of roof on its existing tent kit structures. By 1963 all the troops "with few exceptions" were housed in masonry-type buildings. There was a continuing building program, particularly as deterioration of their original facilities inevitably set in. The provision of adequate water was another continuing problem met by drilling new wells and building a fleet of water-carrying trucks.

Phase III, the withdrawal of UNEF, began in a relatively well organized fashion. The Egyptian authorities had offered airfield and port facilities at Port Said for the departure of UNEF troops. A camp was established at Port Said. The plans, however, were first disrupted by the Egyptian demand for priority withdrawal by the Canadians and then by the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June. In spite of precautions undertaken by UNEF, its bases and personnel came under fire between the opposing forces with resulting fatalities, damage and looting. The Commander withdrew as many UNEF personnel as he could to Camp Tre Kroner and the beaches nearby in Gaza as a "safe area" from which embarkation might possibly be managed. At his request, the Egyptian authorities removed their troops from the area which later proved to be the only UNEF area in

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Gaza which escaped Israeli fire. It did not prove practicable to embark from Gaza so that UNEF personnel had to proceed about 20 miles up the coast, with Israeli help, and were evacuated from Ashdod.

3. Headquarters Staff: At the beginning of Phase I, General Burns brought with him from UNTSO what he called "the first improvised staff for UNEF." This was "set up in business" in Cairo on 12 November 1956. It was composed of a Norwegian, two Swedes, a Dutchman and an American.¹ There were also two international civilians whose nationalities were Canadian and Vietnamese. One of General Burns immediate initiatives in New York when he arrived there on 19 November was to request nominations of competent staff officers from the countries providing contingents. His first recommendation for staff organization was for one of four branches: Personnel, Operations and Intelligence, Logistics, and Stores and Equipment. However, he states that a three branch organization was finally adopted: Personnel, Operations plus Intelligence, and Logistics.² The branch that was omitted--Stores and Equipment--was actually filled by civilian personnel from the UN Secretariat who were posted to UNEF for procurement of stores and equipment, finance and general administration, especially control of expenditures in accordance with UN financial regulations and practice. The Danes provided a veterinary officer to inspect meat purchased locally. On the military side, General Burns had the staff nominations by 27 November and set up the UNEF staff on his three-branch basis, with each branch headed by a Lt. Col. and having from three to six majors and captains in it, apportioned among the nations contributing to the Force.

¹ G. A. Resolution 1000 had authorized Burns to recruit from UNTSO a "limited number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council." One must assume therefore that the "provisional" nature of American Lt. Col. K.R. Nelson's assignment to UNEF, and his early replacement by some one actually recruited for the job, was not in violation of this.

² Burns, op. cit., p. 211. It should be stated that "intelligence" is an unpopular word in UN circles and does not appear in UN documentation.

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Accompanying Hammarskjold to Egypt on 16 November were Dr. Garcia Robles of the Political Affairs Department of the Secretariat who had been nominated by the Secretary-General as Burns's political adviser, and George Ivan Smith who came to help on the public information side. Smith was at the time the Director of the UN Information Centre in London. A bit later King Gordon joined the public relations side. Burns had more difficulty in securing a Legal Adviser as no senior official from the Secretariat was available for this function for some time. The post was filled in the meanwhile by the fortunate circumstance of the Canadians having sent an officer from their Judge Advocate-General's branch who had the requisite experience. Another of Burns's early requests was for a senior medical officer familiar with the problems of medicine and hygiene in the Middle East.

Thus the UNEF staff quickly expanded to meet its initial and continuing needs. No doubt a common background of experience with British and/or American staff procedures within the military establishments of most of the nations contributing officers was an aid in ad hoc conditions. Whatever may have been the problem of securing competent military officers who could quickly work as a team, there is no doubt that finding competent international civilians proved a considerable strain on the UN. Hammarskjold, in his Summary Study, discusses the problem and concludes that the fluctuating needs of the UN argue against expanding the permanent Secretariat staff. Instead, he felt that increasing attention should be given to "arrangements whereby specialist civilian personnel may be made available by Member Governments on a temporary secondment basis for service with UNEF as part of the Secretariat staff."¹

For Phase II, the major lines of UNEF's staff structure apparently were not greatly altered. The 1965 Survey Team reported that it was "convinced that the basic organization of UNEF is correct and that the Force is and has been well managed," and also that: "Reductions have already been made in UNEF Headquarters, and some reductions in international and local civilian staff are also already underway."² In July

¹ A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 86.

² A/C.5/1049, 13 December 1965, paras. 19 and 27.

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1966 a further reorganization of UNEF headquarters took place. Military Movement Control personnel were added, the Military Legal Advisers office was vacated, and the functions of the Headquarters Medical Section were moved to Rafah. However, the main change was in numbers. Military personnel (exclusive of Canadian support officers) fell from 90 in November 1965 to 54 in November 1966 (see Annex E). The changes in the overall national balance of UNEF were, no doubt, of assistance in making this reduction. The authorized international civilian staff at Gaza was reduced from 82 in 1965 to 72 in 1966 (see Annex A).

The organizational structure of UNEF as of 13 January 1967 is shown in chart form in Annex F. The Staff List of UNEF Headquarters as of 1 January 1967 is carried in Annex G and shows the intermixing of UN civilian personnel with the military officers, whose country of origin is also shown. Rotations of staff officers were staggered to allow continuity. The planned rotations as of January 1967 are shown in Annex H.

The UNEF Headquarters Staff (and indeed some of the other components of UNEF) reflected four special characteristics of the operation. First, of course, was its politico-military mission as a consent operation rather than a "fighting force." Second, was its international and ad hoc nature which result in needs and demands for staff representation of national participants and national balance, and also perhaps in some overstaffing which national prestige factors make difficult to adjust later. Third, was the self-contained nature of the UN operation where the more specialized capabilities normally found in superior echelons of regular military organizations do not exist and must be met by increasing the proportion of such capabilities in the operation itself, backed to some extent by capabilities the UN can organize through its own New York staff, commercial facilities or cooperative national military establishments. Lastly, stemming from the foregoing there was the mixed military-civilian nature of the staff. Hammarskjold, while defending the system used by the UN and the competence of the system admitted its short-comings, probably as a protective measure in anticipation of criticism. While stating in his Summary Study that there are some areas where friction is minimized due to clear functional definition, he then went ahead to list areas where problems and misunderstandings had arisen. These were:

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- personnel
- maintenance and construction
- welfare programs
- supervision of mess facilities and canteens
- rotation of contingents
- relations with Governments
- logistics
- finance and accounting
- radio communications
- transportation and travel
- issuance of directives and instructions covering the general administration of the Force.

Phase III or the withdrawal of UNEF began on the basis of careful staff planning but the Egyptian request for priority evacuation of the Canadians and the outbreak of hostilities threw UNEF back into ad hoc expedients. The international civilian staff was called upon to fill many of the gaps. After 13 June only 42 United Nations personnel remained in the Gaza area. The Commander and his remaining staff officers departed on 17 June and only about 30 civilian UN personnel remained to do what they could about the remaining stores and equipment.

4. Line troops: The first of the line military personnel to arrive on the scene in Phase I were ten observers loaned from UNTSO. "The physical presence of the ten observers, with UN insignia, flags, armbands, etc. had a remarkable psychological effect, according to eye-witnesses, calming the atmosphere and giving promise of fuller UN intervention to come."¹

For those to come, Burns had hoped for contingents of not less than battalion strength. He felt that a force made up of many smaller units of different nationalities would be difficult to control, from an administrative as well as a tactical viewpoint. What he eventually got as line troops were: one company, 6 battalions of varying strengths and an armored reconnaissance squadron. There was great pressure on him to deploy UNEF at the maximum possible speed and he was forced to send out units before their personnel had been fully concentrated and organized for their task. The troops were interposed between the Anglo-French forces and the Egyptians to facilitate the former's withdrawal; the armored reconnaissance

¹ Frye, op. cit., p. 86.

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battalion interposed itself in the staged withdrawal of the Israelis from Sinai and Gaza; and the battalion and platoon base camps and observation posts were then established along the Armistice Demarcation Line/International Frontier and at Sharm el Sheikh for the static and continuing interpositioning role UNEF was to play for ten years. The distance covered by the ADL/IF is 273 kilometers and the Sharm el Sheikh camp was a further 187 kilometers south of the line.

The initial assignments of the line troops were:
in Gaza town: the Swedish battalion minus one company.

along the armistice demarcation-Gaza strip line: Danish-Norwegian, Brazilian, Indian and Colombian battalions, and a Swedish company.

along the international frontier-East Central Sinai line: one Canadian reconnaissance squadron, one Yugoslav reconnaissance battalion.

in the Sharm el Sheikh and Ras Nasrani area: the Finnish company.

at Rafah: a Finnish guard detachment.

During Phase II, the assignments changed in accordance with adjustment to cut-backs in the troops available. Along the ADL the observation posts were intervisible and normally manned in the daytime by two men. At night the men in the OP's were withdrawn and the line was covered by patrolling. Mobile reserves were maintained to be able to reach a trouble spot in ten to fifteen minutes. The ADL was clearly marked and on the Egyptian side there was a 500-meter zone which was barred to armed personnel at all times with only local residents being allowed to come within 50 meters of the ADL. These zones were also marked. Contingent zones of responsibility were adjusted to coincide with the local government's administrative sub-districts which without doubt facilitated UNEF's work.

Only certain areas along the IF were found to be so sensitive as to require constant patrolling and observation. The existing mine fields also narrowed the routes of access along with the generally rough and open terrain. Therefore, only certain areas where vehicles could travel without too great difficulty were patrolled and this was supplemented by air

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reconnaissance flights. Camps and OP's were established at especially sensitive spots and mobile reserves maintained which could be sent to trouble spots. There were spaced boundary markers along the IF. On the Egyptian side, no armed personnel were allowed within 2 kilometers of the line by day and 5 kilometers by night. No civilians were allowed within 500 meters although certain privileges of crossing were permitted.

The necessity for UNEF to be as self-contained as possible meant that a much smaller proportion of its military personnel were available for operational duties than is normally the case in military establishments. From time to time in the reports on UNEF the approximate numbers of those so available were given and these are compared with the totals of UNEF military personnel below. No doubt the definition of "operational" is imprecise but this gives an illustration of the problem. Continuing pressure was exerted to replace "non-operational" personnel with less expensive local employees where possible and the number of such local employees increased from 790 in 1957 to a high point of 1,601 in 1962, after which these also were cut back.

	<u>1957</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1965</u>
Total Military Personnel	5977	5334	5341	5159	5120	4581
Operational Number	3500	2500	2650	2700	2200	3389 ¹
Operational Percentage	58%	47%	50%	52%	52%	74%

The total of military personnel in UNEF declined from 5,977 in September 1957 to 3,378 on 19 May 1967--a reduction of 43%. For the table of overall totals, contingent totals, tours of duty and rotation costs see Annex I. In the financial attrition process to which UNEF was subjected over the years, the tours of duty and rotation costs came to be the object of criticism--as, of course, did the pay and allowance reimbursement levels. Arriving at some rough approximations one finds that the rotation cost to the UN per man in 1958 was about \$240. By 1964 it was about \$200. Again approximately, it cost the UN in rotation costs in 1964 per man-year about \$140 per Indian,

¹ A number was also given for those "actually on-the-Line." This was 2,100 giving a percentage of 46% which may be more comparative than the "operational" designation of this year, 1965.

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\$255 per Canadian, \$270 per Scandinavian (who served six months tour), \$316 per Yugoslav (six months tour), and \$635 per Brazilian (who served a year's tour but half the contingent rotated every six months).

Reductions had already begun in 1957 when it was foreseen that some 400 men could be released. When the Indonesians and Finns left in September and December 1957, they were not completely replaced and when the Colombians left in October 1958, only 307 of their original 522 men were replaced. When the Swedes sent their battalion to the Congo in 1960, some 200 of their number were not replaced (although such replacement was expected). In late 1963, the Secretary-General designated an "informal Secretariat study group" to go to Gaza to examine possible reductions. General Gyani as Commander of UNEF chaired the group. They recommended a curtailment of the posts along the ADL which they felt would allow an overall reduction of 500 men in the Danish, Brazilian and Yugoslav contingents. Problems were noted, however, and the 1964 figures show only a Danish reduction of 135 and a Yugoslav reduction of 101. By July 1965, nevertheless, a further reduction of 352 men had been managed and a number of watchtowers along the ADL had been constructed. This, incidentally, not only allowed for an economizing of manpower but also enabled UNEF to cope with the fact that, due to peaceful conditions, a large number of orchards had been planted up to the ADL.

In November 1965, the UN decided to "bite the bullet" and make major changes. To cap the effort, a Survey Team was appointed which was composed of UN senior officials, except for its Co-Chairman, Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown, Chief of Staff of the Irish Army and former Commander of ONUC.¹ They spent a week in Gaza and reported that UNEF should not change its functions and that a change of its mandate was not feasible, i.e. it should not be reduced to an observer mission. However, they felt streamlining was possible. A particularly interesting part of their survey relates to the possibility of "alternative means of discharging functions." They noted that the functions of UNEF allowed it to be a "relatively primitive force" which could operate on a comparatively low financial level, and further

¹ The Report of the Survey Team is contained in A/C.5/1049, 13 December 1965.

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that for these functions there was "no satisfactory substitute for the presence of troops on the ground." They considered the following:

- air cavalry squadrons. Patrolling by one or two such squadrons was deemed too expensive and too complicated to support and operate, and not an adequate substitute for presence on the ground.
- helicopters. These would make UNEF's work easier and more effective but they would be expensive and create operating difficulties. In the Team's judgment, they would not result in a saving in manpower and the relative increase in effectiveness was not required.
- light aircraft. These are a supplement to rather than a substitute for troops on the ground and the "present establishment of two light aircraft would seem to be adequate and efficient."
- radar and infrared devices. These might increase the effectiveness of UNEF's night patrolling but were not judged to be a substitute for it. They would allow slight reductions in night patrol patterns but this was not considered sufficient to justify the extra expense and complications involved.
- animals. The Team urged that further study be given to the use of dogs and horses.

The streamlining suggested by the Team mainly revolved around the inefficient size of the national contingents, with relative costs of the various national contingents a less specific but obviously present factor in adjustments. Contingent support units are much less flexible in size than the troops they support--a proportional cut in infantry soldiers does not result in as substantial a proportional reduction in support troops. As a result of previous reductions, the Brazilian Battalion was down to 2 companies of 2 platoons each, the Yugoslav Battalion to 3 companies of 100 all ranks each, etc. Similarly, national deployment assignments were not always rational, such as the ADL-based Swedish Battalion having responsibility for the Sharm el Sheikh outpost. The report stated further that:

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The Canadian Reconnaissance Squadron, a very highly trained and efficient unit, has a vehicle and radio scale out of all proportion to the rest of the Force and, though it covers a vast mileage per month, in fact, is only responsible for 44 km of the Line and can only operate effectively in daylight.¹

The Team proposed a line troop organization of four "full and coherent" battalions--3 on the ADL and 1 on the IF and at Sharm el Sheikh. To arrive at this it suggested that there be only one Scandinavian battalion--"perhaps alternating each rotation between the three countries," that the Indians decrease and the Brazilians and Yugoslavs increase to full battalion size, and that the Canadian Reconnaissance Squadron be eliminated. This, with decreases in support units, they said would reduce the UNEF strength by 622 men to a total of 3,959. The savings from the reduction were estimated at \$3.5 million. Their recommendations were made in December 1965 when UNEF had a current military strength of 4,581. By 31 July 1966 the UNEF strength was reported as exactly 3,959²--which would indicate that very detailed advance work had been done on the Survey Team's recommendations. Sweden had been reduced to one staff officer and its battalion was to alternate in the future with the DANOR battalion. In May 1966 the Commander suggested further cuts and by the time of the withdrawal in Phase III the strength of UNEF had been decreased by another 581 men to a total of 3,378.

In Phase III, after hostilities broke out, UNEF suffered 15 fatalities (one Brazilian and fourteen Indians) and a further seventeen men were wounded. These were caused by Israeli strafing of a UNEF convoy, by a mine explosion, and by artillery and mortar fire on UNEF camps and headquarters. It would appear clear that the decreased strength of UNEF as a "primitive" military force was not the cause of these casualties. It would also be appropriate at this point to note some of the security measures which had been taken by the Commander:

--All UNEF movement was stopped except on an emergency basis with the authority of the commanding officers of units and senior headquarters staff.

¹ A/C.5/1049, 13 December 1965, para. 24.

² A breakdown which accompanied their recommendations interestingly came to a different total: 3,833.

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- All camps and vehicles were to prominently display the United Nations flag and markings so that they would be clearly visible from ground and air.
- All camps were to take necessary precautions against ground and air attacks.
- In the event any camps, vehicles, or personnel were involved in actual fighting between the two parties, they were to display large white flags and identify themselves. They were also to attempt to establish contact with local commanders.¹
- The Commander had addressed personal appeals to Israel and Egyptian military authorities to ensure the safety of UNEF personnel and installations. The Israel defense forces were fully acquainted with the detailed deployment of UNEF.²
- Troops had been concentrated in as few locations as possible.

5. Transport:

a. Airlift. The initial UNEF airlift was in the main a two-stage affair. The first stage of getting troops and equipment to Naples-Capodichino was largely supplied by the United States.³ Canada evidently handled its own needs. The second stage, from Capodichino to Egypt was carried out by Swissair in three DC-6's which began a regular service to Abu Sueir on 15 November 1956. The U.S. Flying Boxcars were able to fly in the jeeps and half-ton trucks which the soldiers were reportedly more than reluctant to leave behind them. Swissair had no such capacity, however, so the vehicles had to follow the troops by other means for the second stage of their journey. The Italian Air Force was soon helping on the second stage of the airlift and the Royal Canadian Air Force set up a regular shuttle between Naples and Egypt which they maintained until 23 January

¹ A/6672, 12 July 1967, para. 83.

² Ibid., para. 88.

³ The U.S. also flew the Indonesian contingent and part of the Indian contingent directly to Beirut.

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1958. This was the 114 Communications Flight which was based in Naples and initially had twelve C-119 aircraft, although by September 1957 this had been reduced to 4 C-119's. The Swissair contract had been only for the period of 13-26 November 1956. For the period of November 1956 to 31 August 1957, some 4,690 tons of supplies and equipment were brought to UNEF by air.

The Scandinavians set up a joint air connection between their countries and Naples. This involved a weekly flight which was called SCANAP and which was handled in turn by Danish, Norwegian and Swedish airplanes. The first flight was made on 4 December 1956. When the UN supply base was moved to Pisa, the Scandinavian flight moved accordingly and a Scandinavian officer was stationed there to look after their interests (SCANLOPI). With the withdrawal of the RCAF 114 Communications Flight, the Canadians began regular weekly flights from Canada to Beirut via Pisa, where the air shipments from Scandinavia were transferred to the Canadian aircraft. This was the general system maintained during Phase II. One notices, however, that very soon provision was made for five flights per year extending the SCANAP flights from Pisa to El Arish when for some reason the regular RCAF flight could not handle the shipment. In 1963 there is a mention of a monthly Brazilian Air Force flight and by 1965 it was stated that long range air support was being provided by the Brazilian, Canadian, Scandinavian and Yugoslav Air Forces.

In 1958 it is indicated that commercially chartered flights were used for rotations of the Colombians and Scandinavians. Certain Yugoslav officers and men were transported by Yugoslav aircraft. The RCAF handled a partial rotation of their contingent but a second rotation was supposed to take place by "chartered flights." The Canadians came to rotate all personnel on a staggered basis by RCAF flights, while the others mentioned above kept to a commercial basis. The Indian contingent provisions for rotation permitted the advance party to come by either commercial air or sea. At some point between June 1964 and November 1966 the Yugoslav contingent began to rotate by air. By 1967, the Scandinavians had agreed to absorb the costs of one of their two rotations per year.

The Canadians had worked out a pro-rata system for their Canada-Pisa and Canada-El Arish flights. In 1961, for instance, 65 percent was a UNEF cost and 35 percent was covered by the

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Canadian government. The following are the rates per flying hour which they charged where this was reported:

1958	DC-4 Northstar	\$181.26
1960	DC-4 Northstar	\$253.93
1961	DC-4 Northstar	\$243.23
1964	DC-4 Northstar	\$213.00

The Northstars were replaced by Hercules and Yukon flights commencing in 1964 and a combination with flights serving the Cyprus operation resulted in some savings to UNEF. Hourly rates increased 22 and 10 percent respectively for the two types of aircraft in 1967.

For Phase III, the only exit made available for the withdrawal of the Force was the airfield and port at Port Said. The phased withdrawal was based first on locally available means of getting there and then, for the further voyages, on inquiries which the UN made to "commercial organizations around the world." As stated before, these plans were upset by Egyptian demands for priority withdrawal by the Canadians. The Egyptian authorities agreed to the use of El Arish airfield for the evacuation of the Canadians and this took place on 29-30 May 1967 through 21 RCAF KC-130 flights. Half the Yugoslav Battalion had left by air on 3-4 June and that was the end of the UNEF airlift until the rest of UNEF was able to reach Cyprus by sea. From Cyprus the remaining UNEF troops were flown to their home countries.

b. Sealift. Sealift at the beginning of Phase I was an essential part of getting UNEF's vehicles and heavy equipment to its theater of operations. Hammarskjold points to the initial problem in his Summary Study that "ships under some flags could not be used" (one presumes that probably U.S. ships were included in this proscription) and "ships proceeding to Port Said at that time were required to be self-sustaining." It should further be noted, however, that the Anglo-French forces did cooperate in facilitating the UNEF use of the port. The Yugoslav reconnaissance battalion landed at Port Said in two ships on 28 November 1956. The main elements of the Canadian (which included the essential communications unit and equipment) and Brazilian contingents arrived in national naval vessels on 11 January and 2 February.

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Between November 1956 and 31 August 1957, some 18,750 tons of supplies and equipment were delivered to UNEF by sea. During the following year approximately 300 ships delivered an average of 2,000 tons per month. By the next year the average monthly sea cargo was 1,435 long tons per month and some 440 ships had off loaded these UNEF supplies. By 1960 the equivalent figures were 596.8 long tons and 513 ships; and by 1961, 672.4 long tons and 630 ships. Sea cargo evidently stayed at this general level during UNEF's life.

Brazil rotated half its contingent every six months by means of a Brazilian war-ship. This was only changed to a once-a-year rotation in 1967. Yugoslavia rotated the main part of its contingent, for at least the first seven years of UNEF, by commercially chartered ship. The main part of the Indian contingent rotated annually by commercially chartered ship.

For Phase III, as stated above the UN sought commercial arrangements which would utilize the port at Port Said. Between air and sealift, there were to be about 2,800 men and over 1,000 tons of contingent stores to be transported. In addition, a large part of the Force's vehicle fleet, engineer and communication equipment and several tons of specialized items were to be transported to the stockpile at Pisa. Under the original plan, the Brazilian battalion, the remainder of the Yugoslav battalion, and the Indian contingent were to leave by sea. With the unplanned earlier departure of the Canadians, the arrangements for orderly disposal of UNEF equipment and material were obviously seriously disrupted and the responsibility was assumed by the Chief Administrative Officer and his group. The outbreak of hostilities threw their attempts into chaos.

The advance party of the Swedish battalion had left for Port Said by train on the evening of 4 June. For some reason they had to change trains in the middle of the 5 June hostilities but made it to Port Said by that evening. Originally scheduled to leave by air, the Swedish advance party was joined by other UNEF personnel in the area (except for two Field Service staff in charge of UNEF stores) and was evacuated by sea on 6 June to Cyprus, minus their contingent stores. Following the hostilities the process of shipment, of course, resumed.

As to the main body of troops which was caught at Gaza, the original hope was to have them embark from the beach at

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Gaza. Immediate action had been taken by the Field Operations Service to find shipping in the area for the immediate evacuation of UNEF. "A Swedish ship was made available to proceed to Gaza on 6 June. This was followed subsequently by three more ships under the flags of Greece or Yugoslavia and a Brazilian Navy ship which was already on its way to transport the Brazilian contingent."¹ Gaza, however, has no proper port² and the local inhabitants who might have manned the small boats and lighters needed to reach the larger ships were understandably staying at home and were "inaccessible." The area had not been cleared by the Israeli military and snipers abounded. Accordingly, instructions were issued to the ships under charter to proceed 20 miles north to the new Israeli port facilities at Ashdod from which 2,519 UNEF soldiers were evacuated.

UNEF Aircraft - The UNTSO DC-3 provided the first emergency UNEF local transportation, essential to the early planning of the operation. From December 1956 to April 1957 there was a United States Air Force DC-3 chartered to UNEF for the Commander's use (handling fees and charter costs = \$46,000). General Burns writes that:

In the early stages it was intended that Norway would provide the light aircraft, but difficulties of transporting or flying these out proved too great and in the end the Royal Canadian Air Force produced air transport units.³

About 19 December Air Commodore Carpenter of the RCAF conferred with Burns in Egypt and the UNEF air establishment was decided upon. It is interesting to note that helicopters were considered but were ruled out on account of the difficulties of maintenance.

The unit assigned to UNEF and flying first out of Abu Sueir and then out of El Arish was the RCAF 115 Communication Flight consisting of 2 DC-3's and 4 Otter aircraft. In 1958 a third

¹ A/6672, 12 July 1967, para. 105.

² As regards the Gaza beach, it should be noted that early in UNEF a Landing Ship Tank (LST) was purchased to land supplies at Gaza but reportedly this was not a success and was soon discontinued.

³ Burns, op. cit., p. 214.

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DC-3 was added and the name was changed to 115 Air Transport Unit. The composition of this unit as reported through the years is as follows, with the hourly flying rate charged shown in parenthesis:

1957	2 DC-3	4 Otter
1958	3 DC-3 (\$101.26)	4 Otter (\$33.99)
1959	3 DC-3 (\$102.54)	4 Otter (\$54.65)
1960	3 DC-3 (\$ 90.03)	4 Otter (\$45.60)
1961	3 Caribou (\$120.00)	2 Otter (\$45.60)
1963	3 Caribou (\$100.00)	2 Otter (\$22.00)
1964	5 Caribou ¹	2 Otter
1965	3 Caribou (\$ 90.00)	2 Otter (\$22.00)
1966	3 Caribou	2 Otter
1967	3 Caribou (\$113.00)	-----

In Phase III, the earlier departure of the Canadians deprived UNEF of its air support sooner than had been planned. Egyptian restrictions on providing air clearances to El Arish airfield led the UN to charter an Antonov 24-B from Misrair (an Egyptian airline). This was painted white, marked with "U.N." crests, and numbered UN-90. It was only able to make three flights--on 2, 3, and 4 June--before the fighting broke out. That was the last of the UNEF aircraft although it might be noted that from somewhere a special charter flight was arranged which flew from Lod Airport to Nicosia on 11 June with UNEF casualties--12 stretcher and 4 sitting cases.

Vehicles - In Phase I UNEF had an immediate and severe shortage of vehicles. Several contingents had not contemplated bringing their vehicles with them because they judged their normal equipment would not be appropriate for desert conditions. On the other hand, those contingents which did bring their vehicles with them helped contribute to the many headaches stemming from non-standardization of equipment which plagued UNEF for most of its life.

The ten observers from UNTSO, who were first on the scene, brought with them some jeeps which, along with their Motorolas, were invaluable at UNEF's beginning. Burns states that: "One of the more difficult problems in making UNEF truly operational was to collect the transport, ship it by sea to Port Said, and

¹ The UNYOM air support was combined with UNEF's at this time. With the end of UNYOM, 2 Caribou returned to Canada.

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put it in running order."¹ Of great help was the fact that UNEF was able to purchase vehicles from the withdrawing Anglo-French force. These helped fill the gap while contingent transport was being awaited. Some vehicles obtained from UNRWA, local purchases and rentals also helped. The Yugoslavs, Canadians, Brazilians, and Indonesians brought their own mechanical transport. The Indian infantry battalion and the Norwegian medical company were rushed to the scene with no vehicles at all. Shortly after UNEF was formed a large order for vehicles was placed with U.S. military authorities and these arrived in January 1957. By October 1957, the Secretary-General could report that UNEF had approximately 1,100 trucks and trailers of forty different types and makes.² The number settled to a level between 850-900 as the years progressed.

Detailed surveys of UNEF holdings and vehicular requirements were begun in earnest in 1959-60 at which time it was also decided to standardize the types of vehicles for use by UNEF. In 1961, the vehicular policy of "run-down to the point of sale as scrap" was changed to a replacement policy based on relative maintenance costs. As of 1 March 1961, of the total Force holdings of 950 vehicles, 769 were United Nations-owned and 181 were contingent-owned. The different types of UNEF vehicles at this point are shown in Annex J. Also at that time it was reported that most of the armored cars and scout cars had been returned. By 1965 it was reported that UNEF general purpose vehicles had been standardized to the following: M-151 jeeps, CJ-5 jeeps, 2 CV Citroen sedans and vans, Dodge power wagons, Bedford cargo trucks and Volkswagon transporters. In that year all the M-38 A1 jeeps and heavy GMC cargo trucks were to be eliminated except for a few special-purpose vehicles. Standardization held its own traps, however. It was found, for instance, that there was a considerable variation of components among apparently similar Bedford 3-ton trucks.

Budget stringencies did not allow a completely satisfactory vehicular replacement program for UNEF. A technical study in

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 242.

² However, a Canadian officer could state in 1964 that the last time he counted them there were some 155 different types among the 800 vehicles of the Force.

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1966 revealed that more than 40% of UNEF's vehicles were over five years old or had run over 100,000 miles, and that about 25% of the vehicles had become inoperative and were "off the road." How many of the operative vehicles were transferred to Pisa after UNEF's withdrawal is not known to us. Some were transferred to UNWRA and UNTSO, others were no doubt disposed of locally. Many were no doubt victims of the war. "All of the United Nations vehicles in running condition had also been removed by Israel forces and were seen in use in the Gaza area" says the final UNEF report at one point.¹

6. Communications: The Motorola radios in the jeeps brought from UNTSO have already been mentioned. They provided a vital link between Egyptian lines and Port Said. General Burns initially sent messages to the Anglo-French forces to Cyprus but there were frequent delays and errors due to differences in radio procedure. Later he set up a UN station in Port Said as a link to UNEF and the Anglo-French Allied Force Headquarters there. He pays tribute to Mr. Paul Altorf, the Chief Communications Officer of UNTSO, who had been able to set aside a large reserve of communications equipment. Altorf came to Egypt to superintend the setting up of UNEF's initial rearward and forward communication links. A Canadian signal detachment of about 50 officers and men soon arrived but the amount of equipment they could bring by air was strictly limited. It wasn't until 11 January 1957 that the full Canadian unit and their equipment arrived on the HMCS Magnificent. The Canadians were supplemented by a small Indian unit. Most of UNEF's local communications were handled by military personnel while most traffic beyond the area was serviced by Field Service personnel. Contact with New York was again maintained through the nearby facility provided by UNTSO.

These initial facilities carried on over into Phase II. By 1960, VHF wireless equipment providing five speech channels had been installed between Gaza headquarters and the Rafah maintenance area. This allowed a reduction of 30 personnel in the Canadian signals unit and a saving of heavy rental which was being paid for the land line. The 1962 budget proposed replacement of \$125 contingent-owned field type telephones with \$18.50 commercial type sets. The 1961 completion of the radio-telephone system to El Arish needed a further investment in a 40 line switchboard to the 115 ATU camp at Marina, giving UNEF

¹ A/6672, 12 July 1967, para. 118.

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a uniform telephone system. The three main bases at Gaza, Rafah and El Arish were to have teleprinter service. In 1963 it was noted that there were 15 switchboards of various national types in company position along the ADL. Five years of use necessitated the beginning of some replacement and it was proposed to standardize in the United States Army switchboard of type SB-22. A better link with vehicle-mounted sets was proposed through erecting 3 antenna masts whose 60 foot height was essential to provide the required range to patrol cars in valleys between sand dunes. The eventual UNEF communications nets as they existed in January 1967 are shown in diagram form in Annexes K, L, M and N.

In Phase III, the mobile Motorola sets, no doubt, provided an invaluable fall-back system but in spite of this, contact with the international staff at Camp Rafah broke down between 5 and 9 June, being reestablished on the latter date. On 5 June 1967, the UNEF Headquarters radio antenna was damaged by shelling but repaired under fire by Field Service technicians. On 6 June at about 1130 hours, the headquarters building received direct artillery hits and all its radio links were broken. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the closing of the UNEF radio at Port Said on 6 June. The facilities available at Camp Tre Kroner, which became UNEF's headquarters temporarily, were evidently sufficient for emergency communication needs. U Thant paid special tribute "to the exceptional performance of the Field Service communications personnel with UNEF, who in very confused and often hazardous circumstances maintained UNEF's communications with the outside world."¹

7. Maintenance, Stores and Repairs: The initial offers of military units for UNEF were conspicuously lacking in the essential support units which any force requires. General Burns had insisted from the beginning on these needs, and, in spite of the blow to Canadian pride in Nasser's refusal of the "Queens Own Rifles," he came to feel that the refusal was:

...a blessing in disguise, for the administrative and supporting troops Canada provided then and subsequently were absolutely essential, and the force could not have operated without them. It was not feasible for other contributing nations to furnish technical and administrative troops of the kinds needed, as was proved by

¹ A/6730/Add. 2, 26 June 1967, para. 7.

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the lack of response to the request for such contributions which had been sent out by the representatives on November 10.¹

Accordingly it was to the Canadians that most of the responsibility for UNEF maintenance and repair fell.

The first units were those which had been organized for support of the "Queens Own Rifles." These were detached from the battalion and made immediately available.

Burns insisted that the engineer detachments to be provided by Canada and Yugoslavia should be equipped with a good scale of mine-detecting and clearing equipment--one of UNEF's major problems. The Israelis had planted a number of mine belts and provided UNEF with full and accurate information as to where these were located. Inevitably, however, there were a number of scattered mines whose positions were unknown to the UNEF troops, and particularly the Yugoslavs following the Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai desert had to probe for mines (which were of the plastic variety) over every foot of the routes they traversed. Until Hammarskjold protested vigorously to the Israel government, the withdrawing troops had also systematically destroyed roads, railroads and communication lines as they withdrew. UNEF did not possess adequate engineer resources to make the needed repairs and had to call on Egypt for assistance. They quickly organized a labor force and UNEF essential transport was soon able to get through.

Early arrangements were also made with the staff of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCELM) which was to be the main channel for the logistical support promised by the United States. While UNEF experienced many difficulties in getting supplies of all sorts, there is at least one indication that logistical support went more smoothly than might have been anticipated. The U.S. liaison group had suggested that a base organization be established at Naples as a point of delivery for U.S. items of support. Burns says:

As things developed it was found unnecessary to establish such a base. No stores or equipment were held under UN control at Naples, except a limited

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 215.

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quantity of things so urgently required that they had to be forwarded by air, which the RCAF could safeguard.¹

Ad hoc assembling of all the various types of materiel required was accomplished and the accomplishment is a tribute to the UN administrative services and those who cooperated with them. But it is an unsatisfactory system and the conglomerate of resulting types of equipment carried in its wake a maintenance and spare parts problem that haunted UNEF all its life. Down through the years there is constant reference to the spare parts problems and attempts at standardization so that line item stocks of spare parts could be reduced in numbers. The problem of financing UNEF and the indefinite nature of its "emergency" life, of course, was a built-in factor causing postponement of rationalization. It wasn't until 1965, for instance, that standardization and maintenance systems improvement permitted the adoption of a "float of major assemblies" replacement method. That a good deal of rationalization was accomplished is reflected in the fact that in 1965 there was a write-off and sale of UNEF surplus property with an initial value of \$1,266,704.60.

Besides the inevitable initial problems of securing adequate quantities of transport, communications equipment and food, there were, needless to say, many other items which caused difficulties. Egypt helped supply the advance elements of UNEF with tents, field kitchens, jeeps, and all sorts of other things.² One contingent planned to bring its wood burning tent stoves--for which more appropriate oil stoves had to be substituted. There was the famous problem of how to provide the UNEF troops with a distinctive item of uniform--a problem on which Under Secretary Vaughn is reported to have run up a world-wide telephone bill in his search for blue berets. The eventual answer was, of course, the U.S.-style helmet liner sprayed blue. It is reported that the Indonesian offer of troops was put aside, and even forgotten, for several weeks after Jakarta notified the UN that its men would need winter uniforms. Other troops needed summer uniforms. (The 1958 budget provided for \$204,000 for clothing and uniforms.)

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 211.

² Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Associates, International Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 151.

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The resources of the area made provision of gasoline, oil and lubricants no problem for UNEF. On the other hand, finding and providing adequate water for the needs of the force was a continuing problem. UNEF developed its own well-drilling program and built up a fleet of water-supply trucks. The problems with maintaining the water distillation plant at Sharm el Sheikh are well known. Then, in turn, the proximity of the camps in Gaza to the shore of the Mediterranean became a problem as ground began to be fouled by sewage. So UNEF developed sewage disposal facilities and ran a group of swill trucks. Construction of UNEF buildings and the maintaining of old ones was a continuing operation. It is noted that electrical circuits had become dangerous in the latter years of UNEF's life. The equipment for maintaining UNEF roads had deteriorated to a point by 1965 that a special plea was made on the basis that the inability of the engineers to maintain this network endangered UNEF's ability to fulfill its mission.

UNEF varied from time to time as to the level of major automotive repairs it felt capable of handling. Hammarskjold states in his Summary Study that the Canadian Ordnance Workshop was not designed for the repair of large components. Contract arrangements were generally made for such repairs.

With a mixture of contingent-owned equipment--for which the UN had certain reimbursement responsibilities--and UN-owned equipment, UNEF had to maintain two types of records and engage in two different systems of recording. What was involved in establishing this system can be seen in the 1958 report of the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions:

- (a) Complete property accounting in respect of equipment owned by the United Nations is to be continued as heretofore in accordance with the UNEF Financial Rules;
- (b) Contingent-owned equipment is to be subject to the property-accounting practices prescribed by the Government concerned, the definition of "equipment" as against "expendable supplies" also being dependent on national practice;
- (c) Contingents have been requested to prepare, as of 1 October 1958, lists of all equipment now or previously held, in accordance with certain defined categories;

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- (d) Changes occurring in equipment after 1 October 1958 are to be reflected in immediate amendments to the lists referred to in (c) above;
- (e) Notification has been given to contingents that, after 1 January 1959, the United Nations can accept no financial responsibility for any type of equipment, expendable supplies or items of personal issue, unless prior approval to transport such items to the area of operations has been received from the United Nations Secretariat in writing;
- (f) By 1 January 1959, the basic equipment needs of each contingent are to be set forth in standard tables of equipment approved by UNEF headquarters. All contingent-owned equipment in excess of these tables is to be segregated and authorized for return to the home country.¹

As we have pointed out above, the maintenance, stores and repair functions of UNEF was an almost exclusively Canadian affair. However, the Indians provided the India Composite Unit which operated the Supply Depot, the POL (petrol, oil and lubricants) Depot, and also included a Transport Platoon, which worked with the Canadian Transport Company. The 1965 Survey Team noted that the administrative elements could be streamlined to save money and also that: "The division of responsibility between the Canadian and Indian contingents is also impractical from the point of view of command and control and causes duplication and uneven functioning."² It recommended Canadian responsibility and a survey in detail of Rafah by independent experts. The next annual report on UNEF of September 1966 noted that the Force Commander (presumably General Rikhye) had recommended that, in view of the specialized nature of UNEF operations, it "would not be possible to improve on the expertise available within the Force and the Secretariat." After his survey, he recommended the withdrawal of the "Indian Composite Company, Army Service Corps" and this was done in October 1966. The former Indian support strength of 96 men was down to 48 by February 1967 and was to be reduced to 14.

¹ A/4002, 19 November 1958, para. 10.

² A/C.5/1049, 13 December 1965, para. 26.

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An outline of the organization of UNEF in 1964 as provided by a logistics officer is carried as Annex O. The total of units based in Camp Rafah as of 1 February 1967 is shown in the staff list of Annex P. The descriptions of those most relevant to this section (but also including the postal unit) are as follows:

UNEF Engineer Company

The UNEF Engineer Company is responsible for the provision of operational engineer services, the construction and/or maintenance of all accommodation occupied by the Force within the policy and priorities as decided by HQ UNEF, the operation of large static generating plants, the operation of water points, purification of water, and the repair of engineer-installed and/or operated equipment. To accomplish these tasks, the UNEF Engineer Company provides detachments at various locations throughout the Force.

56 Canadian Transport Company

56 Cdn Transport Company provides second line transport for UNEF. This transport is used to move bulk materiel for the overall logistic support of the Force, and to provide additional transport for units when required. This unit also provides the light vehicles for HQ UNEF Maintenance Area and for movement control detachments in UNEF as directed by HQ UNEF Logistics Section.

296 Indian Composite Unit

- a. The 296 Indian Composite Unit operates the Supply Depot, including the cold storage depot at PORT SAID, the POL Depot, and provides one Transport Platoon of second line transport.
- b. The Supply Depot is responsible for the requisitioning, receipt, holding, issuing and accounting of all food items for UNEF and for the maintenance of Force reserves.
- c. The POL Depot is responsible for the requisitioning, receipt, holding, issuing and accounting for POL and hygiene chemicals used in the Force and for the maintenance of Force reserves.

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- d. The Transport Platoon of 296 Composite Unit works in conjunction with 56 Cdn Transport Company in the provision of second line transport.

UNEF Ordnance Company

The UNEF Ordnance Company is responsible for the requisitioning, receipt, holding, issuing and accounting for all items of ordnance stores, ammunition and equipment in UNEF; the inspection of unit ordnance accounts; maintenance of Force reserves of stores and equipment; and repair of non-technical stores. Issues of stores and equipment from the UNEF Ordnance Company are made in accordance with Logistics Manual Part III Scales of Issue.

56 Canadian Infantry Workshop

The 56 Cdn Inf Workshop performs the field or second line stage of repair to all electrical, mechanical and communications equipment in UNEF except for a small portion of the responsibility which is delegated to other units by HQ UNEF. The Workshop is also responsible for the inspection of all electrical, mechanical and communications equipment in the Force, and for base repair as decided by HQ UNEF.

UNEF Postal Unit

The UNEF Postal Unit is responsible for the receipt, sorting, issue and despatch of mail for all units except to and from India and Yugoslavia. The unit is also responsible for the provision of normal post office facilities at certain locations throughout the Force. Postal service within contingents and units is the responsibility of the respective contingent or unit.

UNEF Medical Equipment Depot

The UNEF Medical Equipment Depot is responsible for the requisitioning, receipt, holding, issuing and accounting of all medical and dental supplies and for the maintenance of Force reserves.

As an additional development which is pertinent it might be noted that in 1962 or 1963 "in order to provide improved and

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covered accommodations for UNEF stores and increase the security of attractive items in transit," agreement was reached between UNRWA, Egypt and UNEF, whereby UNEF was able to have rent-free utilization of the UNRWA warehouse facilities at Port Said.

Near the end of UNEF the guard functions at Camp Rafah were being taken over by the Canadians (a number of various contingents fulfilled this function at different times - the last full guard company was Brazilian) and completion of a double fence around the base was being speeded. There was even some discussion as to whether the cost of guards did not amount to a great deal more than possible losses in pilferage.

The general system of equipment procurement which developed in UNEF was for the military Chief Logistics Officer to work very closely at the staff level with the civilian elements on overall policy and budgetary control. As of early 1967, on the military side, expenditures exceeding approximately \$600 would need this officer's approval while lower ceilings were subject to subordinate unit decision. Indoctrination lectures were conducted at both the staff level and at Camp Rafah for the logistics officers of incoming contingents, who were often members of the advance parties. Further means of facilitating the problem caused by frequent rotation and varying national procedures were: (I) the holding of regular liaison meetings of contingent logistics officers; (II) the sending of mobile repair teams to contingent sites and inspecting their repair performance at the same time; (III) having contingents themselves bring into Rafah the items to be repaired or replaced; and (IV) doing the required paper work at that time.

Some related problems of Phase III have already been touched on in preceding sections. In the planned withdrawal, orders had been issued for the return of all UNEF stores to the depots at Camp Rafah. All requisitions were reviewed and those which had not been processed were cancelled. A logistical vacuum was created by the earlier Canadian withdrawal and the UN civilian personnel did their best to cope with it. Among the orders issued when fighting broke out was that all camps should have a 15-day supply of food and supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants.

Israeli fire on Camp Delhi caused some damage to Indian national stores but reportedly no other damage or loss of contingent property occurred. With the exception of some

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barrack furniture, all UNEF property was removed from UNEF camps before they were abandoned. It was not technically possible, however, to move the water distillation and power plants at Sharm el Sheikh. Looting, pilferage and removal of UNEF property from Camp Rafah was heavy and compensation for this was to be claimed as part of the process of final UNEF liquidation.

8. Medical: In Phase I, the Norwegian offer of a medical company was one of the relatively few offers which had been made of such essential support units and was accepted quickly. It was rushed to Egypt, without the vehicles absolutely necessary for its task, but managed to set itself up in business right away. Burns writes that when he returned on November 22 from consultations in New York, the commanding officer of the unit was able to report to him that the unit had performed its first emergency operation--an appendectomy on a Colombian soldier who had been taken ill on the aircraft. In New York Burns had requested a senior medical officer for his staff.

The first report on UNEF stated that the health of its personnel had been consistently good "through the cold of the Sinai winter, the rainy Gaza spring and the intense heat of the summer." The vast majority of UNEF cases requiring hospitalization were handled by the medical unit but those who required more than 2 weeks hospitalization were taken out of the area, usually to Naples. There were 52 such cases during the period from 22 November 1956 to 15 September 1957. During the same period the Force suffered 13 fatalities, distributed among eight of the ten contingents and resulting mainly from accidental shootings, encounters with mines and traffic accidents.

There were initially two UNEF hospitals, the base hospital at Gaza--staffed by the Norwegian medical unit, and a Canadian-manned hospital in the Rafah maintenance area. The base hospital had sub-units attached to contingents and outposts; however, several national contingents had their own medical officers and maintained their own medical inspection rooms. There was a dental clinic in the UNEF maintenance area but, again, some contingents had their own dental clinics. In November 1957 the Norwegian and Canadian hospitals were merged into one which was located at Rafah. Emphasis was placed upon both the need and the desirability of UNEF's being medically self-contained and for this purpose a highly qualified medical staff was maintained for surgery, internal medicine, radiology, and bacteriology. By 1 March 1959 only Norwegians were manning the hospital although

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the Canadians continued to maintain a contingent medical inspection room. It is also noted that a UNEF Medical Board had been established to rule upon cases of possible transfer to outside facilities of hospitalized patients.

On 26 October 1959, fire completely destroyed the UNEF hospital and all its equipment except for a mobile X-ray unit. The Norwegians were able to supply a light field hospital which arrived in El Arish on 29 October and was ready for operations on 30 October. This filled the gap until the new UNEF hospital was able to open in early July 1960. During the period 1 August 1959 to 1 August 1960, there were 392 military personnel admitted to the hospital, 101 UN staff members and local UNEF employees and 144 local inhabitants.

UNEF had a particular problem with cases of acute gastroenteritis and acute hepatitis. Scandinavians were found to be the most affected by these two maladies and in 1962 it is noted that a steady decrease in the latter disease had been achieved by giving them gamma globulin inoculations. Tropical hygiene is not a normal part of Scandinavian military medical concern but they developed special instruction booklets for their peace-keeping troops.

On 1 May 1963 a Swedish medical unit took over the responsibility for the UNEF hospital. This was done at the request of the government of Norway which was finding it increasingly difficult to provide medical personnel. The 1965 UNEF report states that the X-ray wing of the UNEF hospital had been destroyed by fire. The X-ray equipment was replaced by the government of Denmark at no cost to UNEF. The 1965 Survey Team, while recommending major personnel cuts elsewhere, felt that the UNEF hospital strength had been cut too much. The 96 Swedes of July 1964 had been replaced by 72 Danes as of July 1965 and was at the level of 57 at the time the Survey Team visited UNEF. The Team recommended a strength of 69 and a continuation of the rotation between the Scandinavian countries that had been instituted. This was evidently agreed to and the Norwegians were scheduled to take over from the Danes in April 1967. On 19 May 1967 the strength of the Norwegian hospital personnel was 60.

During UNEF's life, medical supplies were usually procured from the variety of national sources to which the contingents

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were accustomed. It wasn't until quite late that this was rationalized. The changeover to one source of supplies, that of Canada, was a two-year process of education and adjustment.

In Phase III, the earlier withdrawal of the Canadians caused serious hygiene and sanitation problems as the services they provided were cut off. UNEF coped as best it could but particularly after hostilities broke out and personnel were largely centered near the Gaza beach these became worse. Three of the Indian fatalities occurred when an Indian officer evacuating two seriously wounded soldiers in a vehicle to "the hospital in Gaza" ran over a mine. The Israeli forces in taking over Camp Rafah did not molest the Norwegian personnel and the patients of the UNEF hospital and the commander of the Norwegian unit succeeded in providing blankets to the other UNEF personnel who had been forced to spend the night on the sand in the open without food or water. We have already noted the 11 June flight which evacuated Indian wounded to Cyprus.

9. Rations: UNEF's initial emergency needs of Phase I were largely met from U.S. military rations stocks located in Europe with the required quantities being airlifted to Egypt. The Italians helped feed the troops at the staging area of Capodichino. Contingents were also asked to bring with them from home a 10-day supply of rations. Stores were purchased from the Anglo-French forces. There is even mention of negotiations to purchase the cargo of fresh food on a ship which had been stranded in the Suez Canal.¹ What a touch-and-go situation it was is indicated, however, by General Burn's report that at one point the Force's reserve was down to 650 rations--not enough to feed its troops for one day.

Reserves and normal local and overseas channels were soon built up to meet Force requirements. At an early period in Phase II, UNEF began maintaining a 60-day reserve and maintenance stock of pack and day rations at Rafah, with a thirty-day reserve backing this up in Naples. In addition to this there was occasionally a 90-day supply of rations at Rafah. Most of the supplies came by ship to Port Said and from there by rail to Rafah.

¹ O'Donovan, op. cit.

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One of the main problems of feeding an international force is the variation in national dieting tastes. UNEF soon learned that this could vary considerably even within a country--India being a particular case in point. They began by establishing a comprehensive ration scale, based on Canadian, British and Indian scales, and supplemented to meet some national demands. One logistician stated that there were in fact, however, nine different ration scales in 1964--one for local employees, seven for each of the various national contingents, and one for guard dogs. The UN itself mentions that in early 1958 a revised UNEF ration scale was drawn up by a team of outside food specialists¹ and was on trial. The fact that contingents supplemented the scale by imports from home at their own expense was also mentioned. Another aspect of the subject is mentioned in 1960 with the announcement of KIP which turns out to mean Kitchen Improvement Plan.

Considerable attention was given to the cost of rations and possible means of achieving economies. The estimated ration cost per man per day as reported in UNEF reports is as follows:

1956	\$2.30
1957	2.00
1958	1.25
1959	1.20
1960	.90
1961	.80
1962	.73
1964	.67
1965	.75

An informed breakdown as of early 1967 was that it cost \$.74 to feed a Canadian \$.60 for an Indian and \$.66 for a Brazilian. By 1967 stocks of pack rations had been drastically reduced on the theory that replenishment could be accomplished within 12 hours, by air-drop if necessary.

In Phase III orders were issued for the units to have 15-days supply of rations in their possession when fighting broke out on 5 June. However, one of the factors favoring acceptance of the Israeli arrangements for evacuation via Ashdod--where the main embarkation began on 9 June--was that at the time of decision there were only two days of food supplies left.

¹ Understood to have been a U.S. Army Quartermaster team.

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10. Welfare: The UN has been criticized for not having made adequate early provision for the welfare needs of UNEF. In our opinion this was not only understandable but pardonable in ad hoc emergency conditions. No doubt, inexperience with force-size military operations meant that a welfare program was not mounted as soon as it could have been, however, and a lesson was learned from UNEF in this respect. Let there be no doubt as to the importance of such a program for the troops morale in the face of the tedium of what soon can become a routine guarding mission away from readily accessible entertainment facilities and--in the case of UNEF--a policy of non-fraternization with the local population.

UNEF soon developed a welfare program. The chart of Annex A shows that a Welfare Officer was detailed to UNEF from the UN staff in 1957. Subsequently this officer was "internationally recruited." He was provided to the UN by the American YMCA who paid the officer's salary and was reimbursed by the United Nations. The last occupant of this post was Mr. William Brown, who would have been there four years had he completed his assignment, which was to last until 1968. The responsibilities of the UNEF Welfare Officer as drawn up by Mr. Brown is carried as Annex Q. As can be seen the program included an extensive sports program (\$1,000 a year was provided for trophies and medals for UNEF sports competitions), beaches and fishing facilities, live entertainment shows,¹ UNEF talent shows, films, tours to places of local interest, a library.

UNEF also provided a Leave Center, located part of the year near Beirut and the remainder of the year in Cairo. This service began in April 1957 and a very large proportion of the Force used it. The leave policy in 1957 was to grant 18 days for six months' service with UNEF. A new policy was announced in 1965 of giving 15 days for a six-months' tour but up to 42 days for a year's tour of duty. Unequal national contingent pay conditions created a problem of inequality as to a soldier's potential for making use of his leave, although the UN policy, implemented on 17 December 1956 and continued unchanged for the

¹ The Golden Gate Quartet provided the first such show in the spring of 1957 and Abbe Lane was there in the summer of that year. Ingemar Johansson gave boxing exhibitions during the 1959-60 year.

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life of UNEF, of paying itself a local allowance of \$.86 per man per day, was of some help. For this, as well as other reasons, the proportions of contingents taking advantage of some of the welfare programs provisions differed. For instance, with regard to national allotments made for the leave centers in early 1967, the Indians and Yugoslavs used 100% of their allotments, the Canadians 60%, Brazilians 80%, and Scandinavians 70%. On the sight-seeing tours, which were not paid for by UNEF, the main participants were the Brazilians and Scandinavians.

"PX" facilities were provided by the Service Institute Warehouse, with profits going to supplement welfare activities. Each contingent had its own method of distribution of these goods. In early 1967 there was a ceiling on inventory of the Warehouse at a \$250,000 level but the annual turnover was about 8 times that.

Mail facilities were provided by UNEF although the Yugoslav and Indian contingents handled their own. In 1957, for instance, the policy was for UNEF to pay the costs of 5 air letters per week for each man to send to his home country. UNEF also produced its own illustrated news publication, the Sand Dune. This was the responsibility of the UNEF Information Officer, who also handled press relations and the distribution of United Nations information materials.

The national contingents themselves provided for religious services and other welfare activities related to national benefits or programs.

11. Other UN Operations: During its fairly long life, there was an interplay of supporting roles which was an interesting feature of UNEF and which deserves at least brief mention insofar as they appear in UNEF reports.

--UNTSO. As covered in previous sections UNTSO played a key role in the launching of UNEF. Not only did its Commander come from being Chief of Staff of UNTSO but UNTSO provided the initial improvised staff and ten observers, jeeps, air support, and vital communication equipment. UNTSO also was UNEF's initial communication link to Geneva and New York. At least in the beginning UNTSO observers were also seconded to UNEF for service

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as its liaison officers in Cairo and Tel Aviv. UNTSO and UNEF played a joint role on the Egyptian-Israel border and close coordination took place. UNTSO was to receive UNEF materiel on the latter's withdrawal and one expects there was a cooperative relationship normally in supplies.

- UNRWA. There was a very close working relationship with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNEF and UNRWA entered jointly into the early abortive effort to establish UN administration over Gaza. They shared port storage facilities in Port Said and UNEF's air unit supplied scheduled flights for UNRWA (which the latter paid for). They helped with materiel in UNEF's critical launching stage and in turn inherited supplies made available by UNEF's withdrawal.
- UNSCO. After the first few days, the UN Suez Clearance Organization (UNSCO) operated independently of UNEF but there was one interesting connection. After much bitter dispute the Egyptians had agreed that some 10 of the Anglo-French salvage vessels could remain as part of the clearance operation. The condition was, however, that the Anglo-French crews must be dressed as civilians and that they would be protected by small detachments of "civilian guards" recruited from the Swedes and Finns of UNEF--about 80 in all. UNSCO, with some difficulty provided the civilian clothes which the UNEF guards wore along with the UNEF blue beret and arm band.¹
- UNOGIL. The UNEF report of September 1959 mentions the receipt (on withdrawal) from the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) of 102.9 tons of general stores, 33 quarter-ton utility trucks, 18 water trailers and 2 station wagons. Certainly UNEF must have played a role in UNOGIL's establishment but we find no details on this beyond a general statement made in 1963.²
- ONUC. Thirteen UNEF officers were initially loaned to the Congo operation for one to two months for staff

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 236.

² A/C.5/1001, 2 December 1963, para. 4.

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duties. On 19 July 1960 the UNEF Swedish battalion was sent on a one month temporary assignment to ONUC. Extension of their stay in the Congo was then made on the basis of the individuals concerned volunteering to do so, with a new UNEF battalion being provided from Sweden. 100 members of the original battalion did not so volunteer and were returned to UNEF as a company to serve out their tour. On 16 April 1961, the newly arrived Swedish UNEF battalion was again called upon and the equivalent of 2 companies were sent to ONUC and from then on the Swedish battalion stayed at the reduced level. UNEF was also called upon at short notice to transfer approximately 80,000 lbs. of defense stores to ONUC in June 1961.

--UNTEA. The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) is included in a 1963 general statement of operations in which UNEF had played an important role in setting up and providing initial services.¹ Eight observers came from UNEF.

--UNYOM. During June and July 1963 UNEF provided administrative and logistics support on short notice to the UN Yemen Observation Mission. This included key staff officers and the equipment and supplies required to sustain the advance elements for a 30-day period. These were air-lifted to Yemen from El Arish and two of the five UNEF aircraft stayed on assignment to the mission. From the UNEF Yugoslav battalion, 115 men were drawn and sent to Yemen by UNEF-arranged shipping out of Port Said. UNEF supplied these men with pack rations, medical, canteen and miscellaneous stores such as uniforms, bedding, tentage, field cookers, refrigerators, communications equipment and a few vehicles and water trailers. Canada had provided two Caribous for UNYOM and prior to February 1964, the UNEF ATU carried out major maintenance for UNYOM air unit moved to El Arish and the two units were combined with responsibility for carrying out air support for both missions. Total assistance to UNYOM from UNEF for rations, stores and equipment up to 31 May 1964 amounted to \$157,700.

¹ A/C.5/1001, 2 December 1963, para. 4.

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- UNIPOM. UNEF loaned the UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) one of its Caribou aircraft from September 1965 to April 1966. It also shared with UNIPOM the Canadian Hercules flights which originated in Marville, France and extended fortnightly from El Arish to Lahore.
- UNFICYP. After the Cyprus operation began the Canadian Yukon flights which helped meet UNEF air-lift needs were combined to serve both UNFICYP and UNEF. The UN portion of these flights was shared in cost between the two operations. As has been seen in previous sections, UNFICYP served a vital function for UNEF as an evacuation reception area in that emergency situation.

C. BUDGETED REQUIREMENTS

The financial rules for UNEF were established in December 1956¹ and were patterned as closely as possible on the existing United Nations financial rules and procedures. Detailed field procedures were effected through Command orders and administrative instructions. As described by Hammarskjold in his Summary Study, after some preliminary explorations the UNEF accounts were operated after 1 July 1957 on an imprest account basis--cash needs being reported to UN Headquarters with all expenditures and commitments reported to them for recording and auditing. The Controller made the necessary allotments for obligation or expenditure.

Annual budgets were prepared and, on some occasions, formally amended and resubmitted. After 1958 the line items in the budgets remained generally the same. There were two main parts, part A dealing with the operation of the Force and part B covering reimbursement to governments for costs incurred in providing military contingents. Part B had two sections: the first covered "extra and extraordinary" costs relating to pay and allowances; the second covered compensation to be paid in respect to equipment, material and supplies.

Annex R is a comparative chart of UNEF budgeted expenditures for 1957-1967. The high point for UNEF budgeted expenditures was for \$30,000,000 which covered the 10 November 1956

¹ ST/SGB/UNEF/2.

to 31 December 1957 period. The subsequent lowest point for a full year's operation was 1966 when the total was \$16,145,984. From this it will also be seen that, excluding the time lag factor implicit in 1957, portion B of the budget devoted to reimbursement to governments providing military contingents varies between 38% and 51% of the total budget. It should further be pointed out that part B does not include contingent rotation transportation costs nor, of course, the allowance paid locally by the United Nations.

The minor sub-divisions of the budget are not reproduced in Annex R but they have been provided in Annex S for those portions of part A of the budget concerned with equipment, maintenance, supplies and services.

IV

UNITED STATES SUPPORT

A. ORGANIZATION

On 7 November 1956, Israel, Egypt, France and the United Kingdom accepted the cease-fire unconditionally. Three days later, 10 November 1956, the Acting Secretary of State submitted to the President of the United States a joint proposal by the Departments of State and Defense for U.S. assistance in the establishment of UNEF. The proposal was approved by the President at seven o'clock on the evening of the same day. With regard to reimbursement, it was agreed that the initial airlift would be provided without charge to the United Nations but that other assistance furnished to the UN would be on a reimbursable basis.

The plan provided not only for non-reimbursable airlift but also non-reimbursable surface lift. It was further stated that military facilities could be supplemented by commercial charter if necessary. Other participating states with which the U.S. had bilateral arrangements for military assistance were to be authorized to use MDAP equipment for their forces assigned to UNEF. The non-reimbursable portion was to be covered by the Department of Defense seeking to secure supplementary appropriations. The reimbursable support would be handled in accordance with the provisions of the UN Participation Act as amended and appropriate Executive Order. No U.S. military

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personnel were to enter nor would U.S. supporting facilities be established in the area supervised by UNEF. It was proposed that wherever possible where new procurement would be required for UN logistical support requests, direct UN procurement would be encouraged without billings going through U.S. accounts. Reimbursement in such cases was to be based upon specific costs incurred for services rendered in connection with procurement or movement of the items procured.¹

Both the Department of State and the Department of Defense were to designate representatives to handle UNEF support. The Department of Defense designated the Department of the Navy as Executive Agent to coordinate its overall support and billings. The Department of State was to notify Defense as to accredited UN and UNEF requisitioning and receiving agents who would be dealing with field representatives of the U.S. This information was to be passed to the Navy Command in Europe, as the representatives of the Executive Agent.

UN requests were to be in writing but such a formality could be postponed in event of emergency request. Screening criteria were to be drawn up. State was to clearly mark any non-reimbursable item prior to forwarding the written request to Defense. Each Service was to accumulate all charges and summarize them in a quarterly statement to the Navy. Each Service would append to its statement a listing referring to each shipment document by number and the value of the items furnished. The actual shipment or issue documents would be retained by the respective Services but arrangements for their audit by UN representatives could be made if desired.

This system was put into effect. In addition, agreement was soon reached with UN representatives that "accessorial charges" (packing, crating, handling and transportation) would be added to item costs. The Army in a 3 December 1956 memorandum fixed these accessorial charges at 16% and it was agreed that these would be computed by FAAG, U.S. Army on an army-

¹ The reimbursement policy was evidently strictly followed. A letter of 10 July 1959 directs the Benicia Arsenal (as one of many who received such letters) to reinstate any charges against UNEF which had been waived since the Comptroller of the Army, Foreign Financial Affairs, had advised that there could be "no waiver of reimbursements in connection with logistical support furnished UNEF."

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wide basis and added to the bill rendered through the Navy.¹

Later, at UN request for additional data, the system described above was changed as of 7 March 1958 to also include sending along to the UN with the quarterly billing, actual copies of each shipping document listed.

Earlier in the process a distinction had been made for the procedures to be followed for "Routine Requests" as differentiated from "Non-Routine Requests." We do not have the exact definitions of the terms in the case of UNEF for this differentiation but they are with little doubt the same as those for the ONUC support system where we do have the definitions.² The procedures used for requests for UNEF are diagramed in Annex T. Subsequent to the time this Annex T diagram was drawn, the UNEF/NAPLES office moved to Pisa. This took place in 1958 and the office was the major link between U.S. supplies in Europe and UNEF. As can be seen from Annex V, by far the major source of U.S. support for UNEF was the Army. Most of the supplies of this support came through the regular Army supply pipeline or from stocks in Europe. The Army facilities at Leghorn and the surrounding area under the 8th Logistical Command were the channel, and a USA/UNEF Liaison Officer was stationed by the Army at the UNEF Pisa base. Originally it was the Navy that supplied this liaison officer.

That the system of providing U.S. logistical support to UNEF at its initial stage was not without its problems is indicated by the following quote from General Burns:

UNEF experienced many difficulties in getting supplies of all sorts. This was not due to any lack of goodwill or energy on the part of the U.S. officers with whom we had to deal, but essentially the difficulty was inevitable when a

¹ A U.S. Air Force bill for the period 1956 through 30 June 1958 was returned by the Navy to the USAF for resubmission; one of the reasons being that the USAF had used a lower accessorial charge of 12½%.

² See the ONUC paper of this study.

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very large and complex machine, designed to support the U.S. forces in Europe and their allies, was expected to provide for the wants of a relatively small heterogeneous force of unique character.¹

Nevertheless, the system worked out its problems as it went along and appears to have functioned quite effectively. The original conversations in New York between representatives of the U.S. services and the UN Office of General Services which developed the above arrangements called the system one of "letters of assistance." The somewhat informal nature of their arrangements at the beginning is indicated by Mr. David Vaughn in a letter of 12 February 1958 maintaining the lower register letters and quotation marks in referring to the "letters of assistance" arrangements.

By October 1958 the Assist Letter system had become much more formalized, not only for UNEF, but also for UNOGIL which was launched in June of that year. On 29-30 October 1958 a UNEF/UNOGIL Logistical Support Conference was held at the U.S. Army Logistical Command, Leghorn, Italy.² Attending the meeting were representatives of:

UN Headquarters, New York
U.S. Delegation to the UN, New York
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Overseas Supply
Agency, Brooklyn
UNEF
UNOGIL
Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg
Headquarters, U.S. Army Communications Zone Europe, Orleans
U.S. Army Logistical Command, Leghorn
U.S. Naval Support Activity, Naples
USN/UNEF Liaison Office, Pisa

At this meeting the existing elements of the logistical system were first examined--the internal UN system, the internal U.S. system, and their interlocking parts. The UN pointed out

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 206.

² A summary record of the conference was attached to the Department of Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, communication OP-401C3/mrc, Ser. 1009 p. 40 of 24 November 1958.

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UN Headquarters must grant authorization before any requisitions are submitted to the U.S. liaison officer for processing through U.S. military sources. It was recommended that all UNEF/UNOGIL requests for U.S. military support material and/or services be submitted for processing through the UN Pisa office. On the U.S. side as much as possible of routine requests were to be handled in Europe without reference back to Washington. Here we have some indication that routine meant other than "unusual requests, excessive requests, ammunition requests, and requests requiring G-2 clearance."

Other problems discussed were:

- the need for a system showing the urgency of requisitions,
- the point of acceptance and inspection of supplies (port of loading or port of unloading),
- minimum acceptable temperature requirements for perishable subsistence,
- a system for determining procurement lead time and availability,
- adequacy of reimbursement billing documentation and jointly agreed numbering systems,
- return of material and equipment,
- retroactive authorizations,
- common instructions applicable to all thru U.S. services.

At the meeting, the representative of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations reiterated U.S. policy with regard to procurement of material for UNEF. He said that the U.S. "will not procure material or supplies not normally carried in U.S. military supply systems for the sole purpose of making the material available to the UNEF. U.S. reimbursable support of the UNEF is limited to those items of supply which are available within the supply system and can be spared."

The UN also raised at the meeting the question of the justification for the 16% surcharge and was referred to the

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office of the Navy Comptroller in Washington. Mr. George Lansky, Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Service, who had attended the Leghorn meeting, made such a query on 12 June 1959.

The Navy's Office of the Comptroller replied that "although the use of the 16% accessorial charge is not covered by written agreement with the UN, it is recalled that the matter was covered in detail to the satisfaction of all concerned in a meeting in your office attended by representatives of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force shortly after the United Nations Emergency Force was originated." The 16% surcharge was based on U.S. past experience of costs for handling of supplies and materials on sales to foreign governments and had been applied since 1950. The Navy Comptroller's letter indicated that a reappraisal of the surcharge would probably result in an increased rate. It was further noted that the presumption had been that delivery would be to the port of Leghorn and that therefore cargo transfer costs and charges for delivery from Leghorn to Port Said were considered as a legitimate extra charge on U.S. Army billings.

The record shows another meeting with the UN officials concerned on 24-25 February 1960 at which many areas of discrepancies and misunderstandings were cleared up. This included such matters as mileage, transportation costs incurred at depots, signature certification, missing documentation, method of statement preparation, overpayments, credits allowed, and considering dropping discrepancies of line items \$50 or less. Another continuing problem which shows up from time to time is that of a mutual identification system between Assist Letter numbers, UNEF requisition numbers and the requisition numbers of the supplying Service. Means of improving the system of dealing with these problems were still being worked on when UNEF came to an end. One very basic change should be mentioned, however, before closing this section. The Navy had been made the Executive Agent for UNEF by a Secretary of Defense memorandum of 12 November 1956. It retained this function through the quarter ending 30 September 1964. In a memorandum of 24 October 1964 the Deputy Secretary of Defense reassigned this function and the Army became the Executive Agent.

B. FINANCIAL SUPPORT

From November 1956 through December 1967, the United States contributed 43.2% of the total UN authorized expenditures for UNEF, including the cost of \$1,191,586 for the initial airlift provided by the U.S. without charge to the UN. However, of U.S. funds provided to the UN, the U.S. received back or was credited with 9% of the total involved for goods and services provided by the three Services of the Department of Defense, without inclusion of the initial airlift. Accordingly, including the airlift but excluding reimbursable support, the percentage of U.S. financial support for November 1956 through December 1967 UN authorized expenditures for UNEF was 39.3%.

Annex U is a table reproduced from a Congressional document. This shows the annual and total U.S. contributions to UNEF as compared with the UN total authorized expenditures from November 1956 through December 1967. The non-reimbursable initial airlift is included in the total U.S. contributions shown on the table. Also included is that portion of the UN bonds which the U.S. calculates as being applied to the July 1962-June 1963 UNEF costs when there was no assessment for UNEF. A further footnote explains that while \$14,000,000 was authorized for UNEF calendar year 1967; upon UNEF withdrawal, this figure was reduced to 11.4 million and the U.S. calculated share was accordingly determined by the U.S. to be \$5,196,000 rather than \$6,384,697.

In an airgram to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on 26 June 1968, the Department of State noted that the revised estimate for 1967 UNEF costs was \$11.4 according to UN Document A/6933 and that its share based upon its previous percentage (per GA Res 2194 XXI) would thus be \$5,196,600. At this time, the outstanding balance due the three Services for reimbursable support per the quarterly statement ending 31 March 1968 rendered by the Department of Army (as the Defense Department Executive Agent) was \$558,546.50. The cablegram stated that this was to be the final accounting for logistical services provided by the United States for the account of the UN Emergency Force. Any further requests or adjustments were to be handled separately. Accordingly the State Department requested that the \$588,546.50 be offset against its UNEF 1967 contribution and announced that it would soon be sending the UN a check for \$4,608,053.50 to cover the remainder.

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Based upon the above, one would arrive at the following totals for U.S. support of UN total authorized expenditures for UNEF as of 26 June 1968 for the November 1956 through December 1967 period:

Total UN Authorized Expenditures	\$214,438,530 ¹
Total US Assessed Contributions	\$ 61,274,350
Total US Voluntary Contributions (initial airlift excluded)	\$ 23,986,270
Waived Initial Airlift	\$ 1,191,586
UN Bonds (applied to UNEF as US portion)	\$ 6,157,466
Total US Contributions to UNEF	\$ 92,609,652
Percentage of US contributions to total UN Authorized Expendi- tures for UNEF	43.2%
Total US Military Services Reimbursed Support	\$ 8,192,976
Percentage of Reimbursed Support to Total US Contributions	9%
Total US Contributions minus Reimbursed Support	\$ 84,416,676
Percentage of U.S. Contributions minus Reimbursed Support to Total UN Authorized Expenditures for UNEF	39.3%

C. MILITARY SERVICES SUPPORT

As shown above the support rendered to UNEF by the U.S. military services on a reimbursable basis came to a total of \$8,192,976. As apportioned between the three Services, the subtotals were:

¹ Includes airlift.

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Army	\$ 7,408,971
Navy	\$ 664,842
Air Force	\$ 119,181

If one included the cost of the initial airlift, which was waived and made as a voluntary contribution, the total support rendered by the U.S. military services was \$9,384,557. The total of U.S. military support to the total UN authorized expenditures for UNEF would thus represent a percentage of 4.4%, but this in no way represents the importance to the UNEF operation which is attributable to U.S. logistical support.

Annex V is a table, by quarterly billing periods, of available figures on reimbursable support by the three Services as compared with UN reimbursement. The totals shown at the bottom of the table are those as of 31 March 1968. At that point \$558,547 was still owed to the United States and was settled as described in the previous section. Annexes W-1, W-2 and W-3 are graphs drawn from the figures of Annex V showing respectively the available quarterly levels of reimbursable support by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Annex X is a listing of major items of U.S. Army support to UNEF by calendar quarter billing.

The graphs of Annexes W-1, W-2 and W-3 are clear illustrations of the fact that reimbursable logistical support of the three Services was concentrated upon the initial period of UNEF. As a very rough indication of the importance of this support, the total of the figures shown in Annex R for UNEF budgeted expenditures in 1957¹ for Equipment, Rations and Supplies and Services is \$9,744,033. Most of the logistical support furnished by the U.S. Army would fall into these categories. Allowing an additional quarterly billing period for probable delays in billing, the total cumulative billing by the U.S. Army (per Annex V) as of 31 March 1958 is \$5,360,577. This would mean that for these categories in the first crucial year of UNEF, the U.S. Army supplied roughly 55% of the needs. As to food for UNEF, taking the Subsistence figures shown in the same six quarterly billing periods in Annex X, the U.S. Army supplied a total valued at \$2,288,623. The percentage this provides of the \$3,860,272 figure shown for UNEF Budgeted

¹ Which included Nov-Dec 1956.

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Expenditures for Rations in 1957 per Annex R is accordingly 59%. A particular point to be noticed in regard to major items of the above categories of logistical support as shown in Annex X is that almost all of them were provided from U.S. military stocks in Europe. However, while these rough quantitative figures indicate the importance of U.S. military logistical support to UNEF's first year, it must be recalled that they cover more than the emergency Phase I launching period, which we have designated as being from November 1956 to March 1957. It was during this initial period that the logistical support provided by the U.S. military services was quantitatively and qualitatively crucial to the operation.

Phase I: It was the initial airlift, provided by the U.S. at no cost to the UN, which poured men and materiel into Capodichino on a time and quantitative scale which would have been difficult, or even impossible, for the UN to have procured from any other source.

Italy had agreed on 9 November 1956 to make Capodichino available as a staging area. Col. Vance, Col. Gormley and C.H. Owsley of the United States joined the group of military attaches assembled in New York from the countries providing contingents.

It was an extraordinary operation. At one point Bernhoft (Denmark) had Copenhagen, Sieger (Norway) had Oslo, and Vance had Wiesbaden, Germany, on the telephone simultaneously. Wiesbaden was headquarters of the United States Air Forces, Europe, and its Flying Boxcars and Skymasters were to be used to get the Scandinavians to Capodichino. The man on the phone on the other end in Norway did not know what airport would be best for the Skymasters to land and pick up the Norwegian contingent. 'Get them going and decide later where they'll land,' Vance said. Wiesbaden telephoned Oslo and said the planes were on their way to the Norwegian capital. 'If that's wrong, let us know and we'll radio them new instructions in flight' . . . Air Force and MATS (Military Air Transport Service) Super Constellations lifted Colombian jungle fighters from Bogata, and Indian paratroops from Agra, converging on Naples from opposite sides of the globe.¹

¹ Frye, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

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The airlift began on 10 November and by 14 November the USAF and MATS had flown 649 men and 111 tons of equipment to Capodichino. Another author gives an aircraft arrival list for 15 November at Capodichino:

0900:	Canadian plane - 1 offr, 4 men, 4 tons equipment
1437:	1 offr, 37 tps. Danish
1630:	1 plane, 17 tons Danish equipment
1645:	8 offrs. and 22 men, Danish
1717:	10 tons of equipment, Danish
1814:	4 offrs. and 58 men, Danish--8 tons equipment
1850:	3 offrs. and 47 men, 12 tons equipment, Norwegian
2015:	1 offr., 6 men, Danish, 15 tons equipment
2120:	1 offr., 3 men, Danish, 3 tons equipment
2200:	5 offrs., 101 men, Danish, 2 tons equipment
2215:	1 offr., Danish, 5 tons equipment
2350:	1 offr., 47 men, Norwegian, 8 tons equipment. ¹

By 22 November the U.S. had airlifted 1,060 men to Capodichino. The U.S. military planes were, of course, equipped to handle soldiers and military cargo. While the UN was initially able to airlift the men by Swissair from Capodichino to Abu Sueir, the large items of cargo caused a problem of delay. Some of this was handled by Royal Canadian and Italian Air Force shuttle but the rest, sorely needed by the troops on the scene in Egypt, had to follow by the much slower sea route.

In terms of the total U.S. airlift, the main part of it was made to Capodichino but the Indonesians and part of the Indian contingent were flown directly to Beirut. In tabular form the total U.S. airlift as extracted from the histories of the units involved would appear as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Equipment/Baggage</u>
Norway	472	178,162 lbs
Denmark	394	197,082 lbs
Sweden	340	77,702 lbs
Finland	263	61,752 lbs
("UN Support" cargo)		98,516 lbs
Colombia	585	35,000 lbs
India	891	275,000 lbs

¹ O'Donovan, op. cit., p. 31.

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Equipment/Baggage</u>
Brazil	50	na
Indonesia	<u>548</u>	<u>91,484 lbs</u>
Total	3,543	1,014,698 lbs

The Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, Finnish and "UN Support" cargo portions of the above were handled by the 332nd Air Division of the U.S. Air Force, based at Evreux-Fauville in France. The task involved a total of 62 sorties which took place over the period of 10 November to 21 December 1956. Of this, 5 were flights by C-54's, 36 by C-119's and 21 by C-124's. Some of the lift had to be accomplished during bad weather but there were no accidents. It is further worth noting that during the same period this air division had to carry out two other emergency air lifts: one involving Red Cross supplies to Vienna for Hungarian refugees; the other involving evacuation of American personnel in the Middle East.

The Colombian, Indian and Brazilian portions of the air lift were carried out by the U.S. Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and involved both its Atlantic Division and Pacific Division. The Colombians were picked up at the Techo Airport of Bogata and at Palenquero Airfield and flown to Capodichino by Atlantic Division aircraft based at Charleston, South Carolina. The advance party of 50 men was flown out by a C-121C on 10 November and the main body followed on 9 C-121C flights between 19 November and 2 December 1956. One C-121C took the 50 Brazillians from Rio de Janiero to Capodichino on 13 January 1957.

The Indian airlift involved MATS Atlantic Division C-121C's based at Charleston and C-124's based at Denver, Colorado. In addition, MATS Pacific Division sent 2 R7V's from Hawaii. The Atlantic Division Task Force Commander for the lift was Col. Franklin S. Henley who had about 172 people in his air crews, control and maintenance teams. Relief crews, maintenance support, back-up aircraft, etc. were positioned in accordance with the needs of the lift. The Atlantic Division planes made 19 trips from Agra to Capodichino (6 C-124, 13 C-121C) and 7 trips from Agra to Beirut (2 C-124, 5 C-121C). The 2 Pacific Division planes left their Hickam base on 13 November, delivered 50 Indians and a substantial amount of cargo to Capodichino, and

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circled the earth. They were gone from their base 10 days and 91.8 flying hours were involved. The Pacific Division made one additional lift to Beirut. Some of the problems which were encountered were: poor communications, small-pox inoculation records for the airlifted troops, supply support and feeding the passengers.

It was the U.S. Air Force 315th Air Division, based in Japan, which carried the Indonesian contingent from Djakarta to Beirut. The lift which took place from 9-13 January 1957, was called "Operation Olive Branch." The division utilized approximately 170 persons in the operation. One C-119 was used to carry the Indonesian advance party and 9 C-124's completed the lift (6 for troops, 3 for cargo and support equipment). The biggest problem encountered was communication inadequacies. The division also had problems with securing passports for their crews and clearances. The Indonesians lacked yellow fever immunizations but since the disease does not exist on Indonesia, waivers were obtained. Another initial problem was the Indonesians' desire to take along some prohibited phosphorous ammunition. There were 12-hour crew-rest stops at Bangkok and Karachi during which time the troops bivouaced. This gave rise to the problem of who was to pay for the bivouac services.

Rations were a particularly critical problem in Phase I. We have already noted General Burn's concern that at one point he had less than he needed for one day's feeding of his troops in Egypt. The UN obviously could not set up its own food supply pipelines overnight. It had to tap into an existing pipeline. The U.S. met this need and sold the UN millions of dollars worth of field rations from the large stores maintained by the U.S. Army at Leghorn, Italy and at Metz and Dreux in France.

Another well-known contribution of the U.S. in Phase I was the need for some distinctive item of apparel for the UNEF troops. This was provided by initially locating 1,000 helmet liners in Leghorn, where they were sprayed the right color of UN blue and, in less than 24 hours, were issued to UNEF troops just before they boarded the plane for Egypt.

Also as noted earlier, the Army was able to provide on an emergency basis a large part of the vehicles UNEF so desperately lacked at its beginning. To be delivered to Port Said by 4 January 1957 were: 61 jeeps, 17 three-quarter-ton trucks,

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56 2½-ton trucks, 6 ambulances and 2 water trailers. The UNTSO DC-3 rented from the U.S. provided the first emergency UNEF local air transport and the Air Force chartered another to UNEF for the Commanders' use between December 1956 and April 1957.

Some of the wide variety of other initial emergency support provided UNEF can be seen from Annex X including: weapons, medicines, tools, radio sets, switchboards, batteries, flashlights, tear gas grenades, water cans, tents, sleeping bags, etc.

Phase II: For the first year of Phase II of UNEF, the operation continued to depend quite heavily on U.S. logistical support, as illustrated by the rough percentages given at the beginning of this section. However, the amount of U.S. support soon diminished to a much lower level. For example, the four 1960 billings (after credit adjustments) were only about 11.5% of the UNEF budgeted expenditure categories used above; the four adjusted 1964 billings only about 3.4%. After June 1964, evidently the Navy and Air Force no longer supplied any reimbursable support to UNEF.

The Army continued its support for the total of Phase II at varying levels as shown by Annex V. As can be seen from Annex X, however, an increasing number of items came to be supplied from sources other than U.S. Army facilities in Europe. One notices in practically every billing of Phase II the supplying of parts--mainly for vehicles and signal equipment. The famous helmet liner continue to be supplied (and even repaired--see 30 June 1965), and the Army provided UNEF with a considerable number of tents. Very often one also comes across charges for hospitalization of cases which needed treatment not available in UNEF.

Evidently not included in the billings of Annex V were the pay and allowances for a few Department of Defense civilians and Navy officers loaned to UNEF. Billings for these individuals were apparently made separately. As concerns the officer personnel involved, they would constitute a minor departure from the UNEF principle of exclusion of great power military personnel. These personnel on loan continued to be paid by the U.S. government against reimbursement, thereby providing by the terms of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 as amended. The period during which such loans were being conducted was from

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June 1960 through May 1963. For the major part of this period only one officer was involved but at one point there were also two civilians--Mr. William J. Wilken and Mr. Myles F. Jackson. The officer personnel were: Lt. Marland S. Ribble, Lt. John M. Schanghnessey, and Lt. J.G. Edward J. Lyman. Available documents do not indicate what duties they performed or where they were located. One indicates that Mr. Jackson was loaned to "the United Nations Emergency Forces (sic), Gaza" and that he was regularly employed with Manpower Management Authorization Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army.

Phase III: For political reasons, U.S. military aircraft and vessels could not have been used in the evacuation of UNEF. Most of the U.S. logistical support to UNEF for Phase III, and its sequence, therefore, had to do with helping in the unloading, repair and storage of UNEF material returned to Pisa (which by late 1967 became the "United Nations Supply Depot Pisa, Italy"). The fairly large billing and credit shown for the March 1968 statement are largely due to delayed billings from jeeps delivered between 1963-65 and credit for a previous UN payment on 14 jeeps for Yemen, 25 repairable jeeps returned by the UN (\$40,534.95) and 25 non-repairable jeeps returned by the UN (\$650).

V

SUPPORT BY OTHER STATES

In the course of the text of the preceding sections of this paper, most of the information available to us on various national support measures for UNEF has been covered. This section will, therefore, be essentially a summary recapitulation by country.

A. PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE

In the initial stages of UNEF the cooperation of all four parties involved in the dispute was extremely important to its success. The withdrawing Anglo-French force facilitated UNEF's sealift at Port Said, and provided essential rations and vehicles. France eventually refused to pay her UNEF assessments in later years but at the beginning she paid them and also helped the voluntary contribution effort. The U.K. has paid from the beginning, and has made continuing voluntary contributions.

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The Israeli withdrawal was much less cooperative and it refused to allow UNEF on its soil. However, UNEF was most useful to Israel and she cooperated with it and paid her assessments.

Egyptian support was vital. While she refused to pay UN assessments for UNEF, stalled on admitting it and created difficulties over some contingents; she supported it in many other ways. The supply and communication chains of UNEF as a non-fighting force depended upon at least the tolerance of Egypt if not its active help. U Thant has stated categorically in justifying the withdrawal decision that "the operation and even the continued existence of UNEF on United Arab Republic territory after the withdrawal of United Arab Republic consent would have been impossible...."¹

At the beginning of UNEF, Egypt not only provided it with some much needed supplies, accommodations, transport facilities, road repair, etc., but it also soon entered into a detailed status of forces agreement indicative of the type of help needed from a host state.² A partial listing of the contents will illustrate the point: entry and exit; jurisdiction; military police, arrest, transfer of custody and mutual assistance; premises of the Force; vehicle, vessel and aircraft markings and registration, operating permits; arms; privileges and immunities; taxation, customs and fiscal regulations; communications and postal service; freedom of movement; use of roads, waterways; water, electricity, and other public utilities; etc.

B. PARTICIPATING STATES

Brazil - Brazil was a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee. It made its offer of troops on 9 November 1956. According to one author: "the contingent had gone on dress parade in the streets of Rio, and the government had made considerable political capital out of its gesture of international mindedness."³

¹ A/6730/Add. 3, para. 51.

² A/3526, 8 February 1957.

³ Frye, op. cit., p. 23.

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It was one of those countries, chosen by Hammarskjold, that Nasser resisted accepting. Brazil's initial contingent was a battalion of three companies, some 500 men strong. The main part of the Brazilian contingent arrived in Port Said in Brazilian naval vessels on 11 January and 2 February 1957, bringing their vehicles with them. A small party of 50 men with minimum baggage was flown to Capodichino by the U.S. airlift on 13 January. The total contingent was 635 in numbers by 3 July 1958 and stayed at about that level until 1965 when it went to 438, rose to 605 in 1966, and had decreased again to 433 by 19 May 1967. Brazil supplied two of the UNEF Commanders and a Brazilian served on General Martola's staff in New York.

The Brazilian troops served a full year's duty with UNEF but half the contingent was rotated by a Brazilian warship every six months. It is noted in 1963 that the UN reimbursed the Brazilian government \$200,000 per rotation; "actual costs exceed this amount, the Government of Brazil absorbing the difference."¹ This still resulted in a roughly approximate cost in rotation to the UN per-man-year for a Brazilian of over \$600. As of March 1967 a once-a-year rotation had been established. The Brazilian Air Force also provided long range air support.

Canada - The idea for forming UNEF and a good deal of the persuasion necessary to get the idea accepted is attributed to Lester Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs at that time. Pearson has stated in debates in the Canadian House of Commons that the idea had been explored as early as 1953 of replacing UNTSO with a "police force which would have greater powers and greater authority."² The Canadian effort met with no success since "neither the government of Israel nor the government of any one of the Arab states was in favor of that kind of force."³ Evidently only a full scale crisis

¹ A/5495, 16 September 1963.

² J.L. Granatstein, "Canada--Peacekeeper, A Survey of Canada's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," in Alastair Taylor, et al., Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 118.

³ Ibid., p. 119.

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could bring about what was finally (but only partially as regards the total Arab-Israeli borders) achieved in 1956.

In Canadian eyes, the Anglo-French action had endangered the three major bases of its foreign policy--the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Western Alliance--and it moved quickly to fill the vacuum. While Australia and New Zealand supported the Mother Country, Canada led in moderating efforts of the United Nations, in spite of criticism of this role by strongholds of the Empire tradition that existed in the country. Then followed the bitter pill of Egyptian rejection of the "Queens Own Rifles." This was a difficult thing to swallow but swallow it she did with some help of the coating provided by the obvious essential need for UNEF support units on a scale which Canada was much more easily able to supply than most other countries. Further salve to Canadian pride was the subsequent UN request that she provide an armoured reconnaissance squadron. However, one judgment is that in the 1957 Canadian election that followed, the Suez action lost the Liberals more votes than it gained for them.

General Burns, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, became UNEF's first Commander. Brigadier Leech, accompanied by two highly qualified Colonels, joined the informal military group at the Secretariat so vital to launching UNEF.

Canada helped in the initial airlift, not only in bringing some of her own contingent and supplies, but in the Capodichino-Abu Sueir leg of the overall need. The RCAF 114 Communication flight set up this shuttle, based in Naples and maintained it for over a year. For the field life of UNEF, the RCAF supplied needed airlift functions and also UNEF's own internal aircraft needs (115 ATU), up to the point where Egyptian insistence on early Canadian withdrawal cut short its role in evacuation.

In addition to air support and the armored reconnaissance squadron, Canada flew in or brought in by the HMCS Magnificent, the administrative units of the Queens Own Rifles, staff officers, a signals squadron, a field workshop, a field hospital, two transport platoons, and a RCAF communications squadron. Following the acceptance by Nasser, the first Canadian troops flew into Abu Sueir ten days after the first UNEF contingents

¹ Granatstein, op. cit., p. 137.

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had been admitted. In 1957 the Canadian contingent numbered 1,172. Between 1958 and 1965 it varied between 932 and 983. With the withdrawal of the armored reconnaissance unit in 1966, the number dropped to 804 which was the approximate strength of the unit at the time of withdrawal. Canadians served one-year tours and had a staggered replacement system. Canada absorbed the costs of its own initial air and sealift: \$333,312 for the HMCS Magnificent's trip;¹ \$438,819 for the airlift. It paid its assessments and also made voluntary contributions. Canadian participants were from its regular forces which meant that Canada absorbed an approximate annual total of \$5,575,000 for pay and allowances of its UNEF contingent. It further estimated an approximate annual nonrecoverable cost of an additional \$530,500 for its UNEF participation.²

Canada, a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee, had reportedly opposed a unilateral decision by U Thant on UNEF withdrawal. Paul Martin, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, took direct issue on 18 May 1967 with Nasser's right to withdraw consent until UNEF's task was judged completed by the UN itself. Canada also strongly objected to Nasser's subsequent closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel-bound shipping. The result was a 27 May request from Egypt for expedited withdrawal of the Canadians. In the course of agreeing to this, both U Thant and the Canadians refuted Egyptian charges of prior Canadian "procrastination and delay" in departure; Canada further stated that other reasons given by Egypt were based on their "regrettable misunderstanding" of Canada's policy and U Thant acknowledged that in complying with Egypt's request his sole reason was not to expose Canadian troops to hostile local reactions upon which the Egyptian Foreign Minister had expressed fears. The earlier Canadian withdrawal, followed by the outbreak of war made something of a shambles of the orderly withdrawal plans which UNEF had drawn up.

Colombia - Canada had been the first to put its offer of UNEF participation in writing but Colombia was second in a letter written the same day, 4 November 1956. A Colombian was

¹ It brought 406 army personnel, 233 vehicles, 100 tons of stores, and 4 light aircraft.

² IPKO Documentation Series No. 13, March 1967, p. 21.

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a member of the first informal military staff group which went to work in the Secretariat on setting up UNEF and Colombia also was a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee. MATS airlifted 585 Colombians to Capodichino where they were in part outfitted from United States Army stocks in Europe. The Colombians served 6-month tours and withdrew their contingent on 28 October 1958. We have not found a reason given for the withdrawal in the UNEF reports but assume it probably was due to the domestic situation in Colombia in connection with the return of Lt. General Rojas Pinalla.

Denmark and Norway - These two countries made their offer to the Secretary-General in separate letters on 4 November 1956. They were thus the third and fourth to respond. By 19 November the Permanent Representative of Norway wrote in a further letter that Norway had increased its offer in order to make possible the setting up of a joint Danish-Norwegian battalion. In the same letter he announced that a Norwegian field ambulance/medical unit of 230 men was ready for immediate transfer - fully equipped except for vehicles. Airlifted by the USAF to Capodichino, the medical unit and the joint battalion, which came to be known as the DANOR battalion, were soon on the scene in Egypt. Lt. Col. C.F. Moe of Norway headed the improvised staff that General Burns temporarily brought with him from UNTSO.

In New York, Lt. Col. Bernhoft of Denmark and Lt. Col. Sieger of Norway joined the first informal working group. Norway was a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee although Denmark was not.

The DANOR battalion had a mixed command structure and the Commanding Officer of the battalion was alternately Danish and Norwegian. Both countries participated in the SCANAP flight system which was soon set up. The battalion rotated every six months although it should be noted that by the end of UNEF the Scandinavians had agreed to absorb the costs of one of their two annual rotations. The Danish strength over the period varied between 417 and 565; the Norwegian between 289 and 614. These figures include those serving in the UNEF Hospital--a service which rotated between the Scandinavians following Norway's request for relief in this function in 1963 due to increasing difficulties it was having in filling the positions. As of the end of UNEF there was also an agreement reached that the DANOR battalion would alternate in service with the Swedish

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battalion. Thus, on 31 July 1966 there was only one Swede serving with UNEF while on 19 May 1967 the 521-man Swedish battalion was on hand. Likewise on that latter date there were 3 Danes and the 60-man Norwegian hospital unit. Both countries stepped into the breach in medical emergencies - the Norwegians with a temporary light field hospital after the UNEF Hospital fire in 1959; the Danes with a gift of X-ray equipment after a 1965 fire.

The Danes estimate that between November 1956 and April 1967 a total of approximately 10,650 Danish servicemen had been on duty with UNEF (officers - 850, non-coms - 1,500, privates - 8,300). The Norwegians estimate their UNEF service total as of 1 October 1966 as having been 10,822 men.

Both countries paid their UNEF assessments and also made voluntary contributions and bought UN Bonds. With regard to reimbursement claims to the UN for UNEF participation; for the period November 1956 to November 1968, Denmark had submitted claims totaling 123.1 million kroner and had been reimbursed 70.4 million kroner, or approximately 60%. The Danes were still owed 52,800,000 Danish kroner - over seven million dollars. The Norwegians had been reimbursed about 63% on their claims and were owed 30,576,000 Norwegian kroner or approximately \$4,276,000. The Norwegians subsequently submitted a further claim for approximately \$890,000. On this total of over \$12 million, they were reported to have been told by the United Nations in late 1968 that there was not much hope for any substantial reimbursements.

Finland - Finland made its initial offer of help on 5 November 1956; the seventh country to do so in writing. Captain Armo I. Saukkonen was a member of the informal planning group of military attaches. General Martola was soon on hand as the first Military Adviser to the Secretary-General. The officers to head the Finnish Company pledged to UNEF were appointed on 19 November 1956 and told they had 19 days to select their personnel and prepare the company for departure. They were sent off without the necessary equipment for transportation, communication and quartering which they understood would be supplied by the United Nations. To quote a Finnish article: "When on arrival in Egypt there was no sign of the above-mentioned material you can imagine how the Company's Commander

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felt."¹ With help from the Swedes, from local resources, and eventual UN supplies the Company was soon taken care of and played its role in the Port Said and southern Sinai areas.

The USAF airlifted the company to Capodichino on 10 December 1956. The UN took over from there and the main part of the company was in Abu Sueir about 25 hours after leaving Finland. Part of the company had to stay several days in Italy because of engine troubles.² The company totaled about 255 men, served 6-month tours, and were withdrawn on 5 December 1957. The reason given for the withdrawal was that their commitment was for a temporary operation and not for an indefinite one.

India - India's political support for UNEF was an essential element in its being launched. Her cautious approach to the commitment and an offer of troops was indicated in her letter of 6 November 1956.³ India was a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee and two of UNEF's Commanders were Indian generals.

The Indian battalion was flown to Capodichino by MATS and the Indian advance party was among those inspected by General Burns at Abu Sueir on 22 November 1956. In addition to infantry, India provided a small communications unit, a transport unit, supply depot units, and small postal and medical units. In 1959, for instance, out of the total of 1,174 men of the Indian contingent, 249 are noted as being "Administrative Troops." The total strength of the Indian contingent varied between 957 and 1,269. The Indians served one-year tours and the main body rotated by chartered commercial ship. There was a built-in limit to the flexibility of Indian participation in UNEF because the unit was drawn from the regular Indian army, however, major cuts were being made in the size of the contingent near the end of UNEF. Indian

¹ Major U. Kettinen, "Observations and Experience Derived From the Activities of the UN Finnish Company in the Middle East," Military Review of Finland, Vol. 33, (March 1968), No. 312, (IPKO Documentation Series No. 9, June 1967).

² Ibid.

³ A/3302/Add. 4/Rev. 1, 7 November 1956.

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assessments for UNEF financing were fully paid. Most unfortunately, India also paid in lives when war broke out in 1967 and fourteen of her soldiers were killed.

Indonesia - Indonesia in a letter to the Secretary-General of 10 November 1956 indicated its willingness "to contribute its share" to UNEF. General Burns notes that: "Egypt accepted the Indonesian contribution at once...."¹ The Indonesians received high marks on cooperation from the United States Air Force which airlifted the contingent of 548 men from Djakarta to Beirut between 9-13 January 1957. The Indonesians only served one tour, however, and withdrew from participation in UNEF on 12 September 1957, reportedly out of an unwillingness to be committed to an operation of indefinite duration.

Norway - (See Denmark-Norway).

Sweden - Sweden was the sixth country to offer participation, in a carefully phrased letter to the Secretary-General on 5 November 1956 from Gunnar Jarring, at that time Sweden's Permanent Representative to the UN. Two Swedish officers were on the temporary staff which General Burns brought from UNTSO. Lt. Col. Stig A. Lofgren was a member of the informal group of military attachés who worked in New York on launching UNEF. The United States Air Force airlifted 340 Swedes to Capodichino and they were soon serving their initial UNEF duty in Port Said. From there they moved to the Gaza Strip. A brief description of the Swedish battalion has been provided by the Chief of the Swedish Army Staff's UN Department:

The unit was organized, from the beginning, as an independent, reduced Swedish field battalion. The personal armament consisted mainly of sub-machine guns, pistols, hand grenades etc. There were also supporting weapons such as machine guns and recoilless guns. In addition, they had equipment for mine reconnaissance, mine removal and mine-laying. The battalion was quite self-supporting as to lodging and provisioning materials. Provisions and ammunition to cover initial requirements were carried with them. There were personnel and

¹ Burns, op. cit., p. 235.

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material to cover the internal requirements of liaison, medical and repair service, as well as a small number of light vehicles. Other needs of transport were covered through the agency of the UN.

After the battalion had been stationed in Gaza and the duty changed to only guarding duty, certain heavy equipment such as recoilless guns and mines were excluded. The accommodation and the food resembled more and more that of personnel in barracks. Food, accommodation and provisioning material were provided by UNEF.

At the end, the organization of the UN battalion had gradually been adapted to its task--guard duty. In order that the unit, in case of need, could be quickly organized as a combat unit with a self-defence task, there had been a pre-selection of contingent personnel who could have provided the extra specialized skills needed. In addition, certain supporting weapons and other material had been stored in Sweden and could have been quickly brought in had it been called for by a crisis situation.¹

Up to 1966, the number of men serving in the UNEF Swedish contingent varied between 349 and 659. Sweden never fully replaced the UNEF contingent depletion which was due to her 1960 Congo commitment. Beginning in 1966, the Swedish battalion alternated with the DANOR battalion, so that while only 1 Swedish staff officer was with UNEF on 31 July 1966 there were 530 Swedes in UNEF on 19 May 1967. The Swedes also took responsibility for the UNEF hospital from 1 May 1963 to 1 May 1965 (and used female military personnel for the first time in UNEF's history). The Swedish personnel served 6-month tours, although along with Denmark and Norway they were paying for one of the two annual rotations themselves at the end of UNEF. They also were a part of the SCANAP support flight system.

¹ Col. Nils Stenquist, The Swedish UN Stand-by Force and Experience, IPKO Monograph No. 7 (Paris: World Veterans Federation, 1967), p. 4.

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Sweden paid its UNEF assessments, contributed voluntarily and bought UN bonds. As of October 1968, Swedish reimbursement claims had been 83% paid but Sweden was still owed 10,800,000 Swedish kroner or approximately \$2,100,000. Along with the other Scandinavian countries, Sweden was advised at that time that substantial further reimbursement was unlikely.

Yugoslavia - It had been the Yugoslav member of the Security Council who had suggested transferring the 1956 crisis to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace procedure. Yugoslavia's letter to the Secretary-General offering to contribute a contingent was dated 8 November 1956.

An advance party of the Yugoslav contingent was a part of the troops reviewed by General Burns at Abu Sueir on 22 November 1956. The Yugoslav contribution was an armored reconnaissance unit which came to Port Said in two ships on 28 November, accompanied by its vehicles, and was soon following up the Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai. The contingent varied between 506 and 719 in strength. It served 6-month tours. The Yugoslav Air Force flew some support flights to UNEF. Col. L. Musicki, as UNEF's Chief of Staff, served as Acting Commander for a fairly lengthy period--August 1964 to January 1965. Yugoslavia had paid UNEF assessments up to 1967 and it also bought UN bonds.

C. OTHER STATES

Ceylon - Ceylon served as a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee. It had offered a contingent but was not among those finally chosen.

Italy - Italy's prompt offer of Capodichino as UNEF's staging area was of great assistance in the launching of UNEF. The continuing hospitality it provided for the support base at Pisa should also be acknowledged. In the vital early stages of UNEF, Italy further provided "extensive airlift and staging facilities....for troop and supply movements from Naples to Egypt."¹ It also provided without charge: "laborers for loading planes and ships, crating and carting services, local transport facilities, space and telephone services, billeting

¹ A/3694, 9 October 1957, para. 58.

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facilities, airport and hanger facilities, and service personnel."¹ An Italian also served on General Martola's staff in New York. The 1958 Budget Estimates provided for some funds for Italian C-119 flights occasionally made at the UNEF Commander's request. The Italian government only charged for fuel, essential spare parts and appropriate air-crew per diem for these flights. This same 1958 document notes that the office premises required by UNEF in Italy were being provided free of charge by the Italian government, exclusive of utilities.

Netherlands - General Burns' "improvised staff" which came temporarily from UNTSO to help launch UNEF, included Captain J. S. Bor of the Netherlands.

Pakistan - Pakistan had offered a UNEF contingent but encountered resistance from India and Egypt² and was not among those selected. A Pakistani officer did serve on General Martola's staff in New York, however, and Pakistan was a member of the UNEF Advisory Committee.

Switzerland - On 26 November 1956 the Swiss Permanent Observer to the United Nations notified the Secretary-General of his government's decision to "take over as a charge on the Confederation the cost of transporting the United Nations Emergency Force by aircraft of Swissair from Naples to Egypt from 13 to 26 November 1956, which latter was the expiry date of the contract concluded on 11 November between the United Nations and Swissair."³ This was a contribution of approximately \$390,000.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

A. OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

With regard to its Phase I tasks and in respect to its Phase II role covering one sector of the Arab-Israeli dispute,

¹ A/3694, 9 October 1957, para. 60.

² Frye, op. cit., p. 23.

³ A/3302/Add. 29, 11 December 1956.

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UNEF was a very effective operation. In Phase I, UNEF's main task was supervision of withdrawal by the Anglo-French-Israeli forces. While Nasser initially stalled the operation in this phase, the major problem was Israeli resistance to leaving Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh prior to achieving more permanent solutions to its complaints on these two areas. This was not a problem to be solved militarily by UNEF. It was a problem which had to be met by political pressure and reassurances both within and outside the UN framework, before UNEF could operationally get on with its job.

As a buffer-zone operation in Phase II, UNEF worked extremely well. In part this was due to the techniques used. In the densely populated areas of the Gaza Strip the border line was well marked as were the prohibited zones on the Egyptian-controlled side of the line. The UNEF patrolling and observation posts within view of each other insured an adequacy of surveillance to deter violations. The Sinai line was also marked and had prohibited zones which some observation posts, mobile land patrols and air-surveillance covered adequately--the same techniques applying also to Sharm el Sheikh. These were "primitive" techniques militarily-speaking but, as reported on pages 62-63, the 1965 Survey Team considered more sophisticated measures and felt they were not justified.

In other words, the UNEF operation was conducted with a level of manpower and with techniques adequate to provide mutual reassurance to the two parties concerned that the situation they had agreed to was being respected. Further, and most importantly, both sides wanted to see UNEF work well, both wanted to keep the border quiet.

A tabulation of violations or incidents as drawn from UNEF reports is carried as Annex Y to this paper. The totals are high but are made up largely of minor offenses. Both sides share fairly equally in blame for violations of the other's off-shore water boundaries, but these violations were not taken very seriously. With evidently few exceptions, the vessels involved were all commercial or fishing craft. There was more resentment about the Israeli air-space violations, which make up a major proportion of the total violations. However, again, these were not taken very seriously since they involved usually the north-east corner of the Gaza Strip where the Israelis had an airfield in fairly close proximity to the ADL.

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More indicative of the quiet state of affairs were the ground violations. Most of these were of a minor nature--often only involving an incursion of a few meters on either side of the ADL or IF. As can be seen, these ground incidents stayed at a fairly low level and actually had substantially declined in 1966. Thus, in the Secretary-General's final report on UNEF in 1967 he could state: "Prior to 16 May there was no indication of a deterioration along the line or of any developments likely to lead to a serious worsening of the situation."¹

The worsening, which led to the end of Egyptian cooperation with UNEF and its request that UNEF withdraw, took place elsewhere. The Arab Summit Meetings of 1964 and 1965 (which resulted in the establishment of the Egyptian-controlled Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO, with its Gaza-based Army) had been disrupted by the emergence of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia as a rival leader to Nasser, by Syrian instability and bellicosity, and by USSR encouragement of a coalescing of Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq. Syria had been dissatisfied with the PLO and had set up El Fatah which began a series of commando raids on Israel in 1965. Usually these infiltrated through Lebanese and Jordanian territory to reach northern Israel. Israel retaliated by attacks by its armed forces on Jordanian and Lebanese villages. The Israeli attack on the Jordanian village of Es Samu on 13 November 1966 was particularly severe and in April 1967 an air battle between Israel and Syria resulted in six Syrian MIG's being shot down and the Israeli jets over-flight of Damascus in triumph. Nasser had entered into a defense pact with Syria in November 1966. Jordan and Syria taunted Nasser with hiding behind UNEF, Israel stepped up its threats against El Fatah and Syria. Gromyko visited Nasser in April 1967 and Nasser subsequently came to believe in information evidently provided by the USSR on 13 May that Israeli troops were massing for a blow against Syria. On 15 May the Egyptian Army made some spectacular troop movements. Arab public opinion rallied in high emotion behind Nasser. On 16 May, a state of emergency was proclaimed for the Egyptian armed forces and, at 10 o'clock that evening, General Rikhye received the message from the Egyptian Chief of Staff requesting withdrawal of "all UN troops which install OP's along our borders."²

¹ A/6672, 12 July 1967, para. 35.

² A/6730, 26 June 1967, para. 6.

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Whether or not this request and subsequent events might have been reversed or altered by action other than that which was taken is, of course, a question subject to much debate. What should be far less debatable is that, as it was constituted, UNEF's ability to carry out its tasks ended once its positions were by-passed; that it was not equipped nor manned to enforce its will on either side; and that it was logistically vulnerable once it could no longer count upon host state cooperation. Its problems then became those of evacuation and protection.

B. UN HEADQUARTERS STAFF AND THE LAUNCHING OF UNEF

It is stating the obvious to say that the UN Headquarters staff faced tremendous problems in launching UNEF. But it is equally obvious that, while some improvements can be made, a great number of these problems are an inescapable part of the ad hoc nature to which UN peacekeeping would still appear to be confined. UNEF was the first force which the UN had to field. Some of the lessons learned from it have been embodied in procedures and regulations which form a permanent part of UN organization. Some of the UN's ability to respond to the ad hoc demands also rests in the individual capacities of a body of men who have been through the experience. As these men leave the UN, its ability to handle these operations becomes less certain.

A great deal has been written about the possibility of having a military staff within the Secretariat to do advance planning and to provide the military nucleus for the expanded needs of meeting an emergency situation. Such proposals become involved in the moribund Military Staff Committee controversy as well as the controversy over the executive powers of the Secretary-General. A further argument made against the contingency planning aspects of such proposals is the uniqueness of each UN peacekeeping operation. In any case, the administrative utility of having such a staff cannot be considered on its technical merits alone but is locked into the political controversy surrounding the concept of peacekeeping itself.

In launching UNEF, the ad hoc demands were met from Secretariat resources and by national support which involved men working at the problems "around the clock." The demands were met not only by hard work but also through patience, good will and, undoubtedly, a fair degree of good luck. Special mention must

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be made of the immediate use of an informal staff composed of military attachés of the nations selected to participate. A more formal nucleus, but also of a temporary nature, was soon set up within the Secretariat under General Martola. It would also appear that this hastily assembled combination of military skills was considerably assisted by the use of the UNEF Advisory Committee as a political sounding board and back-up to the administrative decisions made. Lastly, it should be mentioned that the Secretariat added civilian personnel to meet the needs of UNEF and these people were carried as "over-load" posts in the UNEF budget from the launching onwards.

While a national military establishment can do a great deal to prepare itself in advance to meet ad hoc UN demands--such as analysis of past peacekeeping experience, staff-college coverage, intelligence on possible trouble spots, contingency planning, or even a standby commitment--the UNEF launching experience suggests the following minimum measure. Those countries most likely to be called upon to participate in peacekeeping should include a military member in their UN Mission (some now do), or their military attachés in Washington should keep abreast of UN affairs as a part of their job. Such men can, as in the past, help fill the emergency gap. They would know whom to contact in their own establishments, what the national military capabilities are, equipment characteristics and needs, etc., and would have some degree of appreciation of the unique nature of UN operations.

C. FIELD PERSONNEL

It seems obvious that for the foreseeable future any peacekeeping force assembled by the UN will be composed of national contingents of military personnel organized within or through national military establishments. Thus the first and foremost category of national support necessary for peacekeeping is the provision of such field personnel. While there is some prospect of improvement in advance preparation for such potential participation through the UN itself, this prospect is not very substantial and it is a reasonable assumption that improvement must still rest upon independent national efforts. Cooperation between several countries to this end, as is the case at present with the Nordic countries, is of course a further possibility.

It should be emphasized that, based on the type of operation represented by UNEF, the training demands for adaptation from normal national military duty to the different type of service under the UN are not great. The principal burden for adaptation rests with the officers who must have some degree of appreciation of the peculiarities of this type of military-political operation. Given this capability, either by careful selection or through special training, volunteer units as well as regular units can fulfill peacekeeping tasks adequately. Mobilization time and national legal and political factors are other elements involved in the decision as to whether a country's offer to the UN is to come from its regular forces or from volunteer units formed in addition to the normal standing units.

In any event, in the case of UNEF there were more countries volunteering line troops than were needed. The fact that the action was taken on General Assembly initiative and that parts of the mandate were vague did not noticeably inhibit national offers of participation. Countries sympathetic to only one side of the controversy or the other were among those volunteering. While three of the original ten countries selected did withdraw in UNEF's early period, the selection made by the Secretary-General was essentially a durable and effective one in spite of the authorization problem and the initial uncertainties surrounding UNEF's role. The low level of probability of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute does not seem to have affected the willingness of the long-term seven participating states to continue to provide personnel.

As to why so many nations offered to participate as UNEF was launched, one can be sure that the motivations varied from case to case but on the whole the operation reflected the political climate of the time. It was bound to inherit popularity in many quarters as being largely cast in an anti-imperialist mold. The U.S. strongly supported the operation. With only muted Soviet opposition, manifested largely in an abstentionist way, it offered some hope not only in this specific instance but also in a general way, as a technique by which the UN could reduce the super-power confrontation dangers of the Cold War. The apprehensions caused by the 1960-64 Congo operation were not yet factors of decision on peacekeeping. Lastly, the image of the force put forward by Hammarskjold was vitally important in securing such widespread interest in participation. The force was:

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- to be based on "consent," particularly of the host state, so sovereign was to be respected,
- to be assembled and administered by him in autonomous operation in accordance with General Assembly guidance, so it would not be a tool of the host state,
- and, reflecting the above, the force was to be neutral, non-fighting and balanced.

In addition to this "image," which was then put into practice, there was the further very practical matter that local immunities were granted and disciplinary powers remained in participant's national hands. Also the military staff officers were drawn from the countries providing contingents and such representation at the staff level provided further reassurance to participants.¹

With a greater degree of self-sufficiency in field administration than is the case with usual military operations, the provision of well-trained staff officers is a vital need in peacekeeping. National representation, a large degree of self-sufficiency, variations in national systems of staff procedures and a lack of international experience in some nationalities, varying levels of linguistic proficiency, are among the problems which the staff structure and manning must cope with. UNEF appears to have done so with considerable effectiveness. Nations which may be willing to be called upon for manpower for peacekeeping, with its concomitant needs at the staff level, would do well to provide some of their officers with advance training to assist them with the art of "ad hocery," with an understanding of the political nature of peacekeeping, and with a capacity to adjust to the demands of the particularistic civilian-military staffing of UN peacekeeping operations.

While there were many offers of infantry, the UN did have a problem in securing national units approaching battalion size for UNEF. In the case of UNEF, this was the best size for the

¹ The UNEF Final Report (A/6672) makes a complaint of what was evidently in some cases a too close relationship between a contingent and its home authorities. See para. 17.

national contingent unit. The number of battalions needed was not too great to cause a span-of-command problem and yet were enough so that "balance" could be achieved while benefiting from the advantages of a fairly large unit with national coherence. As is well known, there were greater difficulties in securing adequately trained technical support units. It would appear to be a lesson of UNEF experience that while national contingents should supplement their normal manpower and equipment to make themselves more self-sufficient, the force's central support unit should preferably come from one country alone. Perhaps the central medical facilities and the force aircraft and aircraft maintenance units could be provided by separate nations, but the rest of the support structure is more effectively conducted by a homogeneous unit. A further factor is that support units tend to be more inflexible in size than infantry units. If the support units are supplied by one country, there is a greater chance that reduction in line units will be matched to the greatest extent possible by reduction in support personnel since questions of national prestige are accordingly lessened. One-country support units run the counterpart danger of Hammarskjold's warning regarding "excessive dependence" upon one nationality and the risk of disruption in an emergency situation if the support nationality is singled out for priority withdrawal as in the case of the Canadians in UNEF. However, on balance, this risk is offset by the larger benefits derived from the more effective support role resulting from such longer-range concentration of responsibility.

Representation in UNEF by the Soviet Union and its allies probably would not have basically changed their negative attitude toward the operation. The operation went as far toward geographical and political "balance" as was desirable and necessary.¹ The achieving of such "balance" makes a force vulnerable to withdrawals when the consensus shifts as to the role it should follow or even procedural interpretations. This problem was evidenced at the time of UNEF's withdrawal by India's and Yugoslavia's intention to respond unilaterally if need be in agreeing to the Egyptian request. However, there is a good

¹ A related problem is reflected in A/6672, 12 July 1967, para. 18, where potential embarrassment to the force is mentioned due to the host government according some contingents preferential treatment for reasons "usually quite unconnected with the peacekeeping force."

deal to be said for the position that if a UN peacekeeping force cannot maintain a sufficiently "balanced" composition, the consensus justifying its existence may have eroded. Obviously the "balance" required to achieve a consensus of support for a particular operation is a very relative thing, as UNFICYP, for one, shows.

The goal of "balanced" composition meant that cost factors cannot be overriding in the choice of participating countries. Nevertheless, the wide disparity between national contingent costs in UNEF was a point of continuing contention. National salary and allowance scales are bound to continue to differ. Some measures can be taken to reduce the resentment this can cause in the field. However, on the larger problem of overall costs to the UN, the costs of a particular national source must be weighed against such factors as availability, suitability and balance. There is a considerable difference in cost per man between the "extra and extraordinary costs" for a regular soldier whose salary the UN does not pay and a volunteer whose salary is a UN expense. This is further aggravated if the volunteer is rotated every six months and the regular soldier serves a year's tour. For both cost and continuity reasons, needless to say, a one year tour arrangement is much to be desired but countries may not be willing or able to provide this for a variety of reasons.

D. SERVICES

The major service which national support can render a peacekeeping force no doubt remains that which was the case in UNEF and elsewhere--the Phase I airlift to the operation. If speed is deemed essential, there are probably not too many governments or commercial sources to which the UN can turn for an expeditious airlift. If a politically acceptable country is willing to donate the services of its military aircraft, there would be little point in turning to commercial carriers. If local operating conditions are potentially dangerous or there is a need for self-sufficiency, military aircraft are obviously to be preferred. Sealift may be less crucial but as a means of national support, particularly in Phase I, it is undoubtedly most helpful.

Again in Phase I, there are a multitude of immediate services for which the UN welcomes national support. Not the least

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of these are the services provided by the host state and in particular the matter of finding acceptable bases and accommodations.

E. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Whatever stockpiling the UN may find it possible to undertake, it is doubted that this will ever be able to meet the Phase I needs of a force-sized operation. The UN will need to seek national support particularly in the four major items of aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment and food. Tentage was also a large item with UNEF.

Because of the conglomerate nature of mounting these operations, problems of property record management and equipment maintenance inevitably arise. One begins with the problem of what a national contingent brings with it and what it relies upon the UN to furnish centrally. Based upon the inherent nature of ad hoc operations and the UN's own record of past problems of immediate supply, national authorities can be expected to want to bring too much and to bring the equipment they are familiar with. Available space, of course, inhibits this tendency. But the more the UN can promise and deliver in terms of major item and common item equipment and supplies, the better. For this they will generally need the logistical support of major powers.

Whatever the level of national logistical support for an operation there are inevitable mechanical problems in melding two or more autonomous supply systems together. While some advance knowledge of each others systems is to be urged and has indeed been a product of experience, this is not enough. Given a case like UNEF, where one country accepted the major logistical responsibility in the field, there is a good deal to be said for an expert on that country's systems working in the Secretariat on a full-time basis for at least the launching period. He could be complemented by systems experts from major supplier countries. These men could be military officers on the informal or formal military staff discussed earlier. But they do not need to be. They could be civilian experts attached to General Services on a temporary "over-load" post. A major source of supply overseas which handles "routine" requests also merits special liaison arrangements, as has been the case at Pisa with UNEF.

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As soon as possible after the immediate emergency is over and it appears that a continuing operation will be agreed upon for at least a year or two, action should be taken towards equipment standardization and improving systems of maintenance and supply. This is easier said than done in view of major initial costs against the usual background of uncertain financing and uncertain duration. Nevertheless, there is a role for major powers to play here in rendering the force more effective and efficient which has not really been explored to our knowledge. One might suggest such things as national support on reequipping on a less-than-cost basis and/or a willingness to absorb the costs of sealift/airlift in returning national equipment to its country of origin.

F. FINANCE

UNEF's overall budgeted expenditures for 1957-67 total slightly more than \$213 million or roughly \$19 million per year. Its actual expenditures are extremely difficult to arrive at. Early in UNEF's existence it was decided to establish a Special Account, outside the regular budget, to finance the operation. This was probably a sound decision in spite of the vicissitudes related in the body of this paper. While Arabs, the Soviet bloc, and later France, refused to support UNEF, there was a general willingness on the part of the other Member States to apply the assessment method to paying for UNEF up to the time of the 1965 show-down on Article 19. True, this picture is somewhat falsified by the application of the voluntary contributions to the assessments owed by the less developed countries. Nevertheless, even this measure of collective responsibility is to be preferred to dependence upon voluntary contributions alone. UNEF experience, therefore, suggests that the application of the regular scale of assessments or a special scale can be made more acceptable by an offsetting procedure utilizing voluntary contributions. Many doubt, however, that one will see even this degree of collective responsibility reinstated in the foreseeable future. Yet under a system of voluntary participation in peacekeeping, there must be a greater measure of assurance that the UN will be able to pay the debts it entered into in good faith. The size of the outstanding debt to UNEF participants--\$24 million as of October 1968--which will reportedly remain substantially unpaid, is certainly not an inducement to participation in peacekeeping forces.

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UN development is far from the stage where as an institution it would be permitted or able to support a standing military force. Neither can one expect great tolerance for ad hoc forces which begin to appear indefinite in duration. A continuing pressure for economies in such operations can be expected whether they are financed by assessment or by voluntary contributions. Such pressure, in measure, is in fact desirable but the spur of financial economy should be applied in the context of efforts to help resolve the political problems which brought the force into being. This was not sufficiently the case in regard to UNEF.

G. WITHDRAWAL

What effect will the conditions under which UNEF was withdrawn have upon potential national support of peacekeeping? Any attempt to answer this question is, of course, speculative since no new peacekeeping force has been undertaken in the interim. The claim has been made that as far as any potential host state is concerned, as well as those states particularly worried about the use of the UN as a means of intervention in their domestic affairs, the decision by U Thant has made potential acceptance of further UN peacekeeping more likely. What the decision would have been if there were two host states and one had desired the UN to stay, and what conclusions a state might accordingly draw for its national security calculations from such different circumstances is, of course, not possible to determine due to Israel's refusal to have been a UNEF host state.

As for those who wish to see the UN develop as a more substantial element of international security embodying some relinquishment of national sovereignty in cases where UN majorities approve, and powers with veto rights at least tolerate UN military operations, the withdrawal was something of a shock. For some, it destroyed an illusion that UNEF was something it was not. It showed that UNEF had only bandaged over the underlying dispute which continued to fester, particularly on Israel's other borders. Although U Thant's unilateral action in response to Egypt's request somewhat obfuscates the demonstration, there is good reason to believe he was right that there was no consensus for stronger action and the "consent" principle would have to be fully respected. As General Burns has written regarding Security Council consideration of the issue in the

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18 May-5 June 1967 period: "...the only element of a resolution on which the Council seemed likely to be able to agree would have been an endorsement of the Secretary-General's plea for restraint. This would have been about as much use as trying to put out a forest fire with a water pistol."¹ One can only hope that, as indeed seems to be the case, any such disillusionment is temporary and that nations will continue to support peacekeeping, shorn of its illusions, as a useful international technique.

This does not mean that the UNEF withdrawal experience will not cause peacekeeping proponents and participants to work for improvements, even though continued efforts on these lines may be no more successful than previous attempts. Most specifically efforts to achieve a "cooling-off" period, probably through procedural methods, must continue even if one is pessimistic that temperatures and tempers will be lowered during such a period. And as part of the risks run during such a "cooling-off" period, there must be improved contingency planning and self-protection capabilities on the part of the force, should evacuation be decided upon or become necessary. Lastly, it must be recognized that the force is in a much sounder position if it is stationed on both sides of a line and not just on one side.

H. ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS

UNEF as a buffer zone operation was in effect supervising a demilitarized zone. It was "interposed" not by force but by "consent." It was effective not because it could repulse an attempt to breach the zone by determined military efforts by either party but because its techniques provided a sufficient assurance to each side that this zone was being respected by the other side. From this standpoint, (but not from others) it was not important that the demilitarized zone existed on only one side's territory.

The overall problem involved all of Israel's borders and was convoluted by the inter-Arab rivalries. Great power interests played upon both areas of controversy and the concept of

¹ E.L.M. Burns, "The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping," International Journal, Vol. 23 (1967-68), p. 9.

maintaining a "balance" of military potential was invoked for arms supplied not only to both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute but also to both sides of the inter-Arab rivalry. The General Assembly's Resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956 recommended that "all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities" but no UN machinery existed or was established to even report on this matter. By 1966 the proportions of GNP spent by the countries of this area on defense were higher than those of any other area of the world. In that year, for example, they were: 11.7% for Israel, 8.6% for Egypt, 11% for Syria and 14.4% for Jordan.¹ This difficult policy of maintaining a balance in military potential would appear to have been the only approach to arms control in the area where neither formal or informal agreement between major sources of armaments has appeared possible, and where the U.S.-USSR wish to avoid direct confrontation causes either country's unilateral security guarantee to suffer in credibility. Whether post-1967 reassessments may have changed this situation and made other alternatives possible remains to be seen. The policy of combining peacekeeping and peace-observation with maintaining a unilaterally-determined "balance" in military potential has been shown to be a dangerous answer. Peacekeeping plus peace-observation plus cooperation between arms suppliers on arms control would be a better answer. Again, it must be recognized that this combination, while much safer does not solve the basic dispute. As U Thant wrote in his final report on UNEF:

Peacekeeping operations can serve their purpose properly only if they are accompanied by serious and persistent efforts to find solutions to the problems which demanded the peacekeeping in the first place.²

¹ Strategic Survey 1966 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 33.

² A/6672, 12 July 1967, para. 24.

UNEF MANNING TABLE FOR INTERNATIONAL STAFF
(Authorized Strength)

ANNEX A

<u>Gaza:</u>	1957	1958	1959 ^c	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965 ^c	1966	1967
	IR D	IR D		IR D	IR D	IR D	IR D	IR D		IR D	IR D
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Chief Admin Off	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Legal/Pol Off ^a	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Chief Fin Off	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Chief Pro Off	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Admin Fin Off	2 4	2 6	7 3	4 2	3 2	3 2	2 2	4 1	6	2 1	2 1
Inform Off	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Welfare Off	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Food Supervisor	1	1									
General Service	23	23	22	20	15	14	1 14	11	14	10	10
Field Ser Per	59	59	48	56	60	60	62	1 54	53	50	56
Auditors			2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Senior Inspec			1	1							
Sys Coordin					1	1					
	4 93	5 93	87	9 83	8 82	9 80	9 81	11 69	82	6 56	5 72
<u>Naples/Pisa^b</u>											
Admin Off	2	1	1	1	2	2	2 1	1	1	2	1
Gen Serv Staff	6	6	3	2	1	1	1 1	1	1		
Field Ser Per	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	1		1
Procurement Off		1									
	12	10	6	5	5	5	6 1	5	3	2	2
<u>Beirut:</u>											
Admin Fin Off				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Field Service				1	3	2	2	1	2	1	1
Gen Service					1	1	1	1			
				2	5	4	4	3	3	2	2
<u>New York -</u>											
overload posts											
Professional				8	7	5	5	5	5	5	5
Gen Service	26 ^d	26 ^d	26 ^d	18 26	17 24	17 22	15 20	15 20	15 20	15 20	13 18
<u>Geneva -</u>											
overload posts											
Field Service	5 ^d	5 ^d	5 ^d	5 5	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2
	140	139	124	130	126	122	122	111	110	98	99

IR - Internationally Recruited.


D - Detailed from Regular Establishment


- Post of Senior Legal Officer in 1957 becomes Legal/Political Officer 1958-1967.
- Naples, 1957; Naples/Pisa, 1958; Pisa 1959-1967.
- Actual strength; breakdown between internationally recruited detailed from regular establishment.
- Estimate for 1957, 1958 and 1959 include a total of 31 overload posts in New York and Geneva. For convenience in this chart, they have been assumed to have been divided as they actually were in 1960.


UN SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION FOR PEACEKEEPING

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ANNEX B








UNEF HEADQUARTERS MILITARY PERSONNEL

SECTION / BRANCH	NOVEMBER 1965			MARCH 1966			JUNE 1966			NOVEMBER 1966		
	OFFRS	ORs	TOTAL	OFFRS	ORs	TOTAL	OFFRS	ORs	TOTAL	OFFRS	ORs	TOTAL
Commander	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1
A D C	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1
C O S	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1
Operation Section	3	1	4	3	1	4	3	1	4	3	1	4
Mil Pers Section	6	6	11	5	5	9	5	5	10	3	5	8
Logistics Section	10	11	21	9	9	18	4	3	7	4	3	7
Movement Control							2	1	3	2	1	3
Air Staff	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2
M L A	1		1	1		1	1		1			
Liaison Officers	2		2	2		2	2		2	3		3
HQ Commandant	2	12	14	2	7	9	2	6	8	2	6	8
P I O	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1
HQ UNEF Medical Section	6	9	15	6	9	15	6	9	15			
HQ Support Group*	6	9	15	6	9	15	6	9	15	6	9	15
GRAND T O T A L	41	49	90	39	41	80	36	35	71	28	26	54

*NOTE: In HQ Support Group are shown only non Canadian Officers.



HEADQUARTERS UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCELIST OF STAFF*AS ON 1ST JANUARY 1967

1. COMMANDER
 Commander
 Secretary
 Aide de Camp
 - Maj. Gen. I.J. Rikhye
 - Miss ~~H. Davidson~~ C. De Haan UN
 - Capt. B.S. Bhandari India
2. CHIEF OF STAFF
 A/ Chief of Staff
 Secretary
 - Lt Col W Remple
 - ~~Col. L. Hill~~
 - Miss D. Gowen UN
3. CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Secretary
 Adm. Assistant to CAO
 Secretary
 - Mr. D.G. Sullivan UN
 - Mrs. A.A. Monzon UN
 - Mr. M. Pilkington UN
 - Miss J. Elkington UN
4. POLITICAL AND LEGAL ADVISER
 Political and Legal Adviser
 Secretary
 - Mr. C. Cuenca UN
 - Mr. D.N. Furi UN
5. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
 Public Information Officer
 Asst. Public Information Officer
 Asst. Public Information Officer
 - Mr. B.S. Garcha UN
 - Capt. P.J. Prasad India
 - Mr. P.L. Sethi India
6. GENERAL STAFF
 (a) Operations Section
 (i) A/ Chief Operations Officer - Lt. Col. ~~W. Remple~~ Maj S.I.S. Bal Canada
 (ii) Secretary - Mr. D.A. Gaudia UN
 (iii) Deputy Chief Operation Officer - Maj. L. Saeftlund Sweden
 (iv) ~~Operations Officer~~ - Maj. ~~S.I.S. Bal~~ India
 Chief Clerk - Sgt. A.J. Ojha India

* Note: The corrections shown were due to updating by UNEF Headquarters of changes in its original listing.

(b) LOGISTICS SECTION

Chief Logistics Officer	- Lt. Col. P.N. Chopra	India
(i) <u>Plans and Co-ordination</u>		
Deputy CLO, Planning and Co-ordination Officer	- Maj. D. Sersic	Yugo
Chief Clerk	- WO/2 A.S. West	Canada
Clerk	- Sgt. T.F. Bennett	Canada
(ii) <u>Land Claims</u>		
Land Claims Assistant	- S/Sgt. P.B. Senniksen	Denmark
(iii) <u>Supply and Transport</u>		
Supply and Transport Officer	- Capt. H.F.E. Swain	Canada

(c) Movement Control

Chief Movement Control Officer	- Lt. Col. F.L. Vieira Ferreira	Brazil
Deputy Chief Movement Control Officer	- Maj. R.O. Dobson	Canada
Asst. Movement Control Officer	- Capt. A.S.R. Lawrence	Canada
Chief Clerk	- Sgt. L. Chambers	Canada
Driver	- Cpl G. Finkle	Canada
	- Sgt. B. Beltrame	Brazilian
	- Pte R.W. Cowie	Canada

(d) Military Personnel Section

Chief of Military Personnel	- Lt. Col V. Premate	Yugoslavia
(i) <u>Personnel</u>		
Deputy Chief of Military Personnel	- Lt. Col. F.O. Kleber	Brazil
Personnel Officer	- Maj. G.S. Hinic	Yugo
(ii) <u>Orderly Room</u>		
i/c Orderly Room	- Sgt A.G. Kier	Denmark
Clerk	- Sgt Roop Singh	India
Clerk	- Sgt J.A.S. Wolff	Brazil
Clerk	- Cpl C.V. Parker	Canada

(iii) Leave Centre

Administrative Asst.
Chief Clerk

- Mr.
- WO

K. Andersen
Branko Cadjo

UN
Yugo

(e) Hq Commandant

Hq Commandant
Assistant Hq Commandant
Hq Orderly Officer
Chief Clerk
Food Service Supervisor
General Mess Manager

- Maj
- Mr.
- 2/Lt.
- Sgt
- WO/2
-

S.S. Sahni
E. Bayerl
D.E. Torkildsen
G.S. Rao
R.K. Ricard

India
UN
Norway
India
Canada

ADVISORY STAFF(a) Air Staff
Clerk

- W/C
- Cpl

W. Cunningham
A. Diazenko

Canada
Canada

(b) Signals

Senior Signals Staff Officer
Officer Commanding Hq Troop
Officer's Clerk

- Maj
- Lt.
- Cpl

J.F. Sanderson
~~H.P. Swan~~ Colfer
P. Evans

Canada
Canada
Canada

(c) Medical

Senior Medical Staff Officer
Medical Officer

- Lt. Col.
- 2/Lt

S.A. Jespersen
T. Justesen

Denmark
Denmark

(d) Dental

Senior Dental Staff Officer
(Located at Rafah)

- Maj

G.I.J. Bisailon

Canada

(e) Military Police

Provost Marshal
Deputy Provost Marshal
OIC Investigations
Coy Sergeant Major
Chief Clerk

- Maj
- Capt
- Lt
- S/Sgt
- Sgt

J.J. Hooper
S.M. Joshi
Mc Donald
O.J. Pedersen
E. Giffin

Canada
India
Denmark
Canada

(f) Welfare

Chief Welfare Officer
Asst Welfare Officer

- Mr.
- Mr.

W. Brown
L.A. Rodrigue

UN
UN

(g) Postal

Senior Staff Officer
(located at Rafah)
Postal Clerk - CEPO 32

- Maj M.T.M. Roberts Canada
- Cpl E.H. Linden Canada

9 ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF(a) Finance

Chief Finance Officer
Secretary
Deputy Chief Finance Officer
Treasurer

- Mr. E. Jaeger UN
- Miss J. Antonivich UN
- Miss S. du Crest UN
- Mr. F. Jonsson UN

(b) Procurement

Chief Procurement Officer
Secretary
Senior Procurement Officer
Field Service - Procurement Officer
Field Service - Disposal Officer

- Mr. D.J. Casey UN
- Miss O. de Jorna UN
- Mr. C.J. Gettings UN
- Mr. O. Veeckman UN
- Mr. B. Kilcullen UN

(c) Service Institute Warehouse

Chief Service Institute Officer
Asst. Chief Service Institute Offr.
Field Service Officer

- Mr. W.D. King UN
- Mr. F. Raaso UN
- Mr. O.A. Jorgensen UN

(d) UNEF Property Survey Board

UNEF Property Survey Board
Secretary

- Mrs. E. Tong UN

(e) Civilian Personnel

Chief, Civilian Personnel
Secretary
Civ. Pers. Assistant (Rafah)
Civ. Pers. Assistant

- Mr. A. Ferrari UN
- Miss M. Chambers UN
- Mr. R. O'Connor UN
- Mr. S. Dionisio UN

(f) Internal Audit Service

Senior Auditor
Auditor

- Mr. A. Khan UN
- Mr. S. Bendeck UN

(g) UN Communications Field Service

Chief, Communications Officer	- Mr.	W. Baumgarten	UN
Deputy Chief Communications Officer	-		
Radio Technician	- Mr.	J. Boe	UN
Radio Technician	- Mr.	F. Littera	UN
Radio Officers	- Mr.	J. Pelagri	UN
	- Mr.	E. Acebes	UN
	- Mr.	V. Menon	UN
	- Mr.	H. Theodore	UN
	- Mr.	A. Xouridas	UN
	- Mr.	S. Doulaveris	UN
	- Mr.	G. Sakopoulos	UN
	- Mr.	L. Larsen	UN
	- Mr.	J. Monsalve	UN
	- Mr.	A. Martinez	UN
	- Mr.	J.D. Suarez	UN
	- Mr.	C.A. Rigueros	UN
	- Mr.	D. Rodopoulos	UN
	- Mr.	P. Hernandez	UN
	- Mr.	M. Contraras	UN
	- Mr.	S. Hidalgo	UN
	- Mr.	VAS. Menon	UN-Cairo
	- Mr.	P. Veilis	UN-Cairo
	- Mr.	G. Battista	UN-P/Said
	- Mr.	H. Van Hussen	UN-Tel-Aviv

(h) HQ Transport Unit (Field Service)

Chief Transport Officer	- Mr.	R. Marnell	UN
Deputy Chief Transport Officer			
and I/O Workshops	- Mr.	J. Hannon	UN
Technician	- Mr.	E. Koukopoulos	UN
Technician	- Mr.	J. Burns	UN
	- Mr.	M. Donohoe	UN
	- Mr.	B. O'Leary	UN

(i) Registry Pouch and Reproduction Unit

Chief of Registry	- Mr.	M. Orvad	UN
Researcher	- Mr.	V. Jean-Charles	UN
Field Service	- Mr.	B. Byrne	UN
Codifier	- Mr.	J. Corrigan	UN
Pouch Officer	- Mr.	L. Obadia	UN
File Supervisor	- Sgt.	O.M. Parkash	India

9. CONTINGENT COMMANDERS

Commander	- Lt. Col.	O.F. Cid	Brazil
Commander (Located at Rafah)	- Col.	D.H. Power	Canada
Commander (2/o Danor BN)	- Maj.	H. Jorgensen	Denmark
Commander	- Col.	M.S. Brar	India
Commander	- Lt. Col.	A. Sorensen	Norway
Commander (Located in El-Arish)	- Lt. Col.	S. Prazic	Yugo

10. HQ INDIAN CONTINGENT STAFF

Staff Officer	- Capt	Vijay Sachar	India
Head Clerk	- Sub	T.S. Viswanathan	India
Clerk	- Sgt	Nandoo Teli	India
Cipher NCOs	- Sgt	Bachan Singh Panu	India
	- Sgt	A.K. Sivadas	India
Driver	- Pte	G.K. Kutty	India
Contingent Officer	- N/Sub	Jagjit Singh Kohli	India
Clerk	- Sgt	Munilal Sharma	India

11. INDIAN POSTAL UNIT

Indian Postal Officer	- Capt	B.M.L. Mathur	India
Field Postmaster	- N/Sub	R. Krishnaswami	India
Postal Clerk	- WO/2	G. Gabriel	India
Postal Clerk	- WO/2	P.B. Mukherjee	India
Postal Clerk	- Pte	R.L. Madan	India
Postal Clerk	- Pte	Anusaya Prasad	India
Driver	- Pte	Manoranjan	India

12. UNEF LIAISON OFFICERS

Liaison Officer to UARLS - Gaza	- Maj	G. Tornernjelm	Sweden
Liaison Officer - Tel Aviv	- Capt	L.S. Arentz	Denmark
Radio Officer and Admin. Asst.	- Mr.	H. Van Hessel	UN

13. UNEF OFFICES EXTERNAL TO GAZA(a) Liaison/Administrative Offices(i) Beirut

Chief Admin. Officer	- Mr.	A. Hausner	UN
Movement Control Offr.	- Capt	G.H. Dunkley	Canada
Secretary	- Mr.	K. Sawhney	UN
Mov. Control NCO	- Sgt	O.G. Davis	Canada

(ii) Cairo

Liaison Officer
Radio Officer
Radio Officer

- Maj. C.H. Livijn
- Mr. P. Veilis
- Mr. V.A.S. Menon

Yugoslavia
UN
UN

(iii) El-Arish

Movement Control Officer
FS Radio Officer

-
-

Canada
UN

(iv) Port-Said

UNEF Port Officer
FS Radio and Warehouse Officer
Warehouse Officer

- Mr. P. Wiis
- Mr. G. Battista
- Mr. A. Gauto

UN
UN
UN

(v) Pisa

Administrative Officer
Finance Officer
Movement Control Officer

- Mr. E.G. Moore
- Mr. V. Chavez
- Capt. C.F. Crossley

UN
UN
Canada

(vi) UNEF Liaison Officers - Pisa

USA/UNEF Liaison Officer
Scandinavian Liaison Officer
(SCANLOPI)

- Sgt. R.L. Yarborough
- Capt. P.B. Rasmussen

UN
Denmark

SECTION/
BRANCH

1968

[illegible]

OPERATIONS

POST	RANK
C O S	Col
C O O	Lt Col
Dy Coo	Maj
Ops Off	Capt

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
N O R W A Y
C A N A D E A
S E N D I A

Y A N
JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

**MILITARY
PERSONNEL**

C M P Lt C

U G O S

THE

LOGISTICS

by OMI Maj
M P O Capt.

II C C

1

MOVEMENT CONTROL

C M C Lt C

RAZI

1990

AIR

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**AIR
STAFF
HQ
COMMANDANT**

Hq Com Ma.1

INDIA

**LIAISON
OFFICERS**

Hq 0 OffCapt

HOWARD

10

PI

Dy PIO Capt

NDIA

1

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UNEF CONTINGENTS

ANNEX I

	A/3694 9.10.57	A/3839 3.7.58	A/4210 10.9.59	A/4486 1.8.60	A/4857 30.8.61	A/5172 22.8.62	A/5494 12.9.63	A/5736 29.9.64	A/5919 22.9.65	A/6406 7.9.66	A/6672 12.7.67
BRAZIL											
Officers	44	41	39	41	40	40	40	41	34	na	na
Other ranks	501	594	609	591	585	590	576	588	404	na	na
Total	545	635	648	632	625	630	616	629	438	605	433
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	\$ 131,000	\$ 264,000	na	\$ 400,000	\$ 400,000	\$ 400,000	\$ 400,000	\$ 400,000	na	\$ 270,000	\$ 260,000
Tour of duty	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr
CANADA											
Officers	113	83	86	87	85	82	88	94	87	na	na
Other ranks	1,095	892	897	845	851	863	852	877	867	na	na
Total	1,172	975	983	932	936	945	940	971	954	804 ^e	795
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	na	\$ 371,000	na	\$ 418,000	\$ 515,000	\$ 475,000	\$ 326,000	\$ 248,000	na	\$ 220,000	\$ 208,000
Tour of duty	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr
COLOMBIA											
Officers	31	26									
Other ranks	491	466									
Total	522	492 ^e									
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	\$ 230,000	\$ 460,000									
Tour of duty	6 mo	6 mo									
DENMARK											
Officers	25	32	36	42	47	45	45	35	57	na	na
Other ranks	399	427	512	523	515	517	518	393	424	na	na
Total	424 ^b	459	548	565	562	562	563	428	491	417	3
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	\$ 340,000 ^a	\$ 504,000 ^a	na	\$ 540,000 ^a	\$ 500,000 ^a	\$ 480,000 ^a	\$ 437,000 ^a	\$ 400,000 ^a	na	\$ 375,000 ^a	\$ 150,000 ^a
Tour of duty	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo
FINLAND											
Officers	15										
Other ranks	240										
Total	255 ^e										
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	a										
Tour of duty	6 mo										
INDIA											
Officers	27	70	69	74	75	80	78	78	67	na	na
Other ranks	930	1,097	1,105	1,172	1,176	1,169	1,174	1,187	1,193	na	na
Total	957	1,167	1,174	1,246	1,251	1,249	1,252	1,265	1,269	1,138	978
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	\$ 287,000	\$ 162,000	na	\$ 175,000	\$ 175,000	\$ 175,000	\$ 175,000	\$ 175,000	na	\$ 135,000	\$ 135,000
Tour of duty	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr	1 yr
INDONESIA											
Officers	37										
Other ranks	545										
Total	582 ^e										
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	c										
Tour of duty											
NORWAY											
Officers	71	73	85	66	87	84	57	55	55	na	na
Other ranks	427	465	518	515	527	529	437	440	442	na	na
Total	498	538	603	601	614	613	494	495	497	289	60
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	a	a	na	a	a	a	a	a	na	a	a
Tour of duty	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo
SWEDEN											
Officers	27	34	39	36	33	33	57	57	46	na	na
Other ranks	322	471	620	620	430	391	472	481	380	na	na
Total	349	505	659	650	463	424	529	538	426	16	530
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	a	a	na	a	a	a	a	a	na	a	a
Tour of duty	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo
YUGOSLAVIA											
Officers	55	67	75	71	70	68	67	58	32	na	na
Other ranks	618	607	644	638	638	642	641	549	454	na	na
Total	673	674	719	709	708	710	708	607	506	705	579
Budgeted annual rotation estimate	\$ 200,000	\$ 192,000	na	\$ 192,000	\$ 192,000	\$ 192,000	\$ 192,000	\$ 192,000	na	\$ 169,000	\$ 150,000
Tour of duty	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo	6 mo
Total military personnel	5,977	5,445	5,334	5,341	5,159	5,133	5,102	4,933	4,581	3,959	3,378
Total budgeted annual rotation estimate	\$2,073,000 ^c	\$1,973,000	\$1,906,000	\$1,765,000 ^d	\$1,822,000 ^d	\$1,762,000 ^d	\$1,570,000 ^d	\$1,435,000 ^d	\$1,453,000 ^d	\$1,179,000 ^d	\$ 910,500 ^d

FOOTNOTES


- na- not available
a. Composite figure for rotation of Scandinavian contingents (Denmark, Norway, Sweden); Finnish repatriation costs assumed for 1957.
b. Two rotations of 340,000 each.
c. Total includes initial airlift of Yugoslav contingent (145,000), repatriation of the Indonesian contingent (200,000) and rotation of military personnel from mission to home country, due to incapacitation or other reasons, as distinct from regular contingent rotation/casual rotation (200,000).
d. Total includes estimate for casual rotation.
e. Indonesia withdrew 12 Sep 57, Finland 5 Dec 57, Colombia 28 Oct 58.
f. Canadian reconnaissance squadron was withdrawn on 20 Feb 66.
g. Swedish battalion returned to Sweden on 10 Mar 66.

UNEF VEHICULAR TABLE OF 1 MARCH 1961


Type of vehicle	Authorized establishment	Holdings, 1 March 1961	... Estimated reductions, 1961-1962	Planned purchases in 1961	Proposed purchases in 1962	Estimated holdings, 31 December 1962
<i>General purpose</i>						
Buses, heavy	4	3	1	2	—	4
Buses, light	7	12	5	—	—	7
Cars, heavy	11	15	4	—	—	11
Cars, light	117	103	35	—	10	78
Station wagons, commercial	26	21	4	2	7	26
Station wagons, Willys ..	8	9	1	—	—	8
Trucks, cargo, heavy, 4 x 4	92	215	166	43	—	92
Trucks, cargo, heavy, 4 x 2	92	—	—	21	71	92
Trucks, cargo, light, 4 x 4	121	147	65	8	31	121
Trucks, utility, ¾-ton ..	185	324	183	—	44	185
TOTAL	663	849	464	76	163	624
<i>Special purpose</i>						
Bulldozers	2	3	1	—	—	2
Carriers, multi-purpose, excavators	1	1	—	—	—	1
Trucks, ambulance, ¾-ton	17	16	—	—	1	17
Trucks, light, with cable-laying kit	3	2	—	—	—	2
Trucks, dump	8	8	3	5	—	8
Trucks, fire	1	—	—	1	—	1
Trucks, mounted, excavator, 20-ton	1	1	—	—	—	1
Trucks, petrol	2	2	2	1	1	2
Trucks, recovery, 3-ton ..	1	2	1	—	—	1
Trucks, recovery, 5-ton ..	2	1	—	1	—	2
Trucks, recovery, 6-ton ..	—	1	1	—	—	—
Trucks, refrigerator	—	1	1	—	—	—
Trucks, road, grader	2	2	—	—	—	2
Trucks, shop, van	5	21	16	—	—	5
Trucks, swill	3	3	3	3	—	3
Trucks, tractor, A/C towing	2	2	—	—	—	2
Trucks, tractor, 5-ton ...	2	4	2	—	—	2
Trucks, reefer	2	—	—	2	—	2
Trucks, tractor, 10-ton ..	1	1	—	—	—	1
Trucks, utility, with cable-laying kit	1	—	—	—	—	—
Trucks, water	12	15	4	—	1	12
Trucks, wireless, ¾ with radio kit	6	11	5	—	—	6
Trucks, with air compressor	—	1	1	—	—	—
Trucks, with radio set ..	3	3	—	—	—	3
TOTAL	77	101	42	13	3	75
GRAND TOTAL	740	950	506	89	166	699

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

LINE DIAGRAM



UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
RADIO DIAGRAM
EMERGENCY RADIO NET



Note: A Two pre-set frequencies


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ANNEX M

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

RADIO DIAGRAM

MOBILE MOTOROLA NET



Notes: Phone Patch facilities are available at GAZA and RAFAH.


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graph TD
    NY[New York] --- UZ[4 UZ Geneva]
    J1[4 UN Jerusalem] --- UZ
    T[4 UNT Tiberias] --- UZ
    D[4 UND Damascus] --- UZ
    B[4 UNB Beirut] --- UZ
    J2[4 UN Jerusalem] --- UZ
    UZ --- K[Karachi and Far East]
    UZ --- TE[Telex Europe Commercial]
    UZ --- P[Telex Pisa]
    UZ --- G[4 UE Gaza]
    G --- A[Aircraft Beacon GAZA "GZ"]
    G --- PS[4 UEP Port Said]
    G --- C[4 UEC Cairo]
    G --- BA[4 UEB Beirut Airport]
    G --- TA[4 UEV Tel Aviv]
    G --- UER[4 UER Camp Rafah]
    G --- AE[4 AEU El Arish]
    G --- UN_A[UN Aircraft]
    G --- ES[4 UES Sharm El Sheikh]
    UZ --- M[Telex to Marville]

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- Notes:
1. These communications are under UN Field Service Operations.
 2. Schedules of operations are published periodically by the Chief Communications Officer.

OUTLINE ORGANIZATION OF UNEF



STAFF LISTS CAMP RAFAH (1 Feb 67)

					RAFAH PHONE NO
Commander	Col	DH	Power, MBE, CD		1
Senior Staff Offr	Maj	RJ	Vardy, CD	FGH	2
DAQMG (Eqpt)	Maj	T	Grieff	ASC	9
DAQMG (Maint)	Maj	Arne	Lyngstad		60
Staff Capt (Cdn)	Capt	DE	Gill	RCD	3
Staff Capt (Camp)	Capt	RA	Diespecker, CD	RCA	7
Staff Capt (Eqpt)	Capt	FL	Berry	PPCLI	10
Staff Capt (Eqpt 2)	Capt	CAB	Silveira		23
Staff Capt (Maint)	Capt	V	Granda		4
Records Offr	Capt	IK	Black	RCASC	3
Commander's Secretary	Ssgt	Bollis	G T	RCASC	7
Camp Hygiene Offr	Maj	L	Mazurek	RCAMC	45
Camp Commandant	Maj	RH	Langan CD	RCD	155
Civ Pers Asst	Mr.	B	Byrne		17
NCO IC MP Det	Ssgt	Tessier	G	C Pro 7	59
<u>BRAZILIAN GUARD COY</u>					
Coy Comd	Capt	Iuciano	Del Giudice Neto		116
2IC & 1 Pl Comd	Lt	Edson	Fenseca De Alburquerque		
2 Pl Comd	Lt	Mancel Luiz	Valdevez de Castro		
3 Pl Comd	Lt	Gilberto	Pereira De Almeida		
<u>ENGINEER COY</u>					
CO and Force Engr	Maj	RJ	Paterson		62
2 IC	Capt	K	Brown		53
Sr Wks Offr	Capt	FE	Jewsbury		35
Planning Offrs	Lt	GE	Spence		57
	Lt	MH	Griffin		57
Adm Offr	Lt	LA	Bourque		53r2

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ANNEX P

56 CDN SIG SQN

CO	Maj	JF	Sanderson, CD	Gaza	55
2IC & Adm Offr	Capt	GI	Allen		25
OC Rafah Tp	Lt	WS	Syme		24
OC Gaza Tp	Lt	T	Colfer	Gaza	192

TRANSPORT GJY

CO	Maj	NS	McKechnie, CD		131
MTO	Capt	D	Breer		199
HQ Capt	Capt	DP	Chambers		131
Tpt Offr (GT Pl)	Lt	DN	Basinger		136
Tpt Offr (Adm Pl)	Lt	CGP	Downing		140

UNEP HCSPITAL

CO	Lt Col	SAAJ	Jespersen	
Chief of Staff	Maj	J	Engisg-Karup	
Food Hygiene Adviser	Maj	B	Skovdal	
Pers and Welfare Offr	1/Lt	SE	Jorgensen	
Adm Offr	1/Lt	SA	Hansen	
QM Offr	1/Lt	VR	Veje	
Paymaster	2/Lt	K	Thomsen	
Hygiene Inspector	2/Lt	PB	Pedersen	
Messing Offr	2/Lt	B	Skaarup	
Operating Room	Maj	JC	Nielsen	
	Maj	JK	Kristensen	
	Nurse	I	Nielsen	
	Nurse	I	Petersen	
	Nurse	AA	Bach De Plesner	
Internal Med & MIR	Maj	JC	Feddersen	
MIR	2/Lt	J	Sondergaard	

Lab Asst	Nurse	B	Faber
Bacteriological Lab	2/Lt	J	Hohde
X Ray Clinic	Nurse	VA	Wiedemann
Ward	Matron	J	Holst
	Nurse	MR	Nielsen
	Nurse	IB	Andreasen
	Nurse	T	Lund
	Nurse	L	Abildgarrrd
Pharmacy	Maj	G	Gaardhoje

INDIAN MEDICAL TEAM

OC	Maj	RC	Thakur	49
Dental Officer	Maj	TS	Chhabra	49

MED EQPT SUPPLY DEPOT UNEF

Med Eqpt Sup Offr	Capt	WTH	Cooper	RCAMC	46
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ORDNANCE COY

CO	Maj	LG	Lienster, CD	143
2IC & Stock Con Offr	Capt	GK	Michener	145
Ord Inspection Offr	Capt	D	Berry, CD	149
Adm Offr	Capt	WC	Mellon	143r2
Ord Stores Offr	Capt	DR	Wallace CD	124
OC Sup Sec	Capt	W ^H	Taylor	121
POL Sec	Lt	JTF	Van Will	50
Spare Parts Offr	Lt	LR	Hepburn	140r2

WKSP COY CEU

CO	Maj	EB	Creber, CD	128
2IC & Wksp Offr	Capt	DL	Clarke, CD	129
Adm Offr	Lt	R	Seguin	41
Control Offr	Capt	J	Sanders	129

HQ COY CBU

CO	Maj	RH	Langan, CD	RCD	155
Adm Offr	Capt	HC	Reynett	C Pro C	13
Camp Sergeant Major	RSM(WO1)	GA	Naylor, CD	QCR of C	8

RCAMC DET

Det Commander	Maj	L	Mazurek		45
Med Offr	Capt	DN	Graham		45

DENTAL CLINIC RCDC

Det Commander	Maj	GIJ	Bisaillon, CD		6
Dent Oftr	Capt	JL	McNeil		65

CDN QM RCCC

QM	Capt	RA	Guterson, CD		18
RQMS	WO2		Sprague, AL		18

CDN FD CASHIER OFFICE RCAPC

Fd Cashier	Maj	LT	Little, CD		39
Paymaster	Capt	W	Van Horn		19
Accounts Offr	Lt	WA	Erickson		64

POSTAL DET RCPC

Det Commander	Maj	MTM	Roberts, CD		130
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CHAPLAINS RCAChC

Chaplain (P)	Capt	S	Hanna		120r2
Chaplain (RC)	Maj	B	Rochette		120r3

WELFARE DET

Welfare & Cdn Institute Offr	Capt	FRJ	Berge	RCD	126r3
Sport & Rec Offr	Lt	BN	Lever	RCD	12

UNEF WELFARE SECTION RESPONSIBILITIES

ANNEX Q

1. GENERAL

- a. The CWO is responsible in consultation with the CMP, for preparing for Comdr's approval matters of Welfare Policy. The Welfare Policies for the Force will envisage:
 - (1) Maintaining fitness of the troops through sport programmes.
 - (2) Planning the maintenance and improvement of sport facilities and keeping the different contingents as much as possible at a similar standard of facilities;
 - (3) Providing opportunities to members to visit places of historical and cultural interest in the Middle East at reasonable prices;
 - (4) Helping the contingents in planning their respective welfare programmes, including sports, encouraging the best use of the soldiers' spare time for the sake of their discipline, physical fitness and general education.
- b. The CWO is responsible for administration of welfare activities:
 - (1) Carrying out those activities which are UNEF's responsibility to arrange (e.g. live shows, films);
 - (2) Coordinating and supporting the contingent activities.
- c. The contingent/unit welfare and sports offr(s) will:
 - (1) Act in their respective contingent/unit as representative of the UNEF CWO;
 - (2) Follow the respective Contingent/Unit Commander's orders for planning and executing contingent/unit welfare activities (including sports).

2. Instructions, Orders, Manuals

- a. The Welfare Manual is a booklet issued by the UNEF Welfare Office giving details/procedures concerning UNEF welfare activities including sports/competitions.

ANNEX Q

- b. In March and September of each year, the CWO organizes summer and winter welfare programmes. These programmes are published in UNEFPCO, showing the schedule, dates and rates of seasonal welfare activities.

3. Sports

- a. Monthly meetings scheduled by Welfare with Sports Officers from the various units.
- b. A schedule of sports activities which will last for six months is scheduled twice a year, in April and November (copy enclosed)
- c. The Welfare section is responsible for all schedules of athletic activities involving UNEF competitions.
- d. Welfare arranges clinics for officials, captains and coaches of the various units in most of the sports activities.
- e. Welfare arranges evaluations of all contests where a dispute is involved, to settle differences.
- f. Every six months an awards day is arranged by Welfare where winning teams and individuals receive their trophies and medals for the previous six months competition.
- g. Welfare stores provide sports and welfare equipment for all units.
- h. The welfare storeman is responsible for requisitioning, issuing and accounting for all expendable sports and welfare stores.
- i. Welfare has at many times prepared themselves various pieces of sports equipment, such as tennis and badminton rackets.
- j. The welfare section visits the units periodically for inspection of sports equipment, facilities and handover of equipment by units at rotation.

4. Tours (Jerusalem)

- a. Unit Welfare Officers meet with the Welfare Section to establish demand by units for plane seats before the final allocation.
- b. Welfare assigns unit quota for seats for two flts weekly to Jerusalem.
- c. Welfare accepts bookings from the unit welfare officers and authorizes payments by unit paymasters to finance HQ.
- d. Welfare makes monthly accounting to finance of trips and finalizes payment to agent in Jerusalem.
- e. Biweekly cables are sent by welfare to Jerusalem with personnel requiring hotel accommodation and tour.
- f. Welfare provides Movement Control with biweekly manifest for Jerusalem flights with name, rank, nationality, unit, serial number etc...
- g. Close communication is maintained by welfare with the ASO, Movement Control, and Jerusalem to assure smooth operation during inclement weather.
- h. Welfare maintains constant communication with the units for changes in prices or time variations.
- i. Welfare is responsible for the booking of 14 passengers on the Beirut trips Friday to Sunday along with providing manifest to Mov Control and finalizing payments.
- j. Hotel reservations for Officers and wives and International personnel are made in Beirut, as well as information on tours, etc. for units, during the Leave Center off-season in particular.
- k. In Cairo through the UNEF agent we make arrangements for tours to Cairo, Luxor, Aswan, Alexandria, St. Catherine's Monastery, along with transportation means, hotel accommodations and clearances.
- l. In all the arrangements that are made for tours and hotel accommodations, financial transactions are finalized with Finance through Welfare.

5. Films

- a. Welfare receives four films a week from HQ N.Y. and are placed in circulation throughout UNEF for six weeks.
- b. We receive from Cairo approx 3 short films per month.
- c. On occasion we receive films from the Canadian Embassy in Beirut.
- d. In the course of a month we have approx thirty films in circulation with UNEF in the Middle East Area.
- e. There are at least 30 sites in UNEF where films are being shown each night.
- f. Upon arrival of the four films from N.Y. as well as other films, they must be inspected for damage by welfare and a report is made on each film for number of splices, outstanding scratches and overall general condition.
- g. Before final dispatch to N.Y. the films are given a final inspection and records are kept on condition of each film by welfare. This is done so that we may be able to reply to N.Y. queries about damaged films.
- h. Each day films are delivered to welfare for checking and redistributing to all the units. Many times splices must be made by welfare of damaged film. All films are signed in and out by unit representatives.
- i. Welfare arranges paper work (Admin Report) for final delivery to N.Y. via the pouch with a report of the condition of the films.
- j. Welfare, when possible, arranges special showings for children's birthday parties in the afternoons.

6. Live shows

- a. Welfare makes arrangements through unit welfare officers and C.Os for groups to visit UNEF and entertain troops.
- b. Clearance arrangements for all entertainers are made by Welfare through UAR L.S.

ANNEX Q

- c. Condition of contracts of entertainers is made with welfare as a middle man, between CAO, Procurement and entertainers.
- d. Arrangements for feeding and housing are made by welfare.
- e. Schedule of appearances, transportation and feeding and physical arrangements in units, are made by welfare.
- f. Arrival and departure of groups as well as traveling with them during their stay, is part of Welfare's responsibilities.
- g. Rental of theatres, and all final finances are the responsibility of welfare.
- h. Invitations for all shows are made by welfare and distributed to all units, civilians and VIPs.
- i. Seating arrangements for all personnel in theater are arranged and carried out by welfare.

7. Talent shows

- a. Twice a year talent shows are organized by welfare.
- b. Welfare officers of units meet with the welfare section to make arrangements for auditions of talent in their respective camps.
- c. About four weeks before the show, rehearsals are held for all talent at the Al Nasr theatre to determine final participants.
- d. Welfare has always been responsible for P.A. usage during the shows.

8. S.I.B.

- a. The C.W.O. is on the S.I.B. Committee in an advisory capacity.
- b. Since most of the S.I.B. allocations are directed towards improvements to units welfare and sports facilities, it is the responsibility of the CWO with the Force Engineer, to investigate needs of units and approximate cost and report to SIB Committee.

9. ADL Golf Club

- a. CWO has always been Treasurer of the ADL Golf Club and Deputy CWO the Accountant.
- b. The Welfare Section also makes out all requisitions, for equipment, soft drinks, balls, and any outstanding correspondence required by the ADL Golf Club.
- c. The Welfare Secretary receives all applications for membership to the Club and issues membership cards to new members.
- d. All financial transactions of the Golf Club are made through Welfare.
- e. All personnel problems of Golf Club employees have, most of the time, been handled by the welfare section.
- f. Welfare Section has always been active in making arrangements for Golf Tournaments, providing P.A. systems for parties and procuring band for entertainment.

10. El Andalus ORS Beach Club

- a. Welfare Section was responsible for the initial arrangement of this facility for the ORS of UNEF
- b. We are indirectly responsible, under the CMP and HQ Commandant, for conditions at the Club.
- c. All problems pertaining to the El Andalus Beach Club, by units or by the proprietor are brought to the welfare section for a final solution.

11. Beaches

- a. The Welfare Section is responsible for the conditions on the beaches in Gaza, such as lifeguard towers, boats, volleyball equipment and any provision that should be made to ensure that the beaches are protected as well as possible.
- b. Welfare makes arrangements for the annual Polar Bear Swimming Club each January 1st.

ANNEX Q

- c. Welfare Section is also responsible for organizing fishing trips, by obtaining clearances on all boats used, fishermen hired and personnel fishing, as well as providing fishing lines, bait, ice and other equipment necessary for the safety and the success of the trip.

12. Projectors

- a. Welfare tries to provide projectors for all locations where a sizeable group congregates.
- b. Projectionist courses are arranged by welfare so that projectors are in competent hands.
- c. About 60 projectors are the responsibility of Welfare.

13. Christmas

- a. Welfare always organizes a Xmas Card contest and is also responsible for ordering Xmas Cards in UNEF.
- b. Welfare Section arranges visits by wives to units to sell cards each year.
- c. Welfare must account for all cards brought in and taken out each day and all monies pertained.
- d. Xmas Charities are also arranged by Welfare section through welfare officers, to benefit the local refugees.
- e. Each year welfare orders Xmas trees and decorations to supply the Force.

14. Welfare Library

- a. Welfare is in the possession of 3,000 books which are loaned to units and individuals.
- b. Welfare is also responsible for the distribution of 100 magazines a month.

15. Public Address System

- a. Welfare has always provided a P.A. system for any group so desiring as long as it is available.

16. Welfare Budget

- a. Approximately \$8,000 is budgeted for recreation and sports supplies, films and live shows each year.
 - b. This figure represents an approximately \$40,000 cut in the past 3 years.
 - c. It is welfare's responsibility to implement an adequate and effective program of welfare sports and stay within the bounds of the budget.
17. There are various other miscellaneous activities that welfare assists in but listed above are the outstanding responsibilities.

W. Brown
Chief Welfare Officer

	1957 ^a	1958	1959	1960
Part A				
Section 1. Military Personnel				
I. Allowances	1,863,582	1,684,276	1,634,898	1,651,8
II. Rotation of Contingents	1,988,019	2,037,941	1,750,617	1,747,7
III. Travel and Subsistence		310,079	171,890	170,9
Total Section 1	<u>3,851,601</u>	<u>4,032,296</u>	<u>3,566,405</u>	<u>3,570,4</u>
Section 2. Operational Expenses				
I. Equipment				
1. Motor transport and heavy mobile equip	2,461,571	406,479	38,796	485,5
ii. Misc operational equip	612,470	265,465	238,432	254,2
II. Maint and Oper of Equip				
1. Maint and Oper of motor transport, heavy mobile equip and stationary engines	1,580,077	1,112,108	1,019,449	849,8
ii. Operation of airlift	2,315,856	1,025,662	807,841	733,8
III. Supplies and Services				
1. Stat and off supplies	117,332	46,216	45,182	46,5
ii. Oper supp and services	2,692,388	1,154,306	1,295,001	1,075,7
IV. Communications Services	154,315	38,143	34,047	38,6
V. Freight, Cartage, Express	1,705,740	616,595	393,896	368,0
VI. Insurance	147,798	1,052	668	
VII. External Audit	2,428	12,082	13,000	16,1
VIII. Claims and Adjustment	946,586 ^b	118,157	31,100	11,0
Total Section 2	<u>12,736,561</u>	<u>4,796,265</u>	<u>3,917,412</u>	<u>3,879,7</u>
Section 3. Rental and Mainten of Premises	<u>736,275</u>	<u>335,925</u>	<u>166,873</u>	<u>170,9</u>
Section 4. Rations	<u>3,860,272</u>	<u>1,297,501</u>	<u>1,243,677</u>	<u>1,286,5</u>
Section 5. Welfare				
I. Leave Centre			456,541	407,4
II. Recre and Sports Supplies			28,100	34,5
III. Films	544,057	680,796	77,550	71,6
IV. Live Shows			28,132	24,5
V. Postage for personal mail			58,657	55,7
Total Section 5	<u>544,057</u>	<u>680,796</u>	<u>548,930</u>	<u>593,6</u>
Section 6. Non-Mil Personnel				
I. Salaries of Inter staff))	742,518	779,4
II. Sal and Wages of Locally recruited)1,666,268)1,511,371	803,219	701,8
III. Common staff costs)	125,220	135,194	146,5
IV. Travel and Subsistence	427,294	304,288	269,455	266,6
Total Section 6	<u>2,093,562</u>	<u>1,940,879</u>	<u>1,950,386</u>	<u>1,894,2</u>
Section 7. Contingencies	<u>231,839</u>		<u>71,910</u>	<u>100,0</u>
TOTAL PART A	<u>24,054,167</u>	<u>13,083,662</u>	<u>11,565,643</u>	<u>11,495,9</u>
Part B				
Section 8. Reimbur in respect of extra and extra-ordinary costs rel to pay and allow	<u>5,945,833</u>	<u>6,030,000</u>	<u>7,325,659</u>	<u>7,500,0</u>
Section 9. Reimbur in respect of equip, materials supp fur by Govt to their contingents		<u>4,800,000^c</u>		
Section 10. Reimbur in respect of death, disability awards on behalf of members of cont			<u>58,190</u>	<u>100,0</u>
TOTAL PART B	<u>5,945,833</u>	<u>10,830,000</u>	<u>7,383,849</u>	<u>7,600,0</u>
% B of total	20%	45%	38%	
GRAND TOTAL	\$30,000,000	\$23,913,662	\$18,949,492	\$19,095,9

a. Budgeting categories differed in 1957 from the following years but apparent equivalents have been matched for comparison.

b. Miscellaneous supplies and services.

c. Amount not disbursed but recorded as an outstanding obligation to cover claims from Governments at the conclusion of their contingents' total service in the Force.

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UNEF BUDGETED EXPENDITURES 1957 - 1967

ANNEX R

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
276	1,634,898	1,651,804	1,604,878	1,584,070	1,566,005	1,526,044	1,403,826	1,206,258	456,238
941	1,750,617	1,747,733	1,693,732	1,585,532	1,511,974	1,364,262	1,304,381	947,000	1,724,986
079	171,890	170,934	147,498	119,067	116,115	112,315	88,022	72,483	26,196
296	<u>3,566,405</u>	<u>3,570,471</u>	<u>3,446,108</u>	<u>3,288,669</u>	<u>3,194,094</u>	<u>3,002,621</u>	<u>2,796,229</u>	<u>2,225,741</u>	<u>2,207,420</u>
079	38,796	485,568	103,504	694,149	258,049	91,934	175,681	327,035	138,795
65	238,432	254,240	127,214	192,161	132,156	106,596	80,671	70,398	34,799
08	1,019,449	849,876	898,816	763,585	741,948	720,228	642,591	646,426	338,705
62	807,841	733,888	694,900	663,059	343,095	470,386	419,000	395,000	254,986
16	45,182	46,522	40,951	52,428	60,749	65,200	58,616	42,354	27,596
06	1,295,001	1,075,743	1,108,777	1,330,830	1,047,032	1,001,360	938,033	742,453	449,807
43	34,047	38,682	31,645	37,353	31,544	34,337	27,083	33,859	23,816
95	393,896	368,070	387,650	385,747	358,562	307,792	296,198	214,342	259,585
32	668								
82	13,000	16,154	14,300	15,000	14,600	17,000	22,200	17,000	16,967
57	31,100	11,044	10,000	4,742	4,600	5,000	5,230	7,000	136,000
65	<u>3,917,412</u>	<u>3,879,787</u>	<u>3,417,757</u>	<u>4,139,054</u>	<u>2,992,335</u>	<u>2,819,833</u>	<u>2,665,303</u>	<u>2,495,867</u>	<u>1,681,056</u>
25	<u>166,873</u>	<u>170,985</u>	<u>154,895</u>	<u>152,345</u>	<u>169,275</u>	<u>172,867</u>	<u>176,544</u>	<u>153,216</u>	<u>67,520</u>
01	<u>1,243,677</u>	<u>1,286,510</u>	<u>1,149,388</u>	<u>1,207,349</u>	<u>1,140,761</u>	<u>1,012,021</u>	<u>1,152,641</u>	<u>925,514</u>	<u>358,823</u>
06	456,541	407,454	402,916	339,346	352,775	312,887	299,826	234,784	91,646
	28,100	34,536	32,958	22,568	35,700	29,344	13,035	21,008	5,094
	77,550	71,673	72,000	71,500	77,000	72,000	62,000	58,525	23,956
	28,132	24,527	10,490	21,500	20,000	18,113	10,000	2,500	4,017
	58,657	55,747	63,872	67,924	65,698	54,349	60,018	48,648	20,019
06	<u>648,980</u>	<u>593,937</u>	<u>582,236</u>	<u>522,838</u>	<u>544,173</u>	<u>486,693</u>	<u>444,979</u>	<u>365,465</u>	<u>144,732</u>
	742,518	779,400))	734,539	734,972	748,735))
1	803,219	701,814)1,479,091)1,494,609	840,397	842,917	878,588)1,536,240)1,419,605
0	135,194	146,378	146,708	164,247	172,451	163,535	217,650	224,224	231,172
8	269,455	266,663	275,419	283,552	238,402	227,943	244,548	209,737	259,779
9	<u>1,950,386</u>	<u>1,894,255</u>	<u>1,901,218</u>	<u>1,924,408</u>	<u>1,985,789</u>	<u>1,969,367</u>	<u>2,089,521</u>	<u>1,970,201</u>	<u>1,910,556</u>
	71,910	100,000						198,905	
2	<u>11,565,643</u>	<u>11,495,945</u>	<u>10,651,602</u>	<u>11,252,663</u>	<u>10,026,427</u>	<u>9,463,402</u>	<u>9,325,217</u>	<u>8,334,909</u>	<u>6,370,107</u>
2	<u>7,325,659</u>	<u>7,500,000</u>	<u>7,670,425</u>	<u>7,685,000</u>	<u>8,250,000</u>	<u>7,630,000</u>	<u>8,714,300</u>	<u>7,221,075</u>	<u>4,200,000</u>
c			249,518	481,200	600,000	580,000	795,000	515,000	750,000
	58,190	100,000	75,000	72,000	75,000	75,000	75,000	75,000	75,000
	<u>7,383,849</u>	<u>7,600,000</u>	<u>7,994,943</u>	<u>8,238,200</u>	<u>8,925,000</u>	<u>8,285,000</u>	<u>9,584,300</u>	<u>7,811,075</u>	<u>5,025,000</u>
	38%	40%	43%	44%	47%	47%	51%	48%	44%
	\$18,949,492	\$19,095,945	\$18,646,545	\$19,490,863	\$18,951,427	\$17,748,402	\$18,909,517	\$16,145,984	\$11,395,107

years but apparent

gation to cover
ngents' total

UNEF BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE
AND OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES AND SERVICES.

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
CHAPTER I PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT	2,516,000	801,000	456,000	389,000	319,600	579,000
i. Motor transport and heavy mobile equip	2,314,000	500,000	131,000	140,000	172,500	418,000
ii. Miscellaneous operational equip	202,000	301,000	275,000	249,000	147,100	161,000
a. accommodation stores	na	20,000	na	50,000	65,000	2,000
b. engineering equip	na	18,700	na	64,000	20,700	1,000
c. medical and dental supplies	na	6,000	na	13,900	13,400	1,000
d. generators	na)	na	na	na	7,000
e. tents and tentage replacement	na	53,800	na	56,600	8,000	1,000
f. signals and switchboard equipment	na	6,000	na	10,000	15,000	1,000
g. miscellaneous equip	na	195,500	na	54,500	25,000	2,000
CHAPTER II MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT	3,786,000	1,805,000	1,501,000	1,807,000	1,573,200	1,177,000
i. Maintenance and operation of motor transport heavy mobile equip and stationary engines	2,840,000	1,175,000	980,000	1,062,000	979,700	708,000
a. spare parts for vehicles and maintenance	na	550,000	na	318,500	300,000	15,000
b. vehicle repairs	na	55,000	na	120,000	112,000	7,000
c. contractural repairs and spare parts for stationary engines	na	na	na	28,500	27,700	1,000
d. petrol, oil and lubricants	na	570,000	na	595,000	540,000	47,000
ii. Operation of aircraft	946,000	630,000	521,000	745,000	593,500	469,000
CHAPTER III SUPPLIES AND SERVICES	2,092,000	834,000	973,000	890,000	920,000	944,000
i. Stationery and office supplies	80,000	74,000	40,000	46,000	40,000	40,000
ii. Operational supplies and services	2,012,000	760,000	933,000	844,000	880,000	904,000
a. expenditable supplies in the medical, dental, ordinance, sanitation, quarter-master categories (except clothing/uniforms)	na	na	na	na	na	43,000
b. clothing and uniforms	na	204,000	na	160,000	160,000	15,000
c. engineering supplies	na	na	na	na	na	24,000
d. contractural personal services	na	128,000	na	76,000	80,000	8,000
e. signal stores and services	na	na	na	na	na	na

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ANNEX S

1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
389,000	319,600	579,900	364,500	335,100	335,000	326,000	465,500
140,000	172,500	418,570	280,000	248,300	225,000	241,000	379,500
249,000	147,100	161,300	84,500	86,800	110,000	85,000	86,000
50,000	65,000	20,000	27,000	28,800	na	25,000	10,000
64,000	20,700	16,000	7,900	5,000	na	3,000	3,000
13,900	13,400	8,500	5,000	3,000	na	5,000	2,500
na	na	71,000	12,000	12,000	na	17,500	52,350
56,600	8,000	2,700	3,000	3,000	na	na	na
10,000	15,000	18,300	2,950	5,000	na	5,000	18,150
54,500	25,000	24,800	26,650	30,000	na	29,500	10,000
1,807,000	1,573,200	1,177,100	1,250,000	1,205,200	1,029,000	1,052,000	949,000
1,062,000	979,700	708,000	763,000	735,000	610,000	657,000	538,000
318,500	320,000	150,000	200,000	185,000	na	247,000	177,000
120,000	112,000	70,000	98,000	80,000	na	10,000	5,000
28,500	27,700	18,000	15,000	20,000	na	50,000	68,000
595,000	540,000	470,000	450,000	450,000	na	350,000	288,000
745,000	533,500	469,100	487,000	470,200	419,000	395,000	411,000
890,000	920,000	944,000	957,900	900,000	958,000	960,000	735,000
46,000	40,000	40,000	45,000	50,000	60,000	60,000	50,000
844,000	880,000	904,000	912,900	850,000	898,000	900,000	685,000
na	na	431,000	361,485	386,300	na	428,800	354,000
160,000	160,000	151,000	149,415	128,500	na	101,000	34,000
na	na	240,000	174,600	222,000	na	253,500	195,000
76,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	78,000	na	78,000	68,000
na	na	na	47,400	33,200	na	38,700	34,000


na - not available

a. Budgeting categories differed in 1957 from the following years but apparent equivalents have been matched for comparison.


b. 1958-1959 category is divided into operational supplies and miscellaneous supplies and services.

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM -LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF UNEF BY THE U.S.

ROUTINE:



NON-ROUTINE:



U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNEF

(Nov 1956 - Dec 1967)

	U.N. Total Expenditures Authorized	U.S. Contribution			Per Cent
		Assessed	Voluntary	UN Bond	
Nov 1956-Dec 1957	} 55,000,000 ^a	4,896,063	} 14,112,431	}	27,235,994 ^a 49.34
Jan 1958-Dec 1958		8,127,500			
Jan 1959-Dec 1959	19,000,000	4,943,146	3,500,000		8,443,146 44.44
Jan 1960-Dec 1960	20,000,000	6,497,064	3,200,000		9,697,064 48.48
Jan 1961-Dec 1961	19,000,000	6,115,519	1,800,000		7,915,519 41.66
Jan 1962-Jun 1962	9,750,000	3,121,950	1,321,974		4,443,924 45.58
Jul 1962-Jun 1963 ^b	19,230,000			6,157,446	6,157,446 32.02
Jul 1963-Dec 1963	9,500,000	3,037,040	371,546		3,408,586 35.88
Jan 1964-Dec 1964	17,750,000	5,664,856	871,905		6,536,761 36.83
Jan 1965-Dec 1965	18,911,000	6,837,306			6,837,306 36.86 ^c
Jan 1966-Dec 1966	15,000,000	6,837,306			6,837,306 36.86 ^c
Jan 1967-Dec 1967	14,000,000	6,384,697			6,384,697 ^d 36.87 ^c
TOTAL	217,141,000	62,462,447	25,177,856 ^a	6,157,446	93,797,749 43.20 ^e

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
ANNEX U


- a. Includes \$1,191,586 for initial airlift services provided by the United States without charge to the United Nations.
- b. This period's UNEF costs were financed from UN bond proceeds. UN bonds are to be repaid over a 25-year period from the UN regular budget. The US share of the regular budget was 32.02 percent in 1962 and 1963. Therefore to reflect the overall cost to the United States of the UNEF operation the proportionate US share is included in this tabulation.
- c. The percentage represents the US share of the amount apportioned. The US share of expenditures authorized amounts to 36.16 percent in 1965, 45.58 percent in 1966 and 45.60 percent in 1967.
- d. This represents the amount the US was originally apportioned for 1967. UNEF was withdrawn from the Middle East in June 1967, and the present estimate of cost amounts to 11.4 million. On this basis the US share is \$5,196,600.
- e. This represents the overall US share 1956-1967 including airlift services, assessments, voluntary contributions, bond proceeds and apportionment.


Source: United States, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., House of Representatives,
 Doc. 375, United States Contributions to International Organizations
 (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 12.

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* Initial U. S. Air Force airlift valued at \$1,191,581.40 was waived for reimbursement and is not included in the Air Force total. If it had been included, the total USAF air support of UNEF would have been \$1,310,762.







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MAJOR ITEMS OF U.S. ARMY SUPPORT TO UNEF
BY CALENDAR QUARTER BILLING

ANNEX X

(asterisk indicates source other than
U.S. Army facilities in Europe)

QUARTER ENDING:

31 Dec 1956

168 Rifles for Columbian force at Capodichino	\$ 16,445
Carbines, pistols, etc for Columbians	24,323
Vaccines, medical supplies	681
Compasses, tools, etc for Columbians	1,380
Subsistence (8-15 Dec 1956)	119,381
4 radio sets	18,718
* Maps	58

31 Mar 1957

Batteries, flashlights, telephone switch-boards, etc.	2,484
5,000 tear gas grenades	12,077
142 vehicles (4 Jan 57)	878,345
Subsistence (from Gressen, Germany)	11,356
Subsistence	156,691
Subsistence	38,640
Subsistence	283,360
3,000 water cans	123,606
1,000 helmet liners, sleeping bags, tents, etc	9,150
Generator	89,266
Housekeeping and cleaning supplies	1,716
* Maps	6,297
Hospitalization (3 patients)	500
	885

30 Jun 1957

3 semi-trailers	17,514
3 fork-lifts	11,128
Subsistence	174,190
Subsistence	48,153
Subsistence	9,356
Subsistence	200,604
Subsistence	58,977
Helmet liners, cook-sets, stoves, blankets	111,389
sleeping bags	91,280

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ANNEX X

Cots, tents, etc.	107,648
Refrigerators	8,187
Port labor	?
Hospitalization	1,114

30 Sep 1957

Vehicle parts	47,215
Vehicle parts	75,316
Subsistence	174,007
Subsistence	40,240
48 signaling pistols	768
Cots, tents	239,083
Cots, tents	12,658
Ice cream plant	2,708
1,000 First-aid kits	5,810
Kitchen tools, port labor, chemicals, mine probs, etc	?
* Maps	20

31 Dec 1957

Vehicle parts, tires	13,985
Port labor (Leghorn)	12,749
3 semi-trailers	17,514
1 fork-lift	7,952
Subsistence	13,201
Subsistence	390,330
Subsistence	148,505
Subsistence	43,805
Subsistence	20,968
General supplies	17,139
3 refrigerators	5,490
Flashlights, batteries, etc	?
Hospitalization (1)	5

31 Mar 1958

Subsistence	121,864
Tents (Jan 58)	126,284
Empty gas cans (Jan 58)	5,513
Hospitalization (73 days 1 Canadian)	1,405
19 refrigerators	4,826
Port labor (Leghorn)	2,768
* Medical supplies and equipment	10,899
* Signal supplies	790

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ANNEX X

30 Jun 1958

Subsistence	38,483
Parts, motor pool work in Pisa on UN vehicles	834
* Signal equipment and parts	13,242

30 Sep 1958

Subsistence	94,705
Subsistence	77,568
* Sun glasses	8,000
Port labor (Leghorn)	4,007
2,000 helmet liners	?
* Paint and brushes, parts, etc.	?
Hospitalization (6 days Camp Nicoli, 1 Norwegian)	120
* Field manuals (to Hq UN)	13

31 Dec 1958

Subsistence	111,751
Subsistence	7,089
Hospital equipment (20 Oct 58)	1,257
Gas cans, tents, parts, soap, etc.	?
* 1,120 maps	112
Port charges	1,127
Hospitalization (1)	1,256
* Vehicle parts	1,185

31 Mar 1959

* Vehicle parts	18,308
Misc goods and services	?

30 Jun 1959

* Sunglasses	5,500
* Sunglasses	2,500
Subsistence	1,489
Subsistence	4,374
Maps	305
Hospitalization (Dane 3-10 Jan, Dane 24 May- 5 June)	399
* Signal parts	2,783
* Vehicle parts	18,193
* Quartermaster items	39,072

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ANNEX X

30 Sep 1959

Parachutes (ship to <u>UNOGIL</u> , Beirut)	2,601
Tents	58,200
* Vehicle parts	79,541
Hospitalization (1)	64
Misc goods and services (including repair UN radio transmitter, Pisa)	226
* Signal parts	9,582

31 Dec 1959

60 tents	29,946
300 helmet liners	?
Parts, maintenance and repair vehicles	?
Photos for I.D. cards	?
Port labor (23 Jan)	?
Port labor (13 Sept 1958)	?
* Vehicle parts	14,198

31 Mar 1960

Subsistence	14,298
* Signal parts	201
* Vehicle parts	2,872
* Engineer parts	5,498
* Quartermaster supplies	126,708
Misc goods and services	705

30 Jun 1960

Subsistence	4,941
Gas cans	2,250
Hospitalization (Canadian, 25-30 April)	106
Misc goods and services (incl port labor)	1,269
* Vehicle parts	21,292
* Medical supplies	9,098
* Quartermaster supplies	9,143

30 Sep 1960

Subsistence	18,666
Misc goods and services	371
* Signal parts	4,214
* Vehicle parts	8,062

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ANNEX X

31 Dec 1960

Subsistence	43,712
Subsistence	19,548
Subsistence	25,612
Repairs, maintenance, etc	?
Vehicle parts	55,235
Hospitalization (Indian, 6-14 Nov)	136
* Quartermaster supplies	3,108

31 Mar 1961

Helmet liners, parts, maps, repairs, maintenance, etc.	2,405
3 transportation cases (coffins)	912
Vehicle parts	53,155
Port labor (26 Jan)	405
* Quartermaster supplies	33,882

30 Jun 1961

Subsistence	10,317
Maps, tents, repairs, etc	?
* Vehicle parts	28,155
* Signal parts	355
* Quartermaster supplies	2,585

30 Sep 1961

* Engineer parts	721
* Vehicle parts	11,096
Port labor (ammunition)	30
* Quartermaster supplies	5,299
Misc goods and services	2,238

31 Dec 1961

Hospitalization (3)	378
* Signal parts	2,521
* Vehicle parts	33,961
* Engineer parts	369
* Quartermaster supplies	4,958
Misc goods and services	1,374

31 Mar 1962

Hospitalization (10)	1,433
* Signal parts	1,181

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ANNEX X

* Vehicle parts	19,871
Misc goods and services	1,109
* Quartermaster supplies	5,125

30 Jun 1962

Subsistence	41,949
528 helmet liners	976
Misc goods and services (incl repair UN office machines, Pisa)	1,848
* Signal parts	2,366
* Vehicle parts	16,592
* Quartermaster supplies	5,584

30 Sep 1962

Hospitalization (3)	216
* Signal parts	19,980
* Vehicle parts	11,177
* Engineer parts	2,406
* Quartermaster supplies	4,125
Misc goods and services	360

31 Dec 1962

Hospitalization (3)	79
Misc goods and services	1,524

31 Mar 1963

Misc goods and services (incl repair of UN fork lifts at Pisa and transport support)	1,309
* Vehicle parts	1,618
* Engineer parts	852
* Quartermaster supplies	4,980

30 Jun 1963

Hospitalization (1)	36
* 100 maps	10
* Signal parts	25,624
* Vehicle parts	20,886
Misc goods and services	1,439

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ANNEX X

30 Sep 1963

Hospitalization (3)	13
* Signal batteries and tubes	202
* 8 chemical comparators M2	604
* Vehicle parts	13,729
Misc goods and services	426
* Engineer parts	1,683

31 Dec 1963

2,000 tear gas grenades	5,420
Subsistence	35,415
Hospitalization (6)	51
* Signal parts	5,012
267 helmet liners	?
4 tents	860
* Vehicle parts	5,852
* Quartermaster supplies	10,104
Misc goods and services	339

31 Mar 1964

Hospitalization	507
Misc goods and services incl port services	1,871
233 helmet liners	419
* Signal parts	4,342
* Vehicle parts	20,712
* Quartermaster supplies	3,323

30 Jun 1964

* Signal parts	4,666
* Vehicle parts	2,711
* Quartermaster supplies (incl field range parts)	9,924
Misc goods and services	241

30 Sep 1964

* Vehicle parts	1,052
Misc goods and services (incl Auto Data processing machine rental)	779
* Signal parts	2,063

31 Dec 1964

Forklift repair parts	?
Paint 14 jeeps white to replace UNEF jeeps sent to Yemen	796
* Cooking equipment and other Quartermaster supplies	3,711
* Vehicle parts	11,267
Misc goods and services	1,858
* Signal parts	1,204

31 Mar 1965

Cargo moved at U.S. Army expense from Leghorn to Port Said (14 jeeps)	2,561
Cooking equipment, field range parts	1,723
Vehicle parts	13,328
Misc goods and services (incl Auto Data processing machine rented, repair of vehicles and office machines)	633
Hospitalization	504

30 June 1965

Repair and pack 26 UN projectors	766
Repair and paint 2,963 helmet liners	556
Vehicle parts	2,506
Misc goods and services	3,897
Transportation services	2,464

30 Sep 1965

* (Assist Letter #64 - 3)	34,516
Misc goods and services	511
Petroleum products	675
General supplies	14,105

31 Dec 1965

Ocean transportation by U.S. on 31 July 1965, Leghorn to Port Said 80 metric tons	1,640
Misc goods and services	879
General supplies	2,635

ANNEX X

31 Mar 1966

Ocean transportation on 2 Feb 1965, Leghorn to Port Said, 154 metric tons	2,464
Ocean transportation, 23 Sept 1964, Leghorn to Port Said, 135 metric tons	2,561
Vehicle parts	567
* Medical equipment to Rafah 12 Feb	49
Misc goods and services	1,226

30 Jun 1966

Vehicle parts	11,294
Helmet liners	534
Electrical equip, parts, etc	11,547
Port charges Leghorn (ammunition)	84
Quartermaster supplies	3,149
General supplies	17,943

30 Sep 1966

Signal parts	2,045
Weapon parts	2,946
Vehicle parts	814
Hospitalization (1)	132
Misc goods and services	672
General supplies	25,244

31 Dec 1966

Vehicle parts	5,467
Signal parts	10,906
Industrial supplies	5,673
Misc goods and services	1,029
General supplies	38,260

31 Mar 1967

Misc goods and services	514
General supplies	4,194

30 Jun 1967

Misc goods and services (incl bus and sedan transport for Canadian contingent evacuating via Pisa)	1,146
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ANNEX X

30 Sep 1967

Misc goods and services (incl stevedore
charges 20, 21, 24, and 28 July 1967
and 9 August 1967)
General supplies

2,005
3,881

31 Dec 1967

Repair of vehicles
Fumigation UN Storage Bldg
Port charges (17-18 July)
Port charges (30 Aug)
Port charges (7-12 Sept, Ammunition)
Other misc goods and services
Vehicle parts

4,211
226
1,757
96
65
963
16,274

31 Mar 1968

Delayed billings for 53 jeeps provided
1963-65 less credit for 25 repairable
and 26 non repairable Jeeps and pay-
ment by UN 1 July 1965 for 4 jeeps
sent to Yemen (61,696)
Misc goods and services
General supplies

538
10,453

UNEF

TABULATION OF INCIDENTS

	57 ^a	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67 ^c
Crossing of ADL/IF involving fire	10	14	10	4	4	-	2	4	-	-	-
Firing across ADL/IF	13	1	7	5	4	5	7	7	6	3	1
Crossing of ADL/IF involving theft or kidnapping	102	28	36	66	8	-	-	37	-	1	4
Crossing or attempted crossings of ADL/IF involving none of above, involving mines, firing on UNEF, etc.	79	83	129	262	115	110	105	61	90	42	29
Air violations by UAR				5 ^b	4	4	3	6	2	-	-
Air violations by Israel	na	na	na	95 ^b	232	419	269	377	546	384	232
Air violations by unidentified aircraft				12 ^b	17	60	26	56	38	40	37
Violations of Israel-controlled waters by UAR vessels				35 ^b	35	77	43	109	55	78	7
Violations of UAR-controlled waters by Israel vessels				33 ^b	81	22	60	71	53	66	11
Total					500	697	515	728	790	614	321

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ANNEX Y

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THE CONGO OPERATION

1960-1964

(ONUC)

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THE CONGO OPERATION 1960-1964

(ONUC)¹

I

INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

Since this paper will focus chiefly on the subject of national support--political and financial, but especially material--for the Congo peacekeeping operation, there is little need for an extensive review of the historical background nor for any new attempts at analysis of the Congo situation as it existed at 1 July 1960.² A brief review of the characters and a setting of the scheme should suffice. Nonetheless, the developing situation was complex and it needs to be seen in full perspective.

B. BACKGROUND

The Belgian colonial venture in the Congo dates from 1884 when King Leopold sent the British-born explorer Henry M.

¹ The Congo peacekeeping operation is known as "ONUC" from the initials of its title in French: "Opération des Nations Unies au Congo." ONUC included an Officer in Charge (originally called "Special Representative of the Secretary-General"), and under him 3 elements: the UN Force, the UN Civilian Operation and the Chief Administrative Officer. In this paper, for simplicity, the abbreviation ONUC will be used even though in most contexts the Civilian Operation is not involved.

² Detailed historical and analytical coverage of the Congo situation and the peacekeeping operation in all its aspects is well covered in Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A UN Force in Action (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965); Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping: 1960-1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive and Military Control, 4 Volumes (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 1966 - prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), hereafter referred to as Lefever, ACDA Study; and Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

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Stanley to central Africa. Until 1908 the Congo enterprise was a personal holding of the Belgian King as opposed to the Belgian State. As with other colonial ventures in Africa, territorial subdivisions and local governmental arrangements suited the colonialists, who imposed them, far better than they suited the tribal, communal and economic life of the inhabitants. That area of the Congo known as Katanga is a case in point. On the basis of history, tribes, topography, traditions, economic organization, and especially wealth, Katanga fit poorly into the Congo as a single whole. Until the mid-1930's it had been either actually separate or administered by the Belgians separately from the rest of the colony. To a lesser but still significant degree, other tribal groups and areas of the Congo felt themselves apart from any conception of a single Congo state or nation.

The Belgian approach to colonial management, while not completely unenlightened, was short-sighted. It imagined a slow, methodical advance by the Africans to a point where, at some far-distant date, a somewhat different relationship between colonialists and colonials might be necessary. This advance of the Africans was to be widespread horizontally without any effort at raising up elites more rapidly. Consequently, by the end of the 1950's 10,000 Belgians held all the positions of importance in the colonial governments; 17,000 Belgians ran the economy of the colony; not one single Congolese had reached officer rank in the 25,000 man Force Publique; there was not a single qualified Congolese doctor; only a few thousand Congolese had been beyond primary school level; and there were about 8-15 Congolese college graduates. About 87,000 Belgians were in the Congo altogether.

Yet the late 1950's were a time of tremendous change in colonial Africa and the Congo did not escape the trend. Political parties and tribal associations sprang up and set their programs for independence. In December 1958 an All-Africa Peoples Conference met at Accra, Ghana. The Congolese delegate was Patrice Lumumba. By January 1959 the Belgian government had agreed in principle to independence for the Congo. From then to mid-1960, events moved at a hectic pace in the whole of colonial Africa. The Belgians were facing a flood. By mid-1960 no less than 15 African colonies (and Cyprus) already had, or were scheduled for, independence in

time for admission to the United Nations at its Fifteenth General Assembly session in September 1960.

In January 1960 a Round Table Discussion took place in Brussels with delegates from various Congolese factions. It was agreed that independence for the Congo would be effective at the end of June 1960. The Round Table agreed on a draft Fundamental Law for the new state and a 16-point plan of transition. During May 1960 elections for parliament were held in the Congo and the Lumumbaists with 40 seats were the strongest party in the 137-member House of Representatives. Kasavubu (age 42) became President and Lumumba (age 34) Premier and Defense Minister in the new government formed on 24 June.

On 29 June 1960 Congolese and Belgian officials signed a Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration in Leopoldville,¹ and on 30 June with due ceremony King Baudouin proclaimed the independent Republic of the Congo. Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs was present for the event. Robert Murphy headed the U.S. delegation.

C. THE CRISIS

Less than a week after independence the Congolese Army (Force Publique, later renamed Armée Nationale Congolaise, ANC) mutinied. Its demands were for removal of white officers and more pay. The mutiny spread. Europeans, especially Belgians, were harassed and molested on the streets and elsewhere. By 8 July the first of over 5,000 Belgian paratroopers began to arrive back in the Congo to assist the more than 3,000 Belgian Metropolitan troops already there in protecting Belgian life and property.

¹ Leopoldville was renamed Kinshasa after independence. However, in this paper, place names as they were when the crisis arose will be used. The name "Congo" in this paper will always mean Congo (Leopoldville or Kinshasa). The full name "Congo (Brazzaville)" will be used when the reference is to that state.

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The timing of events at this stage becomes significant.

On 10 July at the suggestion of U.S. Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake, Kasavubu and Lumumba solicited "UN technical military assistance" from UN Under Secretary-General Ralph Bunche, then in Leopoldville.¹ UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, in Geneva since 8 July, returned to his New York headquarters late on 11 July and early next morning conferred on the Congo situation with the heads of nine African delegations (Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and United Arab Republic).² Still on 11 July, Bunche received "approval in principle" from the Secretary-General in response to his message of the day before.

On 11 July Moise Tshombe (age 43) proclaimed the independence of Katanga, requesting Belgian assistance.

On 12 July Kasavubu and Lumumba by telegram to the Secretary-General urgently and formally requested UN military assistance, specifically "...the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo," against Belgian aggression and collusion with Katanga.³

Also on 12 July, 3 Congolese Ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga requested U.S. aid from Ambassador Timberlake. The Ambassador indicated U.S. preference for a multilateral program. A White House spokesman, the same day, referred to the request and confirmed the U.S. preference for UN action. Still on the same day, the Belgian UN representative asked the Secretary-General for UN military aid to collaborate with Belgium in the restoration of order in the Congo.

On 13 July Kasavubu and Lumumba addressed a clarifying telegram to the Secretary-General, pointing out: (1) Belgian

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, op. cit., Vol. 4 Chronology, p. 4.

² A.G. Mezerik, ed., Congo and the United Nations (New York: International Review Service, 1960), Vol. I, p. 4.

³ The 12 and 13 July 1960 telegrams were published in S/4382, 13 July 1960.

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aggression, not internal security, was the purpose of the requested assistance, (2) the request was for military personnel from "neutral countries" and "not from the U.S.," (3) recourse would be had to the Bandung powers if the UN did not respond at once, and (4) the Congolese request had no connection with any Belgian request.

Also on 13 July Gizenga asked Ghana for interim military aid until the arrival of the UN troops. The Secretary-General called a meeting of the Security Council to consider the Congo crisis.

II

MANDATE, PHASES, FUNCTIONS

A. THE MANDATE

For purposes here, it is not necessary to go into all the ramifications and rationales of the Security Council and General Assembly actions and Secretariat interpretations that constituted the evolving mandate for the peacekeeping operation in the Congo. It is necessary to understand the objectives and tasks established for the operation in order to look at the need for and adequacy of support arrangements.

The mandate for the Congo peacekeeping operation was a changing thing. Its basis was the 14 July 1960 Security Council Resolution (S/4387), a compromise sponsored by Tunisia and adopted 8 votes to none with 3 abstentions (China, France, U.K.).

In addition to calling upon the Belgians to withdraw from the Congo and requesting the Secretary-General to report back, the substance of the resolution was as follows:

2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;....

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As a mandate, this was about as vague as it is possible to get. Yet Security Council members, with a general idea of what was intended to follow from it were content to "let Dag do it," whatever "it" was, as being the best politically expedient alternative available.

The Secretary-General in an effort to clarify the mandate reported back to the Security Council on 18 July the following interpretations (S/4389):

1. Restoration of order was the main task,
2. The UN force should be regarded as a "temporary security force" in the Congo with Congolese consent,
3. Although "it may be considered as serving as an arm of the Government for the maintenance of order and protection of life," the UN force was exclusively under UN Command and would not be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict,
4. Security Council permanent members would be excluded from the UN force. Its "hard core of military units" would be sought from African states. Seven African battalions and 1 Swedish battalion had been obtained; more were sought. Requests for specialized units, equipment and airlift had been made to certain non-African states,
5. UN troops would employ force only in self-defense. Any initiative in the use of force was prohibited.

To this point it would seem that a rather clear-cut approach existed. A largely African peacekeeping force, rounded out by non-Africans to serve the universality concept and to provide specialties not readily available from African states, was, with the consent of the Congo government, to enter the country to reinforce and technically to assist that government in restoring order. The Belgian problem was swept under the rug. The squabbles between Congolese factions and the problem of break-away provinces

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were excluded from the mandate as "internal." The possibility of interference from outside the Congo was ignored. The military part of the operation was to be temporary.

It would also seem that the Secretary-General was acting more in terms of the Congolese request passed through Dr. Bunche on 10 July rather than the formal Congolese requests of 12 and 13 July. (See supra, pp. 190-191).

By the time the Security Council acted again on the Congo problem on 22 July 1960, several developments had brought some changes to the picture:

- Belgian withdrawal from major cities to their Congo bases had largely been accomplished except in Katanga.
- Lumumba had requested and been assured of Soviet support.
- Tshombe had announced that no UN troops would be allowed to enter Katanga.

Resolution (S/4405) adopted unanimously in the Security Council on 22 July 1960 was sponsored by Ceylon and Tunisia. It added emphasis to the "Belgian factor" by again calling for their withdrawal and authorizing the Secretary-General "...to take all necessary action to this effect." It commended the Secretary-General and those states which had responded to his requests, and invited the UN specialized agencies to assist.

The Secretary-General visited the Congo 26 July-6 August where he announced the decision that UN troops would enter Katanga. Two days later, convinced that any attempt at entry would be resisted by force, he withdrew the decision. The Lumumba government, militant African states and the Soviet Union raged over the back-down and threatened varieties of actions outside the UN. Hammarskjold, so to speak, "went back to the drawing board" and requested the Security Council to confirm its aims and clarify its views on methods and timing.

The 9 August 1960 Security Council Resolution (S/4426) was again sponsored by Ceylon and Tunisia and was adopted nine votes to none with 2 abstentions (France, Italy). With respect

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to the existing mandate, it confirmed the authority given to the Secretary-General in the 2 previous resolutions and reaffirmed in stronger words, what up until then had been set out only as an interpretation by the Secretary-General: the neutral position of the UN force on internal conflicts "...constitutional or otherwise." It reemphasized and sharpened the need for Belgian troop withdrawal from Katanga by the words "immediate" and "speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General." It very explicitly declared that entry of the UN force into Katanga was necessary.

By citing Charter Articles (25 and 49) for the first time in its consideration of the Congo, the Security Council added some degree of punch to both the non-interference issue and the support problems by pointing up the charter obligation of all states to accept and carry out Security Council decisions and to afford mutual assistance for such measures.

On several occasions in the weeks following its 9 August 1960 resolution, the Security Council addressed the Congo situation and the debates grew hotter as the developments in the Congo compounded in complexity. The Secretary-General again visited the Congo 11-15 August and personally and successfully escorted 2 companies of UN Swedish troops into Katanga, but nonetheless, had an acrimonious falling-out with Lumumba over the latter's demand that Afro-Asian observers be sent to Katanga and over the continued insistence by Hammarskjöld that the UN Force had no mandate to subdue Katanga. Militant African states and the Soviet Bloc supported the Lumumba demands and again threatened a variety of action outside the UN, including volunteers and other direct assistance to Lumumba. By the end of August Soviet airplanes with crews, trucks, other equipment and technicians had arrived in the Congo.

On 5 September Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, who had replaced Bunche as the Secretary-General's representative in Leopoldville on 1 September, closed all major Congolese airports to non-UN air-landings and on 6 September closed the Leopoldville radio station. Since this latter action coincided with the beginning of the confusing spectacle of Lumumba and Kasavubu firing each other, and penalized Lumumba, it was yet another frustration for the already badly frustrated Lumumba supporters, especially the Soviet Union.

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When this sequence ended on 14 September 1960 with the seizure of power by Colonel (later General) Joseph D. Mobutu (age 29), Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, and his announcement that Soviet Bloc missions would be ejected, all the frustrations concentrated on the Secretary-General personally. Soviet efforts formally to censure Hammarskjold in the Security Council failed of adoption and a Soviet veto blocked any compromise or constructive effort. On 16 September over Soviet and Polish objection, and with a French abstention, a Special Emergency Session (the fourth) of the General Assembly was called.

In addition to voting the admission of the Republic of the Congo to the UN, as recommended by the Security Council on 7 July 1960, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on 20 September which affected the mandate. The resolution (A/Res/1474/Rev. 1 (ES IV)) was sponsored by 17 Afro-Asian and Middle East states and was introduced by Ghana. It was adopted 70 votes to none with 11 abstentions (Communist countries, France, South Africa).

In terms of the mandate the 20 September 1960 General Assembly resolution added a few points. It acknowledged, for the first time, that the Congo problem bore a relation to international peace. Its preamble mentioned the unsatisfactory economic situation and "advancing the welfare" as a purpose of UN assistance. It supported the 3 previous Security Council resolutions and "vigorous action" by the Secretary-General. To "law and order," it added "unity, territorial integrity, and political independence" as purposes of UN assistance. In addition to repeating general terms covering non-interference and member obligations under Articles 25 and 40, it explicitly called upon all states to refrain from the provision of military assistance to the Congo except upon request of the UN.

To this point the mandate appeared not too unclear if considered superficially. This can be quickly corrected by remembering that it was all based upon assistance to the government of the Congo, and by then looking at the hopeless morass of the internal situation in the country. It was not until 2 months later on 22 November 1960 that a General Assembly vote on credentials resolved (or showed the lack of resolution of) the question of what the words "government of

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the Congo" meant. As between seating the Kasavubu or the Lumumba representatives in the UN, 97 members voted: 53 for Kasavubu, 24 against Kasavubu (presumably for Lumumba), 19 abstentions, and 1 not voting. A mandate to assist the "government of the Congo" under such conditions, no matter how clear the words appear in the resolutions, rested on shifting sands indeed.

The Security Council's next consideration of the Congo in a way formally affecting the mandate occurred on 21 February 1961. In the intervening 5 months much had transpired. The XV General Assembly, opening 20 September 1960 with an unprecedented number of heads of government present, was treated to a vicious and sometimes uproarious attack on the Secretary-General. Enthusiasm for indiscriminate anti-colonialism was heightened by a "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" in the General Assembly on 14 December 1960.¹ Lumumba, under arrest since 1 December, was killed under mysterious circumstances, his death not being announced until 13 February 1961. Meanwhile on 12 December 1960 Gizenga, a Lumumbaist, had established a rival Congolese government at Stanleyville. By the time of the Security Council 21 February meeting this Gizenga government had been recognized, and in some cases aided, by the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Guinea, East Germany and Communist China. It was, of course, also supported by the Soviet Union. Following the Casablanca conference 4-7 January 1961, withdrawals of their contingents from the UN effort in the Congo were announced by Guinea, Morocco, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, United Arab Republic and Indonesia. Mali had previously withdrawn its contingent.

The 21 February 1961 Security Council Resolution (S/4741) was sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia and United Arab Republic and was adopted 9 votes to none with 2 abstentions (France, Soviet

¹ The declaration on anti-colonialism was adopted 89 votes to none with 9 abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, U.K. and U.S.). Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 510-511, has reported that the U.S. inclination was to vote for the Declaration but that a Macmillan call to Eisenhower had resulted in the abstention.

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Union). It altered and expanded the mandate in interesting ways. First, it recognized that the Congo situation was a "threat to international peace and security...;" that there was danger of "...wide-spread civil war..." and that the UN should act to prevent this, including "...the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort." It added "other foreign" military personnel, advisers and specifically "mercenaries" to the Belgians whose immediate withdrawal was required, excluding only those foreigners under the UN Command. It pushed for conciliation among the Congolese factions and urged the restoration of parliamentary government. For the first time it recognized a basic problem that had existed from the beginning and urged that "...Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control..." It also called for an investigation of Lumumba's death. Together with these new elements, it confirmed all the preceding resolutions including that by the Emergency Session General Assembly on 20 September 1960.

The immediate reaction to these new elements of the ONUC mandate was the strong dissent of the Kasavubu government on the grounds that they violated Congolese sovereignty. With respect to foreign advisers, Kasavubu held, it was up to the Congo to decide, not the UN. The same applied to decisions about convening parliament and investigating criminal acts in the country. It applied most strongly to any efforts at reorganizing (especially if this meant disarming) Congolese armed forces.

In the 6 weeks period between the 21 February 1961 Security Council resolution and 3 resolutions (2 of which were mandate oriented) by the resumed Fifteenth General Assembly on 15 April 1961 and a special agreement between the UN and the Congolese government on 17 April 1961 there were additional significant developments. In the area of operations, these concerned increased harassment of the UN and its officials and troops in the Congo, the closing by Congolese troops of the port of Matadi on 5 March, the need to rebuild the UN force in light of the Casablanca and other withdrawals, and continued maneuvering among the Congolese faction with indications of some polarization between Gizenga (Stanleyville), on the one hand, and the Central government, Katanga, Kasai and others, on the other hand. (See The Tananarive Conference 8-12 March 1961).

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The 3 General Assembly resolutions, if adding no new elements to the mandate, selectively emphasized certain aspects in the existing mandate. A/Res/1599, 15 April 1961, sponsored by 20 Afro-Asian and Middle East states (including India and also Yugoslavia) was adopted 61 votes for (USSR) to 5 against (Belgium) with 33 abstentions (France, U.K., U.S., Congo). It identified the presence of Belgian and other foreign personnel as "the central factor" and decided that except for those under the UN Command they should withdraw. A/Res/1600, 15 April 1961, called upon Congolese authorities to "desist from attempting a military solution," to return to parliamentary government and to seek conciliation, assisted by a UN Commission of Conciliation. The Secretary-General should prevent the introduction of non-UN arms into the Congo. This resolution was sponsored by 16 assorted non-great powers including Iran, Japan and Turkey, and was adopted 60 votes for (U.K., U.S.) to 16 against (USSR) with 23 abstentions (Congo, Belgium, France). The third resolution A/Res/1601, 15 April 1961, sponsored by Ceylon, Ghana, India and Morocco, set up a 4-man Commission of Investigation into the death of Lumumba. It was adopted by 45 votes for, to 3 against (Congo) and 49 abstentions (Belgium, France, U.K., U.S., USSR). The agreement between the UN and the Congolese government on 17 April 1961 (S/4807) resolved the main Congolese objection to the foreign adviser portion of the 21 February 1961 Security Council resolution by excluding from the requirement to leave the country, in addition to UN sponsored personnel, those advisers recruited or returned to the Congo by authority of the President of the Republic of the Congo.

From mid-April 1961 to the last, for purposes here, UN mandate-forming action in the Security Council on 24 November 1961, events outside the Congo context as well as within it needed to be noted, particularly the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961 and the resulting U.S. troop buildup in Europe. An additional element of note more directly related to the Congo issue was the formation on 21 April 1961 of a new, more cooperative government in Belgium. Within the Congo a reconvened Parliament on 2 August 1961 established with landslide support a government of national unity under Cyrille Adoula (age 40), described by one observer as "a sort of Congolese Eisenhower," with Gizenga (age 35) as Vice Premier. The Adoula government was quickly and widely accepted, including recognition by Gizenga (5 August) and the

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Soviet Union (31 August), but Katanga continued its secessionist activities and its use of Belgian and other mercenaries. The UN force successfully and peacefully reentered and opened the port of Matadi on 18 June 1961. UN military action (operation RUMPUNCH) on 28 August 1961, aimed at rounding up foreign military advisers and mercenaries in Katanga, achieved initial success but was stopped by agreement before completing its objectives.

Further UN buildup in Katanga during early September 1961 was followed by more combat action (operation MOTHOR or, in English, SMASH; also commonly called Round 1) from 13-20 September. The UN forces were generally successful but the employment in combat by Katanga of jet aircraft flown by mercenaries created a new complication. Secretary-General Hammarskjold, in the Congo since 13 September, arranged to meet Tshombe in Ndola, Rhodesia, but while enroute there was killed in an aircraft accident along with his whole 16-man party on 18 September. U Thant was not named Acting Secretary-General until 3 November 1961 and, in the meanwhile, UN officials in the Congo, continuing the negotiations with Tshombe which had been interrupted by Hammarskjold's death, arrived at a cease-fire agreement which was formalized on 13 October 1961. Feeling that Tshombe was on the run, the Adoula government opposed the cease-fire and in late October and early November 1961 further combat opened in Katanga in which the Katanga jet pilots as well as other mercenaries continued to play a large role. Congolese forces, more under the control of Stanleyville where Gizenga had returned than the Central government as such, were also on the move against Katanga. Already intense anti-Tshombe sentiment was brought even closer to the boiling point by the report on 11 November 1961 of the UN body investigating Lumumba's death. It clearly implicated Tshombe in that affair.

Security Council Resolution (S/5002) of 24 November 1961, sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia and United Arab Republic, was adopted 9 votes to none with 2 abstentions (France, U.K.). It made 3 main points: the Central government (Adoula government) was the only government of the Congo and it was the one the UN supported and urged its members to support; the Katanga (or any other) claim of sovereignty and a right to secession was rejected; and, referring back to the Security Council

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resolution of 21 February 1961 and ignoring the UN-Congolese agreement of 17 April 1961, it authorized the use of "a requisite measure of force, if necessary" to arrest and/or eject non-UN foreign advisers and mercenaries.

At this point, for our purposes, the mandate can be considered complete. The operation was about 1 1/2 years along and would continue for 2 1/2 more years. It is now possible to summarize the very bare essentials:

- 14 July 1960: (SC) (With Secretary-General's interpretations)- With a sizable, non-great power, mainly African, consent-type force, assist in establishing order but without use of force, except in self-defense, or any interference in the internal power struggle.
- 22 July 1960: (SC) The Belgians should hasten their withdrawal of forces and all members refrain from interference.
- 9 Aug 1960: (SC) Emphasized the non-interference principle applied to both the UN and member states and Belgian withdrawal. The UN Force must enter Katanga.
- 20 Sept 1960 (GA) In addition to internal order, UN purposes include unity and territorial integrity of the Congo. Prohibited interference by member states means all assistance not requested by the UN.
- 21 Feb 1961: (SC) The Congo situation was becoming a civil war and was a threat to international peace. The UN would use force to prevent this. Belgian, and all other, foreign advisers, except those under UN Command, and mercenaries must withdraw. The Congolese internal situation, including the undisciplined Congolese troops, must be corrected.
- 15 Apr 1961: (GA) Merely reinforced the requirement for Belgian adviser/mercenary withdrawal, need to get the internal Congolese house in order and for outside powers to refrain from interference.

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- 17 Apr 1961: (UN/Congolese Agreement) Recognized that the Congo was a sovereign state and, as such, would accept only UN advice and assistance, not UN decisions, on such internal matters as foreign advisers and control of Congolese armed forces.
- 24 Nov 1961: Settled that the Adoula government was the government supported by the UN and its members. Rejected the Katangan, and any other, secession claim. Authorized force to achieve the objectives concerning foreign (non-UN) advisers and mercenaries.

B. PHASES

Any number of alternative methods or combinations of methods can be employed in dividing the 4 years of ONUC into segments for further examination. For example (and to demonstrate just a few of the possible contexts):

- (1) Simple chronology:

1960 / 1961 / 1962 / 1963 / 1964

- (2) Chronologically in a World context:

: U-2 Incident
:
: Breakdown of Geneva Disarmament Negotiations
:
: Sino-Soviet Split
:
: XV General Assembly
O
N The New Frontier
U
C Berlin Crisis
:
: Cuban Crisis
:
: Nassau Agreement
:
: Kennedy Assassination
:
: East African Mutinies

C. THE CIVILIAN OPERATION¹

Alongside the UN Force in the Congo, to which the remainder of this paper is almost exclusively directed, was another massive operation which we should at least take note of at this point in passing: the ONUC Civilian Operation. This was an unprecedented operation for the UN in terms of its magnitude, scope and duration.

Planning for UN technical assistance to the Congo started several months before independence and Sture Linner of Sweden was named Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board. In addition to Ralph Bunche, a small group of UN technical assistance officials were in the Congo when the crisis of early July 1960 arose. The very first Congolese requests for military assistance on 10 July (see *supra*, page 190) were initially seen as one aspect of the program being worked out by these UN technical assistance officials. By 13-14 July, however, this approach was moved out of the spotlight and was replaced by the idea of a UN Force. Even then, however, the UN Force was seen as a temporary measure and the technical assistance program as the long-term solution.

In its second Congo Resolution (22 July 1960), the Security Council, at the request of Hammarskjold, requested the Specialized Agencies of the UN to give their assistance. On 11 August 1960 the Secretary-General outlined his overall plan for the ONUC Civilian Operation. It was an ambitious plan and had been worked out in consultation with the Congolese. A Consultative Group was to be established from representatives of the Specialized Agencies and consultants furnished in 11 areas: agriculture, communications, education, finance, foreign trade, health, instruction of national security forces, labor market, magistrature, natural resources/industry and public administration.

The Secretary-General's plan was not offered for approval nor approved by the Security Council or any other UN organ.

¹ For a comprehensive report on the ONUC Civilian Operation, see Harold Karan Jacobson, "ONUC's Civilian Operations: State Preserving and State Building," World Politics, Vol. XVII (October, 1964), No. 1, pp. 75-107.

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The United Nation's Fund for the Congo, for voluntary contributions, was established by the Fourth Emergency General Assembly on 20 September 1960. Its goal of \$100,000,000 had not been half-reached by the end of 1963 and the U.S. had provided more than 75% of the total contributed. The U.S. proclaimed and maintained a policy that U.S. aid would be channelled through the UN. Certain U.S. programs were organized in such a way as to produce local currency returns which were made available for UN use in the Congo.

The Soviet Union objected strongly to the Civilian Operation in the Congo on the grounds that it was an illegal operation by the Secretary-General, interfered in the domestic affairs of the Congo and had too heavy representation of U.S./NATO personnel.

The UN Civilian Operation in the Congo formally ended with the withdrawal of the ONUC force. However, it has in essence continued under the UN's overall program of technical assistance. As of the end of 1968, some \$176 million have been expended on it of which the U.S. has provided \$130 million or 74%, in addition to various sizable U.S. bilateral assistance programs for the Congo.

The U.S. spent about as much through the UN on the Congo Civilian Operation as it did on the Peacekeeping Force (\$130 as compared with \$132 million). Allowing for the fact that much of the cost of the Civilian Operation was included in the ONUC account during 1960-1964, the overall cost to the UN of the Civilian Operation was over half that for the peacekeeping force. The personnel strength of the Civilian Operation was in the 1,000-1,500 range (including up to 800 school teachers) and recruitment of qualified personnel was always one of its main problems. Its chief had co-equal status with the Commander of the UN Force.¹

¹ A decidedly unfavorable evaluation of the ONUC Civilian Operation, particularly with respect to the type of technicians recruited by the UN and the procedures followed, is to be found in George Martelli, Experiment in World Government (London: Johnson Publications, 1966), especially pp. 75 and 210. A Congolese educator (the only Congolese pre-independence primary school principal) also comments unfavorably: Basile Mabusa, "The Crisis in Education" in Helen Kitchen, ed., Footnotes to the Congo Story (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), pp. 93-94.

UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF ONUC

As of July 1960 each successive American administration--Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower--had proclaimed the dedication of the U.S. to the UN and its purposes and principles, especially its main purpose: the maintenance of international peace and security. The basic policy of supporting UN peace-keeping efforts had been firmly established by both U.S. actions and policy statements. Throughout the Congo operation, this policy was repeatedly confirmed in major pronouncements by Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.¹

With respect to the Congo in particular, and Africa in general, however, U.S. policy was much less clear. A 1959 report prepared for the U.S. Senate under the supervision of Dr. Melville J. Herskovits of Northwestern University stated:

The United States has never had a positive, dynamic policy for Africa. Until very recently, we have looked to continuing control by friendly European powers as a guarantee of stability and dependable cooperation and have been reluctant to acknowledge the principle of self-government as fully applicable to its people.²

A bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State was established as a separate bureau only in 1958, and probably, as of mid-1960, the Bureau of European Affairs with its concern for the metropolises still tended to be somewhat more influential in African policy issues than the newly formed African Bureau.

¹ For example: Eisenhower's 22 September 1960 speech to the UNGA, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIII (10 October 1960), p. 554; Kennedy's speech of 20 September 1963 to the UNGA, A/P.V. 1209; and Johnson's speech of 17 December 1963 to the UNGA, New York Times, 18 December 1963, p. 14.

² Quoted in John H. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1968), p. 246. The Chairman of the Senate sub-committee on Africa was John F. Kennedy.

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There was also mounting evidence as 1960 approached that the communist nations were making a great effort to secure footholds in the new African states.¹ A U.S. approach to this development and to the already apparent difficulties for future U.S. cooperation with the expanding Afro-Asian group of states had not yet been worked out.

The U.S. response to the Congo crisis and the peace-keeping operation, thus, was a case in which policy improvisation was necessary and in which the strength of the basic U.S. policy of UN support seemed to have been pivotal. The major continuing aspects of U.S. policy during the Congo crisis can quite simply be summarized as follows:

1. The U.S. would channel all support through the UN.
2. The U.S. would be content with almost any stable structure the Congolese could arrive at; hopefully it would not be a Soviet satellite.
3. U.S. NATO partners would just have to understand that North Atlantic Alliance ties were not very relevant to the U.S. policy on the Congo--certainly not the determining factor.

A senior U.S. official, knowledgeable of the events in the area, has observed that the "purity" of the U.S. policy in the Congo was almost more than the anti-colonial Africans could believe. They were finally convinced when in December 1962 the U.S. came out firmly with political and material support of decisive military action against the break-away province of Katanga, and this over the wishes of her main

¹ "In mid-July 1960 Moscow pledged 2.5 million rubles for economic aid to Africa through the UN and embarked on one of its most intensive propaganda campaigns under the banner of anti-colonialism." Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 140.

NATO friends.¹ The same observer adds that the resulting peak of U.S. prestige with the Africans did not survive the U.S. involvement in the return of the Belgian paratroopers to the Congo for the Stanleyville and Paulis operations in November 1964 after the peacekeeping operation had ended.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS

The basis for support by the United States for United Nations peacekeeping and peace observation operations, in terms of providing personnel or the loan or sale of equipment, facilities, supplies, and services, is the 1949 amendment² to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945.³

The original Act authorized the President to:

1. Take appropriate action for the United States when the UN Security Council decides to apply Article 41 of the Charter for the interruption of diplomatic and economic relations and communications (i.e., Chapter VII measures not involving the use of armed forces).
2. Negotiate Article 43 special agreement(s) with the UN Security Council (the agreement(s) being subject to Congressional approval).
3. Make available to the UN Security Council on its call in order to take action under Article 42, without a requirement for Congressional approval, the armed forces, facilities or assistance provided for in the special agreement(s). This authorization was specifically limited to those measures covered by the special agreement(s).

¹ G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 1961-1966, made the same point when he said in 1965, "The importance of this event [the military action of December 1962 - January 1963 against Katanga] must not be underestimated. It did more to restore African confidence in the United Nations and the West--particularly in the United States--than any other event in the last five years," Kitchen, op. cit., p. 151.

² Public Law 341, 81st Congress, 1st Sess., approved 10 October 1949.

³ Public Law 264, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., approved 29 December 1945.

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The 1949 amendment authorized the President, when he finds it consistent with the national interest, to comply with requests from the UN (not, specifically, the UN Security Council) for "cooperative action" for support of United Nations activities directed to peaceful settlement and not involving the employment of armed forces under Chapter VII of the Charter. The authorization included the following support, with U.S. expenses to be reimbursed by the UN unless waived, in exceptional cases, by the President:

1. The detail of up to 1,000 personnel of the U.S. armed forces for noncombat duty.
2. The loan of the "agreed fair share of the U.S." of supplies and equipment and the furnishing of facilities, services or other assistance by the National Military Establishment (this last term, now obsolete, equates to the present Department of Defense, the 3 military departments and the 4 services.)

By Executive Order 10206, 19 January 1951, based upon authority contained in Public Law 673, President Truman delegated to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense the authority conferred upon him in the legislation.

In addition to this specific legal and legislative basis, various Congressional acts dealing with agricultural surplus, mutual security and international development contained, as of July 1960, authority for U.S. assistance applicable to the Congo peacekeeping operation.

Two further circumstances were important to the organizational arrangements for U.S. support for the Congo operation.

The executive agency concept had been developed within the U.S. Defense Department and widely used. It called for the assignment to a single military service, after important policy issues had been resolved, of responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the Defense Department and all the

military services. The U.S. Air Force was the designated Executive Agency throughout the Congo operation.¹

U.S. support for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East had been ongoing since 1956 with the U.S. Navy initially filling the Executive Agency role. The U.S. Army took over the Executive Agency function for UNEF on 24 October 1964. The existence of this U.S. support system for UNEF, of course, meant that when the Congo situation erupted and a peacekeeping operation was decided upon, established and well coordinated U.S. and UN organizational and procedural arrangements for support existed and could be readily applied with minor modifications to the Congo operation.

B. DETAIL U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR ONUC SUPPORT²

Initial requests from the UN for U.S. support of the Congo operation in the days immediately following the 14 July 1960 Security Council Resolution were made in New York to the U.S. Mission to the UN (USUN) by the Office of General Services of the UN. These first requests included airlift of UN troops, food, DC-3 and liaison-type aircraft, aviation gasoline, jeeps and helmet liners. Based upon existing statutory and Executive Order authority, as well as upon the earlier Presidential approval on 10 November 1956 of a joint State/Defense proposed arrangement for support of UNEF, a legal judgment was made in the State Department that no additional authorizations were required to provide U.S. support to the UN for the Congo operation.

The initial UN requests were handled through regular channels (i.e. UN, USUN, State, Defense, JCS).³ Meanwhile,

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- ¹ It should be noted that an executive agency designation for assistance to ONUC would, of course, exclude any operational aspects involving employment of U.S. forces which would remain a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - ² Since the U.S. support organization for ONUC was derived from that developed for UNEF, the reader should refer to the applicable portion of the UNEF paper in this study (Vol. IV, pp. 89-103).
 - ³ For example, the furnishing of 11,000 blue helmet liners to ONUC so as to be available for arriving UN troops was directed in JCS messages 501267 and 502595 of July 1960 to the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command.

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representatives of the UN Office of General Services, USUN, State and Defense held several meetings to agree on principles and streamlined procedures for U.S. support. An agreement was reached at a meeting on 23 August 1960, expanded at a further meeting on 19 September and formalized in an exchange of letters between USUN (16 November) and the Director of the UN Office of General Services, David B. Vaughan (1 December).

The complete 3-page text of the U.S./UN support agreement is attached as Annex K. Its main provisions are summarized below:

1. A distinction was made and separate procedures established for Operational and/or Special Requests and Routine Material Support Requests. The former required UN and/or U.S. government certification and validation and included explicitly: "...requests for personnel evacuation, special transportation assistance (both surface and air), complete aircraft, vehicles, ground radar, communications and other principal items of equipment." The latter included all other requests unless they involved excessive quantities or material which could not be spared from U.S. stocks in Europe.
2. The principle was set out that the sources of ONUC logistic support should be: first, from the nations providing contingents for their contingents; second, from commercial sources, wherever possible, for needs beyond those which could be furnished by contingent contributors; and third, from other UN members, on specific UN request, for needs that could not be provided from the first two sources.
3. It established a numbering system for requests (U.S./ONUC Assist No.--, by separate agreement, all requests for aircraft spare parts were to be marked with the assist number prefix 86), and a single channel for all routine requests for ONUC from the UN Administrative Officer in Pisa, Italy (UN/Pisa) to the U.S. Executive Agent Representative in Europe at Chateauroux Air Base France (EXAREUR).

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Operational and/or Special Requests were to come from UN Headquarters to the U.S. Mission to the UN (USUN), where they would be screened by the military members of USUN, thence to State where they would be certified and forwarded to the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Agent. A chart depicting these ONUC support channels is attached as Annex L.

4. It established as a policy that U.S. support for ONUC, to the extent possible, would come from stocks in Europe, and that, unless specifically arranged otherwise, the UN would be responsible for movement of U.S. supplies from the source to the Congo.
5. It repeated a standard provision of U.S. policy: "It is not contemplated that U.S. military personnel will be assigned to the ONUC nor will U.S. supporting facilities be established in the ONUC area under the supervision of the ONUC."

While US-UN procedures were being developed, a Secretary of Defense letter on 4 August 1960 designated the U.S. Air Force as Executive Agent for Department of Defense assistance provided to the UN for ONUC. Under this designation the Air Force established an Executive Agent Representative in Europe (EXAREUR) at Chateauroux Air Base, France, and exchanged liaison representatives between EXAREUR and the UN Administrative Officer at Pisa, Italy (UN/Pisa).¹ The Air Force also arranged single points of contact in each U.S. military service and accounting and billing procedures (originally, billings were to be submitted to the Air Force on a monthly basis; however, the U.S. Army and Navy furnished their bills for support usually on a quarterly basis).

¹ It should be noted that EXAREUR arrangements with UN/Pisa were parallel and similar to, but separate from, arrangements between the U.S. Navy, as Executive Agent for UNEF, and UN/Pisa. Under these arrangements there was a U.S. Naval representative at Pisa whose title was "U.S. Navy/UNEF Liaison Officer, Pisa," as well as a U.S. Air Force "EXAREUR Liaison Officer, Pisa."

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In turn, the Executive Agent Representative in Europe (EXAREUR) coordinated with UN representatives in Europe and with European headquarters and logistics facilities of all the U.S. services to arrange specific procedures on the local level for ONUC support. These arrangements were eventually formalized in a published plan, EXAREUR Operations Plan 1-61, 1 June 1961, and revised in EXAREUR Logistics Plan 1-63, 1 June 1963. In addition to setting out the overall policies and principles as contained in the U.S./UN agreement, the EXAREUR arrangements covered such detail matters as: required copies and routing of documentation, billing procedure, procedures for return of excess equipment or supplies, and activity codes for ONUC (AK 9186 for Army, AFN 5718 for Air Force) so as to permit machine handling of UN requests under MILSTRIP, the U.S. military standard automated requisitioning and issue procedures. The details are not vital but their effect was to put ONUC on the same basis for support as one of the U.S. services or other U.S. government agency with respect to item costs, accessorial costs, return of items for credit, and other features of the supply system. In at least one respect ONUC was accorded preferential treatment over that which a U.S. agency or service could expect, in that U.S. supply sources were directed to furnish supplies for ONUC on an "accounts receivable basis" and, as an exception to regulations, to hold the accounts open locally until settled by the UN in New York without resorting to delinquency procedures required by regulations.

At the Pisa, Italy, level, in addition to the UN/Pisa-EXAREUR arrangements, agreements for local support were worked out between the UN Administrative Officer, Pisa (UN/Pisa) and U.S. Army headquarters and facilities at Camp Darby and Leghorn. Under these arrangements UN/Pisa was afforded, on a reimbursable basis, the whole range of support services available to U.S. organizations in the area. These included transportation services, telephone, hospital, port services, repair and maintenance, automatic data processing, commissary, schools and other services for dependents, fiscal and postal service, self-service supply center, etc. Incidentally, these local support agreements between UN/Pisa (after the 1967 Middle East war and the evacuation of UNEF, it became "UN Supply Depot, Pisa") were initially authorized by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations message 12 November 1956 and are still in effect. The current agreement (4F-AK 9189-0006-8)

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dated 1 January 1968 is not due for renewal or termination until 31 December 1969. It was signed by E. G. Moore, UN Supply Depot, Pisa, on 5 February 1968 and by Colonel T. G. Ferguson, Chief of Staff, Southern European Task Force (U. S. Army) on 19 January 1968.

Finally, on the scene in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa, various U.S. organizational arrangements were required. In addition to the normal U.S. diplomatic and consular representation, a representative of the U.S. European Command (Col. Granville A. Sharpe, U.S.A.) arrived in Leopoldville on 15 July 1960, to provide a single point of contact, advice, assistance, liaison and a channel of communications for the U.S. Ambassador and UN officials in the Congo with the U.S. military structure of all 3 services in Europe.¹ Col. Sharpe was replaced by a U.S. Air Force officer at the end of August 1960 and the position was maintained at least to late 1963 (known incumbents were Lt. Col. John P. Gauthier, USAF, 27-30 August 1960; Col. A. R. Lewis, Lt. Col. K. S. Fjelated, Col. A. Worrell (dates unknown); Col. Leonard Shapiro, USAF, October 61-January 62; and Col. Bertil E. Hansen, USAF, January 62-June 62). The position at times was a powerful one since final decision on U.S. action in some cases, e.g. intra-Congo airlift, was left to him.

As will be explained in more detail below, U.S. Army aviation and signal detachments, totaling about 90 men, from Europe entered the Congo in mid-July 1960. By the end of July these detachments were reduced by about one-third. Another one-third departed during August and by the end of September all had returned to Europe. As they departed, however, U.S. Air Force detachments required to support the airlift entered the area. About 65 USAF personnel were in the Congo in the week following the UN decision to introduce a peacekeeping force. They arrived in 2 C-130 aircraft and comprised a Combat Airlift Support Unit (CALSU).

¹ The basic directives for the CINCEUR Representative in the Congo were contained in EUCOM messages ECJCDO 3-4984, and ECJCDO 3-4985, both of 16 July 1960.

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As the airlift got under way it was necessary to position additional smaller permanent or temporary CAISU's, Movement Control Teams, maintenance and communications personnel, and a total of 3 C-124's as mobile maintenance aircraft along the airlift routes (the Congo airlift involved for one reason or another the use of 52 airfields in 33 countries). As an indication of the size of this aspect of an airlift operation, Brigadier General Watkins' account (see footnote, infra, page 218) shows that 41 C-130 sorties carrying 1,802 Air Force personnel and 238 tons of equipment and supplies were required during the period 16-31 July 1960 to establish the airlift and its support system.

In January 1963 records show the U.S. Air Force representation in the Congo as about 75 persons. At no time were these U.S. Services personnel part of or under authority of the ONUC. The U.S. billed the UN for their travel and per diem expenses but not for their basic pay and allowances. The travel and per diem expenses of aircraft crew members were included in the charge to the UN for the use of the aircraft.

When U.S. sealift support for the UN force in the Congo was requested by the UN and agreed to by the U.S. in January-February 1961, U.S. Navy representation was established in Leopoldville. Initially this representation was a 1 officer (Cmdr. L. E. Bain), 1 enlisted-man team representing Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet. By July 1961 Cmdr. Bain was replaced by Lt. Cmdr. T. J. Breen, Jr., who represented the U.S. Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). Such representation in the Congo continued at a strength varying from 2-5 men throughout the sealift period (Feb. 61-Aug. 63). Although an adviser and point of contact for the U.S. Ambassador, the MSTS representative during this period lived and worked with the Movement Control element of the UN Force staff as an adviser to that group. Because of the closure of the Congolese port of Matadi during a portion of the sealift period, as well as the transportation advantages of debarking UN troops in East African ports, the MSTS representative in Leopoldville was frequently required to serve in Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa.¹

¹ Lt. Cmdr. T.J. Breen, Jr., "The Congo 'Revisited' - C.O. - Military Department on USNS Blatchford Recalls Experiences on Congo Run," Sealift Magazine, Vol. XVII (September 1967), No. 9, pp. 9-19; and an interview with Cmdr. Breen at MSTS Headquarters, Washington, D.C., December 1968.

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C. UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIONS

Since it can be expected in some cases to be a feature of major international peacekeeping and peace observation operations that one or more states, including great powers, with special interest in the dispute, will take unilateral actions before the international effort can get itself organized and under way, one should look briefly at U.S. actions, essentially unilateral, in the very early days of the Congo situation.

Disorder had struck in the Congo as early as 4 July 1960 and the situation was essentially out of hand by 8 July. Reports through the press, national channels and UN channels¹ depicted panic, rape and pillage, disruption of services and food supplies, floods of refugees, requests for unilateral intervention, and actual, threatened or potential unilateral intervention by Belgium, the Soviet Union and the more militant African states, especially Ghana and Guinea.

In what were generally precautionary and preparatory moves during the first few days of the crisis, the following U.S. unilateral actions are significant:

1. On or about 8 July 1960 the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Wasp, along with a support ship, U.S.S. Salamonie, was ordered to sail to a station off the Congo. These vessels remained in the Congo area returning to the U.S. on 11 and 13 August 1960, respectively. In addition to carrying aviation gasoline the Salamonie carried emergency rations, blankets, medicines and other supplies. When the heavy increase of air traffic to the Congo after 14 July 1960 threatened to exhaust commercial refueling capacities at some airports along the route, the Salamonie discharged her load of aviation gasoline into commercial stocks at Accra, Ghana.

¹ Dr. Ralph Bunche, UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, was in Leopoldville from the start of the crisis, having arrived to take part in the 30 June 1960 independence ceremony and to discuss UN assistance for the new state.

Arnold Beichman, in a recent book states that for a period in early July 1960 U.S. Ambassador to the Congo Clare Timberlake was given authority to act as he saw fit, if unable to communicate with the U.S. government, and that this authority included ordering the Wasp "to catapult its planes to prevent Soviet troop-carriers from landing and seizing Leopoldville."¹

2. A U.S. Navy operation known as "SOLANT AMITY," involving an extended program of port visits in Africa by a 5-ship force, including a Marine contingent and a helicopter unit with 6 aircraft, had been planned and was well along in its preparations when the Congo crisis broke. The operation was in furtherance of the President's "people-to-people program." The ships were prepared to give musical concerts and various demonstrations including a Marine landing. They carried toys, sports equipment, candies, medical supplies, souvenirs, books and similar supplies for distribution to the people wherever they visited.

The operation continued as planned, even after the Congo problems began. But, obviously, the force also served, by its very presence, as a valuable U.S. asset in the area. For a U.S. ambassador in a troubled situation, 5 well-equipped Naval vessels with Marines, helicopters and reliable communications hovering "over the horizon," are bound to provide a great deal of comfort. The ships making up the force consisted of 2 destroyer types, 2 amphibious types and an oiler, all under command of a rear admiral. The ships rarely operated together but were in communication with each other.

The first 5-ship force, SOLANT AMITY I, arrived in the area at the end of October 1960, was replaced successively by 5-ship forces called SOLANT AMITY II and SOLANT AMITY III in April 1961 and September 1961, respectively.

¹ Arnold Beichman, The "Other" State Department, the United States Mission to the United Nations (New York: Basic Books Incorporated, 1968), p. 35.

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SOLANT AMITY I was involved in the return sealift of the Guinean contingent from the Congo (see infra, page 246) and in the chase through the South Atlantic for the hijacked Brazilian freighter, Santa Maria. Both operations occurred at the same time requiring the task force to split.

SOLANT AMITY II made well-timed appearances on 2 special occasions: off Zanzibar during a wild period of domestic rioting in June 1961 and at Aden in July 1961 when the Kuwait crisis arose.

3. On 8 July 1960 the U.S. began to assemble transport aircraft in Europe in what was on 18 July officially designated Operation "NEW TAPE."¹ On that first date, 7 C-130 aircraft were placed on 1-hour alert at Evreux Air Base, France, Headquarters of the 322d USAF Air Division. Ten additional C-130 aircraft were flown from Evreux to Furstenfeldbruck Air Base, Germany, where they, along with 2 infantry companies from U.S. Army Europe, also stood on 1-hour alert. This aircraft alert status continued until lifted on 14 July (the troop alert was lifted earlier) and was for the announced purpose of assisting in the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the Congo, if necessary. Through these early actions the U.S. had, when actually called upon to begin the Congo airlift following the 14 July 1960 UN Security Council resolution, 3 squadrons of C-130's and C-124's in Europe relieved from their normal commitments and ready to go. On 16 July 2 additional squadrons came from the U.S. and on 19 July a further 2 squadrons, making a total available for the initial Congo airlift under one command in Europe of 46 C-130's and 60 C-124's, a total of 106 aircraft.

¹ A good account of the first 3 months of Operation "New Tape" by a man who had an important part to play in it can be found in Brigadier General Tarleton H. Watkins, "The Congo Airlift," Air University Quarterly Review Vol. XIII (Summer 1961), No. 1, pp. 18-33.

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4. Also starting from about 8 July 1960 officials of U.S. diplomatic and consular missions in the Congo and neighboring African states were beginning to carry out standard emergency procedures.¹ C-47 type aircraft (DC-3) assigned to service attaché offices made flights to various points in the Congo collecting American citizens (estimated to number 330). To support this effort, as requested between 8-14 July by the Department of State, U.S. Air Force Europe and U.S. Army Europe moved 4 medium helicopters and 6 fixed-wing liaison-type airplanes with necessary crews and supporting personnel to the Congo area (initially to Brazzaville). Among the supporting personnel was Col. Granville A. Sharpe (U.S. Army Europe) who was, as the representative of the U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command, to coordinate the efforts of these teams for the U.S. Ambassador in the Congo. Also in the group, in addition to pilots and minimum crews for airplanes, were 2 or 3 teams of communications personnel numbering 15-25 men each. The C-124 aircraft which brought in these first U.S. personnel were used on their return flights, at the request of the U.S. Ambassador, for evacuation of foreign civilians to Europe. Similarly, USAF planes, which began to arrive in the Congo on 15 July with UN troops, flour and other famine relief supplies, carried evacuees on their return flights. From 13 July to 4 August 1960 about 3,170 persons were evacuated by USAF planes returning to Europe from the Congo. The nationality breakdown was as follows:²

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- ¹ For example, see Counsel General Salisbury-Rhodesia message #43 to the Department of State, 11 July 1960, concerning Congo evacuation flights by two DC-3's of the U.S. Air and Naval Attachés in Praetoria.
- ² Evacuee figures for this period vary widely depending on source; many USAF plane loads were not properly manifested. The State Department generally uses the figure 2,003 evacuees by U.S. means of whom 462 were Americans for the period 8-20 July 1960. The vast bulk of Belgian evacuees from the Congo were lifted by the Belgian national airlines, Sabina. Sabina essentially ceased all European and trans-Atlantic operations between 9-22 July 1960 (at a cost in lost revenues

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U.S.	228	Israel	8
U.K.	21	Finland	2
Belgium	2,593	Germany	3
Greece	48	Tunisia	4
France	20	Portugal	81
Italy	23	Canada	55
Sweden	52	Netherlands	32

In addition, at the request of the U.S. Ambassador in Leopoldville, 2 C-124's flew American evacuees back to the U.S. on 17 and 18 July. The second plane was also used to transport British Major General H.T. Alexander, Chief of the Ghana Defense Staff, and 4 Congolese officials to New York on UN business. By the time UN personnel for an aviation detachment arrived in the Congo about 24 July, the U.S. helicopter and fix-wing aircraft pilots and support personnel were able to check out the UN personnel on their aircraft as well as on 6 additional H-13 helicopters which had by then arrived from U.S. Army Europe and turn over to them an operating aviation organization.¹ The U.S. Army aviation detachment then returned to its home station in Europe.²

of \$500,000 per week) and evacuated from the Congo 25,711 passengers (including 15,596 adults, 8,327 children, and 1,888 infants) in a total of 209 flights (62 with Boeing 707 jets, 66 with DC-7C's, 81 with DC-6's). The daily rate for Sabina was about 2,500 evacuees in 20 flights (see Cecil Brownlow, "Sabina Frees Crisis After Airlift," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 September 1960).

¹ An interesting historical document for national support of peacekeeping operations was uncovered in the research into the provision of these first helicopters and aircraft to the UN in the Congo on 29 July 1960. It is a handwritten receipt on loose-leaf note paper in which Colonel I. Wilander, Deputy Chief of United Nations Air Operations, Congo at Ndola Airport, Leopoldville, on 29 July 1960 signed for 17 handwritten pages of U.S. Army aircraft, parts, tools, accessories, which when priced out came to \$938,284.

² A second interesting footnote to history, in connection with this initial turnover of Army aircraft to the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo, is that the per diem costs for the U.S. Army pilots and crews were paid to them directly by the UN in Congolese francs equivalent to \$4,306.89. Lt. Col. Jerome B. Feldt, U.S.A., was in charge of the detachment.

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5. Even in less glamorous areas such as food supplies, early precautionary and preparatory U.S. actions prior to 14 July affected the launching of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo. Instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff passed through Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, and Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (Rear) (Communications Zone), to various U.S. supply activities in Europe had fully energized the machinery before the actual requirement to support a UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo arose. For example, the preparatory alert for the movement of 300 tons of flour for the Congo percolated through these channels and hit the duty officer in the Quartermaster Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (Rear) (Communications Zone) at 1:20 AM (local) 13 July 1960. The flour was located and a readiness established to start moving it at 30 minutes notice. At 9:00 PM (local) on 14 July the order to move the flour by air from Chateauroux Air Base, France, to the Congo was given. By 7:00 AM (local) 15 July the entire shipment was enroute to the Congo. Thus it was, with support channels activated and exercised, that the U.S. services in Europe were able to respond with minimum delay to urgent UN requests in the days following the 14 July decision in New York. U.S. forces in Europe between 14-21 July 1960, in addition to moving over 3,000 UN troops to the Congo in 69 sorties and the other items referred to above, also furnished for the UN Force rations (200,000 special pork-free "C" rations were moved to 5 Congo locations starting 18 July), over 11,000 UN blue helmet liners, 600 mosquito bars, 10 C-47 aircraft and 20 jeeps.

D. DETAILS OF U.S. SUPPORT OF ONUC BY PHASES OF THE OPERATION

Much of this material has been reduced to graphic and tabular form for briefer and clearer presentation, and is attached as annexes C through J. It should be noted in examining the annexes that in most cases the only date available for a particular U.S. support effort is the quarterly billing period and that this involves a slippage of generally a month or more from the actual date. Wherever an actual date is known, it has been inserted in the annexes along with the applicable support action.

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What needs to be done in this section of the paper is to pull together the details of U.S. material support for the Congo operation into some coherent relationships with the total ONUC effort in terms of the phases of the operation decided on. (See supra, p. 203). Hopefully, in some categories, the available information will support fairly reliable estimates of the proportion of total support effort provided by the U.S.

1. Phase I - Build-up 14 July - 31 December 1960
(5½ months)

Although in an operation extending for almost 4 years, this initial 5½ months phase may seem too small a period to warrant separate consideration, most who have studied peacekeeping deeply would agree that the speed and efficiency with which such operations are launched have critical importance.

a. Airlift/Sealift - Phase I

The airlift and sealift recapitulation figures in annexes G, I and J and official UN records of ONUC strengths, show that during the buildup period 28 national contingents varying from 1 person (New Zealand) to large military units of over 3,000 men (Morocco) were moved into the Congo. The total strength of these contingents was about 20,500 men. Right at the end of the buildup period 2 national contingents withdrew (Mali - 570; Yugoslavia - 20) and 2 were reduced (Ghana - 465; Morocco - 100). Thus, there were 20,500 inbound and 1,155 outbound UN force passengers, or 21,655 altogether.

A number of the large contingents in Phase I were lifted exclusively by the U.S. Air Force.

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Lifted By</u>
Tunisia	2620	USAF
Morocco (in)	3200	USAF
Morocco (out)	100	USAF
Sweden (from UNEF)	650	USAF
Guinea	750	USAF
Liberia	250	USAF
Austria	57	USAF
Ireland	1400	USAF
Pakistan	540	USAF
India (except for small air det.)	700	USAF
Sudan	375	USAF
Mali (in and out)	575 (each way)	USAF
UAR	515	USAF
Nigeria	<u>1500</u>	USAF
Subtotal (Incl. Mali and Morocco both ways)	13,807	

For one other large contingent partially lifted
by the USAF, the details are clear:

Ethiopia	2572	USAF (1,872) Ethiopian Air Force (700)
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Two other contingents provided the complete
lift for personnel of their contingent (USAF
lifted part of the Canadian Equipment--3
C-124 sorties carrying light aircraft, 14
C-124 sorties carrying heavy communications gear
plus 117 passengers) and 5 other contingents or
portions thereof more or less handled their own
lift possibly by ship or in organic aircraft
(details unknown).

Canada	279	RCAF (162) USAF (117)
Italy	110	Italian Air Force
Sweden (other than from UNEF)	40	Sweden
Norway	70	Norway
Argentina	23	Argentina
Brazil	20	Brazil
India (air det.)	<u>50</u>	India
Subtotal	592	

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Other contingents of small size can be assumed to have travelled as individuals or small groups and to have at least made the last leg of their journey to the Congo on USAF planes (USAF airlift data shows 351 manifested but unidentified UN personnel moved to the Congo during the first two months of the airlift. General von Horn and a multi-national staff of about 25 from UNTSO entered the Congo 18 July 1960 by USAF plane.):

Burma	9
Ceylon	9
Denmark	39
Netherlands	6
New Zealand	1
Yugoslavia	21 (in)
Yugoslavia	21 (out)

Subtotal	106	USAF (assumed)
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The records are difficult to decipher on the movement of the Ghanaian contingent:

Ghana (in)	2624	USAF (539)
		Soviet Union (450 est.)
		RAF (1635 est.)
Ghana (out)	465	RAF (465 est.)

Finally, 2 contingents (the two most distant ones) arrived in the Congo in Phase I by U.S. sealift (see Serial 1, Annex G):

Indonesia	1152	U.S. Sealift
Malaysia	615	U.S. Sealift
TOTAL	1767	

Recapitulation - Airlift/Sealift - Phase I

<u>Total passenger lift required (in and out)</u>	<u>21,655</u>
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<u>Airlift</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent Airlift</u>
USAF	16,441	81.5
RAF	2,100	10.4
RCAF	162	*
Soviet	450	2.2
Ethiopia	700	3.5
Italy	110	*
India	50	*
Norway/Sweden	110	*
Argentina/Brazil	43	*
* Less than 1%		
Airlift subtotal		20,166
<u>Sealift</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
US	1,767	100
Sealift subtotal		<u>1,767</u>
<u>Grand Total Airlift/Sealift¹</u>		21,933
<u>National Share of Total Airlift/Sealift -Phase I</u>		
	<u>Total lift</u>	<u>% of Total lift</u>
U.S.	18,208	83.0
U.K.	2,100	9.6
Canada	162	*
Soviet	450	2.1
Ethiopia	700	3.2
Italy	110	*
India	50	*
Norway/Sweden	110	*
Argentina/Brazil	43	*
	21,933	100 %

¹ This figure calculated on the basis of airlift/sealift data differs only slightly from the total passenger lift requirement (21,635) calculated from official strength data for the UN Force. The slight difference can be explained by a day or two difference in base date of information.

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The above statistical approach is necessary to establish the scope of the initial U.S. airlift and sealift for ONUC contingents. It tends, however, to obscure the impact which such operations often have on participants at the "worms-eye view" level. Just a few items will be sketched out below to attempt to show what U.S. airlift and sealift actions were like at the operational level:

(i) The main runway of the USAF base at Evreux, France was under repair when the Congo alert came. Throughout the initial airlift the planes had to operate from a taxiway with no landing aids and which was only 75 feet wide. To help out, the wives of USAF personnel at Chateauroux set up instant laundry service for the heavy load of transit passengers passing through the base.

(ii) Reasonably typical of the initial airlift flights was the 9-day mission from 15-25 July 1960 of C-130 number 56-0536 of the 322 USAF Air Division piloted by Captain I.E. Jernigan:¹

15 July - Depart Evreux empty at 1600 for 937 nautical mile (NM) flight to Tunis 3 hours 25 minutes away. Depart Tunis at 2200 with 65 Tunisian troops and 8,500 pounds of equipment for 1,500 NM flight to Kano, Nigeria, 5 hours 45 minutes.

16 July - Depart Kano at 0900 after refueling for 1,107 NM flight to Leopoldville 4 hours 10 minutes. Offloads troops and equipment.

¹ Cecil Brownlow, "Congo Airlift Provides Tough Support Test for USAF," Aviation Week and Space Technology (Special Report on Congo Airlift).

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17-18 July - Depart Leopoldville at 0915 on an emergency flight to pick up refugees in Stanleyville 663 NM 2 hours 50 minutes and deliver to Wheelus. Depart Wheelus 1600 for Cairo 928 NM 3 hours 30 minutes.

20 July - Depart Cairo at 1200 with 68 Swedish troops and 11,500 pounds of equipment for Wheelus 3 hours 55 minutes. Depart Wheelus at 1745 for Kano 4 hours 45 minutes.

21 July - Depart Kano at midnight for Leopoldville 4 hours 20 minutes. Offload troops and equipment. Depart Leopoldville at 1630 with 70 troops and 13,400 pounds of equipment for Stanleyville 2 hours 55 minutes. Offload troops and equipment.

22 July - Depart Stanleyville at 1045 with 11 passengers and 300 pounds of equipment to pick up refugees at Bunia 304 NM 1 hour 25 minutes. Offload passengers and cargo. Depart Bunia at 1315 with 70 passengers and 8,000 pounds of equipment for Usumbura 317 NM 1 hour 15 minutes. Offload passengers and cargo and return. Depart Bunia at 1700 with 83 passengers and 8,000 pounds of cargo for Usumbura; offload passengers and cargo.

23 July - Depart Usumbura at 0800 for Bunia. Depart Bunia at 0945 with 13 passengers for Stanleyville. Depart Stanleyville at 1230 with 51 passengers and 4,000 pounds of equipment for Leopoldville. Offload passengers and equipment.

24 July - Depart Leopoldville at 0700 for Pointe Noire and return. Depart Leopoldville at 1445 with 21 passengers and 4,000 pounds of cargo for Wheelus 2,212 NM, 8 hours 30 minutes.

25 July - Depart Wheelus at 0045 for return to Evreux 1,150 NM, 5 hours.

Total for period 20,280 NM, 80 hours 35 minutes flying time, 580 passengers, 58,900 pounds of cargo.

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(iii) USAF planes were allotted only one refueling pit at Leopoldville airport and no towing vehicle to move planes to it. The solution used was to reverse the propellers and ease the planes in backwards - a practice frowned on by safety regulations. All aircraft fuel was scarce at Leopoldville during the initial airlift but especially that variety required for the C-124. The affectionate nickname for a C-124 is "Old Shakey" and it must have its proper fuel to take off or climb with a heavy load.

(iv) The emergency U.S. Single Side Band communications facilities which were established in Leopoldville on or about 17 July 1960 permitted Lt. Col. Francis E. Merritt, the USAF officer in charge of airlift operations there at the time, to receive Joint Chiefs of Staff approval within 30 minutes for a UN-requested emergency airlift of Ethiopian troops to Stanleyville. Merritt slept 2 hours of his first 72 hours in the Congo.

(v) To inaugurate the airlift of the Guinean contingent to the Congo, USAF Major Behren flew into Conakry in a single C-119 aircraft in late August 1960. The following day just as the Guinean troop passengers paraded before Guinean President Toure (with Major Behren at his side) and entered the airplane, the U.S. ambassador to Guinea (John H. Morrow, a Negro college professor on his first diplomatic assignment) received a telegram directing the airlift to be cancelled and the C-119 to return to its base. He pocketed the message and had the plane take off for the Congo. After a hectic exchange of messages it was discovered that the intent of the message had been to withdraw the C-119, because it could not safely operate from the Conakry airfield, and substitute C-130 aircraft. A couple nights later USAF C-130's reached Conakry but could not communicate with the Czech tower operator. They finally landed in a driving rain storm at about 0400 with only flares lighting the runway. Ambassador Morrow had to be called to the airfield at 0430 along with several Guinean cabinet ministers before

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airport authorities could figure out what was going on. C-130 arrivals and departures continued for 48 hours to move the Guinean contingent and the operation was the focus of all attention in the country. Ambassador Morrow was congratulated by the USAF Chief of Staff for his quick thinking in choosing to ignore the cancellation messages to avoid a diplomatic incident.

(vi) For about the first year of the operation, UN contingents passing through the USAF base at Wheelus in Libya often did not have funds to pay for meals in the Air Force mess when these flights paused there for refueling, repairs or crew rest. Many cases are on the record where the USAF crews chipped in to buy the meals for their passengers. The problem was solved by arrangements with the UN Secretariat to set up a small fund at Wheelus for this purpose.

(vii) Troops travelling on the Blatchford and other U.S. vessels found the ship's exchanges very popular. In a 3-month's period the Blatchford exchange sold \$50,000 worth of luxury items and could have sold more if stocks had not been exhausted. Since neither the countries involved nor the UN had made any arrangements for currency conversion, the U.S. ships were authorized by the Navy to change the passengers' money for dollars. By the time return sealifts were underway, at least the Indonesians had arranged for each passenger to have \$5 per week for exchange purchases. Ships offices had a frightful time getting last minute purchases of returning passengers embarking at Mombasa/Dar-es-Salaam on board. These often included items as large as refrigerators or hi-fi sets.

(viii) Sealift departures and arrivals were important events wherever they occurred and involved participation by heads of state, senior ministers and chiefs of staff.

(ix) The chief butcher of the Blatchford, a 44 year old native of Haiti, operated the ship's athletic program and arranged softball games and clinics, as well as other sports events, wherever the ship happened to be.

(x) U.S. Navy ships of operation "Solant Amity" (see supra, page 218 and infra, page 246) were pressed into UN service to return Guinea's contingent home after their decision to withdraw. With U.S. Rear Admiral Allan L. Reed on board, ships sailed into Conakry just a few days after a visit there by Soviet leader Brezhnev, again tending to steal the spotlight in this country where communist efforts to establish influence were especially strong. Ambassador Morrow lost more sleep (as he had when the USAF flew the contingent to the Congo, supra, pages 228-229) smoothing over an incident in which Guinean police objected to U.S. sailors picking up soviet flags as souvenirs.¹

(xi) Many contingent's troops were unfamiliar with air or sea travel and with American style toilet fixtures and showers; there were problems, but they adjusted. A safety suggestion was submitted covering what to do about excessive hair oil getting on ship's bannisters.

b. Equipment - Phase I

As with other UN peacekeeping operations, the countries providing contingents to the UN Force for the Congo were expected generally to furnish equipped units (less heavier weapons and transport) which could sustain themselves for at least a week or two in the area of the operation before requiring major additional support in either equipment or supplies.

However, as almost all accounts of peacekeeping operations note, a number of contingents "never seem to get the word" and arrive on the scene without the essentials even to begin the function.

¹ Morrow, op. cit., pp. 225-231.

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Chapter IV below, Support by Other States, will describe the support efforts of contingent contributors including, so far as can be determined, the equipment and supplies status of the contingent on its arrival in the Congo. In this consideration of the Phase I equipment problems, therefore, it seems best to approach the problem in terms of 3 principal equipment areas, in which inadequacies would have critically affected the effective launching and buildup of the peacekeeping force in the Congo: communications, land vehicles, intra-Congo airlift. In addition, there are two other categories of support deserving special treatment: food and ammunition. The former has the characteristic of being susceptible to routine procedures once such procedures have been established. For the Congo, this means we need to look at food supply in Phase I only, assuming the routine procedures would be in effect by the end of that phase. With respect to ammunition, not normally a serious problem in peacekeeping operations, we need only to examine this aspect during the periods in late 1961 and again in late 1962 when significant combat action occurred in the Congo.

As General von Horn, the first of five commanders of the Congo force, has pointed out, the initial communications effort of the UN support organization in the Congo was establishing the links into the worldwide UN radio network so as to have reliable contact with headquarters in New York.¹ The arriving contingents, at best, had communications equipment adequate for short-range communication between its own elements. The large gap in communications, therefore, in the initial buildup phase was between the headquarters of the force in Leopoldville and contingents as they were hurriedly and widely deployed over an area 3 times the size of France, and between contingents. Towards the end of September, 1960 through employment of the Canadian Signal Squadron, receipt of radio equipment, and establish-

¹ Major-General Carl von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (New York: David McKay Company, 1967), p. 165.

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ment of a territorial command structure for each provincial capital, a reasonably adequate main network of communications for the force was established. Between 17 and 31 August 1960 14 USAF C-124 aircraft lifted heavy Canadian equipment, mostly communications gear, from RCAF Station Trenton to the Congo plus 117 Canadian troops.¹ Obviously, 2 months or so without effective communications during the buildup phase of a complex peacekeeping operation is totally unacceptable.

U.S. support in the communications area for ONUC during the buildup phase falls into two principal areas: providing all necessary communications for the U.S. airlift operation and the furnishing of communications equipment for the contingents and command organizations of the force. In addition and throughout the Congo operation--not just Phase I--U.S. unilateral communications were usually the best and sometimes the only means by which the local UN command structure could be sure of reaching its field units or its headquarters in New York. U.S. channels were frequently used for UN business.

General Watkins, in his Air University Quarterly Review article, has singled out communications as the most widespread problem of the Congo airlift. The existing airways communications systems in Africa, being a conglomeration of radio, teletype, telephone, and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) circuits, was not organized in such a way as to support a large scale airlift operation. Accordingly, within a few days after the U.S. airlift got underway its communication system was incorporated into the U.S. Air Force single side-band radio, "Twilight System." Static Twilight radio stations were installed at Chateauroux in France, Kano in Northern Nigeria

¹ The main radio employed by the Canadian signals unit was a U.S. set, AN/GRC26D, with a normal range of 250 miles.

and at Leopoldville. Three other mobile Twilight stations were shifted as needed and at various times operated at Addis Ababa, Accra, Elisabethville, Dakar, Kamina, Kitona, Karachi and New Delhi. A special link into the World-Wide Air Force Communications System was made by establishing a circuit between Leopoldville and Sidi Slimane, Morocco.

Communications equipment, parts and supplies for the contingents and the command organization of the UN force were a major portion (exceeded only by airlift, aircraft and food) of the U.S. support furnished for ONUC during Phase I.

Quite clearly, communications equipment is an area in which standardization of equipment is not just desirable but absolutely essential. Therefore, the early and urgent requests directed to the U.S. from the UN Force in the Congo, as acted upon by the UN Office of General Service (Field Operations Service), must have represented a decision to standardize on U.S. communications equipment. There would appear to have been two important bases for such a decision:

(i) The most common type of communications equipment in the hands of arriving or expected contingents, and

(ii) the type of communications equipment which could be obtained in quantities in the Congo in the shortest possible time.

On either of the bases, U.S. equipment would probably have been the clear choice, although it is possible to question whether the UN headquarters in either Leopoldville or New York had adequate information as to the quantities and types of communication equipment brought in to the Congo by contingents. General von Horn complained of his inability to communicate with his force and, specifically of his inability to determine his assets and requirements, as requested early in

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the operation by UN headquarters in New York, for the very simple reason that he had no contact with most of the contingents.¹ It is interesting to speculate on the painful decision which would have been required had solid data been available and had they indicated that other-than-U.S. communications equipment predominated in the Force.

U.S. communications equipment, parts, and supplies were shipped to the Congo or to the UN facility at Pisa during Phase I mostly by emergency air shipment from either U.S. stocks in Europe or from the U.S. Requisitions on U.S. Army signal supply facilities for these items were usually marked "Emergency shipment must clear depot within 24 hours." Major items were:

<u>Radio Sets</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Price</u>
AN/ARC 12 Types	6	\$ 1,500
AN/ARC 44 Types	2	3,680
AN/PRC 10 Types	52	26,468
AN/URC 4 Types	3	900
AN/PRC 15 Types	2	3,720
AN/UNC 4 Types	2	600
AN/GRC 8 Types	1	1,660
AN/GRC 9 Types	32	39,040
AN/GRC 19 Types	3	21,000
AN/PRC 6 Types	71	8,946
AN/FRC 27 Types	3	7,800
Receiver R 394	5	1,415
Transmitters	2	288
Total		\$117,017
<u>Telephone Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Price</u>
Telephone sets	3	\$ 210
Switchboards	2	316
Control Panels	2	254
Wire (reels)	640	22,400
Total		\$ 23,180

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 166.

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<u>Signal Generators and Power Supply</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Price</u>
Generators	26	
Total		\$2,640
<u>Communications Supplies</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Price</u> <u>(total)</u>
Batteries	7,350	\$22,199
Parts, resistors, tubes, crystals	1 year Supply	<u>13,000</u>
Total		\$35,199
Grand total		\$178,036

In terrain and under deployment conditions such as in the Congo, General von Horn estimated that an average infantry type battalion needed about 100 ground vehicles to operate.¹ During the buildup (Phase I) something like 21-23 infantry battalions or equivalent combat units reached and were deployed in the Congo and the number of such units did not go above that level throughout the 4-year operation. Lefever has estimated the ground vehicle peak strength in ONUC as 3,000.² The figures seem to tally reasonably well assuming some 2,000-2,500 vehicles for the major combat units and 1,000 more or less for the command and support structure.

However, as with most other aspects of logistic support, the time of the most critical need and the time when the need was least satisfactorily met was during the initial buildup period. Luckily the Congo was not a complete wilderness and vehicles could be procured locally, "borrowed"

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 219.

² Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 337.

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from the ANC, and "borrowed" or "commandeered" from local individuals and commercial firms. Fortunately, also, there was an existing, if skimpy, railroad and waterway transport system reaching most areas of the country. (Railway: 5,144 kilometers, 7,000 pieces of rolling stock; waterways: 13,000 kilometers navigable; roads: 150,000 kilometers).

Most of the contingents, if they brought any vehicles at all, brought only a few jeeps. An exception to this rule was the 600-man Malayan battalion lifted from Port Swettenham (4 October 1960) to Matadi (31 October 1960) aboard two U.S. Landing Ships Tank, USS Windham County and USS Whitfield County. Because of the nature of their transportation means, this battalion was able to bring all its desired vehicles at no additional transportation expense. In a happy coincidence with the von Horn guideline mentioned above, the Malaysians brought exactly 100 vehicles (all British makes):

- 10 Ferret Scout Cars
- 38 Long Wheel-Base Land Rovers
- 25 Land Rover Trailers
- 1 Recovery Vehicle
- 4 Water Trucks with Trailers
- 22 3-Ton Trucks

100

As an indication of the standardization problem, the Mali battalion, which had a very short stay in ONUC, had 13 jeeps (U.S.) and 23 small Citroen (French) trucks.

The U.S. provided few ground vehicles for ONUC until needed for military operations some time after the buildup period. However, the 50 U.S. jeeps that were provided in Phase I represented a crash effort designed to meet the critical urgent need. Twenty of these jeeps were airlifted from Europe and arrived in Leopoldville

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between 14 and 21 July 1960. The other 30 were provided from Red River Arsenal, Texas. The shipping details on this latter shipment are instructive as to the effort involved in logistic operations on an emergency basis:

Vehicles (30 jeeps) will be driven to Barksdale Air Force Base (Texas). USA numbers will be obliterated and consignor will submit DA Form 9-73 under AR 700-10. Vehicles will be painted white. Ten vehicles to arrive Barksdale not later than 1530 hours 19 July 1960. Last vehicle to arrive not later than 90 hours from 1200 hours 17 July 1960. Maintain an accounting for all expenses pertaining to this shipment for further reimbursement and establish an accounts receivable for prices on stock food items.

Unlike communications, the land vehicle area appears to be one in which there was an initial UN decision not to standardize or, at least, not to standardize on U.S. vehicles. Maybe there was just the absence of decision on the subject. Presumably the UN Field Operations Service decided it would try to make do with locally procured vehicles and parts to supplement contingent-owned vehicles. Accordingly, vehicles and vehicle parts, normally a costly support category, represented only a minor area for U.S. support until mid-1962 and later.

Intra-Congo airlift was the key to communications and to the movement of man and supplies in the Congo. Fortunately, the Belgians had developed, in African terms, quite an elaborate system of airfields, air services and navigational aids. There were over 200 airfields with runways 2,000 feet or more in length and 45 of these had runways in excess of 4,800 feet. N'djili airport at Leopoldville had a 3 mile long runway which the Belgians claimed in 1960 was the longest in the world. Unfortunately, to the extent that

the air system's functioning depended on Belgian technicians, and this was almost totally, the control portion of the system rapidly fell apart in the initial days of the July 1960 crisis.

Both Sabena Air Lines and a local Belgian subsidiary flew scheduled flights in the Congo and the UN could charter these flights for part of its Phase I intra-Congo airlift requirements.

The UN plan for intra-Congo airlift, as reflected in Hammarskjold's first report to the Security Council on 18 July 1960 (S/4389), particularly in paragraphs 19, 27, 34 and 36, was to create a composite air transport organization with equipment, aircraft, maintenance personnel, pilots and control personnel contributed as individuals or complete air units by UN members.

Thus, during Phase I, such a composite air organization was established from the following contributors:

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| U.S. | - No personnel, 10 C-47's, 5 C-119's, 6 light liaison aircraft, 10 helicopters |
| Italy | - 1 complete squadron of 15 C-119's |
| India | - 1 complete squadron of 15 C-119's |
| Brazil/Argentina | - 1 complete squadron of 10 DC-3's |
| Sweden/Norway | - 1 complete squadron of 8 helicopters, 1 complete light liaison squadron of 8 aircraft |
| Canada | - The officer in charge (Group Captain Carr, RCAF) and a detachment of 8 light aircraft. |

Recapitulating the above in terms of aircraft only, we find:

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	<u>C119</u>	<u>C47/DC3</u>	<u>L20</u> <u>Beaver</u>	<u>U1</u> <u>Otter</u>	<u>Super-</u> <u>Cub</u>	<u>H13</u>	<u>H19</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S.	5	10	4	2		8	2	31
Italy	15							15
India	15							15
Brazil/ Argentina		10						10
Norway/ Sweden			4	4		6	2	16
Canada				2	6			8
Total	35	20	8	8	6	14	4	95

While this appears to be a respectable-looking tactical airlift structure, almost all accounts of its functioning are unfavorable. Its personnel came from 7 different countries and many of those pilots who came as individuals, rather than a member of a squadron, were jet pilots who had to be reoriented on the older transport models. There were language difficulties, and maintenance personnel, parts, and tools were inadequate.

General von Horn has commented:

Ever since I arrived, I had pointed out that the only basis on which our air component could function satisfactorily was through member states providing their own ethnic squadrons complete with flying personnel and ground crews. But up to this time /September 1960/ we had been given only one Indian and one Italian C-119 squadron. And we had been told to create transport and recce-/reconnaissance/

liaison squadrons out of a heterogeneous conglomeration of jet fighters and transport pilots, whose varied languages created a Tower of Babel atmosphere.¹

Another on the scene observer has reported that by early September 1960, because of maintenance difficulties, less than half the larger airplanes (C47/DC3's and C119's) were flyable.

One additional aspect of the intra-Congo airlift in Phase I remains to be covered--its relationship with the strategic airlift of the UN contingents into the Congo, especially by the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. seems to have had throughout the 4 years of the Congo operation a general policy against directly providing intra-Congo airlift.² As will be seen in the treatment of later phases of the operation this policy was relaxed during certain specific portions of the operation, notably the last few months of 1961 and following early December 1962. The CINCEUR Representative in the Congo, working with the U.S. Ambassador, had the power of final decision on intra-Congo U.S. air missions during these periods.

General von Horn notes that during the initial airlift "...interior airlifts were banned..."³ and that this interfered with orderly deployment of the contingents.

Nevertheless, certain contingents were delivered in the U.S. Air Force initial airlift to their

¹ von Horn, op. cit., pp. 223-224.

² The first official expression of this policy on intra-Congo airlift appears to have been a State Department directive passed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff by JCS message 980284, 20 July 1960.

³ von Horn, op. cit., p. 160

deployed locations; e.g. Tunisians to Luluabourg as well as Leopoldville, Ethiopians to both Kamina and Stanleyville, Irish to Goma, Kindu and Kamina, Egyptians to Coquilhatville, and the Austrian Hospital to Bukava. Without this distribution of forces as part of the initial airlift, the UN's intra-Congo airlift and ground transport system clearly would have been overwhelmed at a critical stage of the buildup.

c. Supplies - Phase I

Food supplies for a peacekeeping force present problems which may be small from a big-picture perspective but troublesome with respect to details (e.g. dietary preferences and religious prohibitions in a multi-national force), and critical in the first few weeks after a force is established until routine supply lines and procedures can be established. Accordingly, in this treatment, the food situation will be considered only from this last viewpoint--the first few weeks of ONUC.

The basic scheme for initially feeding the UN Force in the Congo included using those emergency rations which the contingents should have, but in some cases did not, bring in with them and food items provided by the ONUC logistical system to "thicken up" the food supplies which the contingents could procure in their local area.

U.S. support of this general scheme involved the following:

(i) As was pointed out under the section above on U.S. unilateral actions, the U.S. Air Force delivered to 5 locations in the Congo between 18 July - 4 August 1960, 200,000 pork-free packaged C-rations (10 day full subsistence for 20,000 men).

(ii) In addition, between 18 July and 15 September 1960, from U.S. military food stocks in Europe or from the U.S. Army Quartermaster

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Marketing Center in Philadelphia, fresh or canned food (not packaged emergency rations) costing (exclusive of handling and distribution charges) \$372,692 was provided for ONUC. As a gauge of the volume, variety, and special handling provisions in the food shipments, the following list of major food items is instructive:

15,000 lbs. fresh beef, "Emergency--must leave 15 September 1960" \$15,750.

15,846 lbs. fresh turkey \$27,562.

Cans of beef, tuna, milk, corn, juice, peaches, beans, pears, pineapple, apricots, cereal, jam, jelly, desert powders, chili, peas, potatoes, tomatoes, pepper, salt, \$43,815.

12,000 cans beef gravy \$12,600.

1,600 cans green beans "deliver not later than 23 July 1960" \$1,008.

1,200 cans turkey "ship by air 15 September 1960, aircraft to pick up at Harrisburg--York Airport--Emergency-release without funds" \$2,088.

38,400 packages Minute Rice \$20,229.

Some rough arithmetical juggling of these figures might produce an estimate as follows for U.S. food supplies to ONUC during the early portion of Phase I:

U.S. "C" Ration	200,000 rations
U.S. Subsistence (\$373,000 at roughly \$1.25 per man per day)	<u>300,000 rations</u>
Total U.S. Rations	500,000 rations

Used to "thicken up" locally procured subsistence on 25% - 50% basis = 1-2,000,000 ration supplements or, for a 20,000-man force = 50-100 day supply or at an average Phase I force strength of 15,000 = 65-130 day supply.

Although, subsistence for the force, through the UN commercial procurement¹ system, began to arrive in the Congo quite early, the above rough calculations tend to show that for the initial 2 months period or so U.S.-provided food probably furnished the vast bulk of the food supplies for the force not procured locally.

Ammunition supply will be treated more fully under a later more militarily active phase. At this point mention will just be made that to provide a small reserve and to issue ammunition to those contingents arriving in the Congo without it, 3 tons (80,000 rounds) of U.S. small arms ammunition was airlifted to Leopoldville on 29 August 1960. An additional 200,000 rounds were provided in November 1960.

2. Phase II - Peak, Withdraw, Rebuildup, Adjust - 1961

Anyone who spent the year 1961 in the Congo would probably object violently to having the year treated briefly and cavalierly as sort of a year of shuffling around after the exciting buildup of July-December 1960. From the point of view of national support for international peacekeeping, 1961 does offer a tidy package for analysis.

On the local scene, 1961 opened with the Lumumbaist factions in complete rout, Communist missions expelled from the country and militant Afro-Asians getting ready to pull out of ONUC. Throughout the year Congolese political factions would confer, align, confer again and realign until in September and again in December military action in Katanga would highlight the year. Irish General McKeown had taken over from von Horn and would remain as the force commander throughout the year. The pullout of the

¹

General von Horn refers to such a shipment of food procured by the UN Field Operations Service from a commercial source in Germany, which, when it was discovered to be of Israeli origin, had to be relabelled in the Congo before issue to the UN Force; von Horn, op. cit., p. 219.

militant contingents would require a rebuildup. In addition the short-term force would begin rotation cycles. In the U.S., the Kennedy Administration had taken office and would take initiatives on the Congo problem. Although Hammarskjold was to die in September, the year 1961 was still essentially his from the UN point of view, if only because continued criticism of his actions and demands for his resignation from the Soviet bloc kept him under heavy pressure. Use of Force would be added to the ONUC mandate in 21 February and again on 24 November 1961. Having had an Irish massacre, an American/Canadian beating and an Austrian harassment near the end of 1960, the UN Force would suffer in 1961 a Sudanese disaster, a Ghanaian (and British and Swedish officers) massacre, an Italian massacre, an Irish defeat, and find itself under air attack.

On the world scene, one should not overlook the Berlin Crisis at midyear.

From the point of view of national support, Phase II of ONUC is interesting in a number of ways requiring a somewhat different order of presentation than that followed for Phase I. A basically chronological approach will be used concentrating on the major interest or activity of ONUC requiring national support at the time. Thus, support for Phase II will be discussed in the following order: (a) withdrawal, rebuildup and rotation of contingents; (b) major features of the "deliberate," as opposed to "crash" type of support, and the effect on support operations of the closure of the port of Matadi from March to June 1961; and (c) the support aspects of the preparation for and conduct of active military operations toward the end of the year.

- a. Taking first the withdrawals, rebuildup, and rotation of contingents, we should recall that the Mali contingent of some 575 men was the first to leave ONUC, in November 1960, because of the breakup at home of the Mali Federation. These troops were lifted on the return leg of the U.S. Air Force airlift bringing the last of the Nigerian contingent to the Congo. The

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average force strength during 1961 was 17,478 with a low of 15,418 in November and a high of 19,808 in July. The number of contingents stood at 26 in January and dropped gradually to 18 by November. The geographic base of the force also changed during 1961. The African contingents at the first of the year were 2/3 of the force; at the end of the year, 1/3.

During the first few months of 1961, because of political differences over ONUC the following contingents were withdrawn:¹

Guinea	750	January 1961
Indonesia	1,150	April 1961 (returned to the Congo in 1963)
Morocco	3,100	February-March 1961
Sudan	485	April 1961
UAR	<u>500</u>	February 1961
Total	5,985	

A Hammerskjold request of 28 February 1961 for contributions to offset these reductions, and in fact to raise the force to 23,000 strength, produced the following major offers:

India	a brigade of 3,000 additional
Tunisia	600 additional
Liberia	<u>240 additional</u>
Total	3,840

The withdrawal lift requirement fortunately coincided with an inbound famine relief lift (being accomplished by the U.S. Air Force under US/UN Assist No. 130), permitting the Sudanese (Assist No. 125) and the UAR (Assist No. 129) contingents to be moved on the return flights. The other withdrawing contingents were moved by U.S. sealift: the Indonesians on the Eltinge, the Moroccans on

¹ Mali and Yugoslavia had withdrawn earlier.

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the Blatchford and the Guineans on the vessels of Task Force Solant Amity (LST Graham County and LSD Hermitage) (see supra, pages 218 and 230).

An examination in detail of the UAR withdrawal airlift provided by the USAF will demonstrate the time, space, and cost factors involved:

UAR AIRLIFT

All C130A Aircraft (USAF)

All from Coquilhatville to Cairo

<u>A/C #</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Dates (1961)</u>	<u>Cost</u>
560548	35	16,160	1-3 Feb.	\$ 7,752
0006	33	26,300	3 Feb.	5,406
570454	28	16,321	1-3 Feb.	10,659
560537	60		4-5 Feb.	3,723
560529	34	14,160	1-5 Feb.	9,894
550017	9	22,000	31 Jan.-3 Feb.	11,832
0464	24	15,586	31 Jan.-2 Feb.	8,109
0516	76	4,000	1-2 Feb.	7,140
570460	62		1-3 Feb.	9,486
0455	70		31 Jan.-4 Feb.	11,373
560532	5	24,058	31 Jan.-3 Feb.	10,914
0539	28	20,000	2-5 Feb.	11,322
570457	31	5,000	5-8 Feb.	10,812
Total 13	495	163,585		\$118,422

Several characteristics of this particular tidy little airlift need to be noted before any attempts at analysis. First, the aircraft originated at Coquilhatville (a very unlikely place) for cost purposes having terminated inbound famine relief flights there or close by. Second, the costs charged include the return of the aircraft to their home base at Chateauroux, France. Third, the variations in charges relate to the different routes flown because of clearances or weather, and the

requirements for crew rest or aircraft maintenance stops (since non-flying hours also are charged) based on the status of each plane and crew at the time. The hourly flying basic charge for a C130 was \$510 all inclusive.¹

From this it can be seen that the charges might well have been as much as double those shown had the flights originated from a European base instead of in the Congo.

Using the actual figures charged for the UAR airlift, certain significant summary statements can be made:

(i) It cost about \$118,500 to move about 500 men and about 80 tons of cargo approximately 2,200 miles, or \$237 per man.

(ii) There were about 330 pounds of airlifted cargo per airlifted man.

(iii) Assuming 250 pounds per man for the man himself and his personal equipment, the total weight lifted by the 13 aircraft (including cargo) was 290,000 pounds or 22,300 pounds per plane. An accepted planning figure for airlift by C130 aircraft is 30,000 pounds for a 2,000 mile range. The UAR airlift, therefore, would not appear to be a case of serious under-utilization of airlift capacity.

The new incoming contingents or augmentations from India, Tunisia and Liberia were airlifted or sealifted by the U.S.. Part (2,300 men) of the important Indian Brigade was sealifted aboard the Blatchford to Dar-es-Salaam from whence they were airlifted to the Congo. The

¹ The U.S. Department of Defense put into effect an across-the-board 25% reduction from established airlift charges for all customers during the period 1 February - 30 June 1961.

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contingents brought with them on the Blatchford 27 jeeps and 10 motorcycles. An additional 789 Indians were lifted on the Eltinge (along with Malaysians and Pakistani) to Mombasa/Dar-es-Salaam arriving 21 April 1961. This was the last lift by the Eltinge in the Congo sealift operation. Additional Indian equipment was lifted on the USNS Kimbro, a cargo vessel.

Rotation of contingents during 1961 is difficult to document with exactness because of the withdrawals and new contingents. A gross examination, however, would show the following:

Average ONUC strength 1961	17,500 men
Assume all contingents rotated once completely (17,500 in, 17,500 out)	35,000 passengers
U.S. Sea and Airlift 1961 (actually 29 Nov 60-28 Nov 61)	
Air	17,560
Sea	<u>11,523</u>
Total	29,083
or about	85% of one complete rotation.

- b. After more than 5 months of the operation, one would expect to find a shift to a more deliberate support system as opposed to the necessarily crash-type system during the initial buildup. Annexes C-H, U.S. Reimbursable Support by services by calendar quarters, show this shift. This is especially so for the graph depicting U.S. Army support (Annex D) since both the Navy and Air Force graphs are heavily affected by sealift and airlift costs connected with buildup, withdrawal, and rotation cycles. From the Army graph it can be seen that the value of U.S.-provided equipment and supplies arriving for ONUC support during the first half of 1961 exceeded that for the buildup phase. Although a few high cost items help to raise the total for early 1961, the actual number

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of support transactions was much larger as well. Further, the proportion of support furnished from U.S. Army stocks in Europe, over 90% during the buildup phase, dropped significantly during 1961. In terms of number of transactions, as opposed to value, the share from U.S. Army Europe dropped even faster.

Major items supplied from U.S. Army stocks for ONUC in 1961 continued to fall into the following categories: Signal, Quartermaster (although food, a big item in Phase I, tapered off early in 1961), and light aircraft.

In the signal area, radio sets were the important items with about 200 sets being provided during 1961. In the quartermaster field, food remained an important item early in 1961 but receipts from UN commercial procurement soon made U.S. food support less necessary except for packaged emergency field rations. During the year, \$224,430 worth of food was provided for ONUC including \$27,468 worth of 5-in-1 packaged field rations (15,000 rations). Other major quartermaster items were blue helmet liners, insect bars and tentage. In the light aviation field, in addition to a heavy volume of spare parts, 14 H-19 helicopters at \$137,485 each, were provided. An interesting item in this field was the training of 9 Swedish helicopter pilots and 6 mechanics in the U.S. under UN/US Assist No. 214 during October-December 1961.

On 3-6 March 1961 Congolese forces ejected a unit of the Sudanese contingent and closed the port of Matadi. The Sudanese suffered 2 killed in the action, and forthwith announced the decision to withdraw the Sudanese contingent from ONUC.

Matadi is 80 miles upriver from the mouth of the Congo. Ships of 550 feet with drafts of $27\frac{1}{2}$ feet can enter but currents run 9-10 knots from November to January. The town itself had a 1960 population of 4,800. Leopoldville is 260

miles away and is connected by rail. Between the river mouth and Matadi is a dead body of water known as the "Devil's Caldron" which is described in the Hydrographic Officer's Sailing Directions in these words:

Opposite Underhill (on the approach to Matadi) the high hills drop in sheer precipices to the dark and gloomy basin known as the Devil's Caldron, 600 to 800 feet below. The river here is very deep and the current violent; numerous eddies and heavy whirlpools necessitate special care in steering and the greater speed that can be used, the better. Vessels must be capable of making 10 knots or more to negotiate the Devil's Caldron. ...According to the pilots, vessels over 550 feet in length would be unmanageable in the Devil's Caldron.¹

Not much of a port but it is the only real one the Congo has. Its closure on 6 March 1961 effectively cut off supplies for ONUC by ship except by way of East Coast African ports. Matadi was to stay closed until the Nigerians moved into the town on 19 June 1961.

Both the Blatchford and the Eltinge are 522 feet in length. The Eltinge, with 750 measurement tons of famine relief (dried milk), was due to arrive Matadi on 7 March 1961 to unload the dried milk and to embark the Indonesian contingent (the Blatchford had left Matadi with Moroccan troops on 27 February).

After the Eltinge had lain offshore for 4 days, during which time the subject was raised in the Congress (Congressional Record March 9, 1961,

¹ "MSTS Congo Office Opens as Troop Lift Begins," Sealift Magazine, April 1961, pp. 4-5.

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Vol. 107, No 42, p. 1), the UN in New York arranged with Congo (Brazzaville) to have the cargo unloaded at Pointe Noire and turned over there to a World Health Organization representative.

General von Horn considered that landings at East Coast African ports and subsequent transport by rail was the preferred routing for UN troops destined for the eastern Congo and Katanga.¹ Specifically, this would involve landing at Dar-es-Salaam, 708 miles by railroad to Kigoma, about 70 miles across and down Lake Tanganyika to the Congo railroad connection at Albertville in Katanga. But for the large contingents from India, Malaya, Indonesia, and Pakistan moving by sealift such routing would avoid the long voyage around the Cape and up to Matadi. The railroad-river route from Matadi to Leopoldville (rail) to Port Francqui (water) to Elisabethville in Katanga (rail), for comparison, is 1,728 miles.

von Horn, in September 1960, observed that "more than 20 steamers" had docked at Matadi and that it was by then his "main source of supply," although there were severe problems in getting supplies from Matadi beyond the river head at Port Francqui, i.e. into Kasai, Kivu and Katanga.²

In his report on the March 1961 situation, the Secretary General's Special Representative (Dayal) spoke of Matadi as ONUC's "lifeline to the sea" and indicated that in the following 3 weeks alone 33 ships with UN supplies were due to dock at Matadi, not including troop transports (S/4761).

This closure of Matadi for about 15 weeks came just at a time when deliberate supply procedures, 6-9 months lead time being normal for Field

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 218.

² Ibid., p. 223.

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Operation Service procurement, were beginning to produce a flow of supplies and equipment and when withdrawals, new arrivals and rotations of contingents were at their heaviest. In addition to nightmare conditions for ONUC logistics staff and movement control personnel, this period must have been one of maximum strain on the intra-Congo airlift and railroad-water distribution system. Lefever notes that at one time, according to a UN Force Commander, the average monthly intra-Congo airlift load was 7 million pounds of cargo and 9,000 personnel.¹ While this load could have been carried in about 10 well planned C130 missions per day, it clearly was beyond the capacity of the existing UN air transport unit, necessitating heavy reliance on expensive and not-too-efficient commercial charter airlift operations.

From August 1961 to the end of the year, 3 of the 4 major military actions of the Congo peace-keeping operation took place. All were in Katanga:

Operation RUMPUNCH	23 August 1961
Operation SMASH	13-20 September 1961 (Mothor in Hindi or Round 1)
Round 2	5-19 December 1961

The three 1961 military actions are described in detail in the Lefever ACDA Study, Volume 2, pages 106-122. From the point of view of national support for the Congo peacekeeping operation, interest in combat action by a peacekeeping force centers on such factors as: the existence of contingents armed and organized for a combat role, absence of restrictions against the combat use of their troops by contingent contributors, concentration of combat troops and necessary support

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 335.

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in the area of operations, special requirements to support the military action, and most importantly, the actions of states, in this section specifically the U.S., directly or through their representatives in the Congo to support or hinder the military effort.

As has already been mentioned, the composition of the UN Congo force began to change in early 1961 towards fewer, larger, more non-African contingents. In addition the deployment of contingents in the Congo shifted towards Katanga. Whereas at the beginning of 1961 only about 1/5 of the force was in Katanga, a steady shift in deployments brought more than half the force there by December. By the beginning of August 1961 all or the major portions of the more combat capable large contingents from India, Ireland, Sweden and Ethiopia were in Katanga.

Operation RUMFUNCH lasted for only 12 hours on 28 August 1961. Launched with surprise and effectively executed, it rounded up 338 mercenaries of the 441 estimated mercenaries in Katanga. There were no casualties and RUMPUNCH can be described as a police-type action raising no real problems of national support.

Operation SMASH, or Mothor or Round 1, 13-21 September 1961, was an entirely different matter. It was the most controversial single event of the whole Congo experience, involving still unresolved charges of collusion among UN officials and by them with the Congolese government, the opening of serious combat action without proper authority, exceeding the mandate, and the use of unnecessary force and brutality. Unlike RUMPUNCH in other respects, SMASH did not enjoy the element of surprise and was less efficiently led and executed. It involved fighting, often heavy, from its very beginning on 13 September. Hammarskjold enroute on a chartered intra-Congo airlift airplane to meet Tshombe in Northern Rhodesia to arrange a ceasefire was killed in a crash on 18 September along with 16 members of his staff. By the time a ceasefire was finally arranged on

20 September, an Irish company of the UN Force had been surrounded and forced to surrender to Tshombe forces and a Katangan jet fighter had appeared on the scene with the clear threat of its employment against the UN Force. SMASH was a failure and an embarrassment for the UN Force. Beyond the local concentration of UN Forces and the use of heavier weapons already in the hands of the contingents which took part, SMASH involved no particular problems of national support.

As a point of irony and confusion on this score, the lone Katangan jet which caused so much excitement during Round 1 was a French Fouga Magister jet trainer modified as an attack aircraft. It had been shipped to Katanga from France in February 1961 on a U.S. commercial chartered airline (Seven Seas) and was variously reported to have been flown in Round 1 by a Rhodesian or South African mercenary. Following the February import of this plane, the State Department announced on 30 March 1961 that U.S. airlines and shipping lines had been ordered to make no further shipment of arms or military equipment to the Congo.

On 24 November 1961 the Security Council authorized the use of "requisite measures of force, if necessary" in solving the problem of the prohibited mercenaries and military advisers in Katanga. Continued belligerent statements from Katangan representatives, frequent clashes between UN troops and Katanga's mercenary-led forces and the growing influence of the more extreme mercenary elements made it quite clear that force would be necessary to accomplish the UN objectives, and perhaps even in self-defense of the UN Force.

The UN Force in Katanga entered Round 2, 5-21 December 1961, much better prepared than it had been for the September action. UN fighter aircraft were available to counter the Katangan air threat and reinforcing ONUC troops and armored cars were flown to Katanga by U.S. Air Force

aircraft. Several events of interest for national support arose in connection with Round 2. Those involving non-U.S. support will be treated under the appropriate country heading in Chapter IV below. They will be mentioned here only to give an indication of the great importance of national support considerations during these last 3 weeks of December 1961 centering around Round 2 and the Kitona accord which brought this particular phase to an end:

Congo

- (1) 27 November 1961 grant of full freedom of movement in entire Congo to UN (A/4986).
- (2) 23 December 1961 UN acceptance of Congolese offer of 1,000 ANC troops for the UN Force (Note No. 2463).

U.S.

- (1) USAF Airlift to Katanga of Swedish, Irish, and Ethiopian Battalions and Swedish armored cars. (Approximately 100 C124 sorties by 21 December 1961 delivering 1,607 troops, 901 tons of equipment and 12 armored cars to Elisabethville and Kamina).
- (2) In connection with the intra-Congo airlift and the UN jet fighter force, the U.S. provided in late November-early December 1961, in response to US/UN Assist No. 268, one AN/MRN15 two-wheel control tower.
- (3) Assistance with cease-fire arrangements as requested in Tshombe message to President Kennedy. Ambassador Gullion helped arrange and participated in Kitona Conference (S/5038).

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U.K.

- (1) Announced opposition to UN action in Round 2; pushed for early cease-fire.
- (2) Had delayed arrival of Ethiopian jet aircraft by Uganda overflight clearance difficulties.
- (3) Refused UN request for 1,000 pound bombs for Indian jet bombers in UN air element (SG/1087).
- (4) Rejected UN proposal for observers on Rhodesian side of Katangan border (Portugal did the same with respect to Angola) (S/5053).

France

- (1) Announced opposition to UN action in Round 2.
- (2) On 15 December 1961 barred overflights of French territory of UN supply planes. The ban was broadened on 8 Jan 62.

Congo

- (Brazzaville) - Barred overflights of UN aircraft (SG/1096, S/5035). Portugal and the central African Republic did the same.

Rhodesia

- Cross-border assistance and asylum for Tshombe and mercenaries (note No. 2459/Corr. 1).

Ethiopia/

India/Sweden

- Provided jet aircraft for UN Force following September 1961 Katangan air threat: 4 Ethiopian F84's, 6 Indian Canberra bombers, 4 Swedish Saab S29 fighters.

Casualties in Round 2 were 206 Katangan troops, 21 UN soldiers and 50 civilians killed.

3. Phase III - Maintenance, Preparation, Peak
1 January 1962 - April 1963 (15 months)

From a restricted viewpoint of national support and a continuing assumption that the material aspects of supporting a peacekeeping force are susceptible to being made efficiently routine, it is understandable to treat this 15 months period 1 January 1962-1 April 1963 as a unit and to find little in it requiring detailed treatment. The exception is the significant military action phase in December 1962, known as Round 3.

The following factors, and their consistency throughout this phase, are worth noting:

The ONUC mandate remained unchanged.

Robert Gardiner of Ghana replaced Sture Linner of Sweden as Officer in Charge ONUC 10 February 1962 and held that office until 1 May 1963.

Lt. Gen. Kebede Gebre of Ethiopia replaced Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown of Ireland as ONUC Force Commander in April 1962 and held that office until July 1963.

The strength and make-up of the UN Force remained relatively stable throughout the period with about 19 contingents totaling about 17,000. A temporary all-time peak strength was reached right at the end of the period on 1 March 1963 when the inclusion of about 600 ANC troops and the return of the Indonesians after almost a 2-year absence boosted the force to 19,782 men. Only the dozen-man Ceylonese contingent completely and permanently disappeared from the Force during the period.

On the world scene the cast of principal players remained the same and highlights were: the Berlin crisis aftermath in early 1962, the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn, and the Sino/Indian border

war at the end of the year.¹ The Nassau agreement of December 1962 had implications for U.S.-U.K. relations and for France's relations with both of them.

From the start of the period until December 1962 the military situation could be described as an uneasy truce with the UN and Katangan forces gradually concentrating strength to the accompaniment of gradually worsening relations.

With this sort of a stable period to be considered, one can, even more than with Phase II, narrow the scope a bit more. Accordingly, for Phase II the consideration will be limited to the following areas: (a) Airlift/Sealift requirements for contingent rotation, (b) major equipment requirements for the combat phase, and, since this period immediately follows the combat phase and includes the decisive military action of the Congo operation, (c) the problem of medical support (this last subject treatment being sort of an excursion, to be sure that the subject is not omitted).

a. U.S. Airlift/Sealift - Phase III - 1 January 1962 - 1 April 1963

Exact figures for the U.S. airlift/sealift for the 15 month period of concern here are not readily available. However, figures can be developed for the 14 months following 28 November 1961, to which can be added known U.S. airlifts

¹ The Sino-Indian border war of late 1962 - early 1963 was the occasion of another large scale U.S. airlift. From 1962 to June 1963, the USAF lifted some 9,000 passengers and 18,000 tons of cargo in support of the Indians.

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and sealifts during the last month of Phase III, giving the following approximate results:¹

Assume 17,000 strength and 2 complete rotations of all contingents - lift requirement - 68,000

U.S. Airlift

28 Nov 1961 - 29 Jan 1963	10,624 in 7,480 out
Estimated 30 Jan 1963 - 1 April 1963	1,200 in <u>1,200</u> out
Subtotal Airlift	20,504

U.S. Sealift

28 Nov 1961 - 29 Jan 1963	12,068 in 9,376 out
Estimated 30 Jan 1963 - 1 April 1963	(Indonesian) 3,300 in (Indian) <u>4,400</u> out
Subtotal Sealift	29,144

TOTAL U.S. Airlift/Sealift 49,648

or approximately 74% of the required passenger lift.

b. Major Equipment Requirements - Combat Phase 1962

The four sizable equipment supply areas were signal spare parts, ground vehicles, intra-Congo airlift, and ammunition.

¹ Details of some of the USAF rotational airlifts for ONUC, so far as they are known for 1962 and early 1963 are included in Annex J. New military jet transports began to be used by the USAF during this period in the Congo airlift.

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Little in the way of major signal end items were provided beyond 48 complete telephone sets in January 1962 under US/UN Assist No. 318. About \$6,000 worth of batteries and \$181,000 worth of signal spare parts comprised the balance of U.S. signal support during 1962.

With respect to the other support requirements, directly related to the decisive combat action (Round 3) of December 1962 - January 1963, a brief review of events will be useful.

During the one-year stalemate that followed Round 2 and the 21 December 1961 Kitona agreement, there seems to have developed a noticeable hardening of attitudes towards the Congo problem, particularly on the part of the Kennedy administration. The new Secretary-General's attitude also seemed to be undergoing a change toward more firmness, although to some close observers he still seemed more anxious to get the UN out of the Congo than determined to see it through. These trends came to a head in mid-1962 with a series of developments aimed at pushing to a conclusion. In separate but to a degree mutually supporting actions the U.S. began to consult with its allies on a two-pronged approach ("The American Plan"): economic sanctions to pressure Katanga into a federal solution in the Congo and military aid and training assistance to the Congolese central government on a bilateral basis by the U.S., Canada, Italy, Norway, Belgium, and Israel under a form of UN auspices. The bilateral military aid approach came to be known as the Greene Plan from its relation to a U.S. military mission to the Congo in May-July 1962 headed by Colonel Michael Greene.¹

¹ Brig. Gen. Michael Greene in September 1969 was Assistant Commandant, the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

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Intensive consultation took place throughout the summer of 1962:

Gardiner returned to UN Headquarters 2 July

U Thant's 16 day tour of European capitals 4-20 July

Ambassador Gullion to Washington 21 July

U Thant's meeting with Congo Advisory Committee 24 July

Washington meeting U.S., U.K., Belgium, France 1 August

U.S. "Working Paper" to U Thant 4 August

"American Plan" for a Congolese federal union submitted to UN 9 August

"Thant Plan" for a federal solution to be accepted by Katanga within 10 days; otherwise, economic sanctions, 20 August

Katanga accepts "Thant Plan" 2 September

U.S. McGhee Mission to Congo 25 September-4 October

Meanwhile, on the U.S. aid side, President Kennedy on 14 September 1962 authorized \$150,000 military assistance for the Congo government. The equipment arrived in N'djili airport on 8 October 1962.

On the UN side, Thant, by early November, seeing little progress on the "Thant Plan" and noting the ever more threatening military confrontation between the UN Force and Katanga, began moves to strengthen the UN Force. Between 2-15 November 1962 UN announcements of increased troop contributions were made, including:

Indonesia	-	troops
Philippines	-	air unit
Sweden	-	air unit
Norway	-	anti-aircraft unit

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On 29 November 1962, the Secretariat announced that his military adviser, General Rikhye, was leaving for the Congo; on 3 December that the U.S., at UN request, was resuming its intra-Congo airlift of supplies to Elisabethville in Katanga; and on 18 December that the U.S. would provide additional equipment for ONUC (10 F86 aircraft with ground crews, 6 armored cars, 32 3/4-ton trucks and an engineer battalion).¹

Back on the U.S. side, after ordering the Katangan public-relations representative in New York to leave the country within 15 days, President Kennedy announced on 18 December 1962 that a military mission headed by Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman was leaving on 20 December for the Congo to survey the needs of the UN Force. The previous day, 17 December, he had authorized up to \$4 million bilateral military assistance for the Congo.

In the midst of these developments the decisive military action of the operation, Round 3, began in the afternoon of 28 December 1962 with Indian and Ethiopian troops moving to open Katangan road blocks in and around Elisabethville. Within a few days, UN troops had occupied most of the larger towns in the Elisabethville area and UN planes had destroyed practically all the Katangan planes.

Confident of their strong position and with the resolve built up over several months, UN officials from Thant through Bunche to Gardiner were determined not to fall for the cease-fire gambit again. They were well aware of the UN's financial crisis and of the imminent departure of the large Indian contingent from the force in the Congo. "This was (clearly) it." The Indian commanders of the UN Force in Katanga, likewise, were confident and determined. Lefever in the ACDA Study,

¹ Instead of the engineer battalion, mine-clearing devices and bridging equipment were supplied.

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Vol. 2, p. 124 states that the Indian commander, Maj. Gen. Prem Chand, was convinced that the Truman mission, 21-26 December, "...meant not only increased American logistical assistance, but also signaled Washington's determination to support a UN Force military solution if persuasion, negotiation, and economic measures failed."

Round 3 and the Katangan secession ended on 21 January 1963. During the fighting the following U.S. supplies and equipment reached the area:

30 2½-ton trucks - US/UN Assist No. 427

Portable Fuel Storage System (on Loan) -
US/UN Assist No. 430

KB 50 Tanker Airplane (on loan) (Above 2 items to support UN fighter aircraft operations in Katanga).

200,000 rounds belted 30 cal. Machine Gun
Ammunition US/UN Assist No. 411A

30 Assault boats (arrived Elisabethville
11 Jan 1963 from Mildenhall, England)

117 mine clearing devices - US/UN Assist
No. 420

6 Armored personnel carriers (Arrived
Elisabethville 4 January 1963 from Stuttgart,
Germany).

c. Medical Support - Phase III

The original UN plan for medical support of ONUC is indicated by the initial request of the Secretary General to India, Italy, and Austria to provide military hospitals. The larger contingents of regular battalion or brigade size from all contributors could also be expected to contain a small medical capability for their own immediate needs. General von Horn states that very early after his arrival in the Congo he

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co-opted the senior medical officer of the Ghana Brigade on to his staff to organize hospitals on a regional basis. Subsequently, this staff medical task was taken over by Colonel B. L. Kapoor of India assisted also by a Canadian medical officer. When the requested hospitals arrived, the 152d Indian General Hospital established a main hospital in Leopoldville and smaller hospitals at Luluabourg and Coquilhatville. The Italian hospital was established at Stanleyville and the Austrian field hospital at Bukavu.

The Austrian hospital of 50 men and 1 woman had a frightening introduction to the Congo. Flying from Vienna on U.S. Air Force planes 11 December 1960 to Bukavu, they were, on the first night, imprisoned by a howling mob of Congolese and all their personal and professional equipment was stolen or destroyed. There was also a Swiss hospital in Leopoldville and one early UN report (S/4531 Annex 1) carried its 22 members as part of the UN Force.

It would appear that the existing medical facilities and the 3 major UN medical units were able to provide adequate medical support for the UN Force. Detailed accounts of medical operations are available only with respect to the Austrian hospital which found itself engaged by necessity and by choice in extensive public health and hygiene programs for the Congolese as well as caring for its assigned share of UN troops.¹

In terms of U.S. medical support, the U.S. furnished first aid kits and a few medical supplies. Water and food testing kits were also provided (actually these were U.S. Army chemical Corps items). In addition, hospital care at the U.S. Army Hospital Camp Darby, Italy, arranged by the UN facility at Pisa, was provided in a number of cases. The following are examples in Phase III:

¹ e.g. Austrian submission to Committee of 33: A/AC. 121/19, 9 July 1968, and IPKO Documentation No. 1, pp. 23 ff.

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9 days hospitalization, Pvt. Joseph P. Desmond,
Irish, 31 December 1961-8 January 1962

3 days hospitalization, Pvt. Michael S. Cullen,
Irish, 31 December 1961-2 January 1962

3 days hospitalization, Pvt. William R. Marsh,
Irish, 31 December 1961-2 January 1962

3 days hospitalization, Pvt. Marty J. McMullen,
Irish, 31 December 1961-2 January 1962

3 days hospitalization, Pvt. James J. Scally,
Irish, 31 December 1961-2 January 1962

3 days hospitalization, Cpl. Roger Landry,
Canadian

Medical service, Francis M. Quane, Irish,
11 March 1962

3 days hospitalization, Pvt. Sep Mian Badshah,
Pakistani

3 days hospitalization, Maj. Bo Gunnar Svedberg,
Swede, 24-27 August 1962

In ONUC the dead, as well as the sick and wounded, were handled in medical channels. Anticipating casualties and aware of the differing national customs in this area, the UN Field Operations Service, assisted by the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps, early in the operation contracted with the head of a Chicago mortician school to establish and operate the UN mortuary in Leopoldville.¹

Total casualties of the UN Force during the 4-year Congo peacekeeping operation were 235 deaths of which 126 were classified as battle deaths.

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 338.

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4. Phase IV - Rundown and Phase Out - April 1963-June 1964
(14 months)

Following Round 3, Secretary-General U Thant announced on 29 January 1963 that the military phase of ONUC was over and that the force would be progressively reduced. Although open warfare among various Congolese factions was to continue, and in fact to intensify, during the remainder of ONUC's life, the decision to bring the operation to a close as quickly as possible was followed. On 27 June 1963 the General Assembly approved Thant's request to continue the force to the end of 1963 at a reduced strength level. On 18 October 1963, encouraged by the U.S., U.K., Belgium and others and assured of the necessary financing, U Thant asked and received General Assembly approval to extend the force to a terminal date of 30 June 1964.

At the time U Thant declared the military phase ended (29 January 1963), the UN Congo force consisted of 19,464 men, of whom 15,654 were in combat units and 3,810 were in staff positions or support units. The UN fighter aircraft contingent, which had performed so well in Round 3, consisted of 8 (or 10) Swedish J29 jet fighters, 2 Swedish S 29 photo reconnaissance jets, 4 Iranian F86 jet fighters, and 5 Italian F86 jet fighters. There were about 75 U.S. Services personnel in the Congo: 2 Navy in connection with the sealift effort, 1 Army for liaison with U.S. Army in Europe, and the remainder Air Force for communications and other support of the airlift.

The problems for Phase IV and national support are fairly obvious: support pipelines, just highly and somewhat belatedly charged for the big effort of Round 3, would have to be skillfully throttled back and closely controlled; 19,000 troops and their equipment would have to be partially rotated again and finally sent home, and the fixed installations and stocks would have to be progressively liquidated. The continuation of the UN's civilian program in the Congo was, of course, a favorable factor in that it provided an outlet for resources not needed by the

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dwindling UN Force, as well as an agency for taking over the last stages of the disposal process. The existence also of the UN facility at Pisa, Italy and the on-going UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (UNEF) and Yemen (UNYOM) provided outlets for diversion and disposal of ONUC's unneeded resources.

For this study, treatment of the rundown and phase out period will be limited to the (a) airlift and sealift of the force and, (b) at least in the form of a few examples, the disposal of major equipment items not associated with the contingents themselves. Since this phase marks the end of the U.S. airlift/sealift effort for the Congo, it may be useful in this phase to examine these areas in greater detail for the entire operation.

a. Airlift/Sealift Phase IV - April 1963-June 1964

By this period of the Congo operation, the UN Field Operation Service had gathered much experience in the movement of contingents to and from the Congo and had experimented with various refinements; e.g. the scheduling of the Blatchford on an outbound lift from the Congo to perform the lift of Pakistani troops to West New Guinea (UNTEA) (unfortunately aborted when the Blatchford broke down in September 1962) and similarly, to return the Pakistani UNTEA contingent in April 1963, while employing a larger U.S. vessel, the Gordon for one lift in the Congo run. In airlift the UN attempted to employ commercial charter on contract extensively during this period with considerable unsatisfactory results.¹

The Blatchford (replaced by the Gordon for 21 days in April 1963) continued in the Congo sealift until the end of July 1963.

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 336.

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The U.S. Air Force during the final 12 months of the Congo operation charged the UN about \$6.9 million for airlift as compared with \$7.1 million for a comparable 12 month period a year earlier, so the level of U.S. airlift support remained fairly steady.

One particular airlift example will be examined to demonstrate long distance airlift features and various cost and timing considerations during a rundown/phase-out period. This will be the Indian/Pakistani partial rotation and the Indonesian withdrawal of late December 1963-early January 1964 under US/UN Assist No. 478.¹

On 7 December 1963 a UN Field Operations Service representative orally placed an official request with USUN for the Indian/Pakistani/Indonesian airlift commencing about 20 December, stating that the request was made "...only after a long, fruitless effort to obtain suitable commercial sea and airlift arrangements."

He also reported that the UN had considered a sealift option from Mombasa/Dar-es-Salaam but that preparation for this would cost \$200-\$300,000 including intra-Congo movement, rail to port movement, and temporary camps at the port.

The details of the contingents to be airlifted were:

	<u>Lift</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Cargo (Pounds)</u> ²
Leopoldville to Karachi	661	100,306	
Karachi to Leopoldville	330	62,000	
Leopoldville to Bombay	216	34,758	
Bombay to Leopoldville	110	7,260	
Elisabethville to Djakarta	883	141,150	
	<u>2,200</u>	<u>345,474</u>	

¹ USUN message to Dept. of State 2398, 7 December 1963

² 210 tons of additional cargo for the 3 contingents was to be shipped by sea from the Congo by the UN. In addition to the cargo shown, each passenger had 66 pounds of baggage.

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The Field Operations Service stated a preference for the lift to commence with the departure of the Indonesians on the basis of savings in the cost of maintaining this large contingent in the Congo, but that, if possible the incoming Indian/Pakistani groups should arrive in the Congo before the outgoing contingents departed.

The U.S. Air Force accomplished the airlift between 20 December 1963 and 3 January 1964 employing C124 and C135 jet aircraft (56 missions, 19 of which were intra-Congo shuttles). U.S. Air Force personnel involved were 90 crew members, 80 control team personnel at Leopoldville and 25 at Elisabethville, 3 at Bombay and 3 at Djakarta for liaison purposes. (The UN later billed the U.S. and was given credit for \$11,388.45 for billeting, messing, and ground transportation services provided the airplane crews and control personnel in the Congo during this lift).

Countries overflown in the lift were (*landings made) *Congo/Leopoldville, Congo/Brazzaville, Sudan, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Aden, *Pakistan, *India, *Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, *Spain, France, Malaya, Singapore, Niger, Nigeria, *Vietnam and *Hawaii. Personnel and planes came from the U.S. (both East and West Coasts) and from Europe.

The charge for this airlift to the UN was \$888,539 or just over \$400 per passenger with about 160 pounds of cargo per man including personal baggage. Two weeks elapsed from start to finish.

At this point, it might be instructive to look at U.S. airlift/sealift overall for the entire operation:

U.S. Airlift Overall - over the entire span of the Congo operation the U.S. airlifted UN troops and supplies as follows:

to the Congo	43,303 men	8,542 tons
from the Congo	31,093 men	1,904 tons
within the Congo	<u>1,991 men</u>	<u>3,642 tons</u>
Total	76,387 men	14,088 tons

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Airlift charges presented by the U.S. to the UN totaled \$25,819,091 and \$10,317,622 of initial airlift costs were waived (without the waiver total airlift charges to the UN would have been \$36,136,713). These costs include the flying rate charge for the aircraft (\$518 for C124; \$510 for C130; rates reduced 25% during the period 1 February - 30 June 1961) plus the per diem and travel costs of non-crew control and support personnel. They do not include any charge for base pay and basic allowances of U.S. Air Force personnel. On the basis of total cost, (no waiver) the overall airlift would appear to have cost about \$470 per passenger with about 370 pounds of cargo per passenger. Taking into account the waiver of initial airlift costs, the costs charged to the UN are reduced to about \$340 per passenger.

U.S. Sealift Overall - A total of 8 U.S. vessels participated in the Congo sealift 1960-1964 but the vast bulk of the sealift was performed by the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) vessel, the Blatchford (3,000 troop capacity, air-conditioned). This vessel participated in the Congo lift from her departure from New York on 11 February 1961 until her return to New York on 12 August 1963. Since this counts as one single voyage of 2½ years and 174,014 miles, it constitutes the long-voyage record for the U.S. Military Sea Transport Service. While each lift by the Blatchford was handled under the US/UN Assist Letter procedure, the vessel for all practical purposes was the same as under charter to the UN.

The basis for charges to the UN for the Blatchford was a per diem charge for the vessel and crew (\$7,100 per day, increased to \$7,400 per day effective 1 July 1962), plus subsistence costs for passengers, port and service charges, and transportation charges for rotating the ship's crew on 3 or 4 occasions. Charges for the Eltinge were the same as for the Blatchford while per diem charges for the Gordon were \$9,225. For

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the smaller vessels (U.S. Navy, as opposed to Military Sea Transport Service) the basis for charges against the UN was actual out-of-pocket costs with an adjustment downward if the location of the ship at the conclusion of the lift was considered advantageous to the Navy.

During the entire Congo operation, the U.S. sealifted troops and cargo as follows:

	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
to the Congo	20,352	5,322
from the Congo	<u>23,343</u>	<u>2,801</u>
Total	43,695	8,123

Sealift charges presented by the U.S. to the UN totaled \$8,463,631. No sealift charges were waived since the "initial" lift to the Congo, charges for which were waived the U.S. under policy in effect at the time, was fixed as covering the period 14 July - 31 August 1960. The sealift charges include the basic per diem charge for vessel and crew as well as all other chargeable costs associated with the sealift. On the basis of total sealift charges, the cost would appear to be about \$195 per passenger with his personal baggage and about 370 pounds of cargo per passenger.

Having reduced the airlift and sealift data to common terms, it should be possible to make a single comparison between airlift/sealift costs and to evaluate the U.S. share of the total Congo lift:

<u>Cost Comparison</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	
Airlift (excluding intra-Congo lift and ignoring waiver with 370 pounds of cargo per passenger)	74,396	@ \$470
Sealift (with 370 pounds of cargo per passenger)	43,695	@ \$195

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The time factor remains to be considered in any comparison of airlift and sealift data:

Sealift round trip Matadi- Djakarta - Singapore - Bombay - Matadi	55 days
Airlift round trip Leopoldville- Bombay - Djakarta - Karachi - Leopoldville	15 days
Difference	<hr/> 40 days

Assuming that Malayan, Pakistani, and Indonesian troops had the same direct support costs for the UN as the Indian contingent (\$8 per month overseas allowance), one needs to add about \$11 per passenger to sealift costs. However, this consideration would be much more than offset by the fact that sealift includes subsistence for the passengers. Thus, on cost factors alone, sealift has a clear advantage. Its disadvantages are, from a time consideration, lack of quick responsiveness and greatly increased time in transit (particularly when viewed in a 6-months rotational situation).

The cost figures become startling if we compare the airlift/sealift costs under the assumption that a high-direct-cost contingent were being lifted (e.g. one like the Swedish contingent in ONUC for which the UN was charged for all pay and allowances - \$390 per man per month average).¹ The 40 days additional transit time in such a case would add \$520 to the per-passenger sealift cost--clearly arguing for airlift under such assumptions.

As demonstrated above in the details of the Indian/Indonesian/Pakistani airlift of December 1963 - January 1964, the sealift option also

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 381.

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involved certain sizable costs to the UN for positioning the contingents at the port; in that case about \$100 to \$150 per man.

The U.S. Share of Congo Airlift/Sealift can be shown from the figures already developed separately above by comparing them with the total lift requirement. The commonly accepted figure for the total of military personnel who served, at one time or another, in ONUC is 93,000 giving a round trip lift requirement of 186,000. The total U.S. Airlift/Sealift in and out of the Congo (excluding Belgium troops and evacuees) was 118,091 or 64% of the total requirement.

- b. Equipment Roll-up is always a difficult exercise in military logistics. A few examples, for which documentation exists, will show the role played by the U.S. and the techniques employed.

C119 Aircraft - Half-way through the Congo operation, after 3 crashes of Italian C119's, the Italian contingent placed a restriction on the use of their C119's in the Congo. The UN would have been required to reimburse Italy for the 3 C119's which were destroyed. Instead, with U.S. approval, 3 of the 5 U.S. supplied C119's were transferred to Italy to replace the crashed aircraft. The remaining 2 U.S. supplied planes were also transferred to Italy for credit against other Italian charges against the UN.

Vehicles - In addition to vehicles which came with (and generally left with) contingents, ONUC had a quantity of vehicles of its own in the Congo. The purchase of about 60-70 trucks and jeeps from the U.S. has already been described. In addition, in at least one case,¹ ONUC bought outright a departing contingent's trucks and armored cars when disagreement over depreciation charges could not be resolved. Certain other

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 384.

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vehicles were acquired by ONUC through commercial sources locally and abroad. On 5 May 1964, the U.S. offered to buy from ONUC 85 surplus Dodge trucks Model W-500.¹ The sale was consummated under the following terms:

69 trucks, unused, at 75% of cost plus 100% of freight charges to the Congo.

16 trucks, slightly used, at 70% of cost plus 100% of freight charges to the Congo.

\$33,884.49 worth of parts plus freight costs.

Total: \$491,172.49

This purchase was applied against the account owed by the UN to the U.S. for Congo support and, on the U.S. side, was charged against the Military Assistance Program for the Congo.² The trucks were turned over to the Congolese.

Other minor examples of equipment roll-up involving the U.S. are:

Return to U.S. Army Europe of 2 H13 helicopters for credit.

Return to U.S. Air Force for credit of Portable Fuel Storage System used to support UN jet fighters in Round 3.

Transport by U.S. Air Force airlift of 2 H19 helicopters from the Congo to Ader for use of UNYOM (they turned out not to be suitable for the climatic conditions).³

¹ USUN's note verbale, 5 May 1964, Secretariat's note verbale, 8 May 1964, Secretariat's note verbale, 12 August 1964.

² The Military Assistance Agreement between the U.S. and the Congo was formalized in notes exchanged at Leopoldville and went into effect 19 July 1963, 15 UST 142; TIAS 5530; 511 UNTS 47.

³ von Horn, op. cit., p. 356.

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On 21 October 1964, the Acting Chief of the Field Operations Service (George Lansky) advised USUN as follows:

The Chief Administrative Officer of ONUC confirms that no more requisitions are needed through EXAREUR. Therefore, the United States Department of Defence may close out their ONUC groups in Chateauroux and Pisa.

I wish to convey our thanks to the United States Government for providing such excellent groups of personnel, and for the valuable cooperation that the groups have contributed to the success of the ONUC Operation.

The UN ended up selling most of its equipment and supplies on hand in the Congo to the Congolese government for local (non-convertible) currency. In addition the ONUC account received a refund of the equivalent of \$1 million in Congolese francs for custom duties paid on fuel and lubricants, and held a further \$1 million equivalent in Congolese currency from Post Exchange and commissary profits. The sale of surplus ONUC equipment alone amounted to \$5.2 million.¹

IV

SUPPORT BY OTHERS

Complete details of national support have never been published by the UN or by any country participating in or supporting ONUC. Many bits and pieces of information on the subject are available. The purpose of this section will be to pull together as briefly but as completely as possible the information which is available. The scheme of treatment will be to deal in simple alphabetical order with each country involved, attempting

¹ A/6289/Add. 1, 31 March 1966, Annex V, pp. 11-13.

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to state in as few words as possible its overall policy respecting ONUC, the strength and status of its contingent, if applicable, and any special supportive or non-supportive actions. A table comparing national support reimbursable costs for all ONUC contingent contributors is in Annex N.

A. AUSTRIA¹

1. Policy - Austria had not participated in any UN peacekeeping operation prior to ONUC. Its national policy of permanent neutrality and constitutional prohibitions against employment of Federal forces outside of Austria meant that, when asked by the UN in July 1960 to provide a health service, logistics unit and a postal service for ONUC, special ad hoc arrangements were required. A cabinet decision was taken on 15 September 1960 to provide a medical contingent, whose members would be volunteers serving on a contractual basis. Most of the volunteers came from the Army.

Austria voted for all the significant General Assembly resolutions supporting ONUC (20 September 1960, 22 November 1960, 15 April 1961, 27 June 1963, and 18 October 1963).

Austria paid all assessments for ONUC, made a voluntary contribution of \$34,900 and purchased \$900,000 in UN Bonds.

As of 30 September 1965, the UN owed \$49,000 to Austria for its services in ONUC. According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Austria was \$1,123,000 of which \$1,074,000 or 96% has been paid for by the UN.

2. Contingent - The Austrian hospital unit served in the Congo from December 1960 to July 1963. Austria had no representative in the force headquarters. The strength of the hospital was 45-55 and there were 5 contingents rotated through a six-months cycle. All were volunteers. The initial contingent contained 2 women. Some of the same personnel served in more than one rotational contingent; the total Austrian participation was 166 people.

¹ IPKO Documentation No. 1; Austrian submission to Committee of 33, A/AC. 121/19.

3. Special Supportive/Non-Supportive Actions - On 12 December 1960, its first night in the Congo, the Austrian contingent was besieged by tribesmen and all its equipment destroyed. They were freed by Nigerian UN troops. The equipment was replaced by local and foreign purchase.

Each of the contingents increasingly moved into the broad public health area so that towards the end of Austria's participation only about 1/6 of the hospital's patients were UN troops.

Austria has participated in UNFICYP since 1964 and UNTSO since 1967.

Legislation in 1965 regularized the Austrian participation in UN peacekeeping. Participants are still volunteers but the contingents have the status of regular Federal Army units. A UN battalion of 628 men has been organized on paper with all its equipment in a standby status. Similar arrangements have been made for police personnel. The UN battalion has had one trial assembly and orientation. Austria has been on the UN's Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations since its inception in February 1965.

B. ARGENTINA/BRAZIL/EQUADOR

1. Policy - Argentina and Ecuador had not participated in a UN peacekeeping operation prior to ONUC. Brazil had maintained a battalion of over 600 troops in UNEF since 1956.

Argentina was a member of the Security Council in 1960 and in all Congo votes in the Security Council in 1960 and in the General Assembly throughout voted the same as the U.S. Ecuador was also a member of the Security Council and her votes differed from the U.S. on 2 occasions: Yes on the "Belgian Presence," and Yes on the Lumumba investigation. Brazil's voting pattern in the General Assembly was the same as the U.S. and Argentina except for a yes vote rather than an abstention on the resolution setting up the Commission of Investigation into Lumumba's death. In his 1 July 1960 report (S/4389, paragraph 24), Secretary-General Hammarskjold stated that one Latin American country had been asked for troops for ONUC. He had also apparently made a wide appeal for units, men and equipment for the intra-Congo airlift organization. No troops were furnished to ONUC from Latin

America. Argentina and Brazil together furnished a 10 plane DC-3 squadron. The only other Latin American participation was 2 men from Ecuador for 4 months in mid-1961. Argentina by the end of 1968 paid all of its assessments for the Congo; Brazil still owed \$248,838 and Ecuador \$4,120. None of the countries bought UN bonds. As of 30 September 1965, Argentina had been completely reimbursed for its support of ONUC (\$586,000) as had Ecuador (\$6,000); Brazil was still owed \$8,000 and had been paid \$1,643,000.

2. Contingent - The Argentine/Brazil DC-3 squadron personnel were present in ONUC from start to finish generally at a combined strength from the 2 countries of about 60-70 men during 1961 dropping to 40-50 men from mid-1962 onward. Ecuador furnished 2 officers for 4 months in mid-1961.

3. Special Supportive/Non-Supportive Actions - Both Argentina and Brazil are members of the Committee of 33. While neither is considered a particular enthusiast for peacekeeping, especially in an OAS context, they have participated in both UNEF (Brazil only) and ONUC. Argentina, at present, (April, 1969) is represented in UNTSO by 8 officer observers. Ecuador's token participation in ONUC may possibly be attributed to some small onus or at least encouragement of participation resulting from Security Council membership when that body establishes a peacekeeping operation.

C. BELGIUM

1. Policy - As the Congo's colonial master for over 80 years, and with almost 90,000 of its citizens in the Congo, Belgium clearly was the most involved outside power (i.e. other than the Congo itself).

Belgium was not a Security Council member. In the General Assembly she voted for the 20 September 1960 resolution, which confirmed the preceding 3 Security Council resolutions; against the 15 April 1961 resolution which singled out the Belgium presence as the critical factor; and abstained on the other 2 resolutions of that date.

Not wishing to be the villain of the affair and convinced that the UN's means and ends in the Congo were impossibly contradictory, Belgium support and non-support of the UN operation varied from full collaboration to thorough opposition.

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The anomalies in the Belgium policies vis a vis ONUC were not helped by a basic inconsistency between Belgium ends and means as well; that is, her attempting to support both the Katangans and the moderate Kasavubu-Mobutu central government.

Belgium refused to pay its Congo assessments until 1965. At that time, in an agreement with the Secretariat, \$1,500,000 in claims against the UN by Belgian citizens in the Congo were written off against a portion of Belgium's Congo assessment with Belgium paying the balance in full. Belgium made no voluntary contributions but did purchase \$1,200,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - There were about 4,000 Belgian troops in the Congo on 30 June 1960 and over 5,000 more were flown in when the mutinies and disorder started the following week. On 16 July 1960 the Belgian commander proposed to Dr. Bunche that his troops be employed by the UN. The offer was rejected. Between 17-23 July almost 3,000 of the Belgian troops were returned to Europe and the remainder of some 6,000 assembled in the Belgian bases in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.

The Belgian administrative and military infrastructure in the Congo and the thin layer of advisers and technicians who stayed on through the whole 4 year period probably played an essential support role for the UN operation. Mobutu continued to employ 14 Belgian military personnel as his immediate advisers right through the period when the expulsion of all Belgians was the priority ONUC mission.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - Although a minor and surely not an isolated case, the Sabena flight of 9 tons of munitions from Brussels to Katanga on 7 September 1960 illustrates an arms control aspect of the Congo operation. The detection of the shipment on 7 September, the Secretary-General's prompt protest on 8 September, and the Belgian reply of 9 September, containing assurances against recurrence, demonstrate the effectiveness of such measures under some conditions. Conversely, the Secretary-General's protest of 9 September against Soviet unilateral aid and the Soviet rejection of 10 September demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the very same measures under other conditions.

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D. BURMA

1. Policy - In Lefever's 3 categories of Afro-Asian behavior on the Congo issues: militant, moderate, and impartial, Burma falls in the impartial category.¹ Not a member of the Security Council for any Congo vote, Burma in the General Assembly voted for the 20 September 1960 resolution supporting the Secretary-General, abstained on the Kasavubu/Lumumba credentials resolution of 17 November 1960, and voted for all 3 resolutions of 15 April 1961 (co-sponsoring 2 of them).

Burma paid all assessments for ONUC, made no voluntary contributions, but purchased \$100,000 in UN bonds.

¹ Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 261. Of the 19 Afro-Asian contingent contributors, 6 were classified by Lefever with respect to the Congo as militants (Ghana, Mali, Morocco, UAR, Guinea and Ceylon), 8 as moderates (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Liberia, Malaya, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines and Sierra Leone), and 5 as impartial (Tunisia, India, Indonesia, Sudan and Burma). The militants were noted for strong anti-colonial, anti-West (if not necessarily pro-communist) sentiments and had strong nationalistic leaders seeking leadership in the Pan-African movement; this last point being a strong motive in the Congo issue. Morocco saw a dangerous parallel between Mauritania and Katanga. The moderates did not regard economic ties with the West as neo-colonialism and were generally pro-Western, some being recipients of Western military aid. The states in the impartial category had little direct interest in the Congo situation and viewed both Western and Communist motives with some suspicion.

Another author has described three "clusters of African attitudes" concerning the Congo: "radicals" (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR), "conservatives" (the former sub-Saharan French states excluding Guinea, Mali and Togo), and "moderates" (Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, Somalia and Sudan). The moderates supported the UN operation in the Congo; both the radicals and conservatives opposed it - the former because it was not enough, the latter because it was too much. Robert C. Good, "Four Views of the Congo Crisis," in Kitchen, op. cit., pp. 45-7. The fourth view was that of Ghana when its position deviated from the radicals.

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2. Contingent - Burma provided 9 men to ONUC for the first 6 months of the operation.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - None.

E. CANADA

1. Policy - Canada in 1960 was one of the most, if not the most, dedicated and ardent advocate and supporter of UN peacekeeping, and had participated importantly in almost all previous UN operations.

On 14 July 1960 the Canadian Prime Minister announced Canada's favorable response to UN requests for assistance for ONUC. Further announcements and Parliamentary approvals were made on 30 July and 6 August 1960 for a Canadian signals squadron, airlift assistance, a provost (military police) unit, and staff personnel. The Parliamentary approval was for up to 500 servicemen.¹

Not a member of the Security Council for any Congo vote, Canada voted for all General Assembly Congo resolutions except the Kasavubu/Lumumba credentials resolution on which she abstained.

Canada paid all her Congo assessments, made a voluntary contribution of \$263,000 and purchased \$6,240,000 in UN bonds. Canada waived \$650,000 initial airlift charges against the UN. As of 30 September 1965 unliquidated obligations of the UN to Canada for ONUC support were \$1,723,755. According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Canada was \$6,868,000 of which \$6,102,000 or 89% has been paid for by the UN. Canada is a member of the Committee of 33.

2. Contingent - Signals - a bilingual (English/French) Canadian signal squadron of about 250 highly trained men was maintained throughout the operation and provided that vital

¹ Canada and the UN, 1945-1965, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1966), p. 48.

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communications link from the headquarters in Leopoldville to the military sector headquarters and to and between the larger contingents.¹

Provost - a small military police-type detachment of a dozen or so professionals in Leopoldville largely set the standard for the military police function.

Headquarters - At almost any date during the 4 year operation there were more Canadian officers in the Force Headquarters than any other single nationality. This was especially so during 1960. Through General von Horn's tenure a Canadian was either Chief of Staff at the Headquarters or von Horn's chief military adviser. With their language capability, peacekeeping experience, generally good political acceptability, professionalism and familiarity with both Commonwealth and U.S. military procedures, the Canadians were ideally suited for ONUC.

Airlift - Canadian peacekeeping planning calls for a Canadian airlift capability for lifting a battalion plus 7 days of supply to any point within 5,000 miles.² As of 1960, Canada was providing airlift in support of UNEF and also maintaining scheduled frequent military flights from Canada to Europe in support of Canadian NATO forces.

For ONUC Canada waived \$650,000 of initial airlift and, in addition, lifted 11,746 passengers and over 4 million pounds of cargo.³ Employing the same rough arithmetic used on page 273 supra for the U.S. airlift, the Canadian airlift of 11,746 passengers with about 340 pounds of cargo per passenger, assuming none of it was intra-Congo, would have comprised about 6% of the total airlift.

¹ The Canadian signal squadron normally operated at headquarters in Leopoldville and at 4-7 outstations throughout the Congo. Each outstation was manned by 1 officer and 9 men. Using a U.S. radio set (AN/GRC26D) with a normal range of 250 miles the Canadian signalers usually had to maintain circuits 2 or 3 times that distance.

² IPKO Documentation, No. 12, p. 6.

³ Canadian Submission to Committee of 33, A/AC, 121/17, 19 June 1968, p. 12.

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About 25 Royal Canadian Air Force personnel were in the contingent and 4 North Star RCAF aircraft were assigned to the important Pisa/Congo shuttle.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - Canadians in ONUC and the government at home were under a host of conflicting pressures. Tradition, ties and alliances, creating an unavoidable sympathy with the views of the U.S., U.K., France, and even Belgium, had to be balanced by the need for objectivity and impartiality as an enthusiast for UN peacekeeping and as an ONUC participant. It might be said that this "peacekeeper's impartiality," in fact, was Canada's only practicable solution since support for U.S., U.K., France and Belgium policies was impossible because these policies were themselves frequently, and in some cases, continuously, in conflict.

All accounts of the Canadian role in ONUC are overwhelmingly favorable. Important even vital functions were performed without fanfare and with an efficiency that commanded respect. A surprising 27% of the Canadians volunteered for a second 6-months tour in ONUC.

F. CEYLON

1. Policy - Ceylon fell in the militant Afro-Asian camp on the Congo problem along with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR.¹

As a member of the Security Council in 1960, Ceylon voted for the 14 July Resolution, co-sponsored with Tunisia the resolutions of 22 July and 9 August, co-sponsored with Liberia and UAR the resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961. Ceylon generally voted with the Soviet Union and Poland on Soviet-proposed resolutions which failed of adoption. In the General Assembly she was a sponsor of the resolutions of 20 September 1960 and two of the resolutions of 15 April 1961 (central factor was Belgian presence; investigation of Lumumba's death). She voted against Kasavubu in the credentials resolution of 17 November 1960, and abstained on the 15 April 1961 resolution setting up the Commission of Conciliation.

¹ See footnote supra, page 280.

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Ceylon paid her Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but bought \$25,200 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - From August 1960 until April 1962 (22 months), Ceylon maintained from 8 to 13 men in the Congo force, for which the UN reimbursed her \$6,000.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Action - None.

G. CONGO/BRAZZAVILLE

1. Policy - Congo/Brazzaville became a UN member during the Fifteenth General Assembly and voted as follows:

17 November 1960	(credentials)	for Kasavubu
15 April 1961	(Belgian presence is central factor)	for
15 April 1961	(Commission of Conciliation)	against
15 April 1961	(Investigate Lumumba's death)	abstain

As of mid-1969 Congo/Brazzaville still owed an assessment of \$9,938, and had made no voluntary contributions or UN bond purchases.

The President of the country, Abbe Fulbert Youlon, was a supporter of Tshombe, and reportedly harbored dreams of a union between his country and Katanga.

2. Contingent - None

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - On or about 21 July 1960 the U.S. Army aviation detachment which had been operating from the Brazzaville Airport in the collection of evacuees in the Congo was requested to leave.

On 16 December 1961, the day following similar action by France, Congo/Brazzaville forbade UN flights from overflying or landing on its territory (SG/1096).

H. CONGO/LEOPOLDVILLE

1. Policy - Any attempt systematically to look at a Congolese policy towards ONUC would take dozens of pages and end in futility. The Congo was both the "host" and the "object"

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of the operation and, in both capacities, was a feuding tribal area which never during the operation had a sufficient cohesiveness of leadership or policies to permit effective government. Nevertheless, from the point of view of national support for peacekeeping operations, certain speculations, of a policy nature, can be made:

a. Except when they were offering to help out a particular contending Congolese faction, the African contingents making up the initial core of ONUC seem not to have been especially well received in the Congo. This applies particularly to the contingents such as UAR, Tunisia and Morocco which, while African, were racially apart and also to the more militant Black African contingents such as those from Ghana, Guinea and Mali.

b. Anti-Belgian feelings in the Congo were not as deep nor as wide nor as permanent as they looked right after 4 July 1960. After the initial hysterical reaction to independence, Belgians seem to have been the preferred Europeans in Congolese eyes.

Admitted to the UN at the Fifteenth General Assembly, the Congo took part in the 3 resolutions of 15 April 1961, voting against the investigation of Lumumba's death and abstaining on the other 2. Following the 21 February 1961 Security Council resolution¹ which urged the "use of force, if necessary, in the last resort" to prevent the occurrence of civil war and the reorganization of Congolese forces to bring them under control, the Congolese government on 22 February² and again on 6 March³ strongly objected to this infringement of Congolese sovereignty, and appeared to win its point in an agreement with the Secretary-General on 17 April 1961.⁴

¹ S/4741, 21 February 1961.

² S/4743, 22 February 1961.

³ S/4752, 27 February 1961.

⁴ S/4807, 17 May 1961.

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2. Contingent - From August 1962 until February 1964 a Congolese Army contingent was carried on the rolls as part of the UN Force. Its announced strength was 1,000. Actual strength varied from about 625 to 800. It did not play a major part in any actions by the UN Force.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - All accounts of the early weeks of ONUC contain references to cooperative actions by certain Congolese officers and military units in the midst of the overall confusion. Buildings, camps, and other facilities of the Congolese Army were used by the arriving UN Force as well as supplies, transport (including river craft), radios and even weapons and ammunition.

I. DENMARK/NORWAY/SWEDEN

1. Policy - Personnel from these countries had participated in practically every peace observation or peacekeeping operation including UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, and UNEF prior to the Congo operation. All three countries have established positions as staunch supporters of the UN in general and of UN peacekeeping in particular.

Not members of the Security Council in the initial Congo period, all three countries voted for all General Assembly Congo resolutions, except that Sweden abstained on the credentials resolution of 17 November 1960.

All three paid all Congo assessments, made voluntary contributions of \$50,286 (Denmark), \$38,000 (Norway), and \$112,000 (Sweden) and purchased \$5,850,000 (Denmark), \$5,700,000 (Norway), \$14,470,000 (Sweden) in UN bonds.

As of 31 March 1966 unliquidated UN obligations and payments for their support of the Congo operation were:

	<u>Reimbursed</u>	<u>Est. Unliquidated</u> <u>Obligations</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% Paid</u>
Denmark	\$ 2,339,000	\$200,000	\$ 2,539,000	92
Norway	3,844,000	340,000	4,184,000	92
Sweden	20,033,000 ¹	725,000	20,758,000	97 ¹

¹ Included in the UN reimbursements to Sweden is \$642,823 as accounts payable, not yet paid. Deletion of this sum from reimbursements reduces Swedish reimbursement percentage to 93%.

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2. Contingent - All three countries maintained contingents throughout the entire 4 years of the Congo operation. The strength of the Danish contingent varied from 12 in August 1960 to 265 in February - May 1963. A total of about 825 Danes rotated through the contingent of whom most were officers and non-commissioned officers. The Danish contingent was highly specialized and changed its composition from time to time to meet particular needs. In addition to a small staff for the contingent, it at times included: personnel for the UN Force headquarters, movement control, military police, mechanics, sanitary engineers (from the Danish Navy), helicopter pilots and mechanics, transport aircraft and crews (from the Danish Air Force) and a truck transport company.

Although the comparison may not be reliable, in terms of man-months and total reimbursement claimed, available information on Danish charge for the Cyprus Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) permits at least a tentative rough comparison with ONUC and a breakdown of Danish charges:

Danish Contingent - UNFICYP

May - November 1964

992 men X 6 months - 5,952 man months
Total Reimb. claimed - 17.8 million Kr.
(\$2,382,000)

or, per man month - \$400

Danish Contingent - ONUC

July 1960 - June 1964

95+ men X 47 months - 4,542 man months
Total reimb. claimed - 17.2 million Kr.
(\$2,306,500)

or, per man month - \$507

The Danish ONUC contingent was composed of about 15% privates; while the UNFICYP contingents are about 72% privates.

The Danish claims for UN reimbursement for UNFICYP permit a rough breakdown of the charge categories:

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Wages, etc	-	86%
Personal Equip. ¹	-	4%
Other Materiel	-	10%

Sweden and Norway together provided helicopter and light aviation units for the intra-Congo airlift. Both were well represented in small specialized units and staffs (averaging 5-7 officers each in the force headquarters). Sweden in addition provided the first non-African combat unit in ONUC when the Swedish battalion from UNEF was moved to the Congo in the first few days of the crisis. The UNEF battalion was replaced by a specially raised battalion from Sweden, and thereafter Sweden, along with Ireland, provided the European combat element in the force.

Both Sweden and Norway responded to special needs that arose during the operation: Norway with additional air transport in the fall of 1961 and with anti-aircraft units at the beginning of 1963 (too late for Round 3 and, therefore, never employed); Sweden with jet fighter aircraft for Round 3.

The Norwegian contingent generally stood at 125-150 men but rose to almost 500 men during 4 months in early 1963 when the anti-aircraft unit was present.

The Swedish contingent varied around 800-900 men with peaks reaching to 1300.

Maj. General Christian R. Kaldager, Norwegian Air Force, who had served earlier as the Chief of the UN air operation, succeeded Ethiopian General Gebre in August 1963 and was the UN Force Commander in ONUC until December 1963.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - The Scandinavian responsiveness to ONUC requirements in terms of the wide variety of scarce specialties furnished deserves special note.

The Scandinavian procedures for raising and providing peacekeeping contingents, together with the high standard of living in the area, result in very high direct costs for the UN. This subject is dealt with in Chapter V below.

¹ Calculated in Danish data at 4.25Kr. per man day; includes clothing, equipment, hand weapons and ammunition. 7.46Kr. equals \$1.

J. ETHIOPIA/NIGERIA

1. Policy - Ethiopia and Nigeria were grouped with the "moderate" Afro-Asian states on the Congo operation, meaning that they did not regard economic ties with the West as a threat of neo-colonialism and, in general, had a pro-Western bias.¹

Not Security Council members, Ethiopia and Nigeria voted for all General Assembly Congo resolutions except the one on credentials where Ethiopia abstained and Nigeria did not vote.

Both countries paid all Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but purchased UN bonds (Ethiopia - \$1,480,000; Nigeria - \$1,000,000). Both are members of the Committee of 33.

2. Contingents - Ethiopia and Nigeria maintained large self-sufficient combat contingents throughout the Congo operation. The Nigerian contingent arrived 5 months after the Ethiopians (November 1960) and maintained a strength just under 2,000 compared with just over 3,000 for the Ethiopians. In terms of contingent men-months, Ethiopia (119,226) was second only to India (142,704). Nigeria ranks third with (63,617). Ethiopia also furnished the Force Commander, Lt. General Kebede Gebre from April 1962 to July 1963, and the commanders in Katanga from April 1963 until the end of the operation. The Ethiopian played a leading role in the significant military actions of the Congo operation. Ethiopia responded to the Secretary-General's request for jet aircraft in mid-1961. Deployment of the aircraft to ONUC required U.S. approval since they were provided under the Military Assistance Program. The U.K. to a degree hindered the move of the aircraft (see section on U.K.).

As of 30 September 1965 the UN owed Ethiopia for its support in ONUC about \$1,684,000 and Nigeria \$995,000. According to UN data as of 31 March 1966 the total reimbursable support by Ethiopia and Nigeria was \$13,052,000 and \$2,881,000, respectively, of which \$11,368,000 and \$1,926,000 respectively, had been paid for by the UN.

At its peak the Ethiopian Congo contingent represented about 9% of the total strength of the Ethiopian Army. If it

¹ See footnote supra, page 280.

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was rotated approximately every 6 months, in all over two-thirds of the Ethiopian Army strength passed through ONUC. Nigeria's peak strength in ONUC was over $\frac{1}{2}$ of her total army strength and, with rotation, almost all of the Nigerian Army must have passed through ONUC at least once. The late Maj. Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyu Ironsi of Nigeria was the fifth and last commander of the force in ONUC serving from January through June 1964.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - Ethiopia's prompt response to the initial UN request for troops, its provision of a portion of its own initial airlift, its favorable response of an additional battalion force to offset the Casablanca withdrawals of early 1961 and its jet aircraft response in mid-1961, as well as the overall effectiveness of its military contingent, throughout the operation, point up Ethiopia's very important contribution.

General von Horn relates an interesting piece de resistance of Ethiopian responsiveness when, unable to get UN troops from ONUC to a trouble spot in northeast Congo, von Horn through Hammarskjold requested Ethiopia to airlift a company there direct from Ethiopia. The request was honored.¹

On 27 August 1960 the Ethiopian contingent rescued an 8 man U.S. aircrew and 2 Canadians from serious injury or death in an incident at Stanleyville airport. An Ethiopian nurse, who saw the accident, protected the Americans and Canadians and called for help, was the heroine of this event. Her name has been reported as Captain Assifer (or Aster) Ayana.

Another Ethiopian contingent action in Stanleyville, 13-16 January 1962, is notable. To prevent a battle between Gizega's 300 men gendarmerie and ANC troops, the Ethiopians using only one platoon (40-50 men) in a subdued demonstration of force, managed to disarm the entire gendarmerie without firing a single shot.

On the other hand, the Ethiopians (like the Indians, see infra, p. 298) came away from the Congo operation carrying allegations of the too ready use of too much force, and in

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 169.

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some few cases, outright cruelty.¹ One might speculate that, in addition to certain cultural differences on the use of force in human relationship, the use of force in peacekeeping operations comes somewhat easier to a large self-contained, effective, regular military contingent than to a contingent never organized, designed, equipped or mentally conditioned for combat beyond self-defense, strictly interpreted.

Nigeria provided a most necessary facility for support of the UN effort in the Congo. Kano airport in South Nigeria was an important enroute stop in the Congo support airlift throughout the operation. The Secretary-General mentioned Kano "as assistance granted by the Government of Nigeria" in his 18 July 1960 report (S/4389, para. 41). The Nigerian police contingent was also very effective and remained in the Congo after the UN Force was withdrawn.

K. FRANCE

1. Policy - Four sentences from President De Gaulle's press conference of 11 April 1961 set out the essence of the French policy towards the UN and UN peacekeeping and towards ONUC in particular:

And then UNO has the ambition to make a public demonstration, as it did and does in the Congo. The result is that it transports to the spot its global incoherence, the personal intentions of its diverse mandatories, and then the individual partialities of each of the states that send their contingents--with their own orders moreover--which send them there and withdraw them. Under these conditions France sees no way of retaining another attitude to the united or disunited nations than that of the greatest reserve. And, in any case, she does not want to participate either with her men or her money in any of the present or possible enterprises of this organization, or this disorganization.²

¹ For example, CO/268, for an allegation that Ethiopian troops murdered a French woman in Lubumbashi.

² IPKO Documentation No. 18, p. 2.

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Nonetheless, France presently (late 1969) participates with about 20 personnel in UNTSO (the French do not oppose observation missions) and is a member of the Committee of 33.

France abstained on all Congo votes in the Security Council and General Assembly except for an affirmative vote on the 22 July 1960 Security Council resolution which was adopted unanimously and a "for Kasavubu" vote on the credentials resolution of 17 November 1960.

As of mid-1969 France's total Congo assessments of \$17,031,152 remained unpaid. France had made no voluntary contributions nor purchased any UN bonds.

2. Contingent - None.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - The single Katangan jet which threatened the UN Force in late 1960 was a French aircraft brought to Katanga by a U.S. commercial air carrier.

The French decision not to pay for any part of the Congo operation was made in the UN on 28 March 1961.

French difficulties with the Tunisians over Bizerte in July-August 1961 lead to the start of French reluctance to clear U.S. flights in support of ONUC from or over France.

After an unsatisfactory NATO meeting on the Congo situation, France announced a ban against UN overflights on 15 December 1961 (Brazzaville did the same on 16 December as did the Central African Republic).

During 1961 French mercenaries increasingly replaced Belgian officers in the Katangan gendarmerie.

France did not support UN efforts following mid-1962 to impose economic sanctions on Katanga.

L. GHANA

1. Policy - Ghana counts as one of the most militant of the Afro-Asian militants on the Congo question, and yet there are apparent lapses from this basic position.¹

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

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Not a member of the Security Council, Ghana voted for all the General Assembly Congo resolutions with 2 exceptions: she voted against Kasavubu on the credentials question (17 November 1960) and abstained on the decision to appoint a Commission of Conciliation (15 April 1961).

Notably, it was Ghana who resisted some of the Afro-Asian militants and the Communist Bloc and led the Afro-Asian Congo participants to a solid rejection of Soviet attempts to censure the Secretary-General.

Ghana paid its Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions, but purchased \$100,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - Ghana had received and responded to a separate request from the Congo for troops ahead of the UN. Accordingly, Ghanaian troops were in Leopoldville and acted as the reception party for the first arrivals of the UN Force.¹ In a very short period Nkrumah sent all 3 of his Army's infantry battalions to ONUC, as well as medical troops, a large number of police and, it was said, quite a number of political agents.

By 21 September 1960, Mobutu was calling for the Ghanaian contingent (and the Guineans) to get out of the Congo along with its diplomatic representatives and police. The Ghanaian police were finally forced out when the Congolese cut off their water supply² and one battalion (the 3rd) was withdrawn after it mutinied in the Congo ("too much wine, women and hemp").³

Nevertheless, alone among the Casablanca powers, Ghana maintained its contingent in the Congo, except for a 3 months period at the end of 1961, until November 1963 and ranks fifth in terms of contingent man-months in ONUC.

¹ The role played in the first few days of ONUC by Maj. Gen. H.T. Alexander, a British Army officer seconded to Ghana and serving as Chief of the Ghanaian Defense Staff, is a strange vignette of the whole Congo story. See Maj. Gen. H.T. Alexander, African Tightrope (London: Pall Mall, 1965).

² Ibid., pp. 58-79.

³ Ibid., p. 70.

According to UN data as of 31 March 1966, the total reimbursable support by Ghana was \$1,219,000 of which only \$171,000 is considered as having been paid by the UN in the form of goods and services furnished to Ghana by the UN.

Essentially all of the infantry strength of Ghana's Army served in ONUC and, over the whole term, probably well over half of the entire Ghanaian Army.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - Nkrumah was a thorn in Hammarskjold's side with his constant threats and heckling and, as a Lumumba supporter, was a gadfly stirring up tensions in the Congo. Yet, he supported Hammarskjold in the crunch over censure and retained his contingent in the Congo force after the Casablanca conference.

Similarly, the Ghanaian contingent, bombarded with conflicting orders from Accra and UN Force headquarters, still managed to turn in an overall creditable performance in ONUC. For example, the highly controversial closure of radio Leopoldville on 6 September 1960 by Andrew Cordier, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, was actually effected by Ghanaian troops who on 11 September physically prevented Lumumba's use of the station.

Ghanaian troops, their British officers and Swedish members of a movement control team were the victims of the single most costly instance of violence against the UN Force in the Congo. It occurred at Port Francqui 26-28 April 1961 and the actual loss of life is still disputed since the bodies of those murdered were thrown in the river. UN accounts list 48 UN personnel killed. General von Horn reported 120 Ghanaians killed plus three British officers.¹

M. GREECE

1. Policy - Never a participant in a previous UN peace-keeping operation--except as the object and beneficiary of one in the late 1940's--Greece chose to participate in ONUC. In the General Assembly Greece voted with the U.S. on all Congo resolutions.

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 236.

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Greece paid her full assessment for the Congo, made no voluntary contribution but bought \$10,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - The Greek contingent numbered 21-25 men for the 8 months period March - November 1961 for which the UN reimbursed \$44,000.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - No details are known on the composition or employment of the small Greek contingent. It is possible, in view of the timing of its deployment, that it represented Greek support of the Secretary General's plea for more troops following the Casablanca withdrawals of early 1961.

N. GUINEA

1. Policy - Guinea was the most militant of the militant Afro-Asian groups.¹

Not a member of the Security Council, Guinea in the General Assembly voted with Ghana on all resolutions but presumably would have gone much farther in pushing anti-Hammarskjold moves had she been able to get Ghana and the other militants to go along.

Guinea as of mid-1969 still owed Congo assessments of \$9,938 from 1963-64 and had made no voluntary contributions or bond purchases.

2. Contingent - A Guinean battalion of about 750 men (representing about 15% of the Guinean total Army strength) was in ONUC from July 1960 until January 1961. It was withdrawn as a result of a decision at the Casablanca Conference. General von Horn attests his dismay at first sight of the Guinean battalion on 25 July 1960 to learn it had responded to the UN guidance "to bring light infantry weapons" by arriving equipped with heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-tank and light anti-aircraft guns.² The UN reimbursed Guinea \$282,000 covering full payment for the Guinean contingent.

¹ See footnote supra, page 280.

² von Horn, op. cit., p. 168.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - In early August 1960 President Toure of Guinea, angry because the Secretary-General had not accepted Guinea's contingent offer as he had promptly accepted the other African offers, asked Hammarskjold for immediate employment of Guinea's troops in Katanga, saying that if the proposal was not approved he would place his troops directly under the Congo government.

Following the 13 February 1961 announcement of Lumumba's death, Guinea (on 15 February and the UAR on 14 February) recognized the Stanleyville government of Gizenga.

Again von Horn offers an example of the unusual tidbit in referring to a 5-star Guinean general (formerly a veterinary surgeon's assistant) sent to the Congo as President Toure's personal military "private eye."¹

O. INDIA

1. Policy - India rates as impartial in the Afro-Asian policy spectrum on the Congo question, but she was firmly on the Lumumba side in the first months of the Congo crisis.²

Not a member of the Security Council, her votes in the General Assembly on Congo resolutions were:

20 September 1960	(Basic)	yes	(U.S. yes)
17 November 1960	(Credentials)	no	(U.S. yes)
15 April 1961	(Belgian presence)	yes	(U.S. abstain)
15 April 1961	(Commission of Conciliation)	abstain	(U.S. yes)
15 April 1961	(Lumumba's death)	yes	(U.S. abstain)

India paid all her assessments for the Congo, made no voluntary contribution but purchased \$2 million in UN bonds.

India furnished a large contingent for UNEF.

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 214.

² See footnote supra, p. 280.

Because of the relevance of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan to the subject of UN peacekeeping, India's attitude towards that subject often appears ambiguous.

2. Contingent - India ranked first in ONUC in terms of contingent man-months - 142,704 - or about 1/5 of the total man-months served in the Congo by all 34 contingents.

The Indian contingent comprised, in fact, two separate responses to UN requests. The initial contingent of about 750 men consisted of a General Hospital, a C119 squadron, a signals company, logistical units and headquarters personnel. (India was second to Canada in the highest average number of officers in the headquarter's staff).

The second Indian response, and a vital one, was the provision of a complete regular infantry brigade of over 3,000 men to ONUC, plugging the gap in early 1961 after the withdrawal of the Casablanca group's contingents. The brigade remained in ONUC until March 1963 taking a leading part in all 4 of the main military actions of the operation.

India also furnished, as international civil servants, the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, Brigadier (later Major General) Indarjit Rikhye¹ who, for a 3-week period (3-23 November 1960), also served as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo; Rajeshwar Dayal as Special Representative 8 September 1960 - 25 May 1961. The commanders in Katanga were also Indians (Brigadier Raja, Major General Prem Chand) from March 1961 to April 1963.

As of 31 March 1966 the UN still owed India \$3,625,000 for reimbursable Congo support. According to UN data as of that date, the total reimbursable support by India was \$12,031,000 of which \$8,406,000 or 70% has been paid for by the UN. Subsequent reimbursements or offsets are believed to have raised this figure to about 83% by early 1968.

¹ General Rikhye continued in this capacity until his resignation in December 1968, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. VI (January 1969) No. 1, p. 155. With his departure the position fell vacant and, as of late 1969 there were no indications it would be filled.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - India's action of March 1961 in furnishing the strongest combat contingent to serve in the Congo can be said to have saved the operation. This action by India was taken against heavy pressure from the Soviet Bloc and militant Afro-Asians and indicated in the strongest possible way India's support for the UN and its harassed Secretary-General.

Unlike the case of the Scandinavian contingents, India furnished the basic pay for her large contingent requiring the UN to provide only the overseas allowances (average \$8 per man for the Indian contingent per month) and the daily Congo UN allowance of \$1.30 which was paid to all troops. However, India reportedly also received from the UN the pay and equipment costs of reserve units called up in India to replace some of the regular units sent to ONUC.¹

As with the Ethiopian contingent (see supra, p. 290), the Indian Brigade by some accounts was inclined to excessive use of force on occasion.²

The withdrawal of the Indian Brigade was prompted by the Chinese incursions on the Indian borders. The Indian decision to withdraw the Brigade was known in December 1962 but its actual departure was delayed until March 1963. Thus was created a most powerful incentive for decisive action in Round 3 in late December 1962 - January 1963. There were, of course, other incentives to winding up ONUC (e.g. the UN financial crisis and the seeming hopelessness of a lasting, workable, peaceful accord between Katanga and the Central government), but surely the imminent departure of its strongest combat unit must have been a powerful additional reason.

¹ This information on UN reimbursement for Indian reserve units is in Lefever, ACDA Study, Vol. 2, p. 382; no basic source for the information is cited.

² Recall the incident published with pictures on TV and in newspapers around the world of the shooting of two Belgian women at an Indian road block in Katanga.

Contrary to the usual practice among ONUC contingent donors, India placed 3 operational conditions on the use of the Indian Brigade but they were not onerous and were promptly accepted by Hammarskjold.¹

P. INDONESIA

1. Policy - Indonesia qualified for the impartial category in the 3-division breakdown of Afro-Asian Congo positions used before.² She had previously participated with a sizable contingent in UNEF. From the UN assistance during her early nationhood and expectations with respect to West Irian, she may have had reasons to be a supporter of the UN in Congo-type operations. On the other hand, the Sukarno charisma and his balancing act with a not-too reliable army may have been involved also.

In the General Assembly Indonesia cast her vote with India on all Congo resolutions (see supra, p. 296).

Indonesia paid all her Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$200,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - In his first report (S/4389, 18 July 1960) following the initial Security Council resolution of 14 July, Hammarskjold said that he had requested troops for ONUC from one Asian country. This may have been Indonesia,

¹ United Nations Review, Vol. 8 (April 1961), No. 4, p. 13. The three conditions were:

1. Indian troops could not be used to fight troops or civilians of other UN members, except "Congolese armed units and Belgian and other military and para-military personnel and mercenaries in the Congo, if necessity arises and if so authorized by the United Nations."

2. Indian troops could not be used to suppress "popular movements" or to support "parties or factions that were challenging United Nations authority."

3. The Indian Brigade should remain under command of Indian officers and should not be broken up and merged with other UNF contingents.

² See footnote supra, p. 280.

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although he in fact got combat troops from Malaya and specialist troops from India and Pakistan almost simultaneously with those from Indonesia. Both Indonesian and Malayan contingents came by U.S. sealift. US/UN Assist No. 64 applied to the sealift of the Indonesian contingent of about 1,100 men and 250 tons of equipment and supplies (about 450 pounds per man).

The initial contingent of approximately 1,100 men (the 2nd Garuda Regiment) was in ONUC from the first week in October 1960 until April 1961 (7 months). It was then withdrawn and not replaced until 1963 as the Indonesian equivalent of the action of the Casablanca Bloc.

An even larger contingent of over 3,000 Indonesians returned to the Congo in February-March 1963, too late for the decisive Round 3, and, in fact, just in time to commence a phased withdrawal home again. Except for a small rear party of 10-20 men, the last remaining 900 or so Indonesians were airlifted home at the end of 1963.

General von Horn passed out flowers and a left-handed brickbat to the Indonesian contingent when he stated that they were very good in the Congo but a serious disciplinary problem in Gaza.¹ From all Congo accounts they were highly effective.

As of 31 March 1966 the UN debt to Indonesia for Congo support stood at \$608,000. According to UN data as of early 1968 the total reimbursable support by Indonesia was \$4,421,000 of which the whole amount has been settled by the UN.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Action - None.

Q. IRAN/PHILIPPINES

1. Policy - The Philippines, a moderate² in the Afro-Asian group, and Iran are taken together here because their national support roles for ONUC are very similar.

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 227.

² See footnote supra, p. 280.

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In the UN General Assembly both voted with the U.S. on the basic 20 September 1960 resolution; Iran abstained on the credentials issue.

Both paid their full Congo assessments, neither made voluntary contributions, and Iran purchased \$500,000 and the Philippines \$750,000 in UN bonds. Neither is on the Committee of 33, or a participant in other UN peacekeeping operations.

2. Contingent - Both countries responded to requests from the Secretary-General for jet fighter aircraft contingents (Philippines 13 December 1962, SG/1393; Iran 28 December 1962, CO/266,267); unfortunately neither group arrived until Round 3 was all over. Some details of the Philippine Air Force movement are known. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff message 8308, 19 January 1963, to the U.S. Military Advisory Group in the Philippines authorized assistance to get the contingent moving under US/UN Assist No. 423. The Advisory Group issued travel orders on 22 January covering the departure of the 12-man advance party on 23 January 1963.

As of 31 January 1963, the Iranian contingent was operating 4 F/86 aircraft in the Congo.

The contingents numbered 46 for Iran and 77 for the Philippines. They both remained in ONUC for just 4 months.

According to UN data as of early 1968 the total reimbursable support by Iran and the Philippines was \$25,000 and \$90,000 respectively, of which none has been paid for by the UN.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - None.

R. IRELAND

1. Policy - Prior to 1960 Ireland had participated in UNOGIL and UNTSO with small numbers of observers. When asked by the UN for a troop contingent for ONUC in July 1960, special legislative authorization was required. Temporary enabling legislation was enacted on 26 July and permanent, more restrictive, legislation on 21 December 1960.² During the Congo

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

² The texts of both acts are in IPKO Documentation No. 15, pp. 1-8.

operation the Irish also participated in the West Irian UN operation (2 officers). After the Congo, 12 Irish officers took part in UNIPOM, and the Irish still (end 1969) participate in UNTSO (22) and UNFICYP (425). Subjected undoubtedly to many of the same pressures and conflicting interests that applied to Canada (see supra, p. 283), Ireland voted the same as Canada on all Congo General Assembly resolutions of 1960-1961.

While not on the Committee of 33, the Irish show a special interest in UN peace observation and peacekeeping with particular attention to resolving the problems of financing.

Ireland paid all her Congo assessments, made a voluntary contribution of \$8,000 and purchased \$300,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - Initially, Ireland put 2 battalions (about 1,400 men) in the Congo but after the first 6 months stabilized her contingent at basically one reinforced battalion numbering 700-1000 men. The Irish contingent was present from start to finish of the operation. On a 6-months rotation cycle some 5,300 Irishmen in 10 battalion-sized units and 2 armored car companies passed through the Congo, or about 20% of the total Irish Army strength including reserves. The Irish legislation referred to above authorized officers or men of the Irish defense forces, appointed or enlisted subsequent to the passage of the legislation, to be ordered to such duty. However, reports are that there were more than enough volunteers from the Irish forces to make up the contingents.

The Chief of Staff of the Irish Army, Lt. General Sean McKeown (variously McEoin or MacEoin), succeeded von Horn as the second commander of the UN Congo force and served in that capacity from January 1961 to March 1962. About 5 Irish officers and non-commissioned officers (compared to about 10 Canadians) on the average served in the force headquarters. The figures were naturally a bit higher during McKeown's tenure.

General von Horn again provides interesting comments on the strengths and weakness of the initial Irish contingent. Posted to Albertville, about as far as one can get in the Congo from Leopoldville and Matadi, one of the first Irish battalions struggled alone without adequate transport, food,

bedding, or even proper uniforms but with great spirit.¹ On another occasion in August 1960, a frenzied unfriendly mob at the Goma airport in Katanga were changed into a happy welcoming group when the first unit to march out of the U.S. aircraft was the Irish pipe band "with saffron kilts swinging and pibrochs wailing."²

As of 31 March 1966, the UN unpaid debt to Ireland for support was \$160,000. According to UN data as of that date, the total reimbursable support by Ireland was \$5,325,000 of which \$5,165,000 or 97% has been paid for by the UN.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - The Irish had 26 deaths (not all in action) and 57 men wounded or injured during their stay in the Congo. In one action, early in the operation on 8 November 1960, 9 men of an 11-man patrol were massacred by tribesmen near Niemba in North Katanga.

The Irish and Swedes in providing the only European combat contingents in the otherwise Afro-Asian combat force were an essential leavening ingredient. This is especially true for the UN Force's dealing with the Belgian and other European "presence" particularly in Katanga, and it is notable that the Irish and Swedes were used heavily in all the military actions in Katanga.

S. ITALY

1. Policy - Italy was a member of the Security Council until the end of 1960 and on the 3 Congo resolutions voted as the U.S. did on the first 2 (14 and 22 July) but abstained with France on the 9 August resolution requiring entry into Katanga. In all 1960-1961 General Assembly Congo resolutions she voted the same as the U.S.

Italy is a member of the Committee of 33, and participates in UNTSO with 9 officer observers (late 1969).

Italy paid all of her Congo assessments, made no voluntary contribution but purchased \$8,960,000 in UN bonds.

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 219.

² Ibid., p. 192.

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2. Contingent - Italy was in ONUC from start to finish. Initially she provided a military hospital and a C-119 squadron for the intra-Congo airlift force. The C-119 squadron folded up in mid-1962 but in late 1962, Italy responded to the UN need for jet fighters by providing a unit of 5 F-86 airplanes. The total contingent ran 250-400 men until mid-1962 and 50-70 men from then to the end of the operation.

According to UN data as of early 1968 the total reimbursable support by Italy was \$4,053,000 of which the whole amount had been settled by the UN.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - Medical, intra-Congo airlift and jet fighter support on short notice represent important types of support for ONUC. In addition, the UN support facility at Pisa, in accommodations provided free by Italy; was vital to ONUC support (see supra, pp. 211-214).

On 11 November 1961 the 13-man Italian crew of a UN C-119 aircraft which had just lifted 2 armored cars to Kindu airfield for the Malayan contingent was seized by unruly Congolese soldiers, murdered and dismembered. As of that date these 13 men represented 10% of the Italian contingent in ONUC.

T. LIBERIA

1. Policy - Liberia was in the moderate group of Afro-Asians.¹ She became a member of the Security Council at the beginning of 1961 and voted for the 21 February and 24 November 1961 Security Council resolutions (as did the U.S.). In the five General Assembly resolutions of 1960, Liberia voted for all except for an abstention on the credentials resolution of 17 November 1960.

Liberia paid all her Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$200,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - At the beginning of the operation Liberia furnished a small combat force of 225-250 men. When the Secretary-General appealed for troops to replace the Casablanca withdrawals, Liberia offered 240 additional troops. She maintained the contingent at about 450-460

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

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for six months or so in 1961 and then reverted to 225-250 until all were withdrawn in June 1963. About 40% of the total strength of the Liberian Army passed through ONUC.

As of 31 March 1966 the UN debt to Liberia for her contingent stood at \$225,000. According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Liberia was \$680,000 of which \$455,000 or 67% had been paid for by the UN.

3. Special Supportive c. Non-Supportive Actions - Liberia's response to the special plea for troops by Hammarskjöld in his letter of 24 February 1961 (Annex VII of S/-4752) to the African heads of state, even though it was small and temporary, indicated much needed support at a critical time.

The Liberian contingent was deployed generally in platoon size packages in Kasai province. One of their functions was protection of the railroad.

U. MALAYA

1. Policy - The Federation of Malaya ranked as a moderate among the Afro-Asians on the Congo issue.¹ Her votes in the General Assembly, for example, split with India 2 out of 5 times, split with the U.S. 3 out of 5 times and agreed exactly with the votes of Ethiopia.

Malaya paid her full Congo assessment, made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$390,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - Malaya furnished a well equipped combat force for ONUC from the end of October 1960 until just after the end of the military phase, April 1963 (30 months). For the first and last 6 months periods its strength varied from 650-800. During mid-1961 to the end of 1962, its strength increased to 1500-1600 men. On this basis something between 1/2 and 2/3 of the entire Malayan Army passed through the Congo operation.

According to UN data as of early 1968 the total reimbursable support by Malaya was \$2,046,000 of which the whole amount had been settled by the UN.

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - General von Horn was very complimentary in remarking on the effectiveness of the initial Malayan battalion.

Arriving in the Congo at a time of confusion and much disorder, the Malaysians with their full complement of 100 vehicles, including 10 armored cars, and well armed and well equipped were an important addition to the force.

V. MALI

1. Policy - Mali was in the militant Afro-Asian category.¹ She became a UN member at the XV General Assembly session and thereafter voted with Ghana and Guinea, for example, on all General Assembly Congo resolutions.

Mali paid her 1960 Congo assessment but none thereafter. As of mid-1969 she still owed Congo assessments of \$24,259. She made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$20,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - Mali furnished what von Horn called a "first-rate" battalion of about 575 men. It arrived in the Congo 2-6 August 1960 and was deployed to North Katanga. It stayed only 4 months with ONUC, being withdrawn in November 1960 when the Mali Federation broke up. Its equipment included 13 U.S. jeeps and 23 small French trucks (Citroen).

According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Mali was \$151,000 of which \$46,000 or 31% had been paid for by the UN. Settlement involved both Mali and Senegal.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - None.

W. MOROCCO

1. Policy - Morocco was in the militant wing of the Afro-Asian group and voted with Ghana and Guinea on all General Assembly Congo resolutions.²

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

² Ibid.

She paid all her Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$400,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - Starting on 16 July 1960 the Moroccan combat contingent, a brigade of about 3,200 men, began to arrive in the Congo. It stayed for about 8 months. Following the decision by the Casablanca powers to withdraw, the Moroccan brigade was phased out during February-March 1961.

The Moroccan contingent appears from General von Horn's accounts to have been one of the most effective. He was particularly impressed by its officers most of whom had had long training with the French and service in the expeditionary force in Indo-China. A detachment of Moroccan officers and men took over the task of training the Congolese Army, and, through this association, coupled with a tough attitude, managed to achieve a rather thorough degree of control in their assigned area around Leopoldville.

According to UN data as of early 1968 the total reimbursable support by Morocco was \$2,106,000 of which the whole amount had been settled for by the UN.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - The militancy of the Moroccan government on the Congo issue seems to have had little effect on the loyalty and effectiveness of its contingent while it was in ONUC.

General Kettani, commander of the Moroccan Brigade, served as Deputy Commander (to von Horn) of the force and was greatly respected.

X. NETHERLANDS/NEW ZEALAND

1. Policy - These 2 Congo participants are taken together for convenience because of the small scale of their Congo effort. Neither was on the Security Council and both voted the same as the U.S. on all General Assembly Congo resolutions except that New Zealand supported, while the Netherlands and U.S. abstained, on the 15 April 1961 resolution to investigate Lumumba's death.

Both countries participate (end 1969) in UNTSO and both have stated intentions (New Zealand)¹ or actually taken action (Netherlands) to establish some form of earmarked forces for UN peacekeeping.

Both paid their complete Congo assessments, made voluntary contributions (Netherlands \$79,694; New Zealand \$31,918), and purchased UN bonds (Netherlands \$2,020,000; New Zealand \$998,482).

2. Contingent - The Netherlands' contribution to ONUC was 5-7 specialist personnel from the first of the operation until 1964. For a five-month period in mid-1963 the contingent was increased to about 45.

New Zealand furnished, by virtue of being brought from UNTSO by von Horn, 1 or 2 officers for the first 9 months of ONUC.

According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Netherlands was \$345,000 of which the whole amount had been settled by the UN.

Y. PAKISTAN

1. Policy - Pakistan was a "moderate" on the Congo issue.² Not a member of the Security Council, she abstained on the General Assembly credentials resolution of 17 November 1960, but, otherwise voted as the U.S. did on all General Assembly Congo resolutions throughout the mandate-forming period.

Pakistan paid all of her assessments for the Congo operation, made no voluntary contributions, but purchased \$500,000 in UN bonds.

¹ New Zealand's earmarking decision in 1964 was "in principle." By 1969 the government had decided not to act on it. See UNFICYP background paper, p. 478.

² See footnote supra, p. 280.

She had offered troops for UNEF in 1956 but was not called upon to actually provide any. During the Congo operation, in August 1962, Pakistan agreed to provide essentially the entire UN Force for the UNTEA operation in West Irian. From October 1962 to April 1963 some 1,400-1,500 Pakistani infantry troops, support personnel and staff officers participated in that operation.

2. Contingent - The Pakistan ONUC contingent consisted of logistics and staff units and personnel and was present in the Congo throughout the operation. The two principal units were an ordnance company and a transport company, each of about 250 men; the former arrived in August and the latter in September 1960. An average of 7 Pakistani officers functioned on the ONUC staff throughout the operation.

Pakistan ranks tenth among the 34 contingent contributors in man-months expended in the Congo - 27,904. The initial strength of 250 in August was increased to 525 in September 1960 and maintained at about that level until early 1962. During 1962 and 1963 a strength of 675-700 was maintained and then reduced to about 480 for the last 6 months of the operation.

As of 31 March 1966 the UN had paid Pakistan \$222,000 for her contribution and still owed \$320,000. This level of UN reimbursement (about 40%), which had not changed by early 1968, was half or less of that for most contingent contributors. Additionally, the total reimbursed and still owed, compared with man-months expended, would make the Pakistani contingent by far the least costly contingent in the ONUC force (see Annex N).

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - Pressed to find competent and acceptable logistical support units for ONUC, the UN was fortunate in being able to choose a country with Pakistan's credentials: non-involvement with the issue, Afro-Asian in good standing, Moslem, large professional army, and familiar with both British and American military procedures and equipment.

Z. NEW ZEALAND

(See X supra, Netherlands/New Zealand).

AA. NIGERIA

(See J supra, Ethiopia/Nigeria).

BB. NORWAY

(See I supra, Denmark/Norway/Sweden).

CC. PHILIPPINES

(See Q supra, Iran/Philippines).

DD. PORTUGAL/ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA

1. Policy - These more or less interested parties are considered briefly here to point out that there were countries (including also Rhodesia which is covered below under the UK) bordering or near the area of this peacekeeping operation, which on both principle and immediate self interest, opposed the operation.

Portugal voted for the basic General Assembly Resolution of 20 September 1960 and for Kasavubu in the credentials resolution of 17 November 1960. With respect to the resolutions of 15 April 1961, she voted no on the "Belgian presence" and Lumumba's investigation and abstained on the Commission of Conciliation. South Africa voted yes on the Kasavubu credentials, no on the "Belgian presence" and abstained on all others.

Portugal and South Africa did not pay Congo assessments which as of mid-1969 totaled \$201,673 and \$1,503,337 respectively. They made no voluntary contributions nor purchased any UN bonds.

2. Contingents - None

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - The political support of Portugal and South Africa probably did Belgium more harm than good since, by helping to tar Belgium with the colonialism brush, it alienated other possible support and consolidated opposition.

Angola, with a long border and railroad connections with Katanga, was a ready sanctuary and means of access for the mercenaries with the Katangan forces.

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At the end of Round 2 (December 1962), U Thant proposed to Portugal and the U.K. that UN observers be stationed at certain Angolan and Rhodesian airfields and road crossings to control mercenary support for Katanga. Both refused (S/5053). Portugal denied its airspace to ONUC support flights.

A year later, however, after the successful Round 3 (January 1963) Angola reported it was cooperating with the UN to the extent of disarming mercenaries fleeing into Angola.

South Africans served as mercenaries with the Katangan forces increasingly in 1962 and South Africa was accused by the UN representative in Katanga (Mr. Gardiner of Ghana) of providing aircraft for Katanga. The charge was denied.

EE. RHODESIA

(See MM infra, U.K./Rhodesia).

FF. SIERRA LEONE

1. Policy - Rated as a moderate in the Afro-Asian spectrum, Sierra Leone was not a member of the UN until 27 September 1961.¹

She paid her Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$28,003 in UN bonds. She is on the Committee of 33.

2. Contingent - For about 14 months from January 1962 until March 1963, Sierra Leone furnished a company-size combat contingent of about 120 men. The UN announcement of the Sierra Leone contingent, along with additional troops from Ghana and Tunisia, was made 23 December 1961; thus, psychologically at least, affecting Round 2. According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Sierra Leone was \$44,000 of which the whole amount had been settled by the UN.

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - None.

GG. SOVIET UNION

1. Policy - It was the apparent coincidence of Soviet and U.S. support for the Congo peacekeeping operation, as evidenced in the Security Council action of 14 July 1960, that made the launching of the operation possible. As subsequent events showed, the coincidence was more apparent than real.¹ When the opportunities which the Soviets thought they saw in the Congo situation began to evaporate, the Soviets became the most persistent and harshest critics of ONUC.

Conflicting, in fact irreconcilable, goals gave the Soviet policy towards ONUC an ambivalent opportunistic cast: how to make gains for Soviet influence in Africa without frightening the Africans; how to support Lumumba without alienating more moderate Congolese factions which might win out; how to push for strong UN action against the Belgians and Katanga and weak UN action elsewhere; how to attack the Secretary-General without attacking his African supporters; how to refuse financial support and still maintain influence.

The Soviet Union voted for the 14 July, 22 July, and 9 August 1960 resolutions in the Security Council with the U.S. But then in late August and early September 1960 when Soviet unilateral aid for Lumumba (see below) was criticized by the Secretary-General and stymied by his Special Representative in the Congo (Cordier of the U.S.), the Soviets attempted to censure Hammarskjold in the Security Council. Afro-Asian refusal to go along occasioned the first Soviet veto on the Congo issue and brought on the Emergency Session of the General Assembly. There the 20 September 1960 resolution was passed with all (70) in favor, none opposed and the Soviet bloc, France and South Africa abstaining--a resounding Soviet defeat.

The Soviets backed the unsuccessful Lumumbaists in the General Assembly credentials resolution (17 November 1960), abstained on the Security Council resolution for use of force

¹ On 19 July 1960 Prime Minister Macmillan wrote Khrushchev, "I simply do not understand what your purpose is today."

to prevent civil war (21 February 1961), voted in the General Assembly for the "Belgian presence" resolution, against the Commission of Conciliation and abstained on the investigation of Lumumba's death (all 15 April 1961).

On the final Security Council resolution of 24 November 1961, having recognized the Adoula government, the Soviet Union voted yes again with the U.S. on the use of force against the Katangan mercenaries.

The Soviet Union paid none of its Congo assessments which as of mid-1969 totaled \$39,223,085. She made no voluntary contributions and purchased no UN bonds.

2. Contingent - None

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - The Soviet Union responded favorably if indefinitely to a Lumumba request for direct Soviet assistance 14 July 1960.

In the Secretary-General's first report of 18 July 1960 (S/4389), he stated that he had requested air transport from 3 non-African states, (presumably U.S., U. K., and Canada or the Soviet Union), famine relief from 8 states and that food was being flown in to the Congo by 5 countries (specifically including the Soviet Union in both latter groups). On 22 July 1960, Moscow announced that it would send to the Congo 100 trucks plus technicians, interpreters and medical teams.

On 23 July 1960 the Soviets announced that 5 IL-18 airplanes would fly Ghanaian troops and equipment to the Congo. Press reports indicate that 4 IL-18's transported 450 Ghanaians and 2 tons of dried milk and sugar on 21 or 22 July 1960.¹

The Soviets have reported the value of their airlift at \$1.5 million but no claim has been made.

On 15 August 1960 Lumumba again requested direct Soviet assistance including planes and crews, trucks and weapons.

On 25 August 1960 Soviet planes (variously reported as 14 to 19) at Lumumba's disposal began airlifting Congolese

¹ New York Times, 22 July 1960, p. 3.

troops to Luluabourg in Kasai for attacks on forces of Kalonji and Tshombe.¹

The Soviet trucks and technicians arrived by sea on 3 September 1960 and were diverted up river to Port Francqui in Kasai. General von Horn was expecting the Soviet trucks as a contribution to his force.²

Cordier's closing of Congo airfield to all except UN flights on 5 September, followed closely afterwards by the Mobutu takeover and the expulsion of Communist bloc missions (which had soared in size) on 14 September 1960, effectively ended this large scale, but brief Soviet unilateral effort.

HH. SUDAN/TUNISIA

1. Policy - Sudan and Tunisia were categorized as impartial on the Congo issue.³

Tunisia was a member of the Security Council in 1960 and sponsored the initial resolution of 14 July and, with Ceylon, co-sponsored those of 11 July and 9 August 1960 in close consultation with the African group in the UN.

In the 5 General Assembly resolutions Sudan and Tunisia voted together:

20 September 1960	(Basic GA action)	for
17 November 1960	(Credentials)	abstain
15 April 1961	(Belgian presence)	for
15 April 1961	(Conciliation Commission)	for
15 April 1961	(Lumumba's death)	for

Tunisia paid all her Congo assessments, Sudan still had not paid, as of 7 April 1969, \$5,860 of her 1964 assessment.

¹ Some observers have described the Soviet's IL-18's involved in these early Congo actions, or some of them at least, as civil airlines versions of the airplane and not really suitable for military airlift operations.

² von Horn, op. cit., p. 202.

³ See footnote supra, p. 280.

Neither made voluntary contributions but both purchased UN bonds (Sudan \$50,000; Tunisia \$485,000).

2. Contingent - Sudan furnished a contingent of about 400 combat troops from 16 August 1960 until April 1961 (7 months). The small Sudanese contingent replaced a much stronger Moroccan force in the area southwest of Leopoldville. On 3-6 March 1961 the Sudanese force was overpowered by Congolese troops, disarmed and withdrawn from Matadi (S/4758/-Add. 3; S/4761). On 6 March 1961 the Sudanese government announced that it would withdraw its contingent from the Congo since the UN has proved itself "impotent in the face of the problem of the Congo."¹

According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Sudan was \$348,000, of which \$346,000 or 99% had been settled by the UN.

Tunisia's contingent of about 2,500 combat troops started moving to the Congo on 15 July 1960 and was among the first arrivals. General von Horn identifies the working of a military fact of life when he referred to the unfortunate decision, presumably by Ralph Bunche, to place the Tunisian Brigade upon its arrival under control of the Ghanaian Brigade, which action was strongly resented by the Tunisians.²

The Tunisian contingent operated in Kasai during the first few difficult months and was back in the Leopoldville area in time to be involved in the "Welbeck Affair" (a shooting incident involving Nkrumah's personal representative who was declared persona non grata) in late November 1960.

Following the Casablanca withdrawals and Hammarskjold's appeal to the African states for more troops, Tunisia increased her contingent by about 600 to a total of about 3,100. From September 1961 until the end of the year, the Tunisian contingent was not present in the Congo. It returned in January 1962 and was maintained at a strength of about 1,000 until finally withdrawn, following the "end of the military phase," in March 1963. Tunisia ranks fourth (after India, Ethiopia and Nigeria) in terms of total contingent man-months in ONUC (48,368). Probably close to 1/3 of the total Tunisian Army passed through ONUC.

¹ The Sudanese announcement also stated "...we do not mean to imply that the United Nations, led by the Secretary-General, is not doing its best." Quoted in Robert C. Good, op. cit., p. 53.

² von Horn, op. cit., p. 174.

According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by Tunisia was \$2,747,000, of which \$2,723,000 or 99% had been settled by the UN.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - In support of UN efforts to ban unilateral outside support for Congolese factions (by, especially, the Soviet Union and the UAR), Sudan banned overflights of her territory for non-UN flights.

Tunisia's response to the Secretary-General's appeal of 24 February 1961 for troops was prompt and favorable.

II. SWEDEN

(See I supra, Denmark/Norway/Sweden).

JJ. SWITZERLAND

1. Policy - A non-UN member and strict neutral, Switzerland has on occasion rendered important support to UN peace observation and peacekeeping operations; e.g. contract airlift for UNEF from Capodichino to the Middle East, and provision free of charge of an aircraft for UNTSO.

One of the 4 non-member states to have done so (with Germany, Korea, and South Vietnam), Switzerland purchased \$1,900,000 in UN bonds.

2. Contingent - A 22 member Swiss hospital in Leopoldville, actually not an ONUC contingent although so listed on the Secretary-General's Special Representative's first report (S/4531), assisted ONUC.

3. Special Supportive and Non-Supportive Actions - According to Hammarskjöld's report of 18 July 1960 to the Security Council "...the Swiss Government has responded to my request to provide Swiss aircraft to assist in the transport of food and other supplies."¹

General von Horn referred to a Swiss officer, "...loaned to us under the technical aid assistance program," who was for a while involved in the ONUC Civilian Operation program to train the Congolese Army.²

¹ S/4389, 18 July 1960, para. 41.

² von Horn, op. cit., p. 241.

KK. TUNISIA

(See HH supra, Sudan/Tunisia).

LL. UAR

1. Policy - The United Arab Republic was in the militant wing of the Afro-Asian group on the Congo problem.¹ She voted exactly the same as Ghana and Guinea on all General Assembly Congo resolutions of 1960-1961. A member of the Security Council for 1961, she voted with the U.S. and USSR for both resolutions (21 February and 24 November 1961) calling for the use of force.²

The UAR paid Congo assessments prior to 1963 but as of 7 April 1969 still had \$48,387 in unpaid assessments for 1963-1964; made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$249,990 in UN bonds.

UAR is a member of the Committee of 33 and her delegation furnishes the rapporteur.

2. Contingent - The UAR furnished a 500-man parachute battalion to ONUC from about 20 August 1960 to the first week of February 1961 (3,059 man-months). It was deployed with one company in Leopoldville and the remaining 3 companies and battalion headquarters in the northwest corner of the Congo. The battalion was withdrawn as part of the Casablanca Group protest.

According to UN data as of early 1968, the total reimbursable support by the UAR was \$459,000, of which the whole amount had been settled by the UN.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - General von Horn singled out the UAR "Sheitan" battalion for special criticism. He alleged several types of improper UAR

¹ See footnote supra, p. 280.

² On the same day the UAR co-sponsored and voted for the 21 February 1961 resolution calling for "...the solution of the problem of the Congo...without any interference from the outside," President Nasser announced that he was giving unilateral aid to the Gazenga government in Stanleyville. Robert C. Good, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

actions: (1) clearly partisan involvement in the local political scheme; (2) creating an, "Egyptian sphere of influence" in its battalion's assigned operational area; (3) operating on orders continuously being received from the home government; (4) maintaining an unauthorized airlift, and (5) disbursing funds to pay anti-government Congolese troops.¹

MM. U.K./RHODESIA

1. Policy - British policy on the Congo was affected by a number of conflicting factors which were almost impossible to reconcile. Proud of her record in decolonizing but with problems about how to proceed with it in the British African territories not yet fully independent, particularly in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; with support of the UN in general as a fundamental British policy but worried about the precedence perhaps to be established for further action in Africa; and with strong economic interests in Katanga but also in the rest of the Congo and in the African states of the Commonwealth who opposed Katanga, the U.K. had to walk a thin tightrope indeed on its Congo policy. She supported the peacekeeping operation in principle and financially but applied her influence, and occasionally took non-supportive actions to temper the objectives of the operation particularly in its use of force.

In the Security Council, the U.K. abstained (along with France) on the initial 14 July 1960 resolution and thereafter voted for the resolutions of 22 July and 9 August 1960. She also voted for the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 calling for the use of force to prevent civil war but abstained (with France again) on the 24 November 1961 authorization to use force to apprehend mercenaries. On all 5 General Assembly Congo resolutions of 1960 and 1961 she voted the same as the U.S.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with 2,000 miles of border and close economic interests with Katanga and concern that Congo disorder might spill over into the Federation, consistently supported Tshombe. Even prior to

¹ von Horn, op. cit., pp. 203, 213, 228, 237.

Congo independence, Prime Minister Welensky had suggested that Katanga leave the Congo and join the Federation.¹

The U.K. paid all her Congo assessments, voluntarily contributed \$585,000, purchased \$10,460,586 in UN bonds, and waived \$520,000 in Congo airlift charges.

2. Contingent - None

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - The U.K. provided initial airlift to the Congo of a portion of the Ghanaian contingent² and reportedly continued some airlift support for Commonwealth contingents in the operation.³ Reimbursement for the airlift support was waived in the amount of \$520,000. The U.K. received \$3,126,000 from the Congo account in full settlement of reimbursable support.

British officers served with the Ghanaian and Nigeria contingents and British military procedures and traditions were generally the model for the UN Force, modified to a degree by U.S. procedures.⁴

The predominance and pre-eminence of British trained officers in the headquarters staff gave rise to the observation that there existed a "whiskey and Sandhurst set." The degree of doctrinal consistency imparted to staff procedures in the force from these Commonwealth influences was an important unifying feature. General von Horn gives great credit to Western military training as a factor in the highly professional performance of some African contingents in the face of strong partisan pressures from their political leaders;⁵ for example, he points out that the Ghanaian

¹ Peter Calvocoressi, International Politics since 1945 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 352.

² "U.K. Provides Ghana 8 Aircraft for Airlift," New York Times, 20 July 1960, p. 8.

³ Alexander, op. cit., pp. 58-70; strangely Gen Alexander makes no mention of Soviet airlift of Ghanaian troops.

⁴ For the interesting experiences of a British officer of the Nigerian contingent, see Richard Lawson, Strange Soldiering (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963).

⁵ von Horn, op. cit., p. 238.

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soldier who turned Lumumba away from Radio Leopoldville in September 1960 was a member of a guard detail under command of a young British officer.¹

Consistent with her policy opposing the subduing of Katanga by military force, the U.K. opposed each of the UN military operations against Tshombe. Welensky and the British vice-counsel in Elisabethville provided sanctuary and escape means for Tshombe on several occasions.

In the fall of 1961, following Round 1, the U.K. hindered the arrival of Ethiopian jet aircraft in the Congo. The exact details are unclear. Some reports say overflight clearances were denied,² others that fuel was denied, and others finally that stalling tactics were used. A few British mercenaries were also reported in Katanga in late 1961.

In December 1961 the U.K. got into another non-support situation when requested to provide a small quantity of 1,000 pound bombs for the Indian Canberra bombers which had just joined the UN Force. The British at first agreed to do so but the matter became a domestic political issue and eventually the UN withdrew the request.³

Following Round 2, the U.K. and Portugal rejected the Secretary-General's request of 29 December 1961 to station observers in Rhodesia and Angola along the Katangan border. It had been charged that British-made arms were being smuggled into Katanga (Note No. 2459/Corr. 1).

Rhodesia with an important railroad link to the Congo through Katanga was in position to thwart, and apparently did on many occasions, ONUC efforts to supply itself using this route and to apply economic sanctions against Katanga. There were reports in British publications that large quantities of arriving UN supplies (60 railroad cars plus additional food and fuel valued at over 1 million pounds) were held up at the Katangan-Rhodesian border in August 1962. Following Round 3 in January 1963 the UN announced the reopening of the Katanga-Southern Rhodesia railroad (CO/291).

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 211.

² Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 362.

³ Ibid., p. 363.

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NN. YUGOSLAVIA

1. Policy - Yugoslavia played a leading role in the UN deliberations that led to the establishment of the Middle East peacekeeping force UNEF in 1956 and provided an effective, well-equipped contingent for that first major UN peacekeeping operation. Although she withdrew her 20-man ONUC contingent in protest after only 5 months participation in 1960, she subsequently participated with a sizable military contingent in UNYOM.

On the 5 General Assembly Congo resolutions of 1960-1961, the Yugoslav vote was exactly the same as Ghana and Guinea and differed from the Soviet vote on 3 of 5 and from the U.S. vote on 4 of the 5 resolutions.

Yugoslavia is a member of the Committee of 33. She paid no Congo assessments, made no voluntary contributions but purchased \$200,000 in UN bonds. Her unpaid Congo assessments as of 7 April 1969 totaled \$333,269.

2. Contingent - Yugoslavia furnished 20 men from August to December 1960 who were described as "technical personnel." They were withdrawn following the complaint by Yugoslavia, with the UAR and Ceylon, on 6-7 December 1960 after Lumumba had been arrested and mistreated. In announcing the withdrawal, Yugoslavia stated on 21 December 1960 that her aid to ONUC had been conditional on the UN adopting "appropriate decisions" and that this had not been done.¹ Yugoslavia was reimbursed \$40,000 by the UN as full settlement for the contingent.

3. Special Supportive or Non-Supportive Actions - Yugoslavia's occasional support of UN peace observation and peacekeeping operations, although insignificant for ONUC, offers something of a wedge, if a tiny one, into the usually solid opposition of communist states.

QUESTIONS - HYPOTHESES - CONCLUSIONS

This section, from its title, can obviously be seen as the catch-all for ideas or propositions, related to national

¹ CO/20/Add. 10

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support for ONUC, which appear to have significance for the analysis of other past or possible future peacekeeping operations.

Rarely will they be stated with such precision as to deserve to be called conclusions or findings, and this will certainly not be the point at which solutions will be confidently offered. Some points can only be made intuitively, particularly where individual motivations and high government policies are involved. Some questions will be broached and no answer even attempted. An effort will also be made to avoid a host of "on-the-other-hands." The reader will, of course, realize that such caveats are implied with respect to almost any statement on this subject beyond simple exposition.

The approach will be to look sequentially at "decision points" in the process of launching, maintaining and winding-up a peacekeeping operation (specifically ONUC), points at which choices among alternatives are made--trying consistently to stick closely to the "national support" frame of reference. In the appropriate sections of the main report (Vol. 2) further refinement of much of this material will be attempted in the context of experience in other peacekeeping operations, as well as ONUC.

A. PREAUTHORIZATION

Before the question of national support for a peacekeeping operation ever arises, the very idea of a peacekeeping operation must come forth. In some cases (e.g. Cyprus) it has seemed a natural choice arrived at with due deliberation. In the Congo case, on the other hand, events were so rushed that it hardly seems possible that alternatives were fully considered or choices made deliberately. Only a bare 7 days elapsed between the first clue of UN involvement and a fully-launched peacekeeping operation with an 8 battalion force in the area or enroute and many more lined up to come. The UN authorization for the operation came in the middle of the 7 day period and left completely open the question of type and scale of operation to be mounted.

1. Questions: How did the Secretary-General in a matter of a few days arrive at the concept of a 20,000-man peacekeeping force assembled from all over the world and deployed over a huge area in the heart of Africa? How and by whom

was the basic political-military estimate or appreciation of the situation developed? Was the Secretary-General assured, or otherwise how did he envisage, that transportation to the Congo for the force would be provided? Was a cost estimate made? Were any alternative approaches considered (e.g. a one-time refugee evacuation operation and/or a UN military advisory mission, a "presence," or an observation mission)?

2. Hypotheses: Hammarskjold was probably led to the concept of a large peacekeeping operation by the Africans whom he consulted when the first request for assistance came from the Congo (see supra, p. 190). He probably did not have to be pushed very hard.¹ He had sometime earlier completed a tour of Africa and was generally thought to be interested (almost eager) in enhancing the UN role in Africa. The "more (contingents)-the-merrier" approach, although it was unwise from a consideration of an effective military operation or of economy, was probably a result of infectious enthusiasm, Hammarskjold's alleged unbounded faith and actual joy in managing wildly ad hoc conglomerations, and the rather solid political need to balance the more extreme among some of the eager African participants. The logistical problems, including movement of the force to the area, probably received inadequate consideration in the decision process. With the logistical system for UNEF fully operational and the U.S. firmly behind the UN operation in the Congo, the "38th floor" probably thought (and, horribly amateurish as it may be, rightly) that they would just "call on MATS" and everything would be all right.²

3. Conclusions: As a model of crisis management the pre-authorization phase of ONUC stands out as a horrible example. A massive operation was launched in a very slipshod manner in which personal idiosyncracies, ignorance, euphoria and opportunism were more noticeable than rational analysis and deliberation in the initial basic decisions.

¹ Joseph Kraft opined that Hammarskjold knew from the opening days of the crisis that a full UN military force would be needed, and used the technical assistance ploy only to get the project moving: "The Untold Story of the UN's Congo Army," Harpers, Vol. 221 (November 1960), p. 76.

² Kraft reported that the Secretary-General called Secretary Herter on 13 July 1960 and was assured of U.S. support, notably airlift. Ibid., p. 80.

But, it succeeded (in the sense that it did not fail) and the Secretary-General had more trouble keeping unwanted participants out of the action than he did finding participants to take part. It cannot be said that the lack of any material or human resources was a major limitation on the overall effectiveness of the operation.

A peacekeeping operation may be conditioned irrevocably by decisions made even before the formal authorization action. If machinery for developing sound analysis of erupting crisis situations on a UN basis cannot be arranged (and it probably cannot), the U.S. (and others) should see that sound national analyses are quickly made available to the Secretary-General so that these crucial early decisions will be better informed.

B. AUTHORIZATION - "THE MANDATE"¹

The basic authorization or mandate for the Congo operation has been called "uncertain" (Lefever), without much dissenting opinion. Von Horn called it "hopeless." Yet, generally the same can be said (and has been) of the mandates of practically all major peacekeeping operations.

1. Questions: Is it necessary/wise/unavoidable/regrettable/correctable that mandates for peacekeeping operations have that peculiar feature of being so constructed as to appear to represent a sufficient consensus to launch the operation, while obviously camouflaging vastly contradictory expectations among those parties making up the apparent consensus?

How do "uncertain mandates" affect national support for the operation?

What sort of national interests are served by uncertain, flexible mandates as opposed to definite, controlled mandates?

How much of the change between "let Dag do it" and "don't let U Thant do it" is reflected in different personalities as opposed to changing national conceptions?

¹ See supra, pp. 200-201 for a summary of the original mandate for ONUC and the changes in it over the first year and a half of the Operation.

2. Hypotheses: The McLuhanesque aspect whereby diplomats, perhaps with the gleam of a Nobel Peace Prize in their eye, rise to the challenge of constructing an apparent agreement among apparently irreconcilable national positions, and the widely held view (outside the communist orbit and De Gaulle's France) that peacekeeping is "on the side of the angels" have up to now produced the votes to launch peacekeeping operations where the points of actual agreement may have been very much less than the vote would imply.

The Congo operation by demonstrating the wedge-like potential whereby an initial imperfectly mandated peacekeeping operation can change its nature drastically, whipsawing its supporters in the process, may be expected, at least while the memories are fresh and in cases where they seem to have relevance, to encourage a trend towards more precise, controlled mandates. If a UN Force, once launched, (or even perhaps a UN standby force, if that should ever come to pass) can be shifted from impartial "standard" peacekeeping to a major combat role in the coercive settlement of the dispute, both the requesters and supporters of UN Forces will think twice.

Four developments or possibilities may be tending to point to less "free-wheeling" mandates for peacekeeping operations: (1) the approaching end of the post-colonial period in which at least a rudimentary pattern of action and built-in policy consensus existed within the UN for typical situations. The remaining post-colonial problems and other potential future crises to which peacekeeping might be applied may not fit the pattern. (2) the growth in size and the changed political complexion of the UN General Assembly, considered together with (3) the possibility of Chinese Communist Security Council membership, might very conceivably bring U.S.-Soviet views on the role of the UN organs closer to a point between their past positions and, perhaps, to a mutually shared understanding that no major UN peacekeeping operation should be launched over the substantive (as opposed to pro forma) objections of either. (4) The unlikelihood of a "Dag-like" person ever again being chosen intentionally as Secretary-General of the UN, and the inevitable departure from the Secretariat of the big and little names of the last 10-20 years in peacekeeping management (e.g. Bunche, Cordier, Vaughan, Sherry, Rikhye) point to a probably less confident and more cautious Secretariat peacekeeping role. Such a role might encourage firmer mandates.

3. Conclusions: The withdrawal of 6,000 men from the Congo force at a critical point in the operation (December 1960-February 1961) because a sizable number of supporting countries had seen their expectations outraged, and the failure of almost 60 states to honor fully in practice the principle of collective financial responsibility, point up some of the difficulties of a mandate which so papers over basic disagreements as almost to trick participants into taking part. Yet, there would have been no ONUC if it had been necessary to meet all the goals and aspirations of the supporters, participants or opponents of the operation, and ONUC worked.

In view of developments on the world scheme and in the UN framework, and to ensure that national support will not fail, as it did at times in ONUC, the mandates for any future peacekeeping operations should, as a minimum, not contradict the minimum expectations of those states without whose support or, at least acquiescence, the operation is not likely to succeed. The uncertainties manifest in a free-wheeling or a papered-over version may make such future operations more dangerous and therefore less desirable than perhaps no operation at all, or very much less desirable than the insulation of the situation without a peacekeeping force operation at all if that is possible by other means.

C. LAUNCHING-AIRLIFT-CONTINGENTS

James A Stegenga in his recent book on the Cyprus peace-keeping operation tries to make a case that the alleged dependence of sizable peacekeeping operations on the U.S. for their initial launching is a myth.¹ His case is not completely convincing even for Cyprus.²

In the case of the Congo it is possible to be categorical. No national air service, military or civilian, nor any feasible combination of such services, other than the U.S., could have approached the initial airlift capability provided

¹ James A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968), pp. 157-159.

² See the section on U.S. Support in the background paper on UNFICYP, pp. 420-423.

by the U.S. Air Force for ONUC in July-August 1960. The statement is probably almost as true today for the launching of an operation of similar scope from world-wide embarkation points into a remote operational area to be accomplished in a matter of a few weeks with no time for preparation. As the scope of possible future operations gets smaller, the embarkation points fewer, closer together and closer to the operational area, and as the operational area itself gets nearer to world air routes and more developed, this dependence on U.S. airlift diminishes. It also diminishes in even the more difficult environments after an initial period, as the airlift infrastructure is built up, the lifts can be pre-planned and only rotational transport of men, personnel weapons and hand baggage is required.

1. Questions: Does the dependence on U.S. airlift for the timely launching of sizable peacekeeping operations into the more remote potential operational areas constitute a secondary veto which the U.S. should seek to preserve? Has the Soviet Union (or others), or the UN through any feasible system of contractual commercial arrangements, the capability of reducing this dependence to a non-veto level?

2. Hypotheses: The U.S. would probably not want the Soviets to gain through UN peacekeeping airlifts, the additional experience and know-how without which even adequate aircraft and crews do not constitute a proven strategic airlift capability.

3. Conclusions: The U.S., since it has seen every sizable UN peacekeeping operation to date as in its national interest, has had no policy difficulty in providing the vital initial airlift, and that on a free-of-charge basis. To be considered is U.S. action with respect to initial airlift for an authorized peacekeeping operation in which the U.S. sees insufficient national interest to warrant the cost of providing initial airlift or actually would prefer a non-involved role altogether. In order for the U.S. to have an option of the non-provision of initial airlift, the UN should be assisted to develop another option, other than Soviet airlift, to turn to in such cases. A thorough study might show that a pre-arranged system of prime and sub-contracts for airlift could be called into play for many contingencies.¹

¹ Commercial air cargo operations in a good many parts of the world have increased their capabilities by several orders of magnitude since 1960, and even more capable cargo aircraft, handling equipment and airlift procedures are now or shortly coming into service.

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With regard to contingents for ONUC, the Secretary-General got just about everything he asked for. The question, of course, is were his plans for the composition of so large a force sound.

1. Question: Is the "standard UN battalion" of 600-1000 men applicable as a contingent yardstick for operations such as ONUC?

2. Hypotheses: The "standard UN battalion" is a sound basic building block but for operations approaching the size of ONUC an intermediate yardstick which does not extend the "span of control" so far is required.

3. Conclusions: Whatever political sense it may make, if any, a peacekeeping force made up of as many separate contingents as were in ONUC cannot really be commanded and is unmanageable from a support point of view. While it is supposed to be a widely held capability among military forces of all nations to be able to adjust to the unusual and to improvise around difficulties, there is a limit to which irrationalities and infeasibilities can be introduced into a force without rendering it relatively or even totally ineffective. The attempt to finesse political issues, which prove insoluble or which no one wants to address in a proper political forum, by incorporating them in an indigestible way into the military force of a peacekeeping operation is self-defeating. In an operation the size of ONUC (17-20,000 men) span of control considerations would have dictated 5 or 6 brigades (15-18 battalions). The contingents sought for such a force should have been brigades, or components including headquarters and support units which could have been readily brigaded.

D. NATIONAL SUPPORT - SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

ONUC was an example, as was UNEF, of a major peacekeeping operation in which the logistics support system was managed by the UN's Office of General Service, especially its Field Operations Service.

It has become fashionable in peacekeeping literature to denigrate the Field Operations Service and its performances as the logistic manager of peacekeeping operations.

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If the critics were completely fair, they would have to admit that for the Field Operations Service, whose normal role is small-scale routine support of a few static almost self-sufficient UN missions, to shift suddenly to the fielding and supporting of a large expeditionary force in a remote area like the Congo was a momentous accomplishment. Only a very few States have ever had the experience or even the capability of doing so, and for even the most experienced and sophisticated national command and planning establishments such an operation would be a great challenge. For it to be done with tolerable adequacy, or even at all, by a small group of hard-working dedicated more or less amateur logisticians is indeed commendable.

Nonetheless, the inadequacies of the Field Operations Service's management of ONUC support were glaringly obvious, and it would be a vast error to try to enthrone continued dilettantism in this vital area on the basis of the ONUC experience. The section of this background paper on U.S. Support for ONUC, particularly that during the critical first few months (see supra, pp. 222-243), demonstrates conclusively that without U.S. logistical support the ONUC force could not have arrived in the area or been able to begin operations in any effective way.¹ The degree of dependence on U.S. support was much greater than in the UNEF operation.

1. Questions: Granted that the UN Field Operations Service, as the logistics manager of a peacekeeping operation, is neither as grossly inadequate as its critics usually claim nor nearly as effective as it seems to want to maintain, what changes in structure and procedures for UN peacekeeping support would improve the situation?

Is the institutionalizing of support by a major power (e.g. U.S. for ONUC, U.K. for UNFICYP) acceptable as a model for the future? What organizational and procedural arrangements would be required?

¹ An observer on the scene in the New York headquarters during the Congo period has reported that two rounded figures were generally accepted in Secretariat circles and in the Military Adviser's Office: that the U.S. was the source for 85% of the material used in ONUC, and that about 25% of the cost of the operation could be saved by more efficient planning and execution.

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Would it be desirable, and would it be possible, to devise a system of support for a major UN peacekeeping operation which would not be dependent upon, even in the launching stage, logistical support by a major power?

2. Hypotheses: Certain less-than-desirable features of the UN logistics system are, for the time being, unavoidable, given the structure and personalities involved. One central feature of the existing structure--almost totally autonomous, character of the Field Service personnel in the area of operations--is supportable only if there exists in the structure a responsible superior, with adequate logistical staff advice, to provide the essential connection between the supporters and those being supported, and a decision-making capability.

Of the three major extended peacekeeping operations (UNEF, ONUC, UNFICYP), two were characterized by large-scale (in Cyprus, almost total) support of the operation by a single major power. In Cyprus an institutional arrangement exists; in ONUC none did. There may be valid objections to dependence on a single national source, but where it, in fact, exists an institutional arrangement, rather than an improvised interface, would seem clearly preferable, although this may not in all cases be politically possible.

The development over recent years of international corporations and contractors, of conglomerate scope, and the practice of the "systems approach" by such combinations might suggest the possibility of an effective logistic support system for a major peacekeeping operation entirely on a non-national support basis.¹ As with other possibilities for developing a more independent UN capability for peacekeeping, the prospects of such developments raise many political problems. In any foreseeable world context, anything remotely approaching an independent UN peacekeeping capability would be acceptable only with a control mechanism in the system which provides at least as much protection, and probably more, than the present veto provisions of the Charter do.

3. Conclusions: In any future major peacekeeping operation where the major logistical support is from one or a very few national sources, but management remains a Field Operations Service function, a senior experienced logistician from the major supporter(s) should be added to the staffs of both the

¹ U.S. forces in Vietnam now practice a unique system of logistic support whereby some \$500 million per year in

Secretary-General's Military Adviser at headquarters and of his Special Representative (or Officer-in-Charge) in the operational area. As committed logistical supporters of UN peacekeeping operations, the U.S. and the U.K. should periodically consult with each other and with the Secretariat to ensure familiarity and smooth meshing with each of their logistical systems.

Wherever future peacekeeping circumstances will permit, recognizing that this is extremely unlikely, the Cyprus system, whereby a major power manages and operates substantially the entire logistical support system on behalf of the UN, is clearly the most effective of all possible arrangements and should be used.

U.S. policymakers surely would have difficulty contemplating with any comfort a UN capable of launching a major peacekeeping operation independent of national (read U.S.) assistance. It would signify a loss of control and influence which the always important, and sometimes vital, U.S. support role has produced in every past operation. Nevertheless, it is at least a conceivable development if all the efforts aimed at correcting peacekeeping deficiencies were to produce favorable results. This seems a remote possibility indeed.

Not so far fetched and of some possible advantage, might be a sufficiently independent UN peacekeeping capability so as to permit a non-involved role by the U.S. where this suited the national interest (and public opinion) better. Such a role fits better in a fairly large number of possible situations where a completely "hands-off" posture by both the U.S. and Soviets is to be preferred but would be difficult to sustain if U.S. airplanes and equipment (and communicators and technicians) had to move in with a peacekeeping force because no other support means were available.

Efforts to activate Article 43 provisions of the Charter for peacekeeping national support and the Military Staff Committee, in a peacekeeping management role, appear to have no real possibility of succeeding and, in any case, would be

goods and services for the forces are procured directly through local and regional contracts. Colonel J.H.S. Smith, Procurement Support in Vietnam, U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, 1968.

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retrogressive with respect to UN peacekeeping possibilities. Vast improvements in the techniques of peacekeeping and in the effectiveness of national support are possible and desirable. But these are the "tame enemies" with respect to the overall problem, and could be easily solved if the central question could be faced and agreement, or at least a modus vivendi, reached. The central question concerns the "no-go switch" for a peacekeeping system. To date, only the U.S. has had the capability by withholding national support (money and logistics) to stop the launching of major peacekeeping operations. The vast significance of this unique capability has not been fully appreciated in the U.S. since U.S. national aims were always seen as being served by the operations, and the idea of preventing their launching never surfaced. The view from the British or French or, particularly, Soviet position, not to mention the lesser powers, must have been very much different.

Frightening scenarios are sometimes suggested in which, for example, an excited Third World majority in the General Assembly launches a major peacekeeping operation, including possible enforcement aspects, with Soviet or Chinese financial and logistical backing, and with the U.S. powerless to prevent the action which it opposes. Such scenarios sound perhaps a bit less far-fetched today than a few years ago.

Workable solutions for all the problems of UN peacekeeping (veto-free authorization, ready stand-by contingents, independent and reliable logistic support, pre-arranged financing, established command and control), which produced a system completely lacking a "no-go switch," are not at all likely. It is not difficult to imagine a near-future world in which they might be very dangerous.

The present pragmatic, ad hoc UN peacekeeping system, with all of its imperfections, best serves U.S. interests. Proposals for greater automaticity in peacekeeping do not. The U.S. capability to press a "no-go switch" should be preserved, although it might be wise to share the capability a bit.

E. MISCELLANEOUS

Financial - The UN logistical support system appears to be especially weak in the forecasting of requirements and costing aspects. Although ONUC was a much different operation

in many ways than UNFICYP is, the smooth and reliable cost data for UNFICYP contrasts dramatically with the fluctuating and unreliable costing position for ONUC.

Contingent Cost Differentials - The concept of "extra and extraordinary costs" as the basis for reimbursement to governments for contingents is inadequate. At issue is the regular soldier peacekeeper vs. the "volunteer or mercenary" peacekeeper, and morale of contingents is involved as well as the problem of finding money for the operation. (See Annex N).

Arms Control - An effective peacekeeping capability can be seen as not only favoring arms limitations among potential opponents, especially in the Third World, but as a necessity for real progress in this field. This rather conventional statement can be turned completely over by the argument that a sort of automatic, non-discriminating peacekeeping machinery might encourage military adventurism by insuring that military actions would be short-term affairs with low costs and losses (particularly for the initiator). Clearly, no one in his right mind would wish to make war-initiation a frivolous matter by removing the problems of an attrition phase and war-ending for the potential aggressor.

The ONUC resolutions addressed one aspect of arms control by forbidding all assistance to the Congo except through the UN. The Secretary-General brought political pressure to bear on violators with mixed results (see supra, p. 279) and airfield closure was an effective instrument for controlling unauthorized arms importation for a critical week early in the crisis. (See supra, p. 194). Effective border control was not possible.

Disarming of the Congolese armed forces was proposed by Major General H.T. Alexander, the British officer who entered the Congo with the first Ghanaian troops, and actually carried out under his direction on a small scale before the UN headquarters really was established. His proposal was rejected and the arms reissued by the UN Force headquarters once it was in operation.

Limitation or reduction of arms in the hands of disputants in a peacekeeping situation would be a most helpful action. In the absence of their agreement ahead of time to do so, and pro-

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vision for carrying out this aspect of the agreement in the mandate, it is not likely that a consent-type peacekeeping force can bring such action about. Such arms limitation provisions should therefore be sought in the basic agreement between parties to the dispute and/or in the mandate authorizing the peacekeeping operation, which should be accompanied by the strongest pressures for restraining possible arms suppliers from outside sources.

VI

EPILOGUE

Ironically, as the last of the ONUC soldiers pulled out on 30 June 1964 something between 1/3 and 1/4 of the Congo was in revolt and their arch opponents through 4 years of peacekeeping, Tshombe and the Belgians, were back in Leopoldville. Tshombe, in fact, became Premier of the Congo on 8 July 1964 and was soon hiring western mercenaries to help put down revolting factions. The Congo was accepting military assistance from 5 NATO countries and Israel with the Belgians playing a leading advisory role.

The fighting which continued among the Congolese, however, was in a framework insulated from a possible superpower confrontation which was an elemental fear on the part of the U.S. when the Congo erupted in July 1960.

On 13 August 1964 the U.S. introduced Joint Task Force Leopoldville ("JTF-LEO") with 4 C-130 aircraft, 3 helicopters and 105 military personnel, including 42 paratroopers, to provide transportation support for government forces engaged in putting down the revolt. The Belgians had previously provided 100 personnel to operate the Congo government's transport and light aircraft.

On 20 August 1964 Tshombe appealed to the UN to halt infiltration from the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi, accusing the Chinese Communists of aiding the revolt. He was refused.

From 24-28 November 1964 U.S. aircraft flew 600 Belgian paratroopers from Europe and dropped them in 2 parachute operations at Stanleyville and Paulis to rescue about 2,000 white (mostly Belgian) hostages.

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JTF-LEO, at reduced strength, remained for a year in the Congo finally redeploying in August 1965, by which time the government of the Congo had for the most part regained control of the country.

X X X X X X X X X X X

One can only speculate what the Congo might have been like without ONUC. Over \$400 million, the services of 93,000 military personnel, 126 of whom were killed in action, and 4 years of effort went into the operation. The whole fabric of the UN was strained and enthusiasm for UN peace-keeping took a tumble from which it has not yet fully recovered, despite the successful launching of the Cyprus operation.

At the least, ONUC prevented a great power confrontation, restrained the Congolese from an all-out civil war, kept some semblance of order and economic functioning and gave time for other moderating influences to work.

X X X X X X X X X X X

As General von Horn quotes Hammarskjold as saying:¹

My God! This is the craziest operation in history. God only knows where it is going to end. All I can tell you is that I had no other choice but to lay it on.

A close associate of Hammarskjold also has quoted him as saying:

In the Congo I am launching an operation which is probably thirty years ahead of its time.

¹ von Horn, op. cit., p. 180.



FINANCIAL RECAPITULATIONS
U.S. SUPPORT FOR ONUC

ANNEX B

I. U.S. Share of Gross Cost of ONUC (excluding Civilian Operation)		
A. Obligations incurred by UN 1960-1964 ¹		\$391,469,513
B. Obligations incurred by UN 1965-1967 (mostly relating to 1960-64) ¹		5,366,261
C. Total UN Obligations incurred for ONUC		396,835,774
D. Waived costs		
U.S. Initial Airlift	\$10,317,622	
Canadian Airlift	650,000	
UK Airlift	520,000	11,487,622
E. Total gross cost of ONUC		\$408,323,396
F. U.S. Contributions ²		
Assessed	\$88,902,194	
Voluntary	33,078,986	
Waived airlift	10,317,622	
		132,298,802
Percent F of E		32.4%

¹ Source: UN Financial Report and Accounts, 1960-1967.

² Source: 89th Congress, 1st Session, House Doc. No. 229, United States Contributions to International Organizations, February 1964, excluding U.S. purchases of UN Bonds as a contribution. For the effect of including the bonds, see recapitulation III below.

(Note: Additional obligation of \$1,253,955 was incurred during 1968, again mostly pertaining to earlier years. Inclusion of these 1968 expenditures would increase the total gross cost of ONUC to \$409,577,351 and reduce the percentage which the U.S. contribution comprises to 32.3%).

II. U.S. Share of Net Cost of ONUC (excluding Civilian Operation)

A.	Total Gross Cost of ONUC (I. E above)		\$408,323,396
E.	LESS:		
	(1) Waived airlift costs (I. D above)	\$11,487,622	
	(2) Savings through 1967 in settling obligations, sales of equipment, etc ¹	35,042,730	
	(3) Anticipated additional savings, sales, etc ²	<u>7,434,424</u>	<u>53,964,776</u>
			\$354,358,620
C.	PLUS:		
	Accounts Payable to government (after actual and anticipated savings, sales, etc) ²		<u>1,423,712</u>
D.	Total Net Cost of ONUC		355,782,332
E.	U. S. Contribution (less waived airlift) ³		
	Assessed	88,902,194	
	Voluntary	<u>33,078,986</u>	<u>121,981,180</u>
	Percent E of D		34.3% ³

¹ Source: UN Financial Report and Accounts, 1960-1967

² Anticipated additional savings are inferred from the \$8.8 million cited as payable to governments in footnote d on page 2 of the 1967 Report and Accounts (A/7206), from the operation of the "5 year validity rule" (page 17, A/7206), and from the \$1.4 million reserved for unliquidated obligations of 1963 onward (page 43, A/7206).

³ Inclusion of U.S. waived airlift costs in a comparison with net UN costs does not appear valid. If the \$10.3 million of waived airlift is included, the U.S. share rises to 37.2%.

III. U.S. Share of Gross and Net Costs of ONUC (excluding Civilian Operations) considering UN Bond Purchases¹

A. Total Gross Cost of ONUC (I. E above) \$408,323,396

B. U.S. Contributions
(I. F above) \$132,298,802

Plus U.S. Share
repayment of UN Bond
Issue

47,512,928

\$179,811,730

Percent B of A

44.0%

C. Total Net Cost of ONUC
(II. D above)

\$355,782,332

D. U.S. Contributions
(II. E above)

\$121,981,180

Plus U.S. share
repayment of UN Bond
Issue

47,512,928

\$169,494,108

Percent D of C

47.6%

IV. U.S. Share of Net Cost of ONUC Paid or Payable to Governments for Contingents or Other Reimbursable Support

A. Total Net Cost of ONUC (II. D above) \$355,782,332

B. Paid or Payable to 34 Gov'ts (incl. U.S.)
(approx.)² 145,000,000

C. Paid or Payable to U.S. (approx.)² 50,000,000

Percent B of A

40.8%

Percent C of A

14.1%

Percent C of B

34.5%

¹ ONUC (and UNEF) were financed from 1 July 1962 - 30 June 1963 through the sale of UN Bonds. A total of \$169.9 million of bonds was sold of which \$148.4 million was used to finance ONUC (page 10, A/7206). The U.S. share (32.02%) of the cost of liquidating the bonds may be considered a part of the total U.S. contribution to the Congo Operation.

² Source: A/6289/Add. 1, 31 March 1966 Annex V, pp. 22-32, 26-27.

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ANNEX B

V. U.S. Reimbursable Support for ONUC Reimbursed by UN

A. U.S. Reimbursable Support Billed (approx) \$	51,000,000
B. Less: adjustments for duplicate billings, repurchase, offsets, etc. (approx)	<u>2,000,000</u>
C. U.S. Net Reimbursable Support	49,032,608
D. Reimbursed by UN	<u>44,557,459</u>
E. Unreimbursed (outstanding)	4,475,149
F. Percent D of C	90.87%

VI. U.S. Share of Net Cash Cost of ONUC (excluding Civilian Operations)


A. Total of all Congo allotments 1960-1967	\$397,595,344
B. Total of all Congo obligations incurred 1960-1967	396,835,774
C. Total of all disbursements 1960-1967	352,070,827
D. Involving, in the liquidation of obligations, reported savings of	35,042,730
E. Miscellaneous income 1960-1967 (interest, sales, etc.)	11,701,669
F. Unliquidated obligations 31 Dec 1967	7,121,539
G. Of which amount due to U.S. was	4,475,149
H. Disbursements (C above) less income (E above) Net Cash Cost of ONUC	340,369,158
I. U.S. cash contributions, excluding bonds (II E above)	121,981,180
J. U.S. cash contributions, including bonds (III D above)	169,494,108
K. Disbursements to U.S. for reimbursed support	44,557,459


Percent C of B - 88.7% Percent I of H - 35.8% Percent K of C -
 Percent F of B - 1.8% Percent J of H - 49.8% 12.7%


VII. U.S. Share Civilian Operations in the Congo under UN Programs (excludes bilateral programs):¹


<u>Program</u>	<u>U.S. Contribution</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Import Support Program (1960-63)	\$ 79,400,000	100%
UN Fund for the Congo (1960-65)	32,950,000	47%
Civilian Assistance (1964-68)	<u>17,612,390</u>	50%
TOTAL	\$129,962,390	

¹ Costs shown are through 1968. Source: 90th Congress, 2nd Session, House Doc. No. 375, United States Contributors to International Organizations, February 1967, table facing page 162.









ONUC
MAJOR ITEMS OF SUPPORT
BY U.S. SERVICES BY
CALENDAR QUARTER

Serial	Quarter Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	Total
1	30 Sep 60	<p>*13 Generators and power supplies \$2,639</p> <p>*18 Radio sets \$14,699</p> <p>*2 H19, 6 H13 helicopters; 2 U1, 4 I20 aircraft with spare parts and accessories (partial) \$748,100</p> <p>Signal items \$7,157</p> <p>Vehicles and parts (including white jeeps air-lifted from U.S. 19 July 60) \$37,315</p>	<p>(Sealift started 17 Aug 60 with departure USS Bexar APA237 from Hong Kong via Subic Bay to pick up Indonesian troops at Djakarta for the Congo.</p> <p>2 LSTs, Windham County and Whitfield County, departed Subic Bay 26 Sep 60 to pick up Malaysian troops for Congo. UN request,</p>	<p>**Initial airlift 1 Jul-31 Aug 60 \$10,317,622</p> <p>**Flour lift (17 C130 trips, 37 flying hours each) \$320,790</p> <p>10 C47 aircraft \$500,000</p> <p>5 C119 aircraft (assist #24) \$612,460</p> <p>Charter flight for Sec. Gen. and 3 to Congo Aug 60 (assist #35) \$46,919</p> <p>**Refugee airlift (3,170 refugees from 14 countries 13 Jul-4 Aug 60) \$204,902</p>	\$

* From U.S. Army stocks in Europe.

** Reimbursement waived.

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
	*Rations (air- lifted 21 Jul- 10 Aug 60) \$136,838	assist #76, for Malaysian lift was made 12 Sep 60 for lift after 21 Sep 60 (accessorial charge - same as for Army)	(airlift charge basis: \$518 per flying hour by C124; \$510 per flying hour by C130) (accessorial charge - same as for Army)	\$
	*Misc items from U.S. stocks in Europe (incl. 3 tons small arms ammunition air- lifted 29 Aug 60, and 20 jeeps) \$442,117			
	*Wind measuring set \$624			
	*2 Babometers ML102 \$444			
	(Basis for bill- ing for material support - in addition to price of material, a 16% accessorial charge is added to cover;			
	Packing, crating and handling 3.5%;			
	overseas port unloading and handling 1%; over- seas transporta- tion 2%; conti- nental U.S. trans- portation 3%;			

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
	continental U.S. port handling and loading 2.5%; ocean trans- portation 4%)			
Billed this period	\$1,298,720	-	(Carried over	\$1,298,720
Credit adjustments	-	-	to following	-
Cumulative adjusted total	\$1,298,720	-	period)	\$1,298,720

Serial	Quarter Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
2	31 Dec 60 (9 Jan 61 for Air Force)	600 reels signal wire \$20,100 Crystals and batteries (assist #70, 86/94-98) \$23,233 56 Radio sets (assist #79, 86/5) \$57,023 Rations (from New Cumberland, Pa. - emergency basis) (assist #11) \$235,854 *Misc goods and services from U.S. Army, Europe (incl per diem starting 14 Jul) for 14 communicators and 14 Army aviators) (and 200,000 rds small arms ammunition airlifted Nov 60) \$49,353	Sealift Recapitulation (Cumulative) By 5 Oct 60 following sea-lifted into Congo: 1,142 UN troops 275 tons cargo By 29 Nov 60 1,736 UN troops	Airlift \$4,683,859 Supplies and Services \$92,378 Non-crew per diem \$46,840 Airlift Recapitulation (Cumulative) By 21 Jul 60 following airlifted into Congo: Tunisians 1020 Ghanaians 770 Moroccans 1250 Swedes (from UNEF) 625 Ethiopians 460 4125 By 10 Aug 60: 9,213 UN troops 2,334 tons cargo By 5 Oct 60: 14,088 UN troops 3,304 tons cargo By 29 Nov 60: 15,535 UN troops 3,818 tons cargo	\$

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
Billed this period	\$ 485,271	-	\$6,573,871	\$7,059,142
Credit adjustments	(4,307)	-	-	(4,307)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$1,779,684	-	\$6,573,871	\$8,353,555
3 31 Mar 61 (24 Mar 61 for Air Force)	*16,000 blue helmet liners \$50,054 138 Radio sets \$34,781 12 Generators \$3,636 Misc signal items \$47,965 Rations \$423,364 40 Reels of signal wire \$1,400	(Authority for continuing U.S. sealift support established 2 Feb 61. 2-man U.S. Military Sea Transport Service Liaison Office established Leopoldville 10 Feb 61)	Airlift \$2,958,678 Supplies \$132,729 Non-crew per diem \$123,697 Ferrying aircraft \$102,993 **Famine relief airlift Jan-Feb 61 \$401,163 Airlift Recapitulation (Cumulative)	
Billed this period	\$ 663,303	-	\$3,335,342	\$ 3,998,645
Credit adjustments	-	-	-	-
Cumulative adjusted total	\$2,442,986	-	\$9,909,213	\$12,352,199

By 27 Mar 61 following airlifted into Congo:
19,202 UN troops
5,273 tons cargo

Serial	Quarter Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE		TOTAL
4	30 Jun 61	8 H19 helicopters \$1,099,480 Aircraft parts \$38,573 12 Radio sets \$9,072 12 Generators \$3,636 Signals parts \$62,596 (Special signal parts for Canadian set (assist #417) 3000 Insect bars \$2,520 16,960 Helmet liners \$46,070 3,500 Insect bars \$25,200 1,500 Insect bars \$10,800 Rations \$87,162 Misc supplies and services from U.S. Army Europe \$17,685	Sealift USS Bexar (APA237) (Asst #64) Indonesian lift (11 Sep-1 Oct 60) \$15,599 Blatchford and Eltinge 1-31 Mar 61 \$524,586 Whitfield County (Malaysian 4-31 Oct 60 \$25,004 (assist #76A) Windham County (Malaysian 4-31 Oct 60) \$25,004 (assist #76A) Blatchford 11-28 Feb 61 Moroccan lift \$151,200 Eltinge 18-28 Feb 61 Indonesian lift (Sailed from New York with 750 measurement tons of powdered milk for famine relief offloaded at Pointe Noire because of	Airlift \$3,511,641 Non-crew per diem \$59,826 Parking and landing fees \$3,533 C47 Aircraft \$200,000 Meals \$2,675 Supplies \$139,221 Airlift Recapitulation (Cumulative)		\$

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
		closure Matadi) Blatchford, <u>Eltinge, Kimbro</u> April 61 Malaysian, Indian \$582,904 Other Airlift service from Port Lyautey to Dakar (1 Aug 60) Sealift Recapitu- lation (Cumulative) By 30 Jun 61 fol- lowing sealifted into and out of Congo: 8975 UN troops (Basis for sealift charges: per diem charge for vessels as follows plus non-crew sub- sistence: Eltinge- Blatchford \$7,100 (\$7,400 eff 1 July 62)		
Billed this period	\$1,652,538		\$1,416,892	\$ 3,975,902
Credit adjustments	-		-	(2,144,929)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$4,095,525		\$1,416,892	\$11,740,186
				\$17,252,603

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Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
5 30 Sep 61 (27 Sep 61 for Air Force)	*Rations (assist #159 (9 rail cars 28 Apr 61) \$137,268 *6 H19 helicop- ters \$824,770 Aircraft parts \$98,621 Per diem for U.S. signal personnel \$1,005 *34,650 pounds concertina barbed wire airlifted with Tunisian troop left 29 Jun 61 (assist #219)	Sealift Blatchford 1-31 May 61 \$304,588 Eltinge 1-31 May 61 (last utiliz- ation in Congo sealift) \$279,003 Kimbro 1-31 May 61 \$88,954 Subsistence for Guineans aboard Graham County and Hermitage (Feb 61) \$4,745 (Blatchford, 13,000 gross tons, has air conditioned troop space and can carry about 3,000 troops. The ship has a 173-man civil- ian crew and a 20-man military department in- cluding 2 doctors)	Airlift (assist #510, 518) \$1,904,635 POL (later can- celled; see serial 6) \$1,558,550 Non-crew per diem \$282,887 (e.g. 4 airmen Dar Es Salaam for 30 days 19 Apr 61; 1 officer, 6 air- men communication team to Kamina 19 Apr 61) Supplies \$84,846 Meals (May-Jun 61 at Wheelus AFB for Austrians, Pakistani, Swedes, Irish, Italians)	\$ \$5,788,962 (306,274) \$22,735,290
Billed this period	\$1,288,950	\$ 677,290	\$3,822,722	\$ 5,788,962
Credit adjustments	(41,760)	-	(264,514)	(306,274)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$5,342,714	2,094,182	\$15,298,394	\$22,735,290

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Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
6 30 Nov 61 (2 months)	*Tentage (asst #60-107) (Emergency air shipment 24 Nov 60) \$17,770	Sealift Blatchford 1-30 Jun 61, Kimbrow 1-5 Jun 61 \$266,230 Blatchford 1-31 Jul 61 \$289,704	Airlift \$976,599 Assists #156B 147 167 210 173 230 176 239 211 246 86/239	\$
		Rations - to UN in Congo off Bexar 1-2 Oct 60 \$2,701	Meals and billets \$2,646 Non-crew per diem \$47,209 Landing fees \$1,939 Supplies \$32,522 POL \$268,895 (cancelled in credit adjustment below) Airlift Recapitu- lation (Cumulative) By 28 Nov 61 fol- lowing airlifted in and out of Congo: 29,834 UN troops in 6,871 tons cargo in 15,587 UN troops out 668 tons cargo out	
	\$ 20,613	\$ 558,850	\$ 1,335,007	\$ 1,914,470
Billed this period			(POL) { 1,827,446)	{ 1,827,446)
Credit adjustments			\$14,805,955	\$22,822,314
Cumulative adjusted total	\$5,363,327	\$2,653,032		

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
7	31 Dec 61 { 1 month) 29 Dec 61 for Air Force)	Sealift Blatchford 1-30 Sep 61 \$275,351 Blatchford 1-31 Oct 61 \$171,591	Airlift (assist #236, 238, 212, 212A) \$403,294 Non-crew per diem (e.g. 5 airmen to Tunis 28 Jun 61) \$57,862 Supplies \$4,455	\$
	*Signal parts \$27,197 Medical supplies (assist #229) (commercial air shipment from New York on Air Alitalia) \$669 *Engineer wire and lighting equipment (assist #51, 147, 179, 219; shipped in Jun) \$8,330 *Goods and services U.S. Army Europe \$68,564			
Billed this period	\$ 124,207	\$ 446,942	\$ 470,374	\$ 1,041,523
Credit adjustments	-	-	(4,731)	(4,731)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$5,487,534	\$3,099,974	\$15,271,598	\$23,859,106

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
8	<p>31 Mar 62 (29 Mar 62 for Air Force)</p> <p>*12 Radio sets (assist #86- 158) (shipped 19 Apr 61) \$68,520</p> <p>*30 Radio sets (assist #168) (shipped 25 May 61) \$15,270</p> <p>*8 Radio sets (shipped 19 Apr 61) \$45,680</p> <p>Tuition for training in U.S. of 9 Swedish helicopter pilots (assist #241) (Oct-Dec 61) \$36,675</p> <p>*Vehicle parts (assist #147) (air shipment 6 May 61) \$3,708</p> <p>Medical supplies (assist #86-616) (air shipment 14 Mar 62) \$502</p> <p>Chemical Corp</p>	<p>Sealift Blatchford 15 days in Nov 61 \$113,368</p> <p>Blatchford 1-31 Dec 61 \$220,100</p> <p>Charges by India for stevedoring Kimbro in Bombay 26 Apr-1 May 61 \$13,395</p>	<p>Airlift (assist #237, 248, 249) \$2,500,639</p> <p>Non-crew per diem \$110,219</p> <p>Supplies \$2,624</p> <p>Meals: (Wheelus) Irish Dec 61 \$184 Swedes Sep-Oct 61 \$434</p> <p>Billeting (Wheelus) Swedes: 3-4 Nov 61 4-11 Dec 61 19-20 Dec 61</p> <p>\$993</p> <p>Irish: 19-20 Nov 61 7-18 Dec 61 20-23 Dec 61</p> <p>\$741</p> <p>(25% reduction in airlift rates for period 1 Feb-30 Jun 61)</p>	\$

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Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
	food and water test kits \$74			\$
	Goods and Serv- ices U.S. Army Europe \$5,333 (e.g. Port charges Pisa for 333 bundles Norwegian Red Cross dried fish \$22; automatic Data Processing Service \$29)			
	\$ 255,056	\$ 347,461	\$ 2,651,161	\$ 3,253,678
Billed this period	-	-	(airlift) (53,717)	(53,717)
Credit adjustments				
Cumulative adjusted total	\$5,742,590	\$3,447,405	\$17,869,042	\$27,059,037

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Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
9 30 Jun 62	*48 telephone sets (assist #318) \$2,856 *Batteries (assist #317) \$6,117 (shipped 23 Jan 62) *Medical serv- ice U.S. Army Hospital for: Frances M. Quane (Irish) Cpl. Roger J. Landry (Cdn) (assist #243) \$104 *Signal flares \$276	Sealift Blatchford 1-31 Jan 62 \$237,651 Blatchford 1-28 Feb 62 \$221,692 Blatchford 1-31 Mar 62 \$270,064 Sealift Recapit- ulation (1 Jul 61-30 Jun 62) (cumulative for operation in parentheses) Sealifted in and out 18,516 (27,491)	Airlift (assist #314, 329, 311, 279, 305, 312) \$2,800,252 2 wheel control tower AN/MRN-15 (assist #268, 268A) \$16,442 Directionfinder \$6,507 Non-crew per diem \$120,973 Supplies \$44,605 Airlift Recapitu- lation (1 Jul 61- 30 Jun 62) (cumulative for operation in pa- rentheses) Airlifted in 8371 UN troops (35,240) 1210 tons cargo (7,658) Airlifted out 5,562 UN troops (16,800)	\$

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
Billed this period	\$ 30,892	\$ 729,407	287 tons cargo (735)	\$
Credit adjustments	-	-	(admin) (1,226)	\$ 3,750,202 (1,226)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$5,773,482	\$4,176,812		\$20,857,719 \$30,808,013
10 30 Sep 62	Signal motors (assist #86- 332) (air shipped from U.S.) \$2,250 Signal parts (10 IBM pages to list) \$181,162 *Medical Service in U.S. Army Hospital - For: Pvt Sep Mian Bad- shah (Pak), Pvt Cullen (Irish) (Dec-Jan 62) Pvt Marsh (Irish) (Dec-Jan 62) Pvt McMullen (Irish) (Dec-Jan 62), Pvt Scally (Irish) (Dec-Jan 62), Pvt Desmond	Sealift Assist #347 Blatchford 1-30 Jun 62 \$242,119 Assist #328 Blatchford 1-30 Apr 62 \$255,781 Blatchford 1-31 May 62 \$264,590	Airlift \$1,739,101 Billeting (assist #1, Swedes, 418 men, 60 of whom stayed 2 nights at Wheelus AFB 3-5 Aug 61) \$478 Billeting/meals \$2,840 Non-crew per diem \$8,809 Materials \$3,440,409	\$

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Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
	(Irish) (Dec- Jan 62) \$1,020			\$
	*Misc goods and services U.S. Army in Europe \$3,615			
Billed this period	\$ 226,373	\$ 762,490	\$ 5,741,949	\$ 6,730,812
Credit adjustments	-	-	(airlift)(235,123)	(235,123)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$5,999,855	\$4,939,302	\$26,364,545	\$37,303,702

Serial	Quarter Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
11	31 Dec 62	*Medical Service in U.S. Army Hospital for Major B.O. Gunnar Svedberg (Swede) \$108 Aircraft parts \$3,443 Engineer parts (assist #147) \$529	Sealift Assist #347 Blatchford 1-30 Sep 62 \$234,616 Blatchford 1-31 Jul 62 \$240,378 Assist #386 Blatchford 1-31 Aug 62 \$242,680 Sealift Recapitulation (Cumulative) Into 19,335 men 5,644 tons Out 15,368 men 1,558 tons (Total: 34,703 men; 7,202 tons)	Airlift \$167,249 Materiel \$804,480 Non-crew per diem \$20,998 Airlift Recapitulation (Cumulative) Into 40,458 men 8,380 tons Out 23,067 men 782 tons Intra 1,858 men 3,147 tons (Total: 65,383 men; 12,309 tons)	\$
		(Blatchford was under repair in Karachi for 18 days in Sep-Oct 1962. 5000 lbs. of tools, 90 tons of parts and 20 boiler-makers were flown from U.S. or Pearl Harbor for repair job.)			

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Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
Billed this period	\$ 5,158	\$ 717,674	\$ 1,121,343	\$1,844,175
Credit adjustments	-	-	(64,878)	(64,878)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$6,005,013	\$5,656,976	\$27,421,010	\$39,082,999

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
12 31 Mar 63	30 - 2½ ton trucks (assist #427) \$187,783 (delivered Dec 62-Jan 63 by airlift from Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado) Ammunition and explosives (200,000 rds belted 30 cal. assist #411A) (117 mine clearing devices assist #420) (airlifted from Olmstead Air Force Base, Pa. 4 Jan 63) \$227,516 *Rations \$57,240 *Tents \$24,660 *Insect bars \$35,640 Aircraft parts \$27,845 *Services by U.S. Army Europe \$6,328	Sealift Blatchford Oct 62 \$234,575 Nov 62 \$245,385 Dec 62 \$275,113 Jan 63 \$245,340	Airlift \$2,445,318 Materiel \$191,693 Non-crew per diem \$10,732	\$

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
Billed this period	\$ 668,135	\$1,000,412	\$ 2,678,414	\$ 4,346,961
Credit adjustments	-	-	-	-
Cumulative adjusted total	\$6,673,148	\$6,657,388	\$30,099,424	\$43,429,960
13 30 Jun 63	Signal parts and batteries \$27,429 Medical kits \$85	Sealift (assist #439, 440, 463) Blatchford Feb 1963 \$113,830 Mar 63 \$280,594 Apr 63 \$578,905 May 63 \$359,870	Airlift \$4,459,008 Materiel \$543,372 Non-crew per diem \$3,697	\$
- 364 -	Aircraft engines and parts \$65,885 *Misc goods and services U.S. Army Europe \$3,488			
Billed this period	\$ 127,365	\$1,333,200	\$ 5,093,016	\$ 6,553,581
Credit adjustments	(4,825)	-	(airlift) (3,842,671)	(3,847,496)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$6,795,689	\$7,990,588	\$31,349,769	\$46,136,046

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
14 30 Sep 63	Signal wire and parts \$8,301 *Tool kits \$13,074 Aircraft engines, air frames and parts \$219,219 *Misc goods and services U.S. Army Europe \$17,332	Sealift Blatchford \$247,733 (cancelled Serial 15) Jun 63 \$242,079	Airlift \$1,519,606 Materiel \$47,902 Non-crew per diem \$2,381	\$
Billed this period	\$ 296,866	\$ 489,811	\$ 1,629,753	\$ 2,416,430
Credit adjustments	(9,496)	-	(37,102)	(46,598)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,083,059	\$8,480,399	\$32,942,420	\$48,505,878

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
15 31 Dec 63	*Mosquito nets (assist #409) \$1,988 *Signal parts and batteries \$1,839 *Misc goods and services U.S. Army Europe \$1,262 (e.g. stevedor- ing SS Indian Success loading ammunition 15-16 Nov 63 - #921) \$1,262	Sealift <u>Blatchford</u> Jul 63 \$231,000 Other \$96,043 (The <u>Blatchford</u> returned to the U.S. on Aug 12 1963 after 2½ years of Congo sealift in which she steamed 174,014 miles and car- ried about 34,000 UN troops to and from the Congo)	Airlift \$11,527 Materiel \$2,520	\$
Billed this period	\$ 18,501	\$ 331,347	\$ 14,450	\$ 364,298
Credit adjustments	-	(Ser.#14) (247,733)	(2,669)	(250,402)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,101,560	\$8,564,013	\$32,954,201	\$48,619,774

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
16 31 Mar 64	*Tents \$2,390 *Signal parts \$5,167 *Generators \$826 *Misc goods and services U.S. Army Europe (e.g. Automatic Data Processing Service \$92, inspection and technical processing of equipment \$132) \$423		Airlift (assist #478) (Rotation Indian, Pakistan, Indonesian) \$888,539 Materiel \$19,710	\$
Billed this period	\$ 10,186 (Travel)	\$ 2,361	\$ 911,356	\$ 923,903
Credit adjustments	(70)	-	(57,699)	(57,769)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,111,677	\$8,566,374	\$33,807,858	\$49,485,909

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
17 30 Jun 64	Aircraft parts \$21,346 Vehicle parts \$9,614 *Misc goods and services, U.S. Army Europe \$694 (e.g. steve- doring service Pisa for load- ing ammunition aboard SS <u>Indian</u> Resource 18 Feb 64 - \$483)	Sealift Recapit- ulation (Cumulative for Operation) In 20,352 men, 5,322 tons Out 23,343 men, 2801 tons	Airlift \$25,939 Materiel \$6,406 Airlift Recapit- ulation (Cumulative for Operation) In 43,303 men, 8,542 tons Out 31,093 men, 1,904 tons Intra 1,991 men, 3,642 tons	\$
Billed this period	\$ 37,890	-	\$ 33,370	\$ 71,260
Credit adjustments	-	-	(fuel dispenser) (45,224)	(45,224)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,149,567	\$8,566,374	\$ 33,796,004	\$49,511,945

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
18 30 Sep 64	Vehicle parts \$1,173		Airlift \$8,706 Non-crew per diem \$9,339 Material \$1,804 Freight \$4,604	\$
Billed this period	\$ 4,314	\$ -	\$ 24,453	\$ 28,767
Credit adjustments	(127)	-	(28,220)	(28,347)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,153,754	\$8,566,374	\$33,792,237	\$49,512,365
19 31 Dec 64	*Aircraft parts (assist #86/844) \$104,706			
Billed this period	\$ 124,288	\$ 2,689	\$ 121	\$ 127,098
Credit adjustments	(9)	-	(12,693)	(12,702)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,278,033	\$8,569,063	\$33,779,665	\$49,626,761
20 31 Mar 65				
Billed this period	\$ 1,032	\$ -	\$ 1,566	\$ 2,598
Credit adjustments	(54,544)	-	-	(54,544)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,224,521	\$8,569,063	\$33,781,231	\$49,574,815

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
21 30 Jun 65	*Tents \$26,407			
Billed this period	\$ 31,955	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 31,955
Credit adjustments	(80,123)(Rations)		(3,500)	(83,623)
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,176,353	\$8,569,063	\$33,777,731	\$49,523,147
22 30 Sep 65				
Billed this period	\$ 17		\$ -	\$ 17
Credit adjustments	-		-	-
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,176,370	\$8,569,063	\$33,777,731	\$49,523,164
23 31 Dec 65				
Billed this period	\$ 789		\$ -	\$ 789
Credit adjustments	-		-	-
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,177,169	\$8,569,063	\$33,777,731	\$49,523,963

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
24 31 Mar 66 updated to 18 May 66				
(Last transac- tion under ONUC account was \$7.50 of Indus- trial Supplies furnished UN Admin. Officer (E.G. Moore) at Pisa on 3 May 66)	\$ 18	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 18
Billed this period Credit adjustments	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Cumulative adjusted total	\$7,177,187	\$8,569,063	\$33,777,731	\$49,523,981

Quarter Serial Ending	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	GRAND TOTAL
25 As of 31 Mar 66				
Total U.S. Support	\$7,177,187 ¹	\$8,569,063	\$44,095,353	\$59,841,603
(Exc. refugee airlift, flour lift, famine relief)				
Total Waived (Initial airlift)	-	-	10,317,622	10,317,622
Total Billed to UN	7,177,187	8,569,063	33,777,731	49,523,981
Total Reimbursed by UN	6,129,012	7,876,734	30,551,712	44,557,458
Total Miscellaneous Adjustments and Repur- chases Not Included Above	491,329	23	22	491,374
Total Unreimbursed by UN	556,846	692,306	3,225,997	4,475,149
Percent of Total Support Waived	-	-	23.40%	16.41%
Percent of Billed Support Reimbursed (inc. adjust- ments)	92.24%	91.92%	90.48%	90.96%

¹ For a breakdown of this total by categories of supplies and services, see Annex H.

UNUC - Supply Categories of U.S. Army Support by Calendar Quarter.

Quarter Ending	Signal		Ordnance		Quartermaster		Engineer	
	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	S.	M.
1) 30 Sep 60	-	11	1	50	-	26	-	-
Transactions:	\$ -	\$ 7,157	\$ 44	\$ 37,270	\$ -	\$ 136,838	\$ -	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2) 31 Dec 60	-	52	-	-	6	48	-	-
Transactions:	-	67,983	-	-	26,616	278,893	-	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3) 31 Mar 61	-	46	-	-	-	14	-	-
Transactions:	-	86,382	-	-	-	474,368	-	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4) 30 Jun 61	-	203	-	2	-	41	1	-
Transactions:	-	75,304	-	124	-	183,391	8,080	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5) 30 Sep 61	-	155	-	3	1	16	-	-
Transactions:	-	38,803	-	28	9,016	139,675	-	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6) 30 Nov 61	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	17,769	-	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7) 31 Dec 61	-	36	-	4	-	8	18	-
Transactions:	-	27,197	-	122	-	2,571	8,330	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8) 31 Mar 62	-	96	-	25	-	7	1	-
Transactions:	-	141,427	-	3,708	-	596	1,630	-
Amount:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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ANNEX H

Quarter Ending	Signal		Ordnance		Quartermaster		Engineer	
	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	S.	M.
9) 30 Jun 62	-	70	-	10	-	1	-	-
Transactions:	-	23,202	-	378	-	5	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-		-	-
10) 30 Sep 62	-	40	-	8	-	3	-	-
Transactions:	-	187,842	-	178	-	2,616	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-		-	-
11) 31 Dec 62	-	-	-	3	-	-	37	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	59	-	-	529	-
Amount:	-		-		-			-
12) 31 Mar 63	-	7	-	4	-	10	-	-
Transactions:	-	6,591	-	227,570	-	120,697	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-		-	-
13) 30 Jun 63	-	13	-	3	-	4	-	-
Transactions:	-	27,429	-	674	-	426	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-		-	-
14) 30 Sep 63	1	8	-	1	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	361	7,939	-	706	-	-	-	-
Amount:			-		-		-	-
15) 31 Dec 63	-	5	-	-	-	1	-	-
Transactions:	-	1,839	-	-	-	1,988	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-		-	-
16) 31 Mar 63	-	4	-	1	-	4	-	-
Transactions:	-	5,167	-	826	-	2,391	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-		-	-

374

Quarter Ending	Signal		Ordnance		Quartermaster		Engineer	
	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	S.	M.
17) 30 Jun 64	-	3	-	2	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	893	-	9,614	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
18) 30 Sep 64	-	3	-	18	1	1	-	-
Transactions:	-	711	-	1,173	30	990	-	-
Amount:	-		-				-	-
19) 31 Dec 64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
20) 31 Mar 65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
21) 30 Jun 65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
22) 30 Sep 65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
23) 31 Dec 65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
24) 31 Mar 66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Transactions:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amount:	-		-		-	-	-	-
Total	1	752	1	134	8	189	57	
Transactions:								
Total Amount:	\$361	\$705,866	\$44	\$282,430	\$35,662	\$1,363,214	\$18,569	

	Transportation		Medical		Miscellaneous		HQ USA Europe & COMZEUR	
	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.
1)	\$ -	-	\$ -	-	\$ -	-	\$ -	374 938,283
2)	-	-	-	-	1 4,307	-	3 32,982	11 16,371
3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 9,033	5 3,277
4)	1 3,387	47 1,138,053	-	-	-	-	26 6,928	11 10,758
5)	-	18 923,972	-	-	-	-	3 1,060	-
6)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7)	-	-	-	1 669	-	-	9 962	8 67,602
8)	7 1,248	2 34,422	-	1 502	1 36,675	1 74	17 3,690	5 1,644

	Transportation		Medical		Miscellaneous		HQ USA Europe & COMZEUR	
	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.
9)	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	6
	-	-	104	-	-	-	77	2,890
10)	-	1	6	-	-	-	7	67
	-	42	1,020	-	-	-	165	3,450
11)	-	41	1	-	-	2	9	1
	-	3,443	108	-	-	64	292	7
12)	-	9	-	-	-	-	32	3
	-	27,845	-	-	-	-	6,328	187,821
13)	-	8	-	-	-	-	16	26
	-	77,786	-	1	-	-	653	2,835
				85				
14)	1	10	-	-	-	-	10	9
	12,588	219,219	-	-	-	-	3,198	14,137
15)	-	10	-	-	-	-	5	4
	-	11,012	-	-	-	-	1,097	165
16)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	9
	-	-	-	-	-	-	192	231

	Transportation		Medical		Miscellaneous		HQ USA Europe & CONZEUR	
	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.	Serv.	S. & M.
17)	-	4 21,551	-	-	-	-	6 636	7 58
18)	-	2 668	-	-	-	-	2 176	-
19)	-	-	-	-	-	-	6 101	75 107,058
20)	-	-	-	-	-	-	53 638	50 339
21)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4 27,548
22)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 15
23)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 688
24)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 8
ANNEX H								
9	152	9	3	2	3	223	680	
\$17,223	\$2,458,031	\$1,232	\$1,256	\$40,982	\$138	\$68,208	\$1,385,185	

	Accessorial Charges on S. & M.	Serv.	Total S. & M.	Grand Total
1)	\$179,128	\$ 1 44	461 \$1,298,676	\$1,298,720
2)	58,119	10 63,905	111 421,366	485,271
3)	90,244	10 9,033	65 654,270	663,303
4)	226,514	27 10,315	305 1,642,223	1,652,538
5)	176,396	4 10,076	192 1,278,874	1,288,950
6)	2,843	- -	5 20,613	20,613
7)	16,999	9 962	75 123,246	124,207
8)	29,440	25 41,613	138 255,056	255,056

	Accessorial Charges on S. & M.	Serv.	Total S. & M.	Grand Total
9)				
	4,236	7 181	109 30,711	30,892
10)				
	31,060	13 1,185	119 225,188	226,373
11)				
	656	10 400	84 4,758	5,158
12)				
	91,284	32 6,328	33 661,807	668,135
13)				
	17,478	16 653	55 126,712	127,365
14)				
	38,720	12 16,147	28 280,719	296,866
15)				
	2,401	5 1,097	20 17,405	18,501
16)				
	1,378	4 192	17 9,994	10,186

	Accessorial Charges on S. & M.	Serv.	Total S & M.	Grand Total
17)				
	5,138	6 636	16 37,254	37,890
18)				
	567	3 205	24 4,109	4,314
19)				
	17,129	6 101	75 124,187	124,288
20)				
	54	53 638	50 394	1,032
21)				
	4,408	-	4 31,955	31,955
22)				
	2	-	1 17	17
23)				
	110	-	3 798	798
24)				
	1	-	1 9	18
	\$994,315	253 \$163,711	1,991 \$7,250,341	\$7,177,187

U. S. CONGO AIRLIFT OPERATION 15 July 1960 - December 1960

15 July - 1 October 1960

from	to	type airlift	(lb) cargo	pas- sengers	Sorties		start	completed
					C-124	C-130		
Tunis	Leopoldville & Luluabourg	Tunisian troops & equip	463,796	2,612	33	17	15 Jul	3 Oct
Rabat & Sidi Slimane	Leopoldville	Moroccan troops & equip	776,160	3,179	52	9	16 Jul	22 Aug
Cairo	Leopoldville	Swedish troops & equip	379,315	637	12	9	19 Jul	26 Aug
Accra	Leopoldville	Ghana troops & equip	203,889	539	10	3	19 Jul	22 Jul
Conakry	Leopoldville	Guinea troops & equip	131,750	751	1	13	22 Jul	31 Jul
Roberts Field	Leopoldville	Liberian troops & equip	20,000	250	0	4	25 Jul	26 Jul
Addis Ababa	Kamina & Stanleyville	Ethiopian troops & equip	365,536	1,872	1	35	23 Jul	17 Aug
Dublin	Goma, Kindu & Kamina	Irish troops & equip	549,603	1,406	21	20	27 Jul	25 Aug
Karachi	Leopoldville	Pakistani troops & equip	106,409	540	7	5	31 Aug	28 Sep
New Delhi	Leopoldville	Indian troops & equip	208,234	662	11	7	20 Aug	28 Sep
Juba & Khartoum	Leopoldville	Sudanese troops & equip	109,547	370	3	6	16 Aug	17 Aug
Dakar	Leopoldville	Mali troops & equip	187,169	574	15	0	2 Aug	6 Aug
Cairo	Coquilhatville	United Arab Republic troops & equip	39,193	515	0	17	20 Aug	24 Aug
Chateauroux, Bordeaux, & Rhein-Main	Leopoldville	food	1,948,115	0	43	30	15 Jul	10 Aug
Lome	Leopoldville	food	200,000	0	0	7	17 Jul	18 Jul
Malmo & Gardermoen	Leopoldville	8 Super Cubs & 2 Other Acft	200,000	0	3	0	28 Jul	1 Aug
European Continent	Congo	miscellaneous	624,521	351	20	8	16 Jul	15 Sep
Flight Support		troops & equip	476,390	1,802	0	41	16 Jul	31 Jul

Chateauroux, Bordeaux, & Rhein-Main	Leopoldville	food	1,948,115	0	43	30	15 Jul	10 Aug
Lome	Leopoldville	food	200,000	0	0	7	17 Jul	18 Jul
Malmo & Gardermoen	Leopoldville	6 Super Cubs & 2 Otter Acft	200,000	0	3	0	28 Jul	1 Aug
European Continent	Congo	miscellaneous	624,521	351	20	8	16 Jul	15 Sep
Flight Support		troops & equip	476,390	1,802	0	41	16 Jul	31 Jul
Elisabethville, Kamina, & Kitona	Brussels	Belgian	93,381	1,757	20	11	27 Aug	29 Sep
Congo	European Continent	miscellaneous	125,098	34	5	0	16 Aug	2 Oct
Congo	European	refugees		2,540			15 Jul	3 Oct
Subtotal initial airlift			3,502 tons	20,391	257	242		

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1 October - 31 December 1960*

from	to	type airlift	(lb) cargo	pas-sengers	Sorties C-124 C-130	start	completed
Kano	Kindu	Nigerian troops & equip	235,000	650	25	9 Nov	23 Nov
Kindu	Dakar	Mali troops & equip	70,000	314	na		
Kindu	Abidjan	Mali troops & equip	56,000	258	na		23 Nov
Vienna	Stanleyville	Austrian hospital unit	142,000	63	na	4 Dec	13 Dec
Lagos	Leopoldville	Nigerian troops & equip	na	na	na	18 Dec	22 Dec
Leopoldville	Morocco	Moroccan troops & equip	na	na	na	18 Dec	22 Dec
Flight support			2,218,000	1,668	264		
subtotal 1 Oct - 31 Dec 60			4,558 tons	11,862	582		
Grand Total 15 July - 31 December 1960			8,060 tons	32,253	839	242	

* Figures in this portion of the table do not add due to non-availability of information on the individual missions. The subtotal figures are from a U.S. Air Force Special Historical Report.

15 July - 1 October 1960 portion: "The Cargo Airlift" Brig. Gen. Tarleton H. Watkins, Air University Quarterly Review, Summer 1961, Vol XIII No. 1, p. 23; 1 October - 31 December 1960 portion: History, 1602d Air Transport Wing, July-December 1960, pp. 23-25.

ANNEX I

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USAF ROTATIONAL, RESUPPLY AND CARGO AIRLIFTS
FOR ONUC 1962 - EARLY 1963

ANNEX 1

A. Rotations:

1. Ethiopian - 24 June-9 July 1962
147 sorties; 5,905 passengers
37 tons of cargo; 1,618 flying hours
2. Swedish - 10-16 October 1962
10 South-bound sorties; 510 passengers; 27.5 tons of cargo
9 North-bound sorties; 554 passengers; 12.8 tons of cargo
(first use in cargo airlift of C-135 jet aircraft, flying non-stop Stockholm to Leopoldville in 9 hours 20 minutes)
3. Irish - 7-15 November 1962
15 South-bound sorties; 696 passengers; 45.1 tons of cargo
14 North-bound sorties; 581 passengers; 16.7 tons of cargo
(8 C-118 and 1 C-133 aircraft)
4. Norwegian - 8-17 January 1963
334 passengers; 29.8 tons of cargo;
12 sorties (4 C-118, 1 C-124 aircraft)
5. Tunisian - 1-8 March 1963
1,013 passengers; 51.9 tons of cargo
(12 C-135 missions, 4 C-118 missions, 3 C-124 missions)
6. Swedish - 18 April-1 May 1963
South-bound - 460 passengers; 16.6 tons of cargo
North-bound - 623 passengers; 11.4 tons of cargo
(2 C-135, 3 C-118 aircraft)
7. Ethiopian - 17 April-1 May 1963
12 C-130E missions from Elizabethville - 672 passengers; 43.1 tons of cargo
15 C-118 missions from Stanleyville - 590 passengers; 56.6 tons of cargo

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ANNEX J

8. Irish - 19 April-7 May 1963
North-bound - 771 passengers; 40 tons of cargo
South-bound - 496 passengers; 33 tons of cargo
(16 C-135 missions, 6 C-118 missions 1 C-130 mission)
9. Ethiopian - 4-11 June-12-17 June 1963
South-bound - 1,643 troops; 18 tons of cargo
North-bound - 1,664 troops; 100.6 tons of cargo (50 missions)
10. Iranian - 22-26 June 1963
27 passengers; 25 tons of cargo
(2 C-124 aircraft)
11. Philippine - 18-23 June 1963
27 passengers; 22.5 tons of cargo
(2 C-135 aircraft)

B. Resupply Airlift - (Mildenhall, England/Wheelus/Leopoldville)

<u>Month</u>	<u>C-124 Missions</u>
July 1962	4
August	5
September	5
October	5
November	4
December	8
January 1963	10
February	7
March	5
April	3
May	4
June 1963	4

C. Cargo Airlifts

1. Italian aircraft engines and generator - July 1962
12.5 tons
2. Jet engines, August 1962

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ANNEX J

3. Swedish aircraft - October-November 1962
2 S-29C photo-reconnaissance aircraft
16.8 tons plus 20 passengers (2 C-133 aircraft)
4. Trucks - 23 trucks between Leopoldville and Albertville,
December 1962 (3 C-124 aircraft)
5. Armored Personnel Carriers - 65 tons, Stuttgart to
Elizabethville 2-4 January 1963 (3 C-133 aircraft)
6. Ammunition - 8.3 tons mine-clearing devices from U.S.
to Leopoldville 1 January 1963; 61.5 tons
ammunition from U.S. 7-13 January 1963; 30 tons
ammunition from Stockholm 6-11 January 1963
(2 C-124, 1 C-135, 1 C-133 aircraft)
7. Fuel Dispensing System - 17.5 tons from U.S. to Kamina
and Elizabethville 7-12 January 1963.
8. Boats - 30 assault boats, 4 water trailers - 19 tons -
from Mildenhall to Elizabethville 9-11 January 1963
9. Tents, Cots, Ammunition - 16 tons from Copenhagen to
Elizabethville 1-2 February 1963 (2 C-118 aircraft)
10. Bridging - 50 tons of Bailey bridging from Mildenhall to
Elizabethville February 1963 (2 C-124 aircraft)
11. Intra-Congo - 6 Anti-Aircraft guns (5 tons), 3 power
units (10.5 tons) from Elizabethville to Albertville;
4 vans, 17 trucks, 1 ambulance (135.4 tons) from
Kamina to Leopoldville, 18-23 June 1963 (2 C-124
aircraft)

ANNEX K

Procedures for United States Assistance provided
in support of United Nations Activities associated
with the Republic of the Congo

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this document is to establish procedures for United States assistance provided in support of United Nations activities associated with the Congo.

2. DEFINITIONS:

a. Operational and/or Special Requests are those requests requiring UN and/or US Government certification and validation. This category will include requests for personnel evacuation, special transportation assistance, (both surface and air), complete aircraft, vehicles, ground radars, communications and other principal items of equipment.

b. Routine Material Support Requests are those requests not categorized as Operational and/or Special Requests. Requests for maintenance and technical services, individual and organizational equipment, rations, exchange items, and spare parts for aircraft and equipment will be considered routine unless they are determined by EXAREUR to be of excessive magnitude or to involve material which cannot be spared from European stocks.

c. ONUC (Organization Nations Unies Congo) United Nations Operations in the Republic of the Congo.

d. EXAREUR Department of Defense Executive Agent European Representative at Chateauroux Air Station, France.

3. GENERAL ONUC SUPPORT PRINCIPLES:

a. Sources of ONUC Support:

(1) Nations providing Forces for the ONUC will provide required logistic support for such Forces whenever possible.

(2) Logistics support that cannot be provided by participating Nations in accordance with the above, will be provided, as authorized by the United Nations, from commercial sources whenever possible.

ANNEX K

(3) Logistics support that cannot be provided by Nations providing Forces to the ONUC or from contractual sources, will be provided by other UN members upon specific request by the UN.

b. US-ONUC Support:

(1) The United Nations will establish a support system which will insure that: (a) All routine requests for assistance from the US Government to the ONUC will be transmitted through the UN/Pisa, Italy, office to the designated US Department of Defense Executive Agent European Representative, EXAREUR (AMFTA) at Chateauroux Air Station, France; (b) Operational and/or Special Requests for US department of Defense assistance to the ONUC will be transmitted through UN and appropriate US Government channels.

(2) All ONUC requests for assistance from the US Government will be identified with a US/ONUC assist number prior to being transmitted to the US Government for necessary action.

(3) Liaison personnel, as required, will be provided by the UN between the established ONUC support system and the US Government support system to the ONUC.

(4) Routine US Government support assistance to the ONUC will be provided to the maximum extent from European resources, or supplied from continental US sources if not available in the European area, with the exception of requests for exchange items which will be supplied from the US. Operational and/or Special Requests for assistance may be fulfilled from either European area assets or from US sources, whichever may be within capabilities of the United States.

(5) It is not contemplated that United States military personnel will be assigned to the ONUC nor will US supporting facilities be established in the ONUC area under the supervision of the ONUC.

(6) The United Nations will be responsible for arranging for the onward movement of U.S. assistance furnished from designated U.S. supply sources, unless other specific arrangements are made upon submission of the US/ONUC assist request.

4. SPECIFIC: ONUC requests for assistance will fall in two categories as pertains to US assistance:

ANNEX K

a. Routine Material Support Requests will be forwarded to the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Agent Representative, Europe, EXAREUR, by the United Nations Administrative Office, Pisa, Italy. These requests will be filled from European sources whenever possible.

(1) EXAREUR will forward the request to the appropriate activity in Europe for action.

(2) The appropriate supply sources selected by EXAREUR will fulfill the request for supplies from stocks available in the European area and forward in accordance with transportation arrangements included in the request.

(3) If requested supply action cannot be completed by the EXAREUR designated activities in Europe, EXAREUR may request an activity to fill the requirement from the appropriate U. S. supply source. The US source will take necessary action to supply the requirement and ship to ONUC as requested by the UN.

(4) EXAREUR will develop jointly with the United Nations Administrative Office, Pisa, Italy, and other interested U.S. organizations the procedures for accomplishing this procedure for routine support of the ONUC.

b. Operational and/or Special Requests:


(1) All operational and/or special requests will be submitted by the United Nations to the Chief Administrative Officer of the US Mission to the UN and screened by the Military Staff Committee of the US Mission.

(2) The US Mission to the UN will forward the US/ONUC assist to the Department of State.

(3) The U.S. Department of State, after certifying, will forward the US/ONUC assist to the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Agent.

5. FINANCIAL:

Billings for logistic support will be submitted to the UN through the Department of State for payment.



ONUC

Estimated Unliquidated Obligations Due to Member States as
at 30 September 1965

(In thousands of US dollars)

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Estimated Unliquidated Obligations</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Austria	49	
Brazil	9	
Canada	766	Also due to Canada is an amount of \$957,755 representing ONUC claims approved for reimbursement which are recorded in accounts payable pending disbursement to Canada.
Denmark	200	
Ethiopia	7,520	For eventual offset against the estimated unliquidated obligations due to Ethiopia of \$7,520,000 is an amount of \$5,835,728 recorded in accounts receivable as due from Ethiopia representing advances it received against its ONUC claims pending their settlement.
Ghana	1,390	For eventual offset against the estimated unliquidated obligations due to Ghana of \$1,390,000 is an amount of \$171,197 recorded in accounts receivable as due from Ghana for goods and services rendered by ONUC.
India	3,625	
Indonesia	608	
Iran	25	

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Estimated Unliquidated Obligations</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Ireland	160	
Italy	1,915	For eventual offset against the estimated unliquidated obligations due to Italy of \$1,915,000 is an amount of \$522,061 recorded in accounts receivable as due from Italy representing goods rendered by ONUC and advances Italy received against its ONUC claims pending their settlement.
Liberia	225	
Malaysia	1,840	For eventual offset against the estimated unliquidated obligations due to Malaysia of \$1,840,000 is an amount of \$32,300 recorded in accounts receivable as due from Malaysia representing advances it received against its ONUC claims pending their settlement.
Nigeria	955	
Norway	340	
Pakistan	320	
Philippines	90	
Senegal	105	
Sudan	2	
Sweden	725	Also due to Sweden is an amount of \$642,823 representing ONUC claims approved for reimbursement which are recorded in accounts payable pending disbursement to Sweden.

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Estimated Unliquidated Obligations</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Tunisia	24	
United Arab Republic	125	
United States of America	5,121	For eventual offset against the estimated unliquidated obligations due to the United States of \$5,121,000 is an amount of \$602,446 recorded in accounts receivable as due from the United States for goods and services rendered by ONUC.
TOTAL	26,138	Accounts Payable \$1,600,578; Accounts Receivable \$7,163,732

- Notes: 1. The estimated unliquidated obligations, as shown above, were unchanged as of 31 March 1966 (see A/6289/Add. 1, 31 March 1966, Annex V, pp 22-23, 26-27).
2. Incomplete information as of early 1968 indicates that of the above unliquidated obligations the following have been settled: Indonesia, Italy, Malaya and UAR.
3. The total reimbursable costs of contingents (including the above unliquidated obligations as well as those for which reimbursement has been made) is shown in Annex N of this paper under the heading "Cost to the UN."

ONUC
COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SUPPORT COST DATA
FOR CONTINGENT CONTRIBUTORS

Country	Unpaid Assessments (\$1,000) (as of 7 April 1969) (See Annex O)	Voluntary Contributions (\$1,000) (See Annex P)	Contingent ¹ Man-months	Cost to ² UN (\$1,000)	Cost per ³ Man-month
1. Argentina	\$ -	\$ -	747	\$ 586	\$ 784
2. Austria	-	35	1,334	1,123	842
3. Brazil	249	-	1,563	1,651	1,056
4. Burma	-	-	54	*	*
5. Canada	-	263	13,322	6,868	516
6. Ceylon	-	-	206	6	29
7. Denmark	-	50	4,542	2,539	559
8. Ecuador	4	-	8	6	750
9. Ethiopia	-	-	119,226	13,052	109
10. Ghana	-	-	39,203	1,219	31
11. Greece	-	-	188	44	234
12. Guinea	10	-	4,475	282	63
13. India	-	-	142,704	12,031	84

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ANNEX N

Country	Unpaid Assessments (\$1,000) (as of 7 April 1969) (See Annex O)	Voluntary Contributions (\$1,000) (See Annex P)	Contingent ¹ Man-Months	Cost to ² UN (\$1000)	Cost per ³ Man-month
14. Indonesia	-	-	28,460	4,421	155
15. Iran	-	-	198	25	126
16. Ireland	-	8	35,654	5,325	149
17. Italy	-	-	4,020	4,053	1,008
18. Liberia	-	-	9,558	680	71
19. Malaya (Malaysia)	-	-	37,044	2,046	55
20. Mali/Senegal	44	-	2,292	151	66
21. Morocco	-	-	23,668	2,106	89
22. Netherlands	-	80	435	345	793
23. New Zealand	-	32	10	.	.
24. Nigeria	-	-	63,617	2,881	45
25. Norway	-	38	7,023	4,184	596
26. Pakistan	-	-	27,904	542	19
27. Philippines	-	-	278	90	324
28. Sierra Leone	-	-	1,010	44	27

<u>Country</u>	<u>Unpaid Assessments</u> (\$1,000) (as of 7 April 1969) (See Annex O)	<u>Voluntary Contributions</u> (\$1,000) (See Annex P)	<u>Contingent Man-months</u>	<u>Cost to UN</u> (\$1000)	<u>Cost per Man-month</u>
29. Sudan	6	-	3,652	348	95
30. Sweden	-	113	37,109	20,758	559
31. Tunisia	-	-	48,368	2,747	57
32. UAR	48	-	3,059	459	150
33. Yugoslavia	333	-	91	40	440
			TOTAL	TOTAL	AVERAGE
			661,622 ¹	90,652 ²	1383

* Figure not available, considered insignificant.

¹ Source: Lefever (ACDA Study) Vol. 3, Appendix H, Chart B. The Congolese contingent contribution of 12,953 man-months to ONUC is excluded.

² Source: A/6289/Add. 1, 31 March 1966, Annex V, pp. 22-23, 26-27. Not all the UN costs have been paid. Depending on how various offsets and advances are treated, something between \$9 and \$20 million remains unpaid.

³ The cost per man-month figure clearly must be viewed with caution since it ignores differences in contingent composition (e.g. officer = enlisted ratio), equipment scales and losses.

ANNEX O

CONGO ASSESSMENTS OUTSTANDING
AS OF 7 APRIL 1969

1.*Afghanistan	\$ 31,604	30. Mauretania	\$ 17,215
2. Albania	43,602	31. Mexico	786,193
3.*Bolivia	34,833	32. Mongolia	17,215
4.*Brazil	248,838	33.*Nepal	3,240
5. Bulgaria	190,746	34. Nicaragua	33,916
6. Burundi	10,471	35. Panama	33,916
7. Byelorussia SSR	1,357,881	36.*Paraguay	24,229
8.*Central African Rep	6,589	37. Peru	89,184
9.*Chad	9,832	38. Poland	2,466,010
10. Chile	224,847	39. Portugal	201,673
11.*China	6,687,207	40. Romania	641,015
12.*Congo (Brazzaville)	9,938	41. Rwanda	10,471
13.*Costa Rica	7,218	42. Saudi Arabia	69,487
14. Cuba	260,259	43.*Senegal	20,418
15. Czechoslovakia	2,759,408	44.*Somalia	17,445
16.*Dahomey	6,994	45. South Africa	1,503,337
17. Dominican Republic	54,503	46. Spain	985,159
18.*Ecuador	4,102	47.*Sudan	5,860
19.*El Salvador	3,349	48. Syria	20,379
20. France	17,031,152	49. Togo	25,325
21.*Guatemala	38,209	50. Uganda	10,471
22.*Guinea	9,938	51. Ukrainian SSR	5,185,697
23. Haiti	33,916	52. U.S.S.R.	39,223,085
24.*Honduras	5,677	53.*UAR	48,387
25. Hungary	995,024	54.*Upper Volta	14,145
26.*Iraq	22,362	55. Uruguay	97,662
27. Jordan	43,602	56. Yemen	43,602
28.*Lebanon	12,108	57.*Yugoslavia	333,269
29.*Mali	24,259		
			<hr/> \$82,102,487

* Indicates those 25 countries which paid a portion of their Congo assessments.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CONGO AD HOC ACCOUNT¹

Australia	\$ 128,500	
Austria	34,900	
Canada	263,000	
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	3,200,000	(local currency)
Denmark	50,286	
Finland	26,879	
Ireland	8,000	
Japan	115,352	
Netherlands	79,694	
New Zealand	31,918	
Norway	38,000	
Sweden	112,500	
UK	585,000	
U.S.	<u>33,078,986</u>	
TOTAL A	\$37,753,015	
TOTAL B (excluding local currency)	34,553,015	
U.S. Contribution:		87.6% of A 95.7% of B

¹ A/6289/Add. 1, 31 March 1966, Annex V p 31.

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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
FORCE IN CYPRUS

(UNFICYP)

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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS
(UNFICYP)

I

INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

The Cyprus peacekeeping operation has great interest for the current study since it provides an example of one type of support arrangement often recommended by students of UN peacekeeping: logistical support by a single large power on behalf of the UN. Consequently, it is this aspect--support arrangements by the British--that will receive most emphasis. The uniqueness of the support arrangements for UNFICYP must, however, be constantly kept in mind. It is almost impossible to conceive of a future peacekeeping operation in which such optimal conditions for support would be pre-existing, fully energized, completely available and, in all respects, more than adequate for the task.

Accordingly, while we can look at UNFICYP as the model of an "ideal peacekeeping operation" from the national support viewpoint, UNFICYP serves better as a yardstick against which to measure and compare support aspects of more typical peacekeeping operations rather than as a pattern itself for any future application. Military forces, even UN peacekeeping forces, are prodigious consumers of materiel, supplies and services. Problems arise when they deploy in the field and must provide for their own needs. In Cyprus, fortunately, the peacekeeping force is from this point of view operating on the "supermarket parking lot." Consequently the logistical tasks boil down to the still important but less vital ones of providing for special needs and developing the highest order of efficiency and economy in what is essentially an "off-the-shelf" support system.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND¹

Human beings have lived on Cyprus since probably before 5000 B.C., and in the late Bronze Age (1600-1050 B.C.) the

¹ Among recent books, background on Cyprus and the development of the current dispute are to be found in almost any

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island was already a commercial center. Somewhere around 1200-1000 B.C. the island became distinctly Hellenic in race and culture and, despite repeated conquest and occupation by other races and cultures through all the years that followed, remains basically Greek today. Among the foreign occupiers were the Ottoman Turks who as relative newcomers, controlled the island from 1571 to 1878. The British took over after the Turks. Among the legacies of the Ottoman period were a Turkish minority population on Cyprus (loosely estimated today at 20 per cent, but more precisely calculated at 18.2 per cent of the population but with only 12.6 per cent of the income),¹ a heightened ethnocentrism in the Greek Cypriot majority (80 per cent loosely or 77.1 per cent precisely, with 80.2 per cent of the income), and the symbolization in the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and its "Autocephalous Archbishopric" of all the hopes and fears of the Greek Cypriots.

Despite this basis for internal strife, existing for 400 years or so in Cyprus, the two populations coexisted on the island in relative harmony so long as they were under Turkish and then British colonial rule.

Political agitation for the island's independence occurred from time to time, but from about 1830 onwards the focal point for the majority Cypriot community became enosis, or union with the newly independent Greece.

detail the reader desires. T.W. Adams, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Cyprus (Washington: GPO, 1964), in 435 pages, deals with social and economic factors as well as political and security matters. James A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968), in 227 pages, concentrates on UNFICYP. Briefer treatments are in Thomas W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell, Cyprus Between East and West (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) and Linda B. Miller, Cyprus-The Law and Politics of Legal Strife (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 19, June 1968).

- 1 The precise figures for the Greek-Turkish-Cypriot population and income shares are from Stahis S. Panagides, "Communal Conflict and Economic Considerations: The Case of Cyprus," Journal of Peace Research (Oslo, 1968), No. 2, p. 138.

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Cyprus played a minor role in World War I. Following the war, agitation against the British colonialists increased, in tune with the ideas of self-determination then current and, in 1931 Government House was burned down by enosis rioters.

As World War II came along, the Cypriots, fearing Italian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, loyally supported the British war effort with about 19,000 Cypriot volunteers. The island's location was important to allied strategy but Cyprus actually played little part in the war. During the war years the British made certain concessions to the Cypriots, permitting in 1941 the creation of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), and in 1943 the holding of the first municipal elections since the trouble in 1931.

AKEL (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Lao or Progressive Party of the Working People) was from its inception clearly a communist party. It showed surprising strength in the 1943 municipal elections winning control in two of the large coastal cities (Famagusta and Limassol). In terms of percentage of the population AKEL is one of the largest communist parties in the noncommunist world, second only to Italy.¹

C. THE EMERGENCY 1955-1958

Following the war, agitation for independence/enosis became increasingly intense. In 1950 the present Archbishop, Makarios III (then age 37) was elevated to fill the uniquely important position as head of the Cypriot Orthodox Church. In the following few years the positions of the governments of Greece and Turkey became more rigidly opposed on the Cyprus issue and violent agitation on Cyprus found a spearhead in EOKA (Ethnika Organosis Kyprion Agoniston or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

After refusal of the UN to discuss a Greek petition on the subject and a fruitless tripartite meeting among Britain, Greece and Turkey in 1955, Britain declared a state of emergency, deported Makarios (1956) and waged an anti-EOKA campaign on the island, where its garrison rose to as high as 20,000 troops.

¹ Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 14.

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About 600 people lost their lives on Cyprus in the violence of these four years. As the emergency dragged on the Turkish Cypriots became increasingly identified with the British, whose side they took as the enemy of Cyprus. The wartime harmony between the two communities and of the Greek Cypriots with the British completely evaporated.

The UN General Assembly passed an innocuous resolution on the Cyprus issue in 1957. The British used (or misused, in anti-British Cypriot eyes) their Cyprus bases to launch the 1956 Anglo-French operation into Suez and the 1958 movement of British troops to Jordan. Although violence had somewhat subsided, all the basic problems remained unsolved in late 1958 when, through the initiative of NATO Secretary-General Paul Henri Spaak, conferences were arranged that led eventually to the 1959 Zurich Agreements and later London Agreements and the terms for setting up the independent Republic of Cyprus.

D. INDEPENDENCE 1960-1963

The Zurich and London Agreements were tripartite, United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; any direct Cyprus voice was excluded. It could be said that the complicated scheme worked out for Cyprus' future, while apparently a masterpiece of compromise diplomacy, was doomed to failure from the start. Given complete cooperation by all parties or in an era when larger states could order the affairs of smaller or client states without much difficulty, the arrangements might have worked. But the World in 1960 was not that sort of World and any optimism about cooperation in the Cyprus situation seemed unwarranted.

Nevertheless, Cyprus became a constitutional, independent republic on 16 August 1960 with a split executive, with proportional ethnic representation on varying scales in government and security forces which favored the Turkish minority, with the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey having military forces on the island and joint or separate rights of intervention in Cyprus, and with about 100 square miles of British "sovereign" base areas within its national territory.¹ None of the basic arrangements, which were

¹ Adams, op. cit., p. 232, points out that almost any aspect of the Cyprus independence arrangements was negotiable for the British except the sovereign nature of their future Cyprus bases.

incorporated into the country's constitution as well as in three separate treaties, was subject to amendment, and both enosis and taksim (partition) were forever forbidden. Constitutional controversy was to be decided by a three-man Supreme Constitutional Court which would have one judge from each of the Cypriot communities and a third judge from outside.

E. THE CRISIS

The constitutional system, with its extraordinary features for protecting--in fact fostering--the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority and with its humiliating limitations on Cypriot independence, did not work from the start. Three key provisions could not be implemented: First, the Turkish weighted share of the bureaucracy could not be achieved fast enough to suit the Turkish Cypriots. Second, the manner and level of integrating the two communities in the 2,000-man Cypriot Army could not be agreed on. Third, and perhaps most important, agreement could not be reached on the provision for separate Turkish Cypriot councils in the five largest cities since the Greek community would not accept the geographical basis on which the Turkish Cypriots insisted.¹ Funds to run the government could not be collected or allotted. These deadlocks brought the government almost to a standstill and, as frustrations deepened, incidents of inter-communal violence spread. Finally, on 30 November 1963, Makarios proposed a list of 13 amendments to the constitutional system to the Turkish Cypriot Vice President of Cyprus, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, and to the Guarantee Powers. While these proposed amendments might have seemed both wise and necessary to a disinterested student of government, they were instantly rejected by the Turkish government in Ankara followed shortly afterwards by the Turkish community on Cyprus.

A few days later in December 1963 communal fighting broke out and soon developed into pitched battles between the two Cypriot groups; and the peacekeeping machinery wheels began to turn. In the week containing Christmas Day 1963 probably about 100 were killed on each side, with several times that number wounded, captured or missing; and on Christmas Day Turkish jet aircraft buzzed Nicosia and Turkish warships were observed in waters "near" the island (since the Turkish coast

¹ Stegenga, op. cit., p. 29.

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is only 40 miles from Cyprus, any movement of naval units could be seen, or depicted, as a threat).

At the suggestion of the British government, Makarios agreed that troops of the three Guarantee Powers (U.K., Greece, Turkey) on Cyprus, under British command, would perform peacekeeping patrols in Nicosia starting 27 December.¹ The British reinforced their 7,000-man Cyprus garrison with a 750-man battalion from the United Kingdom and a 350-man armored car squadron from their base in Libya. Turkey requested U.S. unilateral intervention, but the U.S. chose only to support the British effort.²

The Cyprus representative called for a meeting of the UN Security Council but at the meeting on 27 December, other than exchanges of charges and counter-charges, no action was taken.

Still within the UN forum, the three Guarantee Powers, with Makarios' approval, arranged with the Secretary-General for the assignment of a UN Representative on Cyprus to observe the situation (Indian Lt. Gen. Prem Singh Gyani, who had previously commanded both UNEF and UNYOM and been in the ICC in Laos, was named to this task on 16 January 1964).

During the next month, while the situation on Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey continued to worsen, attention centered on British efforts, with strong U.S. backing, to relieve themselves of at least part of the Cyprus peacekeeping onus. Proposals were developed for a 10,000-man NATO force (including U.S. troops) with a non-NATO, but Western, mediator; there was also a Commonwealth force version. But Makarios, knowing he could count on support of the Soviet Bloc and the Afro-Asians, and aware that Britain was somewhat "over a barrel" with troops committed in the East

¹ The British representative in the Security Council meeting of 18 February 1964 gave a blow-by-blow account of these developments from late December 1963 to 18 February 1964. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus and the Turkish representative replied with their versions of the same events. S/PV/1095, 18 February 1964, pp. 22-49.

² Stegenga, op. cit., p. 35.

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African mutinies and both unwilling and perhaps unable to carry on its frustrating role in Cyprus, held out for UN action. Just exactly what Makarios wanted from the UN and what his motives were is debatable. Stegenga implies that Makarios probably engineered the whole thing; that he did not want a UN peacekeeping force; he merely wanted UN protection from Turkey so as to solve the island's communal problems by employing, as necessary, his own superior forces. He viewed the Turkish Cypriots in a way as rebels a la Tshombe in the Congo.¹

In any case, with British and American and NATO and Commonwealth approaches stymied and with predictions of Turkish invasion and Greco-Turkish war rampant, Britain threw the problem to the UN Security Council where debate began on 18 February and ended three weeks later with the authorization of UNFICYP on 4 March 1964.

Before examining the Security Council resolution of 4 March which was (and is) the mandate for the UN Cyprus Peacekeeping Operation, we should pause just a moment to bring into some perspective the central character in the story--Cyprus. Despite its long and colorful history, and its central place in the world's limelight after World War II, we should keep in mind that Cyprus is a tiny island on the scale of Puerto Rico, with a population of just over half a million, or on the order of Denver, Colorado. Its role has never been more than that of a pawn in the World chess game. It has inadequate water, no good ports, insufficient food supply and few valuable resources beyond its pleasant climate and scenery. Its population might be described as friendly and placid. That the problems of this fairy-tale island should threaten world peace in the nuclear era and have the statesmen of the world scrambling around for solutions while a few excitable politicians on Cyprus, concerned only with local issues and overwhelmed with the world attention being paid them, kept throwing monkey wrenches in the peace machinery

¹ Stegenga, op. cit., pp. 66-67. One author suggests that at one stage in these developments, Makarios was proposing an Arab League peacekeeping force for Cyprus, Robert W. MacDonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 240.

has suggested to some observers the need to look for new approaches. While it is far beyond the scope and objectives of this study to consider other than the peacekeeping aspects of the Cyprus situation, one can not help but wonder if the "knee-jerk" character of the peacekeeping response does not sometimes permit the system to be "used" against the better purposes of stable world peace.¹

II

THE MANDATE AND PHASES

A. MANDATE

In addition to the five permanent members, the Security Council of the UN in February-March 1964 consisted of Bolivia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, Norway and Morocco. Mr. Bernardes of Brazil was Council President in February and Mr. Liu of China in March. Cyprus, Greece and Turkey as non-Council members were invited to participate in the Security Council debates on the Cyprus question, and a representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community, Mr. Ranf Denktas, made a long statement before the Security Council on 28 February.²

The resolution adopted unanimously on 4 March 1964, which led to the establishment of UNFICYP, was arrived at

¹ See the following on the idea that the Cyprus crisis and the resulting UN peacekeeping operation were to a degree instruments for the ambitions of a few men: Adams and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 11. Stegenga, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 43-46, 57-66; and the Turkish representative in the Security Council S/PV/1095, 18 February 1964, pp. 76-102. The French representative in the Security Council, during several of the 18 votes (as of June 1969) to extend or reaffirm the mandate for UNFICYP, has expressed the view that the continuing presence of the force may hinder rather than help settlement of the problem; e.g. S/PV 1474, 10 June 1969, p. 43.

² The Cyprus issue was debated during this period, leading to the 4 March 1964 resolution, from the 1094th to the 1102d Security Council meetings; 17, 18, 19, 25, 27 and 28 Feb, and 2, 3, and 4 March 1964; the relevant verbatim records are S/PV/1094-1102, 17 Feb 1964-4 March 1964; the resolution is S/5575.

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through laborious consultations in which the February Council President, Mr. Bernardes, played a leading role. The Secretary-General also played a prominent part in these consultations. The resolution was sponsored by Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Norway and Morocco, and introduced by Brazil.

Since every significant word and certainly every sentence of the resolution--preambulatory and operative portions--was arrived at only after an agonizing balancing act by its sponsors among the widely split views of the most concerned parties, it deserves to be seen in full:

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS
1102ND MEETING ON 4 MARCH 1964

The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution.

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,"

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional

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measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him.

The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United

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Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

The resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously; however the Soviet representative required a separate vote on operative paragraph 4, and on this vote Czechoslovakia and France with the Soviet Union abstained. The Soviet representative explained his position before the vote; the Czech and French, following the vote. The French objections to paragraph 4 and lukewarmness towards the whole idea was based on principle and not on the Cyprus situation, involving French reservations on UN intervention in military form and, specifically, on the delegation of so much of the Security Council's responsibility to the Secretary-General.

The Soviet and Czech positions were the same they followed throughout the Cyprus debates preceding the resolution passage. They vigorously supported the Cyprus government position and sought Security Council action which would, in effect if not explicitly, deny any right of intervention in Cyprus by the Guarantee Powers, especially Turkey. In their view, with such Security Council protection for Cyprus, a peacekeeping force would not be necessary. Soviet and Czech affirmative votes on the final resolution as a whole were therefore somewhat reluctant and were justified on the basis that the government of Cyprus agreed to the Security Council action.¹

¹ After 18 affirmative Soviet votes extending or reaffirming the UNFICYP mandate, the Soviet representative in the Security Council was still saying on 10 June 1969 "the Soviet Union from the very beginning did not consider the presence of these forces on Cyprus as justified, and we continue to adhere to that view." S/PV/1474, 10 June 1969, p. 56.

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The significance of the resolution, from one point of view, is that it permitted the peacekeeping operation to be launched. It certainly did not do much otherwise to settle the problems. Each side in the Cyprus dispute, selectively emphasizing those parts of the resolution which pleased it, interpreted it as a stimulus for pushing forward on the same track as before. In fact violence on the island somewhat increased after the resolution as each side sought more favorable positions before the expected peace force arrived. This complicated the difficulties the Secretary-General already was having in trying to round up contingents for the peace force. Not only did the contingents have to be acceptable to Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the U.K., and be willing to pay their own way or, at least, take the chance that they would have to do so, but it more and more looked like an operation in which hard fighting might be involved from the very start.

There were (and are) three principal tasks in the UNFICYP mandate and they can be stated quite simply. Their execution has been far from simple. First, UNFICYP was "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting." Second, it was "as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order." Third, and also "as necessary," it was to contribute to "a return to normal conditions." Unfortunately, to the Greek Cypriots and to the Makarios government, which by paragraph 2 of the resolution had "the responsibility for maintenance and restoration of law and order," the UNFICYP tasks were interpreted to mean that the UN Force should act as an arm of the Cyprus government in putting down the rebellious Turkish Community. To the Turks and the Turkish Cypriot community, UNFICYP's tasks meant enforcement of the 1960 Constitution. The Secretary-General held that they meant neither, but simply what they said. In his view UNFICYP would work to prevent the initiation of force by anyone on Cyprus for any purpose and to restore stability and normalcy in the daily life of the island. The UN mediator set up by the resolution, but not the UN Force, would concern himself with the political issues and constitutional problems of Cyprus.

The UNFICYP resolution was another in the series of "uncertain mandates" which have launched major peacekeeping operations by the UN. If anything, it was even less precise than those for UNEF and ONUC and gave the Secretary-General

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an even freer hand in mounting and running the operation. In two respects it was more restrictive: the short-term (initially 3 months) authorization for the force with the requirement that any extensions be reauthorized by the Security Council; and the requirement that the peacekeeping force not be a charge on the UN budget (the costs of the mediator and his support were authorized to be charged to the UN budget).

B. PHASES

The UNFICYP operation, from the national support viewpoint, has been very stable. It does not, therefore, fall into phases which can be marked by major changes in mandate or in composition. In terms of costs or strengths there is a great "sameness" about it over the years it has been in Cyprus. On a graph¹ its quarterly costs appear as a level line at a little over \$5 million per quarter and its cumulative costs rise on a smooth 45 degree line reaching at the end of 1969 to just over \$110 million. Only in the first half year or so do the lines show slight humps representing the slightly higher costs of the launching phase. Only at the end of 1968 and into 1969 do the lines bend down a bit showing reductions in cost as the force's size is reduced.

Because of this continuity in the support aspects of UNFICYP, this study will proceed by looking at particular functional areas of UNFICYP support by the UN and national supporters throughout the period of the operation to date. Examination of these functional areas of support on a calendar quarter basis is facilitated by the availability of data on that basis in reports prepared by the UN Secretariat each time the Security Council was called upon to extend the UNFICYP mandate. As of 15 December 1969, the end, or renewal point of its current mandate extension, UNFICYP will have been on Cyprus 23 calendar quarters. For 7 of those quarters no separate data are available since they fall in periods where the Security Council extended UNFICYP for 6 months rather than 3. For purposes here, it should be sufficiently accurate to arrive at values for the missing quarters by simply interpolating across the gaps.

¹ See Annex A.

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III

SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

A. GENERAL

It is possible to sketch out very briefly a list of factors which need to be kept in mind in looking at the support organization and procedures for UNFICYP:

1. Situation: UNFICYP must be both an interposition force on the order of UNEF but not along an established cease-fire line) and a law and order Force (on the order of ONUC). Thus, it must be deployed throughout the island.

2. Environment: The area of deployment is small-- 3,572 square miles, 140 miles long, 60 miles wide--with adequate existing roads, communications and other utilities. A relatively high standard of living, in Middle East terms, exists among the population and the normal economy provides the usual goods and services of a modern western country. The money spent by the peacekeeping force is important to the island's economy.

3. British bases: The two modern, fully equipped, well stocked British base areas on Cyprus, of course, constitute a central factor. The bases were fully capable, before the force was ever launched, of supporting a force several times the size of UNFICYP, and the British, eager for help in the Cyprus muddle, were more than willing to provide support. British scales and procedures of support are noted for adequacy and efficiency (with the possible exception of that much-maligned British failing--food preparation).

4. The UN Force: A maximum force of 7,000 men became the established goal although it would appear that the Secretary-General saw that figure more as a maximum strength which he need not struggle to reach. Half the force, or 3,500 men, was assured by a British commitment. But it appears to have been both a British and Secretary-General view that a smaller British share of the force would be sought. With the force composition requiring approval by Cyprus, U.K., Greece and Turkey, quite clearly these would be no "odd-man-out-type" contingents; only the elite of proven peacekeepers, noted for high standards of conduct,

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professionalism and impartiality would be acceptable.¹ The 6 districts into which Cyprus was divided for local government purposes suggested that 5 other major contingents, in addition to the British, would make for a rational deployment arrangement. The 5 turned out to be Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. In addition, Austria furnished a military hospital of the type structured to support a brigade in the Austrian Federal Army (that is, field-type medical support for 2-3,000 men). There was also established a civilian police component of about 175 men (UNCIVPOL) as part of the UN Force for Cyprus distinct from the military contingents. The police have come from Austria, Denmark and Sweden, each of whom also participates in the military part of the force, and from Australia and New Zealand (the latter's participation ended in mid-1967).

5. Timing: Unlike the crash launchings of UNEF and ONUC, UNFICYP "crawled" into place. More than a month elapsed after debate started in the Security Council which quite predictably would lead to a UN peacekeeping force for Cyprus, and debates had been preceded by more than a month of sparring on other types of peacekeeping efforts. Even after the 4 March 1964 resolution, despite anguished British cries to get moving with the UN Force, 3 weeks elapsed before it could be said to be operational in Cyprus on 27 March.² The various reasons for this delay will be discussed under appropriate headings below. Suffice it to say under these general remarks, that the leisurely pace in which the force was launched permitted ample time for planning, stock-piling, reconnaissance and other preparations which for UNEF and especially for ONUC would have been so very valuable. The launching of UNFICYP, as the Danes have reported, was "more along the lines of a planned relief for an already existing force."³ Obviously, the leisurely pace was possible only because the British had their bruised finger in the leaky dike.

¹ Stegenga, *op. cit.*, p. 73 estimates that the Turks would have been the hardest of the 4 to please in the choosing of acceptable peacekeeping contingents. It was Cyprus, however, which ruled out any Afro-Asian contingents.

² See *infra*, pp. 433 to 436 for the special roles of Canada, Turkey and Finland in getting UNFICYP "off the launching pad."

³ IPKO Documentation No. 11, p. 17.

B. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT

This section will deal with how support for UNFICYP was organized and will examine the subject in terms of the UN, U.S., U.K. and "others." "Others" will include the host state and the contingent contributors.

1. UN Organization: When the U.S. on 27 March 1964 forwarded its first check for \$500,000 as part of its initial pledge of funds for UNFICYP, it asked the UN Secretariat for information as to the standards or premises relating to costs which would guide the UN in the operation.¹ It seems quite clear that the U.S., realizing that again it would fall to its lot to be a principal bankroller of another peacekeeping operation, wanted assurances that costs would be held down as much as possible. The Secretariat response indicated the general scheme for organizing the force and for the cost elements of the operation, at least as they had been arranged for UNFICYP's initial mandate 27 March - 27 June 1964:

- a. The force will not exceed 7,000 men.
- b. UN will bear no financial responsibility for the Canadian or British contingents.
- c. UN will have no responsibility for reimbursement of pay or allowances for the Irish contingent.
- d. UN will bear the cost of the Austrian medical unit, estimated at \$60,000 for personnel and \$24,000 for equipment.
- e. UN will reimburse all pay and allowances for other contingents.
- f. UN will pay all costs for rations, accommodations, water, utilities, for all contingents except the British.
- g. Generally, the U.S. will furnish initial airlift without cost.
- h. UN will pay no daily service allowance (allowance for UNEF and ONUC was 86¢ and \$1.30 respectively).
- i. UN will not purchase motor transport or aircraft.
- j. UN will not pay for operation of aircraft in Cyprus, this being a British responsibility.
- k. Civilian personnel in UNFICYP will not exceed 200 civil police and 65 international civil servants.
- l. UN will not pay for Canadian and Swedish weekly supply flights to Cyprus.

¹ A copy of the State Department instruction to USUN directing this action is attached as Annex E.

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Obviously, the Secretariat also was trying to keep costs under control, and had arranged initially for considerably more than half the military force on a cost basis substantially below the UN standards.¹ Later in the operation, when the British contingent was reduced and the Canadians and Irish shifted at least part of the way toward the full reimbursement basis applicable to the Austrians, Danes, Finns and Swedes, this economy feature of UNFICYP was in effect for less than half the force.

The UN organization in Cyprus, as distinct from the peacekeeping force, has been kept small. The UN scheme referred to above indicated an initial UN planning figure of not to exceed 65 international civil servants. In fact, the number has been somewhat smaller. At the end of 1968 it stood at 49 with planning underway for a reduction of 20 per cent or so in 1969. In addition, there were about 420 local civilian employees on the UN payroll in Cyprus.

Included in the international civil servant category are the Secretary General's Special Representative,² the UN Force Commander,³ the Senior Political and Legal Adviser, the Police Adviser and the Chief Administrative Officer.

¹ The UN standards for reimbursement to contingent contributors were established in connection with UNEF and are to be found in the following UN documents: General Assembly Resolution 1151 (XII), 22 November 1957, and paragraphs 86, 88 and 91 of the Secretary-General's report of 9 October 1957 (A/3694); and General Assembly Resolution 1575 (XV), 20 December 1960 and paragraphs 67-70 of the Secretary-General's report of 13 September 1960 (A/4486 and Add 1 and 2). See pp. 38-44 in the UNEF background paper prepared as part of this study for a discussion of these standards.

² Incumbents of the position Secretary-General's Special Representative have been: Galo Plaza (Ecuador) 11 May-28 Sept 64; C.A. Bernardes (Brazil) 26 Sept 64-5 June 67; P.P. Spinelli (Italy) (Acting) 6 Jan-20 Feb 67; B.F. Osorio-Tafall (Mexico) 21 Feb 67-Present.

³ Incumbents as UN Force Commander have been: Major General C.F. Paiva Chaves (Brazil) (Acting) 17-26 Mar 64; Lt. General P.S. Gyani (India) 27 Mar-27 June 64; General K.S. Thimayya (India) 9 July 64-17 Dec 65 (death); Brigadier A. J. Wilson (U.K.) (Acting) 18 Dec 65-15 May 66; Major General I.A.E. Martola (Finland) 16 May 66-Present.

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Unlike the practice in ONUC where the Secretary-General's Special Representative was the "officer in charge" of the operation, on Cyprus the UN Force Commander is accepted as having equal status with the Secretary-General's Representative.

The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) role in Cyprus is also very different from that in UNEF or ONUC. With such a heavy proportion of all support on Cyprus provided through the British bases on prearranged procedures, the CAO organization is relieved of much of its normal work.¹ The CAO plays a role in procurement from outside of commercial airlift for rotation and of special UN items (e.g. stationery, berets, badges), and, in conjunction with the British support system, in procurement of certain support on the local market.² Otherwise, his principal function is to oversee and certify the accounts of the British support system.

As a final part in the UN organization for support in the area, the reader should refer to pp. 213-214 of the background paper on ONUC for an explanation of the UN Supply Depot at Pisa, Italy.

2. U.S. Organization: Although it turned out that there was actually less need to do so, the U.S. government organized itself more deliberately and thoroughly for support of UNFICYP than it had done for UNEF or ONUC.

The specifics are as follows and the documents involved are attached as Annexes B through E:³

On 7 March 1964, in a letter to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk referred to the UN Security

¹ See infra, p. 425 on U.K. organization for the "assist agreement" between the UN and the U.K. for UNFICYP support. The agreement itself is at Annex F.

² See infra, p. 431 for the government of Cyprus support to the force under Article 19 of the Status of the Force Agreement.

³ The reader should consult pp. 28-32 of the UNTSO paper and pp. 208-210 of the ONUC paper for detailed discussion of the statutory basis for U.S. support of international peace-keeping operations. That aspect will not be covered here.

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Council resolution of 4 March and a basic decision by the President on airlift assistance by the U.S. for UNFICYP contingents. Secretary Rusk invoked his statutory authority to determine that initial airlift assistance would be in the U.S. national interest and therefore free of charge to the UN. He also indicated that other logistic support for UNFICYP might be required and, in certain cases could be provided free of charge. Guidelines on the matter of support, other than initial airlift, were to be worked out between State and Defense staffs (Annex B).

On 13 March the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance (who himself would be embroiled a few years later as a negotiator in the Cyprus muddle), instructed the military departments, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Supply Agency on support for UNFICYP. The policy line was clearly stated: "the U.S. will contribute initial airlift not within the capability of other participating nations and consider logistical support on a case by case basis." The instructions covered the assumption of costs by the applicable elements of the Department of Defense and assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the task of developing procedures for support. The "tone" of U.S. support was established by the words "It is desired that the Department of Defense agencies be responsive rapidly to State-DoD approved requests from the UN for U.S. assistance." (Annex C).

The procedures developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were promulgated in a letter by the Assistant-Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, on 27 March to the military departments, assistant secretaries of defense and Defense Supply Agency. (It also was distributed in the Joint Staff as a JCS paper on 30 March 1964). The letter transmitted a 7-page "Outline Plan, Concept and Procedures for U.S. Support of Cyprus Peacekeeping Force." (Annex D).

The procedures mostly dealt with internal responsibilities and tasks within Defense. The gratis furnishing of initial airlift was confirmed but it was still left for a case-by-case decision on other support, with either sale or loan as possibilities. Paragraph 4 of the Outline Plan is worth quoting here:

Channels of Communication. Requests for U.S. Military support will be channeled from the USUN Mission to the State Department with information copies sent directly

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to ASD (I&L), ASD (ISA), ASD (COMP), JCS, CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE. The State Department will pass requests with recommended action to the ASD (I&L) who will review and coordinate as necessary with appropriate DoD components, thereafter transmitting to the OJCS indicating action to be taken. The Director, J-4, has been designated the central point of contact and coordinating agent for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The appropriate director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insofar as practicable, will place the requirement on the appropriate military service or unified command. If at any time it is determined that the request seriously degrades the operational capability of U.S. forces, the requirement will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequent recommendations forwarded to the ASD (I&L).¹

It will be noted that, unlike the support arrangements for UNEF and ONUC, no U.S. military department was assigned Executive Agency responsibility. The rationale for this change undoubtedly stems from the consideration that UNFICYP support by the U.S. would be for a shorter period, less routine in nature, require more policy decisions, and not involve the consolidated bookkeeping and billing which the earlier operations had required.

The "tone" of U.S. support, as established in the Vance letter was carried on in the Outline Plan's paragraph 5 c which said "Prompt Action in response to approved requests is essential."

On the same day that the Outline Plan was issued by Defense, State advised the UN through USUN of the gratis initial airlift policy, but stated:

¹ Abbreviations are as follows: "ASD" - Assistant Secretary of Defense; "I&L" - Installation and Logistics; "ISA" - International Security Affairs; "COMP" - Comptroller; "JCS" Joint Chiefs of Staff; "CINCEUR" - Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command; "CINCSTRIKE" - Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strike Command (Tampa, Florida); "Director J-4" is the Joint Staff logistics officer.

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The U.S. expects, and we understand that the UN agrees, that services and logistical support, other than the airlift referred to above, that may be requested from the U.S. for UNFICYP will be paid for by the UN on a reimbursement-billing basis, unless there should be a specific agreement to the contrary. (Annex E).

3. U.K. Organization: The British had, of course, been on Cyprus for almost 85 years when the need came for them to support the UN peacekeeping operation there. In fact, they had been performing in the weeks before UNFICYP was deployed many of the same functions which the UN Force was to perform once it became operational. Transferring half, and gradually something more than half, the peacekeeping burden onto the arriving UN troops was a relatively easy task and it was accomplished smoothly and efficiently.

a. The British Sovereign Base Areas - It will be recalled that, under the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959, Britain retained 2 base areas in the south of Cyprus totaling about 99 square miles. These were British sovereign territories--not Cyprus territory. In addition Britain was entitled by the agreements to joint use of the Nicosia airport in both peace and war. The bases were planned and, to a degree, stocked to accommodate and support up to 20,000 men. About 1,000 Cypriots resided within the base areas and almost 10,000 Cypriots worked on the bases but lived outside their boundaries. Neville Brown describes the bases as including:

...a stockpile for one or more brigade groups, a NATO early warning station, a wireless station that is officially regarded as constituting an essential link in Britain's global radio network, accommodation for the three infantry battalions and their supporting units, and Akrotiri, at which some tactical aircraft are permanently located and which is used periodically by transport planes and V-Bombers.¹

The two bases were new and modern, several millions of pounds having been spent in improving them in the 2 or 3 years just before the eruption of the Cyprus crisis and UNFICYP.

¹ Quoted in Adams, op. cit., p. 416.

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b. Cyprus District - In addition to major British military headquarters in command of combat troops and Royal Air Force units, there was on Cyprus in 1964 the British Headquarters, Cyprus District. The nearest U.S. Army equivalents to District Headquarters are the so-called Zone of the Interior (ZI) or Continental U.S. Army Headquarters in the U.S. In addition to a capability to command assigned troop units of all types, a British District Headquarters is staffed to perform with respect to an assigned geographical area all necessary functions which are the responsibility of the British War Office (Army Department). These would include, inter alia, all housekeeping and garrison functions, procurement, contracting, logistical support, assistance to civil authorities, civilian hire, and budgeting and financial management. Other major British headquarters on Cyprus contributing to the British capacity to support UNFICYP were Headquarters, Near East Land Forces (NEARELF), the Royal Air Force Headquarters and establishment at Dhekelia, Akrotiri and Nicosia and the Regional Representative of the United Kingdom Ministry of Public Buildings and Works.

c. Early Formation of UNFICYP Headquarters - The Commander of the Cyprus District at the beginning of the Cyprus crisis was Major General Peter Young, who on 26 December 1963 became the Commander of the Joint Truce Force (U.K., Turkish, Greek), the predecessor of UNFICYP. In mid-February 1964, still three weeks before UNFICYP was authorized and over a month before it became operational, General Young returned to his post at Cyprus District. He was replaced in command of the Joint Truce Force by Major General Michael Carver, who with a staff of 170, was flown in from England. General Carver became Deputy Commander of UNFICYP when it was formed, and his staff, combined with the small staff of General Gyani, on the island since mid-January, became the core of the UNFICYP Headquarters. With the presumptive UNFICYP commander, deputy commander, and full basic staff on the ground a month before the first large troop arrivals, all aspects of the peacekeeping operation and its support arrangement could be worked out in detail. This pre-deployment planning was further facilitated by the early arrival in Cyprus of reconnaissance groups or advance parties from the Secretariat¹ and all contingent contributors. The Canadian

¹ The Secretariat reconnaissance group consisted of Mr. Feiffer (Comptroller Office), Maj. Mariz (Military Adviser's Office) and Mr. Lansky (Field Service). The group departed New York on 6 March 1964.

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advance party was only six days ahead of its contingent, but in most cases 2, 3 or even 4 weeks intervened between the advance party and the contingent's arrival.

d. The UN/U.K. Assist Agreement - Although it appears not to have been formally finalized in writing until almost a year after UNFICYP began to function, the Assist Agreement between the UN and the U.K. for UNFICYP support was effective from 27 March 1964.

Attached as Annexes F-H are:

Annex F The UN/U.K. Assist Agreement, U.K./UNFICYP/65-1, 16 March 1965.

Annex G A table showing the arrangements for "Apportionment of Costs Between Participating Governments and the UN" as they were during the first year of UNFICYP.

Annex H A statement as of September 1968, entitled "Financial Arrangements and Reimbursements to Governments" recording changes to that date in the arrangements for apportionment of costs of UNFICYP.

Under the Assist Agreement the British were to furnish essentially all supplies, equipment and services with two general exceptions: one, items not applicable to the needs of the U.K. armed forces, or, two, items not stocked or readily available from U.K. resources on Cyprus. Another obvious exception was supplies and services, especially land and buildings, obtained by UNFICYP from the government of Cyprus under Article 19 of the agreement on Status of the Force (see infra, p.431).

British support of the Force was to be on a reimbursable basis, except that no reimbursement would be claimed for British participants in UNFICYP. The Canadian contingent, as such, as originally arranged was also to pay its own way. (Support for Canadians in both the Force and Zone headquarters, as distinct from the contingent, was UN reimbursable). The reimbursable arrangements for the Canadian contingent were subsequently altered; see infra, pp. 457-458.

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The basis for UN reimbursement for U.K. support was established as:

Consumables - cost plus 25% surcharge.

Non-consumables - rental at a monthly rate of 1/34 of the item cost plus 25% surcharge, plus an additional 10% surcharge of the item value upon its return to British stocks. Rental charges include maintenance of the item for "fair wear and tear" usage.

When the Cyprus peacekeeping operation has ended, it should be possible to analyze definitively whether this rental scheme for equipment for the force was a wise choice. Obviously, over a period now nearing 6 years, the UN has paid in monthly rental charges almost twice the value of the equipment items. On the other hand, the rental scheme enabled the UN, especially hard pressed for ready funds in the Cyprus operation, to avoid heavy initial capital costs and to forecast its costs with much more accuracy than in UNEF and ONUC. Additionally, the problem of roll-up and disposal of equipment when the operation ends has been solved in advance. While the British charge schedule, 25% or more over cost, at first blush seems heavy--recalling that the U.S. "accessorial charge" for UNEF and ONUC support was 16%--it can be assumed that it was well justified in negotiating arrangements with the Secretariat. An important difference, of course, in addition to inclusive maintenance, is that the British claim no additional reimbursement above the surcharges for the services of their personnel, not only those who are part of UNFICYP but also those engaged in support in the British establishments in the base areas.¹

e. Documentation Procedures - Further details for each support category will be set out in later sections. At this point we will cover only the general arrangements for support.

Support procedures are spelled out in great detail in UNFICYP Standing Operating Procedures, Personnel Instructions and Logistic Instructions, with sample forms and step-by-step guides for each support action. The documentation

¹ See infra, p. 488 for more on U.K. "absorbed costs."

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system allows for full surveillance of the system and close accountability. Essentially, each support action is documented in five or more copies of standard British Army forms with a receipted copy flowing to the Force Logistics Officer (a British Army Lieutenant Colonel) from the receiving contingent and an issue copy from the British activity providing the support. Any request for support at greater than established scales requires a two or three-step approval process. A system of frequent reports and audits and Boards of Enquiry and Survey ensures that the British support establishments, the Force Commander and Logistics Officer and the UN Chief Administrative Officer are at all times informed and in full control of the support system.

Records and bills for reimbursement purposes are submitted monthly and are authenticated at UNFICYP Headquarters by or on behalf of the Chief Administrative Officer before return to U.K. authorities for submission to the UN through their New York Mission. Similar thorough and stringent control procedures apply for UN furnished or rented equipment, contingent provided equipment and premises and services furnished by the government of Cyprus.

4. Other Organizational Arrangements:

a. "Self-Sustaining" Contingents - Each major contingent (i.e., other than the small police contingents for UNCIVPOL and the Austrian Field Hospital) was expected to be a lightly equipped, fully self-sustaining unit. It was supposed to be able to manage and support itself when provided with the necessary back-up support. Therefore, in addition to its command set-up and operational troops, each contingent needed mechanics, clerks, cooks, personnel and finance specialists, drivers, communicators, religious, information, and welfare personnel, supply technicians, repairmen and medical personnel. This contingent-level of support, in British terminology is known as "first-line" support. Instances are very rare indeed in which the competence or performance of national contingents in peace-keeping operations are ever publicly criticized, and this holds true for UNFICYP. Nevertheless, it can be safely assumed that first-line support within the UNFICYP contingents has not always been of uniformly high standards. With the best intentions in the world, this would tend to be so in any multinational force, particularly one where the tour

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of duty is so short (6 months) and most of the contingents are ad hoc assemblies of volunteers. The most noticeable areas in which inadequacies in first-line support could be expected to occur are in the operation and maintenance of major equipment items, especially vehicles and electronics. UNFICYP Logistic Instructions provide for technical advice and assistance from the British support system for contingent first-line support.

At the other extreme, it can be argued that if a national peacekeeping contingent of say 600 men is fully organized to be self-sustaining for first-line support it may be, in fact, over organized. This is because a support structure is somewhat inelastic with respect to the size of the force supported, particularly at the lower strength levels common for peace-keeping contingents in UNFICYP.

For example, the Canadian support components in UNFICYP at the beginning of 1969 were organized as follows to support a national contingent whose overall strength had fallen from 1,000 or more to 582 (including the support components):

<u>Headquarters, including:</u>	<u>13 Officers</u>	<u>59 Men</u>
Commander and Deputy	(3)	
Personnel Officer	(1)	
Logistics Officer	(1)	
Postal Section		(2)
Chaplains	(2)	
Ordnance Detachment	(1)	(11)
Cipher (Code)		(4)
Public Information	(1)	(1)
Field Cashier	(2)	(6)
Dental	(1)	(2)
Movement Control	(1)	(2)
<u>Support Company:</u>	<u>7 Officers</u>	<u>149 Men</u>
Headquarters	(1)	
Commissariat		(19)
Quartermaster	(1)	(11)
Institutes (PX)		(12)
Transport		(26)
Medical	(1)	(7)
Maintenance	(1)	(31)
Pioneers	(1)	(12)
Welfare	(1)	(5)

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Civilian Laborers

-

68

TOTAL

20 Officers
68 Civilians

208 Men

Thus, there were 228 Canadians (plus 68 civilian laborers) in an essentially first line supporting role for themselves and for 354 other Canadians in an operational role with a capability to support twice as many, at least. If a proportionate "slice" of the British support system were to be added to the Canadian support figure, the situation would be well past the point where the "support tail wags the operational dog."

Military logisticians, in a conventional war context, rightly maintain that high proportions of supporters in terms of total strength are sound if a full sustained fighting capability is to be realized. On the other hand, it is frequently argued that in the peacekeeping context a full sustained fighting capability is irrelevant. What counts are blue berets and arm bands highly visible at the scene of potential trouble.¹

The main significance of the figures for the Canadian support--operational breakdown, above, is that they demonstrate the problem of any multilateral force which, initially well structured overall as a force and with well structured contingents, begins to have problems of balance as strengths are reduced.

b. SCANAP, SCACYP and SCANLOPI² - It should be remembered that when Sweden and Denmark responded to the Secretary-General's call for peacekeepers for Cyprus in March-April 1964 both countries still had contingents in ONUC (376 and 77, respectively, as of 1 March 1964), about 500 men each in UNEF and 10-20 observers each in Palestine. (UNTSO).

¹ There is, of course, very respectable and expert opinion which holds that a peacekeeping force should have a full sustained combat capability. e.g. E.L.M. Burns, "The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping," International Journal, Vol. XXIII (Winter 1967-1968), No. 1, pp. 16-17.

² IPKO Documentation No. 11, pp. 18-19; No. 5, pp. 8-16.

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From the beginning of UNEF in 1956 (and later extended in 1960 for their personnel in ONUC) a special Scandinavian air service was established as a means of moving individuals and small groups, mail, spare parts for national equipment, welfare items, correspondents and entertainment groups between the home country and their contingents.

Originally the outbound terminus for the fortnightly flights was Capodichino near Naples (thus Scandinavia-Naples = SCANAP), and the name was retained when the UN base in Italy moved to Pisa. Onward transportation from Naples (later Pisa) was by UN airlift--usually Royal Canadian Air Force for both UNEF and ONUC--but occasionally, when backlogs occurred, UN representatives authorized movement of the SCANAP flight to the final destinations at UN expense.

To represent Scandinavian interests at the UN base in Pisa and to arrange onward transport of personnel and cargos, a Swedish or Danish major or captain was stationed there as SCANLOPI (Scandinavian Liaison Officer, Pisa). The officer assigned this function was carried on the rolls as a member of UNEF.

Upon the establishment of UNFICYP with Swedish and Danish contingents the same general arrangements were carried over with flights directly to Nicosia or via Pisa. With the end of UNEF in June 1967, the flights are now strictly in support of the contingents in UNFICYP and are known as SCACYP (Scandinavia-Cyprus). At no charge to the UN for the service, a Swedish Transair commercial aircraft of the DC-6B type (capacity 23,000 pounds) flies Swedish-Danish personnel and cargos to Nicosia on every other Wednesday and returns the following day.

c. Other Scandinavian Organizational Arrangements - The Cyprus crisis came along just at the moment when Scandinavian efforts leading towards a coordinated, permanent regional peacekeeping capability, underway since 1959, were at the point of fruition.

Following a suggestion by Secretary-General Hammarskjold in 1959 that states consider UN peacekeeping in their defense planning, Norway, Denmark and Sweden--joined by Finland in 1963--established committees and working groups on a Scandinavian basis to develop regional thinking on the subject.

The results of this study and planning were funneled into a semiannual meeting of Defense Ministers of the four countries. Such a meeting at the level of Defense Ministers occurred in late 1963 or early 1964 at which, apparently, there was agreement to proceed to form and train a regionally coordinated standby peacekeeping force. Necessary legislation was introduced in the Norwegian Storting in January 1964, in the Danish Folketinget on 13 March (approved on 30 April), in the Swedish Riksdag on 6 March. Finland's law on its "Surveillance Force" was not passed until 25 March 1964, although the government's decision to form such a force was taken in December 1963.¹

The requirements in early 1964 for UNFICYP contingents from Denmark, Sweden and Finland thus came a bit too early for the full results of this 4 years of Scandinavian planning to be effectively employed. Nonetheless, the intensive and detailed study and coordination among these three contributors for UNFICYP and their agreement on all basic concepts of peacekeeping operations would clearly have been unifying factors in the incorporation of the three contingents and their employment in the force. In turn, their experience with UNFICYP should help immeasurably in the continuing organization and training of the permanent Scandinavian force.

d. Organizational Arrangements of the Host State - Paragraph (or Article) 19 of the UN-Cyprus Agreement on the Status of the Force (S/5634), 31 March 1964 reads as follows:

Premises of the Force

19. The Government shall provide without cost to the Force and in agreement with the Commander such areas for headquarters, camps, or other premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfilment of the function of the Force. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain the territory of Cyprus, they shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Commander, who alone may consent to the entry of officials to perform duties on such premises.

¹ IPKO Documentation No. 2, p. 1 (Denmark); No. 3, p. 1 (Sweden), No. 8, pp. 1, 4 (Finland); No. 14, p. 1 (Norway).

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Other paragraphs of the agreement cover additional host state support categories as follows: communications and postal services (29-31); use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields (33); water, electricity and other public utilities (34); provisions, supplies and services (36); and locally recruited personnel (37).

As it has worked out in practice, the government of Cyprus considers that it should provide without charge functional headquarters and premises for UNFICYP and the individual contingents, in good structural condition and properly equipped with essential furnishings. With respect to UNFICYP camps, Cyprus agrees to keep any existing building in habitable condition but assumes no responsibility for tents, bedding or other furnishings. Maintenance by the government, or the provision of materials for the contingent to do the work itself, is limited to keeping premises habitable, structurally sound and weatherproof. New work, improvements or structural alternatives are not permitted in rented premises and if done in other UNFICYP occupied premises, are at UN expense.

The Cypriot government agency involved in this area is the Public Works Department, which uses its own or contractor personnel in performing these services.

Up to a date in 1966, the government of Cyprus made no distinction in their support arrangements between the military elements of UNFICYP and the civilian police elements (UNCIVPOL). However in 1966 the Cypriot Attorney General ruled that UNCIVPOL was not included in the Agreement on the Status of the Force and therefore Cyprus would not provide for them the services of Paragraph 19 on a free basis.

Within UNFICYP strict controls are exercised, with any work above the maintenance level requiring Headquarters UNFICYP prior approval and any work costing more than £50 (\$120), except for the British contingent, requiring the Chief Administrative Officer's approval. All work in this area must be within an overall fund ceiling allotted from time to time by the Chief Administrative Officer.¹

¹ HQ UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 5, Works Services and Maintenance, Nicosia, 21 March 1968.

An instruction issued by Headquarters UNFICYP states:

The Force lives under operational conditions. Every effort will be made to alleviate hardships due to these conditions, but Contingents must NOT expect these accommodations to equate to the standards which they have in their own countries.¹

As might be expected, there have been criticism on both sides of the standard-of-living issue in UNFICYP--those more concerned with costs emphasizing the tendency of the standards (and the expenses thereof) to rise by a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses process, and those not so concerned with costs emphasizing the remaining inadequacies of their accommodations as compared with home standards or the standards of other contingents. One UNFICYP officer, probably a member of the cost-conscious school, commented recently that very strict guidelines are required in a peacekeeping force if a reasonably austere standard of living for the force is to be maintained in the face of these pressures.

C. SUPPORT PROCEDURES BY CATEGORIES

1. Contingents:²

a. Military contingents - Unlike UNEF and ONUC where the Secretary-General had more contingent contributors than he could use, quite a logjam developed when U Thant, following the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, took steps to constitute the Cyprus Peacekeeping force. The jam lasted until 13 March and involved 10 days of hectic activity.

Immediately following the adoption of the resolution U Thant approached 7 countries, on which all 4 concerned parties (Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, U.K.) could agree, for contingents for the force. In addition to the U.K., these included Austria, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.

¹ HQ UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 5, Works Services and Maintenance, Nicosia, 21 March 1968, para. 23.

² See infra, Chapter IV, Section B, pp. 451-488 for details of each national contingent and its equipment.

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The Secretary-General had in mind a force of not over 7,000 of which the U.K. had assured him they would provide half.¹ Thus, an average of about 600 men would have been required from each of the other six countries, or a light (by now, sort of "standard") peacekeeping battalion.

Each of the six, while indicating sympathetic and positive consideration of the request, raised questions and conditions or pointed out difficulties for it in furnishing a contingent. One common, if not always stated, problem was the matter of meeting costs for the operation.

On 7 March U Thant appealed for voluntary contributions in a letter to all member states, estimating a requirement of about \$6 million for the 3 month's operation of the force. He also renewed his appeal to Brazil for a contingent since Brazil's initial response had been the most pessimistic. On 9 March he tried to cool down the growing violence and invasion threats by appeals to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

On 11 March U Thant again appealed to all 6 potential contingent suppliers pointing out that he had assurances of at least \$3 million (\$2 million from U.S., \$1 million from U.K.) for the force with hopes of more to come, and that the logistical and other arrangements on Cyprus for the force looked encouraging. On the same day he furnished them draft instructions for the force and attempted to clarify its tasks.

The matter came to a head on 11, 12, and 13 March. The U.K., complaining of the delay, gave the Secretary-General a 12 March deadline for announcing progress; the Turkish government issued a flat ultimatum to Cyprus threatening to intervene to protect the Turkish Cypriots until the UN Force arrived; and Cyprus in response called a meeting of the Security Council for 13 March.

J. King Gordon gives Canada's Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, much credit for saving the day. His visit to New York to consult with the Secretary-General on 12 March, his decision to move the Canadian advance party that same evening (even ahead of authorization for participa-

¹ Reportedly the Secretary-General's military advisers recommended a somewhat larger force of 10,000 men.

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tion by the Canadian Parliament) and his telephone consultation with the other 5 potential contributors, enabled U Thant to announce at the 13 March Security Council meeting that the force would be established without further delay.¹ On 17 March he was able to say that the force was "in being" (S/5593/Add 2), and on 26 March that it would become "operational" the following day (S/5593/Add 3).

The pressure by Britain and Turkey may also be said to have contributed to the breakthrough; and Finnish Foreign Minister Jaakko Hallama, during the budget debates on funds for the Finnish contingent, implied that the Finnish decision to participate, taken formally on 14 March but possibly known sooner, helped to bring the Swedes and the Irish, the other neutrals among the potential contingent contributors, into the operation.² The Brazilian participation (at one time thought to involve a small naval force with about 270 men) never materialized, and the Austrian military contribution was set at a hospital unit of about 55-60 men.

Since with these developments, the force would have fallen short of its planned strength, the Secretary-General asked Denmark for a 1,000 man contingent and also requested that the other contingents be established at 1,000 men.³ Thus, about 1,000 each from Canada, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Ireland, plus the Austrian hospital, would permit a British troop involvement in the force of less than 2,000 men.

UNFICYP became operational at 0500 hours 27 March 1964 under command of Lt. General Gyani with only the Canadian and British contingents on the scene. By the following day advance parties from Sweden, Ireland and Finland had arrived followed by their main bodies, respectively, on 10-14 April, 19-20 April and 25-30 April. The Austrian hospital advance party also visited Cyprus in March but the hospital unit did not arrive until 16 May. Two-thirds or more of the Danish contingents also arrived about mid-May.

¹ J. King Gordon, "The UN in Cyprus," International Journal, XIX (Summer, 1964), No. 3, p. 340, cited in Stegenga, op. cit., p. 77.

² IPKO Documentation No. 8, pp. 11-12.

³ It is likely that the Secretary-General sought other contingent contributors in Latin America before turning to Denmark as a substitute for Brazil.

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b. Police Contingents (UNCIVPOL) - The source of the idea for UNCIVPOL, the full rationale for it and the process by which the decision was reached are still mysteries (at least to the writer). It was not until 2 May 1964 that the Secretary-General reported that "Experience has already shown that the fulfillment of the task of UNFICYP requires an element of police liaison personnel."¹ A contingent of 28 Austrian police were operational in UNFICYP on 14 April, just over a month before the Austrian military hospital was in place, while the Swedish military contingent arrived almost a month before its police contingent.²

In any case, sometime between 4 March and 4 April 1964, U Thant formally approached Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the U.K., and informally approached Australia and New Zealand seeking a police component for UNFICYP of 200 men. He got 175 from 5 contributors, and the strength has remained within 1 or 2 of that figure over 23 calendar quarters of the operation (to December 1969).

Canada, Finland, Ireland and the U.K. chose not to participate. The others, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand (until mid-1967), furnished police contingents: 40 each for Australia, Sweden and Denmark; 20 for New Zealand and 35 for Austria. When New Zealand dropped out, Australia and Austria picked up the requirement for 10 additional police each.

c. Participation Agreements - Formal agreements with the governments furnishing contingents were not concluded until 1966 when, in a letter dated 21 February to all contingent contributors, the Secretary-General thanked them for their support and proposed an agreement concerning the services of the contingents with effect from the beginning of that service. Attached as annexes to the letter were the

¹ S/5679, 2 May 1964, p. 3.

² U Thant had requested 40 Swedish police on 3 April and the Swedes had agreed to provide a voluntary police contingent on 17 April 1964; S/5661, 17 April 1964.

31 March 1964 Agreement with Cyprus on the Status of the Force (S/5634) and the 25 April 1964 Regulations for the Force (ST/SGB/UNFICYP/1).¹

The letter dealt with rights and privileges and with good order and discipline; but an interesting feature was the provision against withdrawal of the contingent without "adequate prior notification to the Secretary-General" (paragraph 8). The first sentence of paragraph 13 directly concerns our subject:

13. Finally, I suggest that questions involving expenses should be dealt with in a supplemental agreement.

These supplemental agreements on expenses have, in fact, been a continuing process for each country dating, in some cases, from right after the initial launching of UNFICYP. Annex H, attached, gives a good summary account of the changes in the agreed handling of expenses for each contingent. Annex I is the exchange of letters constituting the supplemental agreement between the UN and Austria. It might not be too great an oversimplification to say that the series of supplemental agreements show two trends developing as a peace-keeping operation goes on and on: first, those contributors who were most generous in the terms under which they originally provided contingents find the buildup of costs which they assumed increasingly burdensome, and tighten up their terms; second, those contributors who from the start claimed full reimbursement grow embarrassed as the published figures show the high cost of their support, and scale down their terms a bit.

It is certainly easier to state than to solve the problems raised in considering the question of contingent costs. Annex M, attached, shows comparable contingent costs and other data for UNFICYP. In the ONUC background paper (p. 272),

¹ Identical letters were sent to each contingent contributor. The one for Finland is IPKO Documentation No. 20, pp. 26-29 without the annexes. The one for Austria, with annexes is in the Austrian Government Official Gazette for 17 May 1966, item 60, pp. 301-341. They can also be found in UNTS.

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it was similarly pointed out that the monthly cost to the UN for pay and allowances for the average Indian soldier in the Congo force was \$8 as compared with \$390 for the average Swede. UN costs for pay and allowances in UNFICYP constitute over the years three-fifths or more of the total costs of the operation and the two largest contingents (Canada and the U.K.) share little or not at all in those costs. It might be suggested that existing guidelines employing the terms "direct costs," "direct support costs," "out-of-pocket costs" and "extra and extraordinary costs" require better definition. The difficulty of course is the "regular" (e.g., Canadian) as opposed to the "volunteer" (e.g., Scandinavian) peacekeeping contingent approach. The bulk of the writing on peacekeeping seems, in a not very specific way, to favor the "volunteer" approach, generally citing personal motivation and other similar values. Stegenga, on the other hand, may go too far in consistently using the word "mercenary" instead of "volunteer" in this connection, but perhaps only a little too far and the problem needs serious examination.¹

2. Airlift/Sealift: Canada and the U.K. provide their own contingent lift (both initial and rotational) by their own means and without charge to the UN. The remainder (about 2/3 of the force or a rough average of 3,500 men) must be provided airlift by the UN. Initially, this share of the force was moved to Cyprus by U.S. Air Force planes. Subsequent rotations every six months for the other than British and Canadian components have been either by military airlift (U.S., U.K., Italy) or commercial means; the latter exclusively since mid-1965.

For the 19 calendar quarters from its operational date to the end of 1968 the UN had spent \$3,736,000 on the movement of contingents or about 4% of the total cost to the UN of the Cyprus operation (including unpaid obligations).

While a six months tour of duty is generally in effect in UNFICYP, there have been enough exceptions, partial extensions, split tours and other irregularities over the years to break up the neat spring and fall rotation periods which should have obtained. For example, in the rotational airlift for 1969, the Austrian hospital had 4 rotation dates for 25

¹ Stegenga, op. cit., e.g. pp. 174-175.

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men each, the Australian police had 3 dates (one of which involved only 1 man) and the Finnish contingent had 4 dates for about 140-180 men each. For such small groups it has probably worked out in practice that individual, block or charter commercial travel is more economical than reimbursable military airlift. Further, the uneconomically high costs that would fall to the country (probably the U.S.) expected to provide free military airlift make such airlifts an unattractive proposition.

The procedure for airlift of contingents for rotation involves mainly the UN Office of General Services in New York. Headquarters, UNFICYP provides an annual forecast of rotational lift requirements to New York. The Office of General Services then, in the practice generally followed through mid-1965 attempted through the assist letter system to obtain free military airlift for the larger moves. It arranged commercial air travel by the most favorable economic means for the smaller lifts and for those larger groups for which free military airlift could not be arranged. The commercial arrangements have been used exclusively from mid-1965 onward.

3. Rations and Water: Earlier it was said that UNFICYP has been in that happy position of "operating in a supermarket parking lot." Now it must be added that the supermarket did not have a gourmet food department when the force arrived. But the supermarket manager was a very cooperative type and he quickly set one up.

All UNFICYP contingents draw rations from British supply depots on Cyprus according to several different ration scales that have been developed and approved by each contingent commander, Headquarters UNFICYP and the UN Secretariat to meet national tastes. Only the British and the Irish use the standard British ration. Each of the other UNFICYP contingents has a different ration (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Canada). To allow even further latitude for differences in national tastes, a commutation system was established for UNFICYP on 29 May 1965. Under this system (which does not apply to the Canadians, who have a completely Canadian ration scale) a contingent may underdraw certain ration items up to 20-30% of the computed value of the set ration and use the savings therefrom to draw any available ration item they prefer.

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To meet these varying tastes the British arrange to import regularly about 50 different food items from Canada, Scandinavia and New Zealand/Australia; bake seven different bread varieties daily and even cater to such strange North American quirks as the Canadian desire for ice in cold drink items.

Canada pays for the extra cost of its ration. (See Annex H, para. 10).

As an indication of the favorable environment, and of the economic consequences of UNFICYP to the island's people, more than half of the food stuffs issued to UNFICYP by the British are bought locally. For a six months' period one British officer estimated local food purchases at £250,000 (\$700,000). Similarly, water on Cyprus is generally considered potable. UNFICYP regulations require a medical examination of water sources for purity. There are also special ration scales and arrangements for patients, patrols, wardogs, inflight groups and emergency rations.

As with other British support arrangements for UNFICYP, the procedures for rations are efficient and are clearly laid out; quantity and financial controls are tight, and the signed receipt for all transactions ends up with the UN Chief Administrative Officer.¹

4. Transport: The vehicles in use for road transport in UNFICYP fall into 4 categories:

- a. national vehicles owned by contingents
- b. British vehicles on loan to UNFICYP
- c. vehicles owned by UN
- d. vehicles hired by UN from local contractors.

The numbers, types and sources of vehicles each contingent and element of UNFICYP may have are established by Headquarters, UNFICYP and any changes require specific approval. Within 10 days after its arrival each replacement contingent is required to submit a one-time report of all vehicles in its possession. A report is required monthly thereafter

¹ HQ UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 3, Ordnance-Rations Nicosia, 25 September 1967.

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showing each vehicle and its mileage for the month. For transport needs beyond the capabilities of its own vehicles, contingents call upon the UNFICYP Transport Squadron, a British unit, for assistance. The terminology, first-line, second-line, is also used for these two levels of transport support.

Replacement of non-repairable vehicles as well as the provision of vehicle spare parts is the responsibility of the original source (i.e. national, British, UN, contractor).

Maintenance is handled differently for each category. First-line maintenance is that within the capability of a battalion, employing its drivers and motor pool personnel. It does not involve any sizable repair jobs. Second-line maintenance is that done by a specialized support unit like a workshop and involves most common repair jobs but not major rebuilding.

Contingents (other than those without any capability in this field like the Austrian Hospital and UNCIVPOL) are responsible for all first-line maintenance on all their vehicles from whatever source. They are also responsible for second-line maintenance on their national vehicles, although the British support units will give limited assistance. The British workshops perform the first-line maintenance for those elements with no maintenance capability at all (including the force headquarters) and second-line maintenance on all British source vehicles.

UN owned vehicles are maintained by commercial contract, and contractor-hire vehicles are maintained by the firm providing the vehicle (it must be replaced by the contractor if not repairable in one day), but for both these categories the British workshops inspect the vehicle both before and after the work is accomplished for quality and financial control.

The nationally-provided vehicles will be covered in the next section for each contingent, where the information is available. UN owned and UN hired vehicles probably represent a very small portion of the total vehicle fleet. A British briefing officer, about a year after the start of UNFICYP, estimated that "almost 1,000" British vehicles were in use in the force, and that during a six months' period the British support units alone had driven about 3 million miles in support of UNFICYP.

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The monthly basic rental charges, including normal maintenance service, for British vehicles on loan to UNFICYP are as follows:¹

3-ton truck	\$126
1-ton truck	105
$\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck	84
Staff car	105
Water truck	126
1-ton Armored Personnel Carrier	231
Ferret Scout Car	462
$\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer	16.80
1-ton water trailer	42

Drivers of all vehicles in UNFICYP are required to have a UN driver's license. Americans find it hard to understand that throughout most of the world, even including the advanced countries of Western Europe, driving and doing simple repairs on motor vehicles are not commonly held skills. In UNFICYP, as in all other peacekeeping operations, one hears the complaint of excessive costs in transport operations caused by poor driving and maintenance practices.

5. Medical: UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 1, 7 June 1968 states:

Contingents are required to be self-contained in their medical arrangements and are to provide their own medical supplies and equipment through National channels except where otherwise ruled by the Chief Administrative Officer, UNFICYP.

Each of the large contingents has a medical/dental capability for the day to day care of their own troops. More serious illnesses or injuries are cared for by the British Military Hospital at Dhekelia, which is not part of UNFICYP, or by the Austrian Hospital at Kokkini Trinithia (15 kilometers West of Nicosia), which is.

¹ To these basic monthly rentals must be added the surcharges described on supra, p. 426. Since Cyprus, like England, drives on the left side, British vehicles are especially suitable for use on Cyprus.

The climate, conditions and sanitation practices on Cyprus present no particular health problems and the operations of the force have not produced any unusual number of casualties or injuries. Cypriot medical facilities are good (6 general hospitals) and there is a national health service program on the U.K. model.¹

Some rather rough figures for the Austrian Hospital indicate they treat about 25-30 patients a day on an out-patient basis. The bed capacity of the hospital is 50 but can be doubled or even tripled in case of need.

The full rationale for having a hospital as part of UNFICYP, recognizing that the British medical capability could be more than adequate for the whole force, probably involves many factors besides simple medical efficiency. The Austrian medics proved very effective in the Congo in organizing public health services, community programs, refugee care and other functions going beyond medical treatment of the UN troops. Should such functions ever have (or yet) become necessary in Cyprus, a non-British medical capability might become most useful. As it is, the Austrian medics, in addition to caring for UN troops, give some temporary treatment to civilians in need, although they must be careful not to upset the medical practices of local Greek and Turkish Cypriot doctors (there were 414 licensed physicians, 123 dentists, 216 pharmacists and 415 midwives in 1962).² They also undertake worthwhile preventative medicine programs with UNFICYP contingents such as complete dental checks and treatment for the entire Finnish contingent and X-ray examinations for the Danish.³

¹ Adams, op. cit., p. 186.

² Ibid., p. 187.

³ UN financial considerations also figure in the Austrian Hospital case. Hospitalization of a UN soldier in the British hospital costs the UN about \$30 per day; it is free in the Austrian hospital. However, see infra, p. 454 for the costs to the UN of maintaining the Austrian hospital.

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UNFICYP will be the source, by the time the operation has ended, of some interesting data on the medical aspects of a peacekeeping force. The Force Headquarters has a medical staff section with a Force Chief Medical Officer--a British Army medical department Colonel (Col. T.A. Pace since 15 January 1968). Each major contingent has 2 or more medical officers and, of course, the Austrian Field Hospital is part of the Force. Medical conferences are held frequently among the medical personnel of the force and a very thorough monthly statistical and analytical report on health matters is prepared. Training courses are conducted by the British Base Hospital for UNFICYP members on water purification, sanitation and other health matters.

Attached as Annex J is the statistical summary for the operation of the UNFICYP Austrian Hospital during 1968 showing the patient load by nationality and the breakdown of various medical and dental activities.

For UNFICYP as a whole in 1968, the following interesting medical statistics are examples of the type of information which can be obtained from medical reports. Although presented below in summary form, the information can be broken down by classes of illnesses and injuries, trends and corrective measures and by nationality:

1968 Hospital Admissions -

low month (June)	59 (14.4 per 1,000)
high month (Dec)	81 (25.1 per 1,000)
Monthly Average	80

1968 Deaths -

total for year	7
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1968 First attendances at Medical Centers -

low month (Apr)	154.5 per 1,000
high month (Aug)	217.6 per 1,000

1968 Evacuated home

total for year	87
high month (Aug)	15
low month (May)	2
Monthly Average	7.25
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A holding/evacuation policy of 30 days has been established for the force.

As with all military forces, the incidence of venereal disease, accidental injuries, suicides and psychiatric cases in UNFICYP is closely studied for causes and trends. The medical reports also provide much useful information on sanitation, insect and rodent control, acclimatization and nutrition related to the health of the peacekeeping force.

UNFICYP has no mortuary capabilities and employs commercial facilities in Nicosia when the need arises.

6. Ordnance Stores: This section will deal very briefly with supplies and equipments other than the big items such as vehicles and rations, which the British furnish on loan or sell to the force on a reimbursable basis. Included are tentage, furniture, cleaning equipment and supplies, refrigerators, radios, office equipment and supplies, weapons, kitchen equipment, etc.

For all such items, the scale or basis of issue is set and closely controlled. All transactions except distribution of equipment within a contingent are thoroughly controlled and documented. For non-consumable items a monthly inventory report (called the "Hire Schedule") is required, as well as special inventories by a board of officers, with UNFICYP Headquarters representation, at rotation time. Above a £25 (\$60) total write-off limit, all losses require a board of inquiry, with review by Headquarters, UNFICYP. A British officer, assigned as Quartermaster, is responsible for all supplies and equipment used in the force headquarters.

A review of the "hire schedule" (which excludes vehicles) as of the end of December 1968 shows that the equipment brought by the contingents or their need for British equipment or both vary greatly. For example, just a few categories of equipment are shown below together with the amounts loaned to various contingents and the headquarters:

Machine guns	Danes only	6
Padlocks	HQ only	46
Typewriters	HQ only	47
Tents (various)	Canadians	222
	Danes	17

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Tents (various	Finns	13
	Irish	162
	Swedes	20
Cooking Equipment (pieces)	Austrians	31
	Canadians	95
	Danes	9
	Finns	35
	Irish	236
	HQ	188
Oil heat stoves	Austrians	100
	Canadians	99
	Danes	200
	Finns	239
	Irish	214
	Swedes	261
Radio (C43)	Austrians	1
	Danes	1
	Finns	1
	Irish	2
	Swedes	1

As another indication of the volume of British support in this particular area, the same British briefing referred to above estimated that over 200 tons of furniture and camp equipment and 400 tons of tentage had been issued to contingents.

British equipment supplied in this manner is paid for under the rental system described on supra, p. 426.

7. UN Stores: The Chief Administrative Officer, the Chief of General Services and the Procurement Representative, all of whom are members of the international UN staff of UNFICYP, have responsibilities for procuring through New York or locally those few items of supply provided for UNFICYP by the UN. Once the supplies are procured, they are issued and accounted for by the British support system although in a different set of accounts and under somewhat closer control by the Chief Administrative Officer.

In addition to UN owned or contracted vehicles, items in this category include UN stationery, UN owned or rented furniture and appliances, and special uniform items, i.e., blue berets, field caps, helmet liners, badges, brassards, scarves and olive green shirts and trousers. The uniform items, once issued to the individual, are no longer account-

able and are retained by the individual on departure (except for helmet liners, used only by the Scandinavians, which must be turned in). The British and Canadian contingents and all of UNCIVPOL do not use the olive green shirts and trousers.

Although slightly different in minor details, the control procedures for UN stores are as strict as for the other categories, with frequent audits and inventories and thorough documentation. All durable items of UN property including rentals are marked and carry registration numbers for more complete inventory control.

UN published financial records for the Cyprus operation, unlike all other peacekeeping operations for which separate reports have been made, carry no entries for purchase of equipment. This indicates that this category of support for UNFICYP is insignificant in the total support picture.

8. Canteens, Institutes, PX's: As the Sutler's Store was to the U.S. Cavalry on the wild western frontier (as frequently depicted on television), so the PX, NAAFI, Institute, or whatever else it may be called, is to today's soldier everywhere, including those in peacekeeping forces. He practically demands it as a right--someplace where he can buy minor necessities, a few little luxuries including drink and tobacco, and perhaps share a little social atmosphere while spending his money.

Under the agreement between the UN and Cyprus on the Status of the Force, and supplemental agreements, each national contingent is allowed to operate its own facility of this kind and to import for it on a duty-free basis. However only consumables of a national character can be imported and sold in the contingent stores. So-called "attractive items" are prohibited and must be bought on the open Cypriot market or in the tax-free store operated for UNFICYP by the government of Cyprus. Headquarters UNFICYP instructions caution contingents to be very careful with customs clearances, and all handling of such supplies, and recommend that items be rationed to discourage misuse (140 cigarettes per week, 2 bottles of hard liquor per month).¹

¹ UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 1, 7 June 1968, Nicosia, paras. 24-30.

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The British NAAFI's (Navy, Army, Air Force Institute) in the base areas undoubtedly operate on a very much less restrictive basis than that imposed on the non-British contingents of UNFICYP.

9. Defense Stores, Ammunition: UNFICYP, as both a law and order force and an interposition force deployed widely throughout the area of operations, has been required to maintain and rather frequently to display a fighting capability.¹ While always officially described as "self-defense," UNFICYP's use of force occasionally has gone beyond the strictest meaning of that term. So long as restraint, impartiality, and non-initiation are practiced by UNFICYP, it would appear that it can and does employ very closely measured amounts of force to carry out its mission even where its own safety can hardly be said to be threatened. Such operations as disarming irregular forces and dismantling fortified positions seem to fall in this category.

It appears from most accounts that the military peacekeepers of UNFICYP perform this difficult juggling act extremely well.

Even at its planned strength of 7,000 men and 6 or 7 reinforced battalion groups with supporting units, UNFICYP would have been too small and too weak to control the situation by directly confronting the other military forces on the island. Counting all the regular, irregular and paramilitary forces of the Cypriot government and of the two Cypriot communities, and the regular contingents from Greece and Turkey, probably between 40,000 and 2 or 3 times that number of combatants would have had to be controlled. Some of them, to make matters worse, were not even controllable by their own leaders. In addition, the numbers

¹ The "use of force" question in UNFICYP is an interesting subject but its analysis is not required here. The 4 March 1960 resolution and subsequent Security Council extensions do not really address the subject. The Secretary-General stated his position--and his instructions to UNFICYP--in an Aide Memoire, S/5633, 10 April 1964. It can be argued that lack of objections to the Secretary-General's "guiding principles" constitutes, in effect, their incorporation into the mandate; but the contrary position can also be argued.

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and weight of weaponry available to the contestants grew rapidly after UNFICYP was established, as the government of Cyprus arranged arms imports and as arms were smuggled in to the Turkish Cypriots.¹ By August 1964 Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces were employing armed patrol boats, armored cars, 25-pound artillery (British terminology--equivalent to the standard light 105 millimeter artillery weapon of a U.S. infantry division), automatic 20 millimeter cannon, grenades, machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers.

The original British contingent for UNFICYP included 2 armored car squadrons and the Canadian contingent had one. These armored car squadrons were company-size units equipped with the British Ferret scout car. The Canadian Ferrets arrived on 30 March 1964 aboard the Canadian aircraft carrier, Bonaventure, along with other heavy equipment for the contingent. Other contingents originally had weapons limited to small arms, light machine guns and mortars. The Finns had heavy mortars of Soviet manufacture (120 millimeter). The Irish had a few French made armored cars.²

In order somewhat to offset the upgrading of armaments among the antagonists in Cyprus in the Summer of 1964, Canada was requested to provide an antitank platoon equipped with jeep-mounted 106 millimeter recoilless rifles. The unit of about 25 men arrived by Canadian airlift on 15 August.

The British-manned logistics units of UNFICYP hold a reserve supply of minor defense fortification materiel on call for use by any UNFICYP contingent. The reserve includes 100 coils of concertina barbed wire, pickets and bobbins of barbed wire for other types of barriers and 15,000 sandbags.³

¹ In July 1964, arms receipts by the government of Cyprus at the port of Limassol were only partly distributed, in the opinion of UNFICYP, in 1,000 3-ton truck cargoes. See S/5950, 10 September 1964, para. 41.

² Through their earlier trying experiences on Cyprus, the British had fabricated, as a local expedient, a 1-ton truck with light armor around the passenger compartment. A few of these were available for issue to contingents of UNFICYP.

³ HQ UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 1, 7 June 1968, Nicosia, para. 16.

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Ammunition in UNFICYP is a contingent responsibility for supply to be obtained from the home country or purchased from the British ammunition supply depot at Dhekelia, if available.

Because the climate of Cyprus causes unpacked ammunition to deteriorate, but also for the much more important reason that UNFICYP ammunition must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the contending Cypriot forces, storage and issue controls are especially strict.¹ Minimum ammunition is kept on hand in operational positions by contingents with that not felt to be immediately needed kept in contingent controlled storage, at zone headquarters, or at the British ammunition depot. The British depot may also hold the so-called "second line" reserve for each contingent if the contingent is not able to do so. Of that ammunition with the contingent, an absolute minimum (e.g. enough for 2 magazines or 1 belt per weapon) is removed from the sealed containers.

The ammunition holdings of contingents for operational (i.e. not including training) purposes for certain selected weapons are as follows:²

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Rounds per Weapon</u>	
	<u>1st Line</u>	<u>2nd Line</u>
Pistol	14	7
Rifle	100	50
Machine gun (ground)	500	250
Machine gun (armored car)	2,000	1,000
Bazooka, etc.	8	4
106 mm Recoilless Rifle	8	6
81 mm mortar	109 (24 smoke)	199 (24 smoke)
Grenade (hand, explosive)	1/3 per man	1/6
	10 per scout car	10
Grenade (white phosphorous)	12 per scout car	6

¹ There have been two public scandals involving instances in which UN arms got to a Cypriot side (Turkish in both cases): The "Airman Marley case," involving a British RAF man who was not a member of UNFICYP; and the "Swedish case" involving 5 members of the Swedish contingent. Stegenga, op. cit., pp. 85, 99.

² HQ UNFICYP Logistic Instruction No. 12, 15 July 1968, Nicosia, especially Annex F.

DETAILS OF NATIONAL SUPPORT

A. GENERAL

National and international organization and procedures for support of UNFICYP have now been covered. It remains in this chapter to cover the details of national support by each state which has rendered such support by the furnishing of troops, police, financial contributions, and material support either free of charge or on a reimbursable basis.

The approach will be to deal first with contingent contributors, then separately with the U.K. and the U.S., and finally with all others who were to a lesser degree involved but with particular attention to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

B. CONTINGENT CONTRIBUTORS

1. Australia: With small scale participation in UNTSO and UNMOGIP, in addition to its 40-50 police contingent in UNFICYP, Australia falls well within the category of those who support UN peacekeeping, but hardly as an uncritical enthusiast. To the extent that UN peacekeeping is seen to accord with the basic Australian belief in collective security and does not raise Australian apprehensions about the misuse of the UN for Afro-Asian militancy, she is a supporter. The Commonwealth aspects of the Cyprus peacekeeping operation increased its acceptability to Australia. In fact, initial Australian planning for participation of its police contingent in UNFICYP was based on an assumption that the police component would be a Commonwealth force.

Australia has provided since May 1964 a 40-man (since the fall of 1967, a 50-man) police contingent. They serve a 12 months' tour in Cyprus and the UN pays only for their direct operating costs in Cyprus. Australia pays all salaries and allowances, equipment, clothing and travel to and from Cyprus, including one Nicosia-Rome round trip for leave purposes during the tour.¹ The general order of Australian direct

¹ See Annex H, para. 6 for the terms of the UN-Australian agreement on cost apportionment.

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costs may be roughly estimated as follows (ignores training, uniform, equipment and other costs):

Man-months	May 1964-Dec 1968	2400
Average monthly salary	\$ 300	
Average monthly allowance	140	
		<hr/>
Travel-250 men X \$2,000		\$1,056,000
		<hr/>
		500,000
		<hr/>
Total		\$1,556,000

In addition, Australia through 1968 had pledged \$1,037,000 for UNFICYP and had actually paid \$937,000.

2. Austria: Four years before the request to serve in UNFICYP arose, Austria first faced the problems involved in its national policy of permanent neutrality and constitutional prohibitions against employment of Federal forces outside Austria when it sent a hospital unit to the Congo.¹ In that operation a total of 166 Austrian volunteers in 5 successive contingents served from December 1960 to July 1963. In addition to its current hospital unit of 50-55 men and its 45-man police contingent in UNFICYP, Austria also has 12 people in UNTSO. Legislation of June and July 1965 reconciled the constitutional issues and since then the service of Austrians in UN peacekeeping operations (or, for that matter, in disaster relief operations) has a sounder legal basis. Still, however, all participants, even those from the Federal Army or Police, must be volunteers and are paid at civil servant, rather than military, rates. Planning for future participation has included the formation and periodic training assembly of a "UN battalion" whose potential members, until the specific need actually arises, declare only a willingness to volunteer.²

Austria can probably be said to have moved into the enthusiast category on UN peacekeeping. There are apparently

¹ See p. 276 et seq. of the ONUC background paper in this series. See IPKO Documentation No. 1, p. 5, for the citation of Austrian Constitution Articles 79-81 which are based on Article 120 of the St. Germain Treaty.

² IPKO Documentation No. 1, pp. 19-22.

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adequate volunteers and many participants extend their tours or serve repeat tours. Accounts written by past participants extol the self-satisfaction of such service. They also point out the value for Austrian prestige abroad, and the better understanding achieved among peoples. They usually also acknowledge that the financial returns to the individual are quite rewarding and that valuable experience is to be gained from both professional and cultural viewpoints.

In both the Congo and Cyprus the Austrian medical groups placed great emphasis on community health and other civic-action type programs, and on developing close and helpful relationships with local people. In the Congo such programs ran the patient load to as high as 4-5,000 per month. In Cyprus, where local health conditions are relatively very good, the same size hospital handles a much lighter load. Average monthly statistics in Cyprus in 1966, for example, were 39 in-patients, 260 out-patients, 165 X-rays, and 165 dental patients for the Austrian hospital.¹

It is Austrian overall policy that all costs for its contingents furnished to an international organization for peacekeeping or disaster relief shall be borne by the international organization. For UNFICYP, as noted on supra, p. 418 the UN costs for the Austrian medical unit to be reimbursed to Austria were a matter of pre-arrangement between the UN and Austria. They were for the initial 3 months \$60,000 for personnel and \$24,000 for equipment, plus, of course, transportation in and out and full accommodation, food and other necessary support in Cyprus.

The Austrian hospital was initially moved to Cyprus by non-reimbursable U.S. Air Force airlift under US-UNFICYP Assist No. 8 commencing 24 April 1964. The lift included 54 people and 61,750 pounds of cargo including 5 vehicles (2 VW station wagons, 2 VW ambulances, 1 VW sedan) and 1 diesel generator. The lift was accomplished by 3 C-130 aircraft assigned to U.S. Strike Command.²

¹ See Annex J for details of the Austrian Field Hospital operation in 1968.

² Documentation for the Austrian Hospital Airlift is: USUN msg. to State 3829, 22 April 1964; U.S. Air Force msg. AFXOPH72411, 24 April 1964; and STRIKE Command msg. STRJ3-OE 4199, 25 April 1964.

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Through June 1967 the UN, according to its figures, had reimbursed Austria for medical and police contingents a total of \$1,422,000, or an average of \$109,385 per calendar quarter.¹ Assuming for simplicity that the total of both contingents was close to 100 men throughout the 13 calendar quarters, a per-man-month reimbursable cost for the Austrian hospital and police would be about \$365.

Using Austrian data (with one extrapolation to provide a missing figure for 1968) produces the following results for 19 calendar quarters from April 1964 through December 1968:

Hospital 1964-1968

UN Reimbursable costs	\$1,211,170
Austrian borne costs	465,875
Total personnel provided	561

Police 1964-1968

UN Reimbursable costs	912,474
Austrian borne costs	329,550
Total personnel provided	135

Total 1964-1968

UN Reimbursable Costs	2,123,644
Austrian borne costs	795,425
Total personnel provided	696

Using the same rough calculations as before (100 men over 19 calendar quarters) the direct reimbursable costs per-man-month would be \$373 to be reimbursed by the UN and \$140 borne by Austria, or \$111,771 by the UN and \$41,865 by Austria per 3-month period. As a super-simplification, it might be said that Austria in her two contingents has provided on the average about one-fiftieth of the UNFICYP force at about one-thirty-fifth of the total direct UN reimbursable costs for all contingents.

Austria through 1968 pledged and paid \$520,000 to the UN for the UNFICYP Special Account.

¹ Annex K.

3. Canada: As probably the leading peacekeeper of them all--a reputation earned through prompt and generous Canadian participation in practically every significant peacekeeping operation since 1945--Canada had some hard questions to consider when asked on 4 March 1964 to be a part of UNFICYP.

A Canadian writer notes that, as the Cyprus situation developed in the very beginning of 1964 "...the first criticism in years of the Canadian role in peacekeeping was heard."¹ Canada's hard-won reputation for impartiality in peacekeeping--difficult in any case for a country like Canada--was bound to come under special strains in the Cyprus situation where ties with the U.K., the Commonwealth (both old white and new Afro-Asian) and her NATO partners (including Greece and Turkey) were all horribly tangled. Government and opposition spokesmen and the press were quite divided on the issues involved and much was made of the charge that once again Canada was being asked to "bail the U.K. out."

Canada would probably have preferred a NATO peacekeeping force for Cyprus but the government was prepared to go along with a new UN commitment. As early as 19 February 1964, however, the Prime Minister was indicating conditions that would have to be met before Canadian troops would take part: the force would have to be such as to contribute to peace, the duration of the mandate would have to be fixed, and Canada would want to approve the choice of a Mediator.² On 12 March 1964, the Secretary-General in reporting to the Security Council on potential contingents stated that Canada had submitted a number of questions prior to deciding on participation in UNFICYP and that these questions pertained to "...organization, status, directives, liaison and duties of the Force."³

¹ David Cox, "Issues and Opinions: A Report on the Conference on Peacekeeping," in Alastair, Taylor et al., Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 169.

² Ibid., p. 172.

³ S/5593, 12 March 1964, para. 4.

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The key role played by Canada in getting UNFICYP launched when a week-long "after you, Alfonse" situation developed among reluctant contingent contributors was described supra, pp. 433-435. On 13 March 1964 Parliament approved the participation of Canadian troops up to a strength of 1,200. It should be noted, in looking at that figure, that the total strength of the Canadian Army is about 44,000 and that its main combat units are 4 infantry brigade groups. One of these, with a strength of 6,500 is assigned to NATO and stationed in Europe. Of the remaining 3 infantry brigade groups in Canada, two are committed to NATO leaving one for North American defense and other special duties, including peacekeeping.¹

The initial Canadian contribution was transported to Cyprus by Canadian airlift and sealift and was the only contingent, other than the British, on the island on the day UNFICYP became operational (27 March 1964). It consisted of the standby infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron and headquarters and support units. The airlifted personnel and equipment began arriving on 18 March. The Ferret scout cars, other heavy equipment and remaining personnel arrived on 30 March on the aircraft carrier Bonaventure and a smaller escort ship, the Restigouche. The Canadian contingent initially manned the Green Line² dividing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot quarters in Nicosia as well as providing the bulk of a Zone headquarters and a share of the staff personnel for the Headquarters of UNFICYP located in RAF-provided facilities at Nicosia airfield west of the city. In December 1964 the Danes took over the Green Line task and the Canadian contingent shifted to the Kyrenia pass and road area.

The initial strength of about 1,100-1,150 held until mid-1965 when the requirement to man the zone headquarters lapsed. From then until the end of 1966, a strength of just under 1,000 was maintained. Through 1967 and 1968 the Canadian strength dropped slowly from just under 900 to 750 and at the beginning of 1969 stood at 595, of which,

¹ The Military Balance 1966-1967 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 17.

² "Green Line" from the color of the pencil used to mark it on headquarters maps.

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as shown on supra, pp. 428-429, only about 350 functioned in an operational role. By June 1969 strength had further dropped to 574. Over the period 1964 through 1968 about 54,400 Canadian man-months went into UNFICYP out of a total of about 285,300 man-months or just under 20%.

The original arrangements which Canada made with the UN for apportionment of costs for the Canadian contingent were very generous but were altered once in 1964 and twice in 1966 to reduce Canada's share.¹ Canada's initial commitment was to bear all costs including transport for its contingent for the 3 months contemplated in the mandate. This was altered, or clarified in June 1964 to distinguish between the Canadian Contingent, to which the all-costs commitment applied, and those Canadians on the zonal and headquarters staffs who had been requested separately by the UN. For this latter group, Canada claimed reimbursement for "out-of-pocket" costs, including special allowances, foreign allowances and maintenance support from British sources in Cyprus (estimated at \$19,500 for the first period), as well as one-time costs for 14 radio sets (\$168,000), one special airlift (\$17,500), and a transfer of about \$900 in Canadian property to the Finnish contingent.

Effective with the mandate renewal of 26 June 1966, Canada claimed reimbursement for the "direct local support" costs of the contingent in Cyprus except that Canada continued to pay the extra cost of the special Canadian ration scale.

After 26 December 1966, Canada also claimed reimbursement for the weekly RCAF flight between Canada and Cyprus.

It is difficult to reconcile available financial data on the Canadian participation in UNFICYP since they never seem to be expressed in terms which can be compared on a sustained basis throughout the period of participation. The following table attempts a rough summary (\$1,000 U.S.):

¹ See Annex H, paras. 9-14.

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	<u>Pay and Allowances</u> <u>Absorbed</u>	<u>Out of Pocket Costs</u>		<u>Total</u>	
		<u>Absorbed</u>	<u>Reimbursed</u>	<u>Canada</u>	<u>UN</u>
1964 ¹ (9 months)	2,861	3,093	20	5,954	20
1965 ² 26 Jun 66 (18 months)	5,722	6,186	20	11,908	20
26 Jun 66-30 Sep 67 (15 months)	3,815	2,053	1,234	5,868	1,234
1 Oct 67-31 Dec 68 (15 months)	3,468	2,230	-	5,698	-
TOTAL (57 months)	15,866	13,562	1,274	29,428	1,274 ³

Additional cost data with respect to the Canadian participation in UNFICYP of possible interest, and probably order of magnitude validity, are:

Cost to Canada of 1964 Troop movements	\$190,000
Cost of single special flight	\$ 17,500

Of the total UNFICYP Canadian strength of 582, at the beginning of 1969, the main semi-annual rotational force was 464 men. Its movement requires 8 sorties - 5 for personnel, 3 for cargo. The remaining Canadians rotate individually or in small groups on the weekly flights.

Canadian absorbed pay and allowances per man-month in UNFICYP (average)	\$ 290
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- 1 Canadian furnished data, S/6954, Annex III, p. 1.
- 2 Calculated by extrapolating the data in note 1 above so as to arrive at the point in time where the apportionment of cost changed.
- 3 Annex K. For the period 1 Oct 67-31 Dec 68 the UN would appear to owe Canada some \$1.2 million which it has not been in position to pay. Canada is therefore, for the time being at least, also absorbing these costs raising the total Canadian absorbing costs to about \$30.6 million.

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Canadian absorbed out-of-pockets cost per man-month (under arrangements prior to June 1966)	\$ 310
Canadian absorbed out-of-pocket costs per man-month (under arrangements since June 1966)	\$ 175
Cost to UN per month per Canadian (under arrangements since June 1966)	\$ 95
All inclusive Canadian per-man-month costs 1964 through 1968: to the UN	\$ 23
to Canada	\$ 541

Canada has neither pledged nor paid any contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account.

Towards the end of this second half of the decade of the 1960's, it is possible to note some Canadian weariness and a mild disenchantment with peacekeeping. The Canadian contingent's ejection from UNEF in 1967 under charges of partiality, the sheer unpleasantness of the participation in the Congo force through 4 long years, and the strains on the individual participants as well as on the Canadian defense establishment of what is now approaching 6 years in Cyprus have had their effect. Peacekeeping no longer seems to be the unambiguous, true path for Canada to "international sainthood."¹

To keep her Cyprus force up to strength, Canada, in the spring of 1966, had to convert artillerymen temporarily to infantry and in the rotation later that year sent out a battalion at least 100 men under strength.²

Canadian servicemen have become more aware that they usually get the hardest tasks in a peacekeeping force, are supported relatively more austere by their home country

¹ Cox, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

² Ibid., p. 176.

while on the operation, and share very little if at all in the individual financial rewards and other fringe benefits which other members of the peacekeeping force obtain. Observers have noticed that whereas in Scandinavian and other European countries, with strong interest in peacekeeping, it is the Defense Ministries that most consistently advocate peacekeeping participation and the Foreign Ministries that try to hold back, in Canada it is not so clear and frequently the reverse.¹

The changes in defense and foreign policy or emphasis, predicted to follow the taking of office by the Trudeau government in Canada, have not yet at end-1969 clearly appeared. Pronouncements in early April 1969 indicated some degree of adjustment among Canada's priorities. Peacekeeping is still one of these but whether its relative position and absolute emphasis has gone up or down is yet to be seen. It seems fair to estimate that Canadian support of peacekeeping will in the future at least be less uncritical and less automatic than in the past. Nonetheless, a Canadian role in international peacekeeping is a basic feature of the Canadian conception of its place in the World; Canadian repute and status is to a significant degree based on it. Canadian military expertise is best known for this role. It is part of the main Canadian counter to "continentalism;" that is "internationalism."²

4. Denmark: Denmark is a member in good standing of the Scandinavian peacekeeping club,³ and when asked to provide a 1,000-man military and 40-man police contingent for UNFICYP in April 1964, responded promptly and affirmatively. All the Danish police were in Cyprus by 25 May and about 700 of the 1,000 military had arrived by 22 May with the remainder

¹ Cox, op. cit., pp. 185-186. See also John C. Ries, Peacekeeping and Peace Observation: The Canadian Case (ACDA/WEC 126, Vol. IX), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 30 June 1968.

² For some of the implications of a country like Canada trying to be both a loyal member of the Western Alliance system and an "uncommitted" middle power for peacekeeping, see Peter Calvocoressi, World Order and New States (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), pp. 109-110.

³ See supra, pp. 430-431.

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to follow in early June 1964. Denmark had not been in the list of 7 countries originally asked for military contingents but was added when Brazil's inability to provide a contingent required a substitute donor. Response time was shortened since Denmark had earlier in February 1964 made the necessary decisions, planning and preparation for participation with 600 men in a NATO peacekeeping force for Cyprus.¹

Like her Scandinavian partners, Denmark had at the beginning of 1964 decided on and secured the necessary statutory basis for a permanent stand-by peacekeeping force; but just as with the others, preparations had not advanced quite far enough for these arrangements to be directly used for the UNFICYP contingents.

The Danes have an Army of about 30,000. From 1956 to end-1969, more than 20,000 Danes have participated in UN peacekeeping operations:

UNEF	1956-67	10,650
ONUC	1960-64	825
UNTSO	1948-mid 1969	195
Kashmir	1965	82
Yemen	1963-64	5
Lebanon	1958	57
UNFICYP	1964-mid-1969	<u>8,173</u>
TOTAL		19,987

Out of 3,992 UN peacekeepers in all operations on-going as of 5 February 1969, Denmark was providing 528. Only the U.K. (1,113) and Canada (617) had more, and the U.K. was something of a special case.

Denmark's UNFICYP military contingent entered Cyprus by U.S. airlift and carried about 60 tons of unit equipment in addition to 25 vehicles.² The departure airfield was Aalborg.

¹ Stegenga, op. cit., p. 89.

² The warning order for the Danish airlift was contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff message JCS 5957, 21 April 1964, to U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe. The order to execute the lift was in JCS 6234, 8 May 1964.

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Difficulties about the availability date of the police personnel prevented their inclusion in the contingent airlift. The police traveled on scheduled commercial flights. The UN also shipped about 25 tons of Danish unit equipment by commercial sealift. The airlifted vehicles comprised 15 radio jeeps, 3 1-ton radio trucks, 3 3-ton workshop trucks, and 4 3/4-ton trailers with radios and generators. Each man was allowed 240 pounds for personal baggage and equipment.

The initial military contingent numbered about 1,000 men, which strength was maintained from mid-June 1964 to mid-January 1966 (19 months). From January 1966 to November 1968 (34 months) a contingent strength of about 650 was maintained. Rotations have occurred each six months generally in May and November. The 11th contingent with a strength of 461 is currently in Cyprus, its tour scheduled to end November-December 1969. Contingent 1 was moved to Cyprus by the U.S. Air Force; contingent 2 by the Royal Air Force; contingent 3 by the U.S. Air Force; contingent 4, and presumably all subsequent ones, by commercial airlift.

It appears from rotational figures that from 50 to 200 men in each Danish military contingent extend their tours for an additional 6 months.

Denmark's initial 40-man police contingent entered Cyprus on 25 May 1964.¹ It was chosen from about 70 applicants. DANCIVPOL serves the shortest tour of any UNCIVPOL contingent--12 or 16 weeks, depending on the schedule of the SCACYP flights by which its members move back and forth. Figures are not readily available, but obviously with such short tours there must be many repeaters among the Danish police. In Cyprus DANCIVPOL works with the Danish military contingent and also with the Canadian contingent. Its members are billeted in 2 hotels - 28 at the Saray Hotel in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, and 12 at Hotel Rock Ruby in Kyrenia. One of its principal duties is the operation of the Nicosia-Kyrenia convoy 4 times daily. The daily work schedule is a very full one but nights are generally free.

¹ Details on DANCIVPOL are available in an interesting article of February 1967 by a Danish police superintendent, IPKO Documentation, No. 27, pp. 1-24.

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DANCIVPOL brought initially 8 jeeps, 2 motorcycles and a number of bicycles from Denmark. These had, for all practical purposes, been worn out by early 1967 and were replaced and slightly augmented by British vehicles.

In addition to their normal salaries DANCIVPOL members are paid:

\$134.10 per month	payable in Denmark
32.20 per month	payable in Denmark
<u>241.40 per month</u>	paid in Cypriot pounds
(average)	
\$407.70	

Accommodations are paid for by the UN and meals are charged to the individual at 1 Cypriot pound (\$2.80) per day or \$84 per month.¹ Laundry service is free through the Danish military contingent and dry cleaning charges are reimbursed. Seven days' leave is authorized during each tour of at least 3 months. For professional and language interests 2-week inter-change tours between the Australian and Danish police contingents are arranged.

Even with what appears to be substantial financial and professional rewards for DANCIVPOL duty, Danish officials have commented from time to time on the difficulty of securing qualified volunteers. One would suspect seasonal variations in this regard.

Denmark's understanding with the UN on cost apportionment for its UNFICYP contingents was essentially the same as for Finland and Sweden; i.e., the UN to pay or reimburse "all expenses but presumably, as regards direct government expenses, extra and extraordinary costs only."² Costs of

¹ Prior to 1966 UNCIVPOL accommodations were provided by Cyprus. The heavy cost of such accommodations in first class hotels was an undoubted cause of Cyprus seeking a way out of the requirement to accommodate UN police. See supra, pp. 432-433.

² Annex H

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the Danish/Swede SCACYP flights were to be absorbed.¹ UN officials visited the 3 Scandinavian capitals involved in October 1964 to finalize these basic arrangements.

Effective from April 1966 certain additional costs have been absorbed by Denmark:

"Sundry expenses" including certain travel, medical and welfare expenses, and expenses in Denmark connected with forming and disbanding the contingents

Reimbursement for accidents to Danish personnel

Initial equipment of Police contingent

By 10 October 1968 the UN had reimbursed Denmark \$15,775,000 for the Danish military and police contingents. However, because of the continuing deficit in the Cyprus accounts these payments only took care of Danish claims up to April 1967 for pay and allowances of the military contingent, and up to October 1966 for costs relating to contingent equipment and the pay and allowances of the police contingent.² This payment (\$15.8 million) is the largest of any reimbursement to UNFICYP contingent contributors and is also larger than the payment to the U.K. for reimbursable support of all contingents (except the U.K.) through March 1968.

According to Danish data, by the end of June 1969, 10 military contingents had served in UNFICYP each serving 6 months. The UN reimbursement claimed (or estimated) and received are as follows:

1st-6th Contingents June 1964 - May 1967 (3 years)

Claimed	- \$14,415,750
Received	- 14,281,650
Balance due	- 134,100

7th-8th Contingents May 1967 - May 1968 (1 year)

Claimed	- \$ 4,344,840
Received	- 67,000
Balance due	- 4,277,840

¹ See supra, p. 430.

² Annex K.

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9th-10th Contingents May 1968 - June 1969 (1 year)

Estimated claim \$4,613,040

Total 1st-10th Contingents June 1964-June 1969 (5 years)

Reimbursement claimed (incl. est.) \$23,373,630

In its 10 military contingents covering a period of 5 years, something like 46,000 man-months were represented. The costs reimbursable to Denmark by the UN on a per-man-month basis, therefore, over the 5 years was \$508. This, of course, does not include those direct support costs in Cyprus for the Danish military contingent which the UN provides or for which it reimburses the U.K.¹

The military contingent costs for which Denmark claims reimbursement fall into 3 categories. Details are available for the 6 months tour of DANCON I, May - November 1964:

Wages

Wages to non-service personnel	\$1,342,368
Special allowances	717,583
Miscellaneous expenditures	51,240

Personnel Equipment

Allowance for personal clothing, equipment, hand weapons and ammunition (992 men for 182 days at \$.57 per day)	102,895
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Other Materiel

Non-recurrent compensation calculated on 100% depreciation	98,949
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Compensation calculated on basis of partial depreciation	<u>136,031</u>
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TOTAL	\$2,449,066 ²
or \$397 per man-month, of which 89% is pay and allowances.	

¹ This direct support cost figure is calculated at \$66 per month. See infra, p. 490.

² Since from the information on the preceding page, the average 6 months' cost of DANCONS I to VI, June 1964 to

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Considering Danish data as of late 1968 to establish a "Daily Cyprus rate," produces the following UN reimbursable costs:

Wages

Pay	\$12.27
Allowances	4.94

<u>Materiel</u>	<u>1.48</u>
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TOTAL	\$18.69
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or \$560.70 per man-month, of which 92% is pay and allowances.

Applying this man-month figure to the estimated man-months for the Danish contingents produces a total reimbursable cost figure of \$25.8 million, which is some 10% above the actually claimed (and estimated) reimbursement.¹

A tentative explanation for what appears to be an average variance of about \$100 per man-month between calculations based on detailed costs on a per-man basis and those based on overall claims by Denmark for reimbursement might be that this represents a charge for services and support in Denmark forming, preparing, administering and finally disbanding the contingents. If this is the case, it represents about a 20% domestic service charge which has the effect of raising the per-man-month contingent reimbursable costs from about \$400 to about \$500.

Denmark has reported on six occasions that it absorbs certain costs in connection with its UNFICYP contingents. These seem to average out over the 3½ years covered by the data at \$120-130,000 for a 3-month period, or for 11 contingents of 6 months each, a total of \$2.6 to \$2.9 million.

May 1967 works out to \$2.4 million, this detailed data or DANCON I seems to have set the pattern and been generally valid over the 3-year period.

¹ See infra, pp. 469-470 for a comparison with Finland's costs and a tentative conclusion that the figures need to be adjusted downward by 10-14%. See also infra, pp. 483-484 for the same calculations as applied to Sweden's contingent.

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This amounts to about \$52 per man-month. Presumably included is Denmark's share of SCACYP flights.

Denmark has contributed to the UNFICYP Special Account for each mandate extension. Her pledges through 8 January 1969 total \$1,245,000. Only the initial contribution of March 1964 was paid in cash (\$75,000). All subsequent pledges have been retained by Denmark for offset against reimbursement due from the UN. \$690,000 in Danish pledges were written off in this way in 1965-1966-1967.

5. Finland: Finland joined the Scandinavian regional planning machinery for peacekeeping in 1963 and participated actively in the working groups, committees, seminars and in the semi-annual Ministers of Defense meetings. Finland's somewhat sensitive position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union makes it not a little surprising that Finland felt free to join with a Western-oriented neutral and 2 members of NATO in a project with which the Soviet Union over the years has shown little sympathy.

A Scandinavian observer has reported that the Soviet Union, in fact, did not register any objections to Finnish participation in Scandinavian peacekeeping planning, but that the Soviet Ambassador regularly calls at Finnish government offices to make inquiries following each regional peacekeeping meeting or conference.

Finnish legislation for a permanent standby peacekeeping (surveillance) force of up to 2,000 1-year volunteers was in the works, as it was also in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, when the UN call for a UNFICYP contingent was made. The legislation was approved 26 May 1964, but its full implementation will not take place until after the commitment to UNFICYP has ended.¹

Finland participated, as of mid-1969, in UNMOGIP (3 officers) and UNTSO (20 officers) in addition to UNFICYP (478).

It has been described in supra, pp. 433-435 how the Finnish affirmative response, after some delay was experienced by the UN in getting any of the potential contingent donors to move, helped break the log jam.

¹ IPKO Documentation No. 8.

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On 16 March 1964, the Defense Ministry was ordered to form the contingent (initially at a strength of 700 but increased, at UN request to 1,000 before it left Finland). Its main body arrived in Cyprus 25-30 April.

Finland was also requested to provide a civilian police contingent but reported it was unable to do so.

Ten Finnish contingents had been in UNFICYP as of the end of 1968. The contingents were known as YKSP 1-10, standing for UN Finland Battalion. Semi-annual rotations generally occur in late March and late September each year. On the order of 25-30% of the members of each contingent extend their tour for an additional 3 or 6 months. Twelve months is the maximum allowable tour.

YKSP-1 was transported to Cyprus by the U.S. Air Force.¹ An advance party of 35 men and about 1½ tons of equipment was moved first, followed 25-30 April 1964 by the main body of 948 men with 175 tons of equipment and supplies, including 13½ tons of ammunition. Ten C-130B aircraft flying 2 missions each were required for the move of the main body.

The move of YKSP-2 six months later in October 1964 to replace YKSP-1 was also accomplished by U.S. Air Force lift. Only about 630 new men had to be brought in since over 350 men of YKSP-1 had elected to stay on.

YKSP-3 (late March 1965) and YKSP-4 (late September 1965) were moved by commercial air (Kar-Air, 550 men; and J.A.T. and Adria, 335 men, respectively). Presumably all subsequent rotations have also been by commercial airlift.

The original Finnish plans for YKSP-1 were to employ only a very few officer and NCO volunteers from the regular service (about 20 when a 700-man force was planned; perhaps a few more for the 1,000 man force which was actually sent). The bulk of the force was made up of volunteers from the reserves. The contingent was formed at Santahamina (near Helsinki) with a headquarters; reconnaissance, communications, pioneer and military police platoons; 3 infantry companies and a maintenance company. Additional officers, headed by a colonel, were provided for employment with UNFICYP and zone headquarters.

¹ Directives for the initial Finnish airlift were contained in JCS 5887, 16 April 1964 and JCS 5909, 17 April 1964.

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For YKSP-1 the Finnish parliament appropriated \$1,320,000 to cover establishment and 3-months service in Cyprus:

Clothing, Supplies, equipment, materiel	- \$480,000
Salaries, wages, allowances	- 720,000
Reserve for contingencies	- <u>120,000</u>

TOTAL	\$1,320,000
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This proved to be inadequate, and an additional \$444,000 was appropriated for YKSP-1's overall tour of 6 months bringing the total to \$1,764,000.

The amount appropriation for YKSP-2 was \$1,560,000.

Finland adopted the general Scandinavian policy on financial arrangements - i.e. full reimbursement, and the agreement with the UN for UNFICYP called for the UN to bear "...all expenses, but presumably, as regards direct Government expenses, extra and extraordinary costs only."¹ In the Secretary-General's periodic reports on UNFICYP, it is regularly reported that Finland absorbs certain costs but these are not identified and no amount is ever stated. In September 1968, the UN Secretariat identified the costs which Finland assumed as 'allowances 'per diem' of certain personnel assigned to duties relating to UNFICYP."² This, unfortunately, adds very little in the way of clarification.

According to information as of 10 October 1968, Finland had been reimbursed for its UNFICYP costs through June 1967 in the amount of \$12,488,000.³ This represents 13 quarters of UNFICYP service and would extend from YKSP-1 to half-way through the tour of YKSP-7. Employing the appropriations data for the first 2 contingents as shown above and assuming the same costs as YKSP-2 for all subsequent ones (although the strength dropped gradually by 40% during this period) a Finnish cost of \$10,344,000 could be estimated. On

¹ Annex H.

² Annex K, para. 23 b.

³ Annex K.

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the basis of man-months of UNFICYP service (about 32,000 by the end of June 1967), the \$12.5 million reimbursed to Finland works out to about \$390 per man month. This compares closely with a Danish man-month cost of \$397 reached by one method of analysis on supra, p. 465.

Using the Scandinavian "Daily Cyprus Rate" information from supra, p. 466 for Finland produces the following comparison:

Wages

Pay	\$8.76
Allowances	4.05

<u>Materiel</u>	<u>1.97</u>
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TOTAL	\$14.78
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or \$443.40 per man-month, of
which 87% is pay and allowances.¹

Applying this man-month cost figure to the estimated man-months for the Finnish contingents through June 1967 produces a total reimbursable cost figure of \$14.2 million, which is about 14% above the actual reimbursement figure.

The similarity of the results of these calculations for Denmark and Finland suggest that over the course of the Cyprus operation, the "Daily Cyprus Rate" approach produces a cost some 10% or so too high.² The "Daily Cyprus Rate" may have better validity for current or near-future cost estimates. For UNFICYP costs from 1964-1969 a man-month adjustment of 10-14% downward in the "Daily Cyprus Rate" seems more consistent with other cost data. On this basis, a Danish man-month average reimbursable cost of \$500 and a Finnish one of \$400 would result.

Finland's Ambassador to Sweden, Mr. Sakari S. Tuomioja, with the Finnish government's approval, was named the Mediator

¹ Comparable figures for Denmark, supra, p. 466 are \$560.70 and 92%.

² The same applies to Sweden and the "Cyprus Daily Rate;" see infra, pp. 483-484.

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for Cyprus by U Thant on 25 March 1964. He served in this capacity until he fell ill on 16 August 1964. He died on 9 September 1964.

Finland has furnished the Commander of the Force in Cyprus, Major General I.A.E. Martola, from 16 May 1966 to the present.¹

Finland has pledged a contribution to the Cyprus Special Fund each year. As of December 1969, these pledges total \$425,000. As with most of the other contingent donors, contributions are, in fact, write-offs of obligations due Finland by the UN for its contingent in UNFICYP.

6. Ireland (Eire): The Irish are thought by most observers to make good UN peacekeepers. In fact, Peter Calvocoressi lists Ireland as one of only four middle powers he feels fully qualify for the role - Ireland, India, Brazil and Sweden.² Irishmen themselves seem to take to it as individuals, and cite such attributes as self-reliance, a soldiering tradition, courage, faith, sincerity, sympathy, perseverance, patience, an anti-colonial background and a well-developed sense of humor which operates, it would seem, especially well in hopelessly adverse situations.

Many visitors to the Emerald Isle have noticed these qualities in play every day, and it is frequently said that only the Irish could live with the strange collection of sympathies and antipathies that exist there. Violence in northern Ireland in the fall of 1969 focused attention anew on these peculiarities of the Irish personality.

It was this very aspect of the Cyprus situation in March 1964 which gave Ireland most concern - i.e., the painful similarity with the Irish case of two quarreling Cypriot communities on a little island with talk of imposed solutions from outside, involving possible partition of territory and shifts of populations, and, as the last straw, with the U.K. as a very involved party.

¹ General Martola is 73 years old and has served more than three years with UNFICYP. If the operation continues into 1970, it would seem likely for a new commander to be appointed.

² Calvocoressi, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

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A pattern had been set by Irish participation in earlier UN operations. The first of these was in Lebanon (UNOGIL) with 50 Irish officer observers for 5 months in 1958. In that same year Irish participation began in UNTSO and still continues with 18 officer observers as of 5 February 1969. The Congo operation (ONUC), 1960-1964, involved an Irish contingent for the first time, as opposed to individual observers, and this required new authorizing legislation.¹ The Irish were in ONUC from start to finish and some 5,300 of them served there during the four years. Twenty-six Irish soldiers lost their lives in the Congo (9 in a single massacre) and some 57 were injured or wounded. Considering that the Irish Army with its reserve, from which all these men came, numbers only about 25,000 the Irish participation in ONUC counts as a major effort. Although officers and men, appointed or enlisting in the Irish forces after the 1960 legislation, are subject to being ordered to duty with an Irish peacekeeping contingent, it has been reported that more than enough servicemen volunteered for the ONUC contingents.

For 3 months in 1962, 2 Irish officers served with the UN observer group in West Irian (UNTEA) and for 7 months in 1965-1966, 12 Irish officers served with the India-Pakistan operation (UNIPOM).

On 7 April 1964, the Irish Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Frank Aiken, spoke to the Dail Eireann in support of the government's decision to furnish a contingent for the Cyprus operation.² He dwelt at some length on the background and complexities of the Cyprus situation and described the efforts taken, since the original UN request on 5 March 1964, to obtain an acceptable basis for Irish participation. His two main parts dealt with conditions and financial arrangements.

The conditions set for Irish participation warrant being set forth fully. According to Aiken, they were communicated

¹ See pp. 301-303 of the ONUC background paper in this study for more on the Irish participation in ONUC. See also IPKO Documentation No. 15, pp. 1-8 for the 2 pieces of legislation.

² Mr. Aiken's speech of 7 April 1964 is reproduced in IPKO Documentation No. 15, pp. 9-16.

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to the Secretary-General on 13 March and confirmed as correct by the Secretary-General on 19 March 1964:¹

- (1) that the function of the force would be to maintain peace while the process of mediation to achieve an agreed solution of the problem confronting Cyprus was in progress and that the force would have no function in influencing the character of the settlement to be made or its subsequent enforcement;
- (2) that an assurance would be forthcoming from the Governments of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey that, during the presence of the force in Cyprus, they would not intervene or attempt to impose by force, or by threat of force, a solution of the problem - and, particularly, a solution by partition;
- (3) that every effort would be made by the Secretary-General to ensure that the Greek and Turkish Governments would place under the command of the United Nations their troops now stationed in Cyprus; and
- (4) that, if it should be agreed to be necessary to keep a United Nations force in Cyprus after the expiration of three months,
 - (a) other member-countries of the United Nations would be asked to provide contingents, and
 - (b) the Government would be free to withdraw the Irish contingent, irrespective of the progress of the mediation and the state of affairs in Cyprus at that time.

Financing of UN peacekeeping has become a topic of special Irish interest. Mr. Aiken stated his objections to the financing scheme for UNFICYP, and, on rather a high point of principle (which as will be seen below, had to be backed-off from almost completely), stated that Ireland:

¹ Aiken, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

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...will pay the usual United Nations overseas allowances to our troops and will accept no reimbursement from the United Nations unless it is levied on all members of the United Nations in the normal way.¹

Ireland was also asked for a civilian police contingent for UNFICYP but reported it was unable to provide one.

Originally asked for a military contingent of 500 men, Ireland's share for UNFICYP was upped to 600 during the consultation period and when the main body flew to Cyprus 18-20 April to join the advance party which had moved on 9 April, the contingent totaled 631. At UN request, by July-August 1964 an additional 400+ men were introduced giving the Irish a split initial contingent (called the 40th Infantry Battalion, 600+, and the 3rd Infantry Group, 400+).² This split contingent, with split rotation periods, persisted until late July 1965, after which date the contingent consisted of a single organization called an infantry group with a strength of 500+ men. This permitted regular semi-annual rotations in April and September each year. The 500+ strength lasted until the September 1968 when it dropped to 400+ men. As of the first of 1969, the Irish contingent has put about 37,000 man-months into UNFICYP; by the end of the present mandate on 15 December 1969, some 42,000 man-months.

As with most other contingent donors, (except Sweden) Ireland now has her 11th contingent in UNFICYP. This has accordingly, involved the movement of an original contingent and 10 rotational contingents. Both the original and the

¹ Aiken, op. cit., p. 16.

² This oddity of Irish nomenclature need not concern us too much. Until September-October 1965 both an infantry battalion (40, 41 and 42) and an infantry group (3 and 4) made up the Irish contingent. From then until July 1965, there were 2 infantry groups present (4 and 5). Since July 1965, only infantry groups have been there (5 through 12). Both organizations are battalion type units consisting of a headquarters and several companies. The distinction is that the "battalions" are set organizations while the "groups" are ad hoc or provisional organizations.

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first two rotational contingents involved the 600+ and the 400+ men split movement. The U.S. Air Force moved both parts of the original contingent, and the 600+ men element of the first and second rotations. The 400+ men elements of the first and second rotations were moved commercially (J.A.T. and Adria for the second one, at least).¹ The eight rotations from 1966 through the two for 1969 have presumably all been by commercial airlift.

One gets an idea of the equipment and supplies of the Irish contingents by looking at the quantities of stores brought in with both elements of the initial contingent by U.S. Air Force airlift:

First Element:

9 April 1964	1 C-130 aircraft; Advance party - 60 troops; 6,600 pounds
19 April 1964	8 C-130, 8 C-124 aircraft Main Body - 560 troops; 216,000 pounds, including 2 armored cars. ²

Second Element:

21 July 1964	1 C-124 aircraft; Advance party - 71 troops; 6,440 pounds
4 Aug 1964	8 C-124, 2 C-130 aircraft; Main body - 323 troops; 147,773 pounds including ordnance 89,995 pounds engineer 5,000 pounds signals 16,000 pounds welfare/canteen 6,120 pounds barracks supplies 13,628 pounds medical 2,500 pounds

¹ One rotation, at least, of the 400-man contingent was flown by the Irish Air Line in January 1965 at a cost of \$48,000 (which was the low bid when the UN solicited estimates).

² The Irish armored cars in UNFICYP are French-made Panhards, not British-made Ferrets.

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transportation	
spares	3,000 pounds
company supplies	10,500 pounds
armored car	
spares	1,030 pounds

Similarly, in the first rotational airlift which the U.S. Air Force provided for the 600+ men element in October 1964, some 32 tons of cargo was moved from Dublin to Nicosia while only 3 tons was brought back with the returning original contingent.

With respect to financial arrangements with the UN, the Irish settled initially on a system about mid-way between the British/Canadian "no costs" and the Scandinavian "all costs" approaches.¹ Ireland was to pay all costs in Ireland of preparing, outfitting and supporting the contingent and its pay and allowances throughout its tour. The UN was to pay its transport to and from Cyprus, provide all necessary support in Cyprus and reimburse for Irish property expended or written-off in UNFICYP service.

By May 1965, Irish continued participation was made dependent upon the UN assuming also the preparation and support cost incurred in Ireland from the inception of Irish participation in UNFICYP. Ireland would continue to pay salaries and allowances for the contingent.

In July 1965 a final adjustment took place whereby the UN undertook, if it has the funds, to reimburse, from the inception, overseas and per diem allowances of the contingent with Ireland continuing to pay the basic salaries.

The result of these 1965 adjustments was a retroactive claim by the Irish government for reimbursement of costs through 26 June 1965 totaling about \$2 million.²

According to October 1968 UN data, Ireland has been reimbursed \$4,528,000 for costs relating to pay and allowances

¹ For the specific provisions of the UN/Irish cost apportionment arrangements, see Annex H, para. 15.

² S/6702, 23 September 1965, p. 2; and S/6954, 19 November 1965, Annex III, p. 1.

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through September 1967 and for costs relating to equipment through March 1967.¹ These are not very handy figures to work with since they lump two cost areas at different base dates.

According to the Secretary-General's semi-annual or quarterly reports on UNFICYP since mid-1967, Ireland absorbs certain unidentified costs for her contingent, and does not, as Canada does, specifically state that these absorbed costs exclude normal salaries. As reported by Ireland, these figures were rounded and stable for several quarters at about \$260,500 per quarter. This works out to about \$167 per man per month for the Irish contingent and one suspects that it represents the basic salaries for the men paid by Ireland.

Interestingly, if this assumption is tested by adding \$167 per man-month for Irish contingents throughout the operation to the \$4.5 million UN reimbursement to Ireland, one obtains a figure of about \$11 million, which, considering their average 12% larger contingents, is quite comparable to the Danish, Finnish and Swedish figures of \$15.8 million, \$12.5 million and \$14.4 million, respectively.

On this admittedly shaky basis, one can at least suggest that an Irish peacekeeper in Cyprus cost the UN in reimbursable costs about \$167 less than the low-range of the Scandinavian peacekeeper or, tentatively, about \$230 per man-month. It must be remembered again that this cost does not include transportation to and from, and direct support costs while in, the area of operations.

Ireland pledged \$50,000 to the Cyprus Special Account in 1965 and paid it up in 1966. She has made no further pledges or payments.

7. New Zealand: New Zealand had 1 or 2 officers in the Congo operation (ONUC) for about the first nine months, by virtue of their being brought along by General von Horn as part of the staff he selected from UNTSO. New Zealand, as of mid-1969 still participated in UNMOGIP with 4 officers and in UNTSO with 5 officers.

¹ Annex K.

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The general approach of New Zealand to peacekeeping is probably indistinguishable from that of Australia (see supra, pp. 451-452). However, on 30 October 1964, on the eve of the Canadian Peacekeeping Conference at Ottawa which New Zealand attended, Prime Minister Holyoake announced a government decision, in principle, "...to designate a unit for participation in future, properly instituted, peacekeeping operations of the United Nations."¹

Subsequent New Zealand government announcements indicate some waning of enthusiasm. On 2 April 1969 Prime Minister Holyoake defended his government's position, as compared with Canada, on UN peacekeeping but commented that advance planning as envisaged in his 1964 statement, was "...just not a live issue in the United Nations today."²

From May-June 1964 until they were pulled out on 28 June 1967, New Zealand furnished a 20-man civilian police contingent for UNFICYP.

New Zealand's financial arrangements with the UN for its police contingent in Cyprus were essentially the same as Australia's. The UN was to bear only support costs in Cyprus with New Zealand absorbing all pay and allowances, uniforms and equipment and travel both ways. In these initial arrangements, however, New Zealand warned that UN reimbursement for overseas allowances might have to be requested. This was done with the beginning of the second mandate period (28 June 1964). Apparently New Zealand never actually submitted claims for reimbursement of the overseas allowances, and when the police contingent was withdrawn 3 years later on 28 June 1967, New Zealand waived its right to submit such claims.³

Throughout its 3 years and a month or so of service in Cyprus, the 20 New Zealand police operated with the British contingent in the Limassol area. They were deployed in two groups: one at Limassol city and one at Mallia. After the New Zealand withdrawal, Australian civilian police took over these two posts.

¹ IPKO Documentation No. 37, p. 10.

² Press Statement, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand, 2 April 1969.

³ Annex H.

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No hard data on absorbed costs for the New Zealand police contingent are available. It should not be far off to assume that they were about the same per man as for the Australian police, or

\$300 average monthly salary	
140 average monthly allowance	
2,000 travel costs per man per year	
man months 760 X \$440	\$334,400
travel 60 X \$2,000	120,000
	<u>\$454,400</u>

The UN was required to pay only for the direct support of the New Zealand police while in Cyprus. The waiver of claims for 3 year's reimbursement of overseas allowances probably saved the UN about \$100,000.

New Zealand pledged and paid \$42,000 to the Cyprus Special Fund in 1964 but has made no pledges for subsequent years.

8. Sweden: In terms of peacekeeping credentials, Sweden is usually considered to be the model: a wealthy, non-aligned middle power with advanced technology, a large reserve of trained military personnel, and a sort of missionary zeal for peace.¹ Swedish names come easily to mind in the peacekeeping context--Count Bernadotte, Dag Hammarskjold, General Carl von Horn.

Sweden had taken part in most earlier UN peace observation operations, and when the Cyprus force was authorized in early March 1964, still had over 350 men in the Congo (ONUC), about 500 in Gaza (UNEF), and a dozen or so observers in UNTSO. As of mid-1969, 486 of Sweden's peacekeepers were on duty in UNMOGIP (5), UNTSO (32) and UNFICYP (409 military, 40 police).

¹ While Sweden's Army, for instance, has only about 12,000 regular officers and NCO's, it gets 35,000 conscript trainees for 10 months and 75,000 reservists for 15-40 days training per year. The Army could mobilize about 600,000 men. The Military Balance 1966-1967, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

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Among the Secretary-General's original requests of 4 March 1964 for battalion size contingents for UNFICYP was one to Sweden, whose response was given on 6 March. It should be noted that this was the very day on which Swedish preparations, in coordination with her Nordic neighbors, for a permanent stand-by peace force reached the stage of announcing Royal consent to proceed in parliament with the government's proposal.¹

Sweden's answer of 6 March to the Secretary-General's request for a contingent was a highly qualified "yes." It stated that Sweden "...was prepared, in principle, to endeavor to organize, on a voluntary basis, a Swedish contingent of the size of one battalion to form part of the proposed Force, for a period of three months." There was one prerequisite: that Sweden would not be the only neutral on the Force; and prior to a government decision, clarification was required on duration, size and composition, status, tasks and powers, and financing.²

The efforts of U Thant to provide the necessary assurances and clarification and to get something going in the all-important financial area have been described on supra, pp. 433-436.

Also described (supra, p. 436) were the arrangements for contingents of civilian police. Sweden provided such a contingent of 40 policemen who were in place on Cyprus by 6 May 1964.

The Swedish UNFICYP military contingent never quite reached the strength of 1,000 men. By 8 June 1964, it stood at 954 men and fluctuated from 750 to 960 men until the end of 1966 when it dropped to about 615. This strength was held until the end of 1968 when it dropped to about 425. Over the 19 quarters to the end of 1968 approximately 41,300 man-months were expended in 11 Swedish contingents. This man-months figure is within 1,000-1,500 of those for Denmark and Finland

¹ "His Majesty's Proposal to the Swedish Parliament" 6 March 1964, IPKO Documentation No. 3, p. 1. See also supra, pp. 430-431.

² S/5593, 12 March 1964, p. 2.

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over the same period. Since the first 2 contingents served only 3 months tours, Sweden as of April-May 1969 had her twelfth contingent (412 man) in UNFICYP whereas all others had their tenth or were readying their eleventh. Through the eighth contingent, the battalions were given even numbers starting with 30; i.e., 30, 32, 34 etc to 38th Swedish Battalion. Effective with the ninth contingent, introduced October 1967, a consecutive numbering system was used; i.e. 39, 40 and 42nd Swedish Battalion, introduced April-May 1969.

Sweden's original military contingent was introduced into Cyprus in 4 increments extending from 26 March to 13 May 1964. This caused some disruption and strength fluctuation in the next couple of rotations until the effects of the different entry dates gradually disappeared.

The four increments included a small advance party of 12 men moved commercially by the UN on 26 March. The other increments were all moved by the U.S. Air Force at no charge to the UN, and included:

2- 3 April 1964 - Advance Party B - 30 men, 1 ton individual equipment, 2 radio trucks, miscellaneous equipment to capacity of aircraft.

10-14 April 1964 - Main Body - 662 men, 20 tons individual equipment, 3 radio trucks, 7 tons ammunition, 4 tons rations, 14 tons tentage, etc., 15 tons ordnance supplies, 3 tons medical supplies¹

13 May 1964 - Contingent from ONUC - 88 men²

¹ In addition to the airlifted cargo, 3 workshop vans were sealifted from Gothenburg, 4 April, to Famagusta, 19 April 1964.

² Airlift of the Swedish ONUC group to Cyprus cannot be fully documented. USUN 3714 of 12 April 1964 indicated the U.S. was alerted for the requirement. U.S. records on airlift

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Forty Swedish police arrived in Cyprus 5-6 May 1964 as commercial passengers. Sweden billed the UN \$4,632.79 for their fares.

The first rotation of the Swedish military contingent came on 7-13 July 1964 or just 3 months after its introduction. About 700 men were taken out and only about 500 brought in. The airlift was provided free of charge by the U.S. Air Force, except for a 50 man advance party which moved to Cyprus commercially on 7 July. The incremental introduction effect was still felt in this rotation since the U.S. Air Force had to pick up two straggler groups after the main airlift - 66 men on 16 July and 85 men on 23-24 July, 1964.

The second rotation also involved only a 3 months tour for the contingent being relieved. Airlift was provided by the Italian Air Force employing C-119 aircraft. It occurred 13-14 October 1964 (with smaller straggler groups before and after) and involved 487 men leaving Cyprus and 406 coming in.

Thereafter, all rotations have been on a six-months cycle--October and April--and have been by commercially chartered flights (Transair, March 1965; JAT and Adria, October 1965; Transair for 4 rotations 1967-1968).

Sweden's original arrangements with the UN on cost apportionment followed the Scandinavian pattern: the UN to bear "...all expenses, but presumably, as regards direct Government expenses, extra and extraordinary costs only."¹ By the time UNFICYP was about one year old, it had been clarified that Sweden would bear the costs of the SCACYP flights,² staff contributions, arrangements for staff, etc (welfare) and other miscellaneous costs incurred in Sweden in connection with organizing the contingents. With effect from January 1966, Sweden additionally assumed costs including pay of civilian police, deputy's pay to professional personnel, travel costs and per diem and medical after-care.³

for ONUC show airlift charges for this period; see ONUC background paper, Annex G, serial 18.

1 Annex G.

2 Supra, pp. 429-431

3 Annex H, para. 23 c.

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Although it cannot be fully documented in every case, certain fairly reliable information can be set down about the cost components of Swedish peacekeeping contingents:

(a) The costs for extra supplies and equipment to equip the proposed 1,600-man permanent stand-by force were estimated at \$2,128,500 with \$870,075 required annually to maintain the force.¹ Since this was to be a 2 battalion force and to include 50 additional men and an expensive aircraft component, it should be safe to assume that less than \$1,000,000 was required to outfit the Cyprus contingent.

(b) The Swedish Army Staff has a UN Section which manages its peacekeeping participation. Cost of this section, estimated as \$116,100 per year, is considered a UN reimbursable item in Swedish planning.²

(c) During 1966 Swedish pay scales for the military contingent in Cyprus, reimbursable by the UN, were as follows:³

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Monthly Allowances</u>	<u>Total</u>
Major	\$650.00	\$232.50	\$882.50
2d Lt/1st Sgt	350.00	203.10	553.10
Private	270.00	145.50	415.50

(d) The "Cyprus Daily Rate" for UN reimbursement to the Scandinavian contingents, previously referred to in connection with Denmark and Finland,⁴ for Sweden reflects:

Wages

Pay	\$13.06
Allowances	5.83

Materiel

1.45

TOTAL

\$20.34

or \$610.50 per man-month of
which 93% is pay and allowances.

¹ IPKO Documentation No. 3, p. 4.

² Loc. cit.

³ IPKO Documentation No. 4.

⁴ Supra, pp. 466 and 470.

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According to UN data as of 10 October 1968, the UN had reimbursed Sweden \$14,384,000 for her military and police contingents in UNFICYP. Because of the deficit in the Cyprus Special Account, these reimbursements were not current. They covered:¹

pay and allowance, military and police, through December 1966; equipment, military contingent, through September 1965; equipment, police contingent, through April 1965.

To reduce this data to a basis where man-months costs can be estimated, we will simply assume \$100,000 per quarter for the unreimbursed military equipment claims, ignore the police equipment item, and arrive at end 1966 with a total Swedish cost to the UN of \$14,884,000. By that date the total man-months for the Swedish contingents would have been about 28,000, for a cost per man-month of \$532. Application of the "Cyprus Daily Rate" over the same time span would produce a total Swedish cost to the UN of \$17 million or again, as in the case of Denmark and Finland, about 14% above the fairly well-known total costs. Thus, just as a rounded man-month figure of \$500 for a Dane and \$400 for a Finn seemed to make sense as a UN reimbursable cost for UNFICYP, so \$530 seems a good round figure for a Swede.²

Sweden reported on 3 occasions in 1966-1967, covering 18 months of the Cyprus operation, dollar figures for assumed costs. These are roundly stated as \$360,000 for a contingent tour of six months or very close to \$90 per man-month.

Sweden has been a regular contributor each year to the Cyprus Special Account and has, as of 8 January 1969, pledged a total of \$1,900,000. The pledges for 1966, 1967 and 1968 were \$360,000 each, or exactly the same figure used in the preceding paragraph as a 6 months' figure for costs assumed by Sweden. It is probable that these pledges are settled by offset and represent a waiver by Sweden of an additional \$360,000 each year.

¹ Annex K.

² See supra, p. 470.

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Swedish officials in early 1969 were known to be aware of the problem of Swedish high costs among peacekeeping contingents and to be working on a cost apportionment on the order of 2/3 to be borne by the UN, 1/3 by Sweden. If, because of high wage levels in Sweden it takes on the order of \$620 per month (plus travel and all local direct support) to field a Swedish peacekeeper, Sweden would have to assume \$207 per man-month, under this apportionment, to reduce the UN cost to \$414 per man-month. While this would bring the costs per man to the UN more in line with other national peacekeeping contingents which are reimbursed for pay and allowances, it would appear to more than double the costs for Sweden. Even if voluntary contributions on the order Sweden has been making were applied directly to assumed costs, the cost to Sweden would still be almost double under a 2/3 - 1/3 sharing of costs.¹

9. United Kingdom (as a Contingent Contributor): This brief section will deal only with the U.K. as a contingent contributor.

The British role in Cyprus during the 1955-1958 emergency and up to Cypriot independence and the crisis which followed was covered in supra, pp. 405-410. The U.K. organization for supporting UNFICYP was discussed on supra, pp. 423-427; and the financial details of that support will be covered on infra, pp. 488-491.

¹

Note: This paragraph was based upon data and viewpoints as of the beginning of 1969, and was actually written in April 1969. It is, therefore, especially interesting to note what appears to be a Swedish shift during the second half of 1969 to or towards the 2/3 UN - 1/3 Sweden cost sharing basis discussed above. In U Thant's report of 3 June 1969, recommending yet another extension of UNFICYP to 15 December 1969, a much larger assumption of costs is reported for Sweden. In fact, the amount reported, \$520,000, works out as \$201 per man-month for the Swedish contingent through the last six months of 1969, or more than twice the level of cost previously assumed by Sweden, and within a few dollars of the level calculated in the preceding paragraph for the 2/3 - 1/3 sharing. Only when Swedish voluntary contributions and claims for reimbursement over the period are known will it be possible to evaluate the full effect of the apparent shift.

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It seems to have been a feature of the major UN peace-keeping operations (UNEF, ONUC, UNFICYP) that they put Britain in a position where a host of conflicting interests pulled in every direction.

In both UNEF and UNFICYP, the U.K. was to a degree one of the objects of the operation; and ONUC had grave implications for the future of Britain's ex-colonial areas in Africa, her investment in those areas and, even, her heavy investment in the break-away Congo province of Katanga.

Despite these problems Britain has enjoyed the image of a consistent and loyal supporter of UN peacekeeping. British doctrine on military support for civil powers and British military staff procedures have become the most generally followed standard in UN peacekeeping forces.

When the crisis erupted on Cyprus, Britain lacked both the will and the means, certainly the former, for committing the necessary forces in a purely British effort to impose order. The solution was a multilateral effort and this was clearly the policy course chosen by the U.K. from the start. When commonwealth and NATO formats proved unacceptable, mainly to Makarios, a UN peacekeeping force, with Britain (a permanent member of the Security Council!) committed to furnishing half the force, became the only acceptable alternative.

The Force, in fact, never reached the 7,000 strength planned for it and the main reason was that the U.K. never provided the 3,500 men which would have brought it to that total strength. It would have been quite easy for the British to have put another 1,000-1,500 men under the UN banner since easily that number of men in the Sovereign Base Areas were more or less fully engaged in supporting UNFICYP. The conclusion which seems to follow is that both the British and the Secretary-General placed higher priority by far on playing down the British role in the operation than in reaching the strength goal set for the Force. In his Aide Memoire of 10 April 1964 on the functions and operations of UNFICYP, the Secretary-General clearly high-lighted the "...distinction between the troops of the British contingent in the United Nations Force and the British military personnel in Cyprus, such as those manning the British bases not included in the United Nations Force."¹

The British offer to provide half the 7,000-man force was made to the Secretary-General on 9 March 1964, and on or about 11 March the U.K. pledged \$1 million of the \$6 million required for support of the Force for 3 months.

¹ S/5633, 11 April 1964, p. 3

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The Secretary-General's reports covering the first 6 months of UNFICYP operations make it a little unclear as to the exact composition of the British contingent during that period. As of 30 April 1964, he cites a British contingent strength of 2,719 which by 8 June 1964 had dropped to 1,792, and by 8 September 1964 to 1,025. The difficulty arises in that unit designations in the text of the reports do not correspond exactly with those shown on the deployment map and that units are shown as being relieved from the Force, which from both the text and deployment map never appeared as part of the Force at all. The following would appear to have been the developments during those 6 months by the end of which the British contingent had stabilized at the strength of 1,000-1,200 which it has maintained ever since:

<u>Original U.K. Contingent</u>		<u>Stabilized Strength after first 6 months</u>	
HQ UNFICYP Staff	175	HQ	155
2 Infantry Battalions	1,000	1 Infantry Battalion	550- 600
1 Parachute Infantry Battalion	500	-	-
1 Artillery Battalion	400	-	-
1 Artillery Battery	100	-	-
2 Armored Car Squadrons	250	1 Armored Car Squadron	125- 150
RAF and Army Air Corp Units (16 Aircraft)	100	10 Aircraft	45
Logistics Units	<u>175</u>	Logistics Units	<u>175</u>
Totals	2,700		1,000-1,200

Despite the fact that Cyprus is not of a home base as far as British soldiers are concerned, it seems that the British have rotated units through the UN Force at least as frequently as other major contingents. The rotations have not been on the more or less neat semi-annual cycles of the other contingents. Nevertheless, counting each change of the infantry battalion and the armored car squadron as a rotation, it can be said that the U.K., like most of the others, as of mid-1969, had its eleventh contingent in UNFICYP.

All rotations for the British contingent units and individuals have been by Royal Air Force (at least one Armored car squadron came in by sea) at no charge to the UN.

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Through the end of 1968, the British contingent contributed about 64,500 man-months to UNFICYP or 23% of the total man months for all military contingents.

The U.K.'s arrangement with the UN was that the U.K. would pay all expenses of the British UNFICYP contingent. The only minor caveat had to do with possible third party claims involving members of the contingent.¹

Over the years of the Cyprus operation, the U.K. has reported "absorbed costs" for its contingent in UNFICYP which average out at roughly \$400,000 per quarter. From the start of the operation to the end of 1968 this would total some \$7.6 million or about \$118 per man-month for the contingent. Since the U.K., in fact, absorbs all costs of its contingents, this figure would appear to apply to British man-hours, services and equipment expended in support of UNFICYP on Cyprus from the Sovereign Base Areas for which no charge is made.

In addition to providing almost $\frac{1}{4}$ of the strength of UNFICYP, and the vital command, control and support organization, the U.K. is the second (after the U.S.) largest contributor to the Cyprus Special Account. As of 8 January 1969 British pledges totaled \$20,220,476 or the same 23% of the total contributions as her contingent has been of the total Force. \$1.5 million was pledged by the U.K. for each of the 6 months extensions covering 1969.

The British interest in peacekeeping continues and her current views on the mechanics of peacekeeping support are quite clearly based on the UNFICYP experience.²

On 23 February 1965, the British Foreign Secretary announced in the House of Commons that the government

¹ A legal action in which a hotel owner on Cyprus sought damages for British occupation of the hotel during the late 1963 Truce Force period as well as after the establishment of the UN Force is described in The Times (London), 12 February 1969, p. 14. The Law Lords held that the UN was "not a state or a sovereign" and that the suit could be brought against the British Crown.

² See U.K. submission to Committee of 33; A/AC. 121/16, 29 May 1968.

"...was prepared, if requested and subject to our national commitments, to help to provide logistic backing for a United Nations force of up to six battalions, the financing of this offer depending on the arrangements prevailing at the time."¹

There has been speculation but little actual amplifying information with respect to this British commitment for peacekeeping logistical support. The statement itself contains all the usual caveats and it is far from clear whether it amounts to anything resembling either of the two terms most frequently used in describing peacekeeping readiness conditions: "stand-by" or "earmarked." The fact that the announcement came at a time when the British forces reserve system was being extensively reorganized suggests that there may be a relationship, and that the logistical support commitment to UN peacekeeping would be met from units, equipment and individual specialists of the reserves.

C. ADDITIONAL LOGISTIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT

To this point the organization and procedures for support of the UN peacekeeping operation have been described as well as the details of the contributions made by donors of contingents for the Force. In this section the details of logistical and financial support, other than, or in addition to, the contribution of a contingent, will be set out.

1. United Kingdom: While the British have provided their own UNFICYP contingent to the UN completely free of charges, and have paid all the costs for rotation of eleven successive U.K. contingents, other logistical support for UNFICYP has been on a reimbursable basis. An exception was the free airlift for the rotation of the Danish contingent in November 1964 which was furnished by the Royal Air Force. The organizational and procedural arrangements for this reimbursable British support were described in Chapter III above.

Through March 1968 the UN had reimbursed Britain \$11.2 million for this support.² This figure, conveniently, covers almost precisely 4 years of the operation, during which time

¹ See U.K. submission to Committee of 33; A/AC. 121/16, 29 May 1968, p. 1.

² Annex K.

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the total costs to the UN were \$84.4 million. On a quarterly and monthly basis, respectively, the two figures work out to:

	<u>4-year total</u>	<u>Quarterly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>
U.K.	\$11.2 million	\$ 700,000	\$ 233,333
Overall	\$84.4 million	\$5,277,000	\$1,759,000

The British reimbursable support is 13% of the total cost, whereas in the average quarter through the period UN obligations to contingent contributors (if they were all paid - which they were not) are roughly 60%.

To adjust the costs for British-furnished reimbursable support to a man-month basis, it is first necessary to exclude the British contingents throughout the operation and the Canadian contingents for the period prior to 26 June 1966 when they paid their own local support.

On this basis an approximate man-month reimbursable direct support cost for UNFICYP military and police contingents, for that support furnished by the British, would be \$50. This seems like a low figure for food, shelter, gas, oil, equipment rental, labor and barracks services, etc. Yet it tends to be confirmed by examining UN Financial Records and Accounts for the period.

This would be a good point at which to examine those data in order to arrive at a man-month direct support cost (excluding airlift) for that support procured and supplied by the UN to UNFICYP, rather than by the British. Such records for UNFICYP are regularly divided into parts I and II, the former covering operating costs incurred by the UN; and the latter covering reimbursements to governments providing contingents. In Part I direct support costs for both the UN-provided and British-provided goods and services are subsumed under three headings. The three headings and an approximation of monthly costs for each are as follows:

Operational Expenses ¹	\$155,000
Rental of Premises	20,000
Rations	<u>105,000</u>
Total (monthly	\$280,000
or about \$66 per man-month of which \$50	
by the U.K. and \$16 by the UN.	

¹ Operational Expenses include maintenance and operation of motor transport, operational supplies and services,

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It is quite likely that in no other major peacekeeping operation has the force been maintained so well at so low a maintenance cost per man-month. An efficient, relatively austere and very closely controlled support system, operating in a small area, close to sources of support, with a very small civilian component, and about half the force on an absorbed-costs basis are the characteristics of UNFICYP to which these low costs can be attributed.

The only remaining major direct support cost factor which has not yet been examined on a man-month basis is that for movement of contingents. For convenience, this will be covered in the following section dealing with U.S. airlift support. All cost data, by contingent, will then be summarized in Annex M.

2. United States: Cyprus in 1964 was another case, like the Middle East in 1956 and the Congo in 1960 where employment of the peacekeeping option can be said to have served American national interests. Some variant other than a UN peacekeeping force was sought by U.S. policymakers at the time for the purpose of keeping the issue out of the UN political forum in which it was anticipated the Soviet bloc and the more militant anti-colonialists would exploit the problems for their own ends.

Given the intractability of the Cyprus problems and the continuing potential for a Greek-Turkish conflict over them, and considering the relative success of UNFICYP in tranquilizing the dispute, it is fair to speculate now whether a NATO or other form of ad hoc Western peacekeeping force might not, in fact, have been a much worse choice. The UN force has been extended every 3 or 6 months for 6 years without dissenting votes in the Security Council and neither the Soviet bloc nor anti-colonial enthusiasts have been noticeably successful in getting much mileage out of it. Morocco and Ivory Coast, the two African members of the Security Council when the force was first authorized, played quite responsible roles. If they favored Makarios' position to a degree, they nonetheless appreciated the problems facing the Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey and the U.K.) and took a generally balanced view.

communications, freight, cartage, express, and purchase of miscellaneous operational equipment.

U.S. policy towards the Republic of Cyprus from its independence in 1960 sought a stable developing Cyprus, linked with the U.K., Greece and Turkey as a bulwark against communism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Retention by Britain of its base areas and by the U.S. of its communication facilities on the island was considered a necessity. The legal order of the Zurich-London agreements, therefore, had to be adhered to. To help foster stability and growth, the U.S. was willing to extend extensive economic aid to Cyprus.

The first economic agreement entered into by the new Cyprus government was with the U.S. in December 1960, and from then until 30 June 1963 total U.S. aid for Cyprus amounted to \$20 million, including loans, grants and shipments under the Food for Peace program.¹ A U.S. economic survey of the island's development potential was published in April 1961 (Thorpe Report). Makarios made a state visit to the U.S. in June 1962, which was returned by Vice-President Johnson later in the year. A Fulbright educational program was established and Peace Corps volunteers were sent to the island.²

When serious inter-communal fighting broke out in December 1963, President Johnson sent a joint letter to President Makarios and Vice-President Kuchuk cautioning restraint. In late January 1964 he sent General Lyman Lemnitzer, the American NATO Commander in Europe, to Ankara and Athens to warn of the consequences if Greece and Turkey were to go to war over Cyprus. In February 1964, Under Secretary of State George Ball visited the capitals of the three guarantee powers and Nicosia in search of a solution.

In the course of these U.S. diplomatic initiatives, an "Anglo-American Plan" surfaced. Under this plan a NATO peace-keeping force of 10,000 men, with 1,200 U.S. combat troops and U.S. support units for the entire force, would operate for 3 months while a European mediator worked out a truce.

¹ Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., p. 60.

² Senator Fulbright visited Cyprus on a Presidential mission in May 1964.

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When, for a variety of reasons set forth earlier (*supra*, pp. 408-409), a UN auspices for the peacekeeping force became the only acceptable solution, the U.S. got behind the proposal, probably quite thankful for the chance to get a little bit off center stage.

Since 1964, the aims of U.S. Cyprus policy by some might be critically described as negative. More fairly they can be pictured as tactical and procedural rather than substantive so far as Cyprus itself is concerned. What has been sought is any negotiated solution which would be acceptable to our NATO friends. The means have been full support of the UN peacekeeping effort, quiet diplomacy and occasional firm stands to prevent a spread of the conflict to Greece and Turkey.

The difficulties for the U.S. in this delicate balancing act have been great, and at times, particularly with respect to Turkey, U.S. restraining pressures have brought bilateral relations almost to the breaking point.¹

The main U.S. national support for UNFICYP, other than political, has been the provision of free airlift for contingents during the first year, and as its principal financial backer throughout the operation to date.

Through 15 December 1969, according to UN estimates, UNFICYP will have cost about \$110,800,000 (including \$590,000 for repatriation costs if the operation is terminated then).² Financing has been entirely by the voluntary contribution system established in the original 4 March 1964 mandate, and the operation has been in a deficit position almost from the start.

The 15 June 1969 deficit amounted to \$8,060,000. The deficit has had to be borne by contingent contributors through non-reimbursement of their claims for extra costs in respect of pay and allowances, depreciation of contingent-

¹ For example, the 5 June 1964 letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu which was taken as a serious affront to Turkish sovereignty and was a factor in the fall of the Turkish government.

² S/9233, 3 June 1969, p. 31.

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owned equipment and supplies and death and disability benefits. As of early 1969 none of these claims had been paid for any period beyond 31 December 1967 and many earlier claims were also unreimbursed.

Using about \$100 million as a rounded cost estimate for UNFICYP through 1968 (19 calendar quarters) permits easy comparison of costs, pledges, payments and the U.S. share of the financial support:

UNFICYP through 1968

(\$ millions)

Costs	\$100	
Pledges (total)	89	
Pledges (U.S.)	40	(40% of costs; 45% of pledges)
Payments (total)	79	
Payments (U.S.)	33	(33% of costs; 42% of payments)

The policy decisions and the organizational arrangements for U.S. national support of UNFICYP were described earlier (supra, pp. 420-422) and the relevant documents are attached as Annexes B through E. The summary at Annex L reflects on a single page all U.S. support for UNFICYP in the area of supplies and services. Support through the provision of U.S. supplies has been very minor, involving mainly radio batteries and a few repair parts for U.S.-type equipment in the hands of contingents. These supplies have been furnished through local arrangements between the UN Supply Depot at Pisa, Italy and nearby U.S. army supply installations.¹

The significant U.S. support was in airlift for the initial deployment and first rotations of contingents. The details of these air movements have been described above in the sections dealing with each contingent. Airlift procedures were described on pp. 438-439. What will be attempted

¹ For 1965, 1966 and 1967 the approximate share of UNFICYP total costs expended on all forms of U.S. goods and services was respectively: 1.4%, 1.8% and 2.0%.

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here is an analysis of the overall airlift picture for UNFICYP in order to arrive at average costs and national support shares.

Airlift of UNFICYP Contingents

(through 31 December 1968)

(19 calendar quarters)

About 50,000 men had served in UNFICYP¹

Therefore, 100,000 one-way movements

At no charge to UN - 57,000 one-way movements (57%)

Charged to UN - 43,000 one-way movements (43%)

Cost charged to UN - \$3.7 million (4% of total UNFICYP cost)

UN costs for contingent movements per man/month -

Considering only movements charged to UN - \$30

Considering all movements - \$13

National share of airlift contributions for Contingent movements

	<u>% of All Moves</u>	<u>% of Free Moves</u>
U.K.	23%	40%
Canada	18%	32%
U.S.	12%	21%
Denmark/Sweden (SCACYP)	1.5%	3%
Italy	.8%	1%
Australia	.4%	.7%
New Zealand	.1%	.2%
Total	57%	100%

In considering the costs of contingent movements, it must be remembered (as explained on supra, pp. 418-419) that the composition of UNFICYP changed over the years in such a way as to reduce the proportion of the force provided to the UN under the most favorable financial terms. Further, the sizable share of the airlift for contingents provided free by the U.S. all took place during the first year or so of the operation. Accordingly, contingent movement costs

¹ Includes UNCIVPOL; excludes international civilian staff.

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through 1967, 1968 and 1969 were more on the order of 7-9% of total cost rather than the 4% that applies across the 1964-1968 period. For the last six months of 1969, for example, contingent movement costs to the UN are estimated at \$640,000 or 8% of the total cost and \$29 per man/month in terms of the total strength of the force.

The U.S. values the airlift provided free by the U.S. Air Force for UNFICYP at \$1,254,107. Assuming Canadian cost factors are the same as for the U.S. Air Force despite the longer distances and that British costs are half as much, the costs for the three principal airlift supporters might be roughly estimated as:

Costs to Suppliers of Free UNFICYP Airlift

(\$ Millions)

U.K.	\$1.3
Canada	\$2.0
U.S.	\$1.3 ¹
Others	.3
	<u>\$5</u>

A point to be noted, in addition to statistical shares of overall troop airlifts, is that initial airlift has certain significant aspects which distinguish it from later routine rotational airlifts. One obvious aspect is the need for haste in the launching phase of a peacekeeping operation. A second aspect is that contingent equipment comes in on initial airlift, whereas mainly only troops and personal baggage move on subsequent rotations.

3. Others (Soviet Union, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, main financial contributors): The Soviet Union has had its difficulties, and has not been noticeably successful in balancing its Cyprus tactics and longer-term bilateral relations. Despite what looks like very large opportunities for mischief-making, Soviet gains in the Cyprus problem have not been impressive. In many ways it seems that Moscow, when

¹ More precisely \$1,254,107. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Contributions to International Organizations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968, p. 15.

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it takes a position other than one of complete opposition to a UN peacekeeping operation, has a particularly difficult time reaching and holding a consistent policy line. This was certainly noticeable in the case of the Congo operation.¹ It also has been a feature of the Soviet role in the Cyprus case.

It should not have been difficult for Moscow to set its most obvious goals: (1) weakening the cohesion of the South Eastern flank of NATO, and (2) elimination of the British bases on the island. The tactics for achieving these goals have gone through rather large shifts.² The main thrust of the Soviet tactics through the initial part of the operation was on the Makarios, Cypriot Communist, Cypriot Greek, and mainland Greek side of the dispute but with large areas of ambiguity. Each of these factions had goals which differed in certain detail, and followed certain contradictory causes of action with respect to the other factions. The Soviets, for instance, could not support Enosis (union with NATO Greece) and, to the extent that Makarios and the Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, disagreed openly on this and other issues, support of both was difficult. Further support of these groups and factions required, necessarily, an open anti-Turkish stance which, for reasons not really connected with Cyprus, the Soviet Union did not want to take. After the fall of Khrushchev, the Soviet line increasingly shifted from anti-Turkish to pro-Turkish while still attempting, mainly through the continuation of secret arms aid to Marakios, to keep the other line to the Cypriot government open.

Thus, a Cypriot official was reported as saying on 17 October 1965 that the U.S.S.R. had furnished Cyprus \$70 million in arms aid, half of which was a gift. However, at the time, it was also noted that the Soviet ground-to-air missiles reportedly shipped to Cyprus via the UAR in May 1965, had been returned to the UAR following the Soviet pro-Turkish shift.

¹ See pp. 312-316 of the ONUC background paper.

² Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 30-52 describe 6 tactical phases of Soviet Cyprus policy.

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A year later in December 1966, during a Kosygin visit to Turkey, the Soviet leader went a long way towards joining his Turkish hosts in condemning arms shipments to Makarios by Czechoslovakia--an odd alignment, indeed.¹ The oddity is compounded by the fact that not only Kosygin and the Turks condemned the Czech arms shipments, but so did U Thant's representative on the island, Mr. Carlos Bernardes, and General Grivas, the anti-Makarios commander of the Greek Cypriot forces at the time. Bernardes reportedly resigned over the refusal of Makarios to place the weapons under UN control.²

The Soviet Union has maintained, perhaps with tongue-in-cheek, that it gives substantial support to the Cyprus peace-keeping operation by merely allowing it to exist over the years, thus permitting the "imperialists and colonialists of the aggressive NATO military bloc" to calm a bad situation for which they are totally responsible. Any ideas that the Soviets should also make financial contributions are called "completely unacceptable."³ The Soviets (and France), while casting affirmative votes for each renewal of the UNFICYP mandate, have consistently refused any attempts formally to expand its role or to alter its financial support basis.⁴ The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact States, of course, have neither pledged nor paid any sums for the Cyprus peacekeeping operation.

The Republic of Cyprus, the leading party in the dispute, acts as host to UNFICYP and also makes voluntary contributions to the UN account for support of the force. It also at times has made life miserable for the UN effort to achieve peace on the island, and has provided a favorite indoor sport for everyone connected with the Cyprus dispute: trying to understand the profoundly obscure (and at times, vice versa) Archbishop-President of the Republic.

¹ Adams and Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 44-47.

² Ibid., pp. 48-49.

³ S/PV. 1474, 10 June 1969, p. 57.

⁴ For example, when U Thant in September 1964 proposed the use of UN regular funds if sufficient contributions were not forthcoming. S/PV. 1153, 17 September 1964, para. 105; and in the same month his proposals for an enlarged

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The Cypriot government has seemed to hold most of the high cards in the game, lacking only a sure counter to Turkish intervention. The local military advantage of the Greek Cypriot side, very great even in 1964, has been increased further through arms grants and purchases. Probably more than the opposition of the Soviets or French, it is the opposition of the Cyprus government which has prevented any expansion of the UN force or of its interpository role.

UNFICYP helps maintain peace on Cyprus--in itself the best counter against Turkish intervention. The Cypriot government, with its high cards and the protection of UNFICYP, has reason to hope for a solution on Cyprus generally on its terms. That it has this hope, but seems to have learned that it must not push a delicate balance too hard as it moves to achieve its goals, offers the best chances in many years for a Cyprus solution.

The procedures by which the host functions are carried out by Cyprus were described supra, pp. 431-433 as well as under each of the categories of support in pp. 439-448.

Of special significance from the Cypriot government point of view is the domestic financial effect of UNFICYP. The Cyprus export-import balance is chronically in deficit with the shortfall being made up by tourism, the servicing of foreigners and their interests on the island, and remittances from Cypriots living abroad (over 100,000 in London alone). In rough terms, the pre-1964 pattern was as follows:

Cyprus trade imbalance	- \$55 million
Tourism	- \$10 million
British expenditures and aid	15 million

The share of the \$20 million per year cost of UNFICYP which enters the Cyprus economy is difficult to judge precisely, but it should be a safe estimate that it much more than offsets the tourism losses caused by the fighting on the island, and is an important plus for the local economy.

UNFICYP with greater powers, especially in separating and disarming the contending forces on Cyprus. Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 329.

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Cyprus has made a voluntary contribution to support UNFICYP each year of the operation. By 8 January 1969 these contributions totaled \$582,600 and took the form of write-offs of claims against the UN for reimbursable assistance by Cyprus.

Greece and Turkey, as historical foes, NATO allies, U.S. aid recipients, and sponsors of the two contending Cyprus communities, have had a whole raft of Hobson's choices on their plates with the Cyprus problem.

The significant point is that the strength imbalance existing between the two factions on the island is exactly reversed with respect to the two sponsoring powers--Turkey is so much stronger in addition to being closer. Hardly less significant is the fact that neither Greece nor Turkey has serious designs on Cyprus and both probably really wish the problem would just go away. Since most of the ordinary people of both communities on Cyprus feel much the same way but, nevertheless, can be hurled at each other's throats at the drop of a hat, there exists not only a vital need for UNFICYP but also an environment in which it stands a good chance of maintaining peace. Which, unfortunately, is not to say that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would not be right at each other again the minute UNFICYP departed.

While both Greece and Turkey, particularly the latter since its role as protector of its Cypriot community is real--not largely fiction, have made all the expected gestures, pronouncements, and demonstrations, it seems that all things considered they have both been reasonably restrained on the Cyprus problem. Ultimata have had escape clauses and military moves have been quite obviously of the show-of-force type. Greek moves in support of Greek Cypriots have also contained elements which appear to aim at control over Greek Cypriot extremists and even over Makarios at the same time.

Both Greece and Turkey, from a purist point of view, have earned black marks for providing arms, armed men, training and encouragement to their communities on Cyprus all through the period UNFICYP has been trying to maintain peace. From a more practical viewpoint, it appears that the actions of the Cyprus government were far more destabilizing, and that the actions of the mainland sponsors, especially Turkey, frequently helped to restore stability.

To keep the relations in proper perspective, it should not be forgotten that the U.K.--not Greece or Turkey--is Cyprus's main trading partner, and that the Cypriots have a higher per capita gross national product than either of the mainland sponsors.

In each year of the UNFICYP operation through 1967 both Greece and Turkey made voluntary contributions for its support. Turkey ceased to contribute at the end of 1967; Greece continued. As of 8 January 1969 Greece's contributions amounted to \$6,850,000, exceeded only by the U.S. and the U.K., while Turkey's amounted to \$1,839,253.

A detailed accounting of the major financial contributions for UNFICYP is attached as Annex O. Altogether 51 countries, including 4 non-members of the UN, pledged financial assistance. The extremes as of early 1969 were \$500 for Botswana and \$40,100,000 for the U.S. Of the 51 contributors only a dozen had contributed a total of \$1 million or more for the period 1964 through 1968. These were Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K. and U.S.

Secretary-General U Thant has on every possible occasion expressed his dissatisfaction with the method of financing UNFICYP. After each extension of the force, he has been forced to go, almost literally "begging cup in hand," seeking contributions. At times he has varied the approach by addressing separate appeals directly to new Member states or to non-contributors or to contributors of earlier years who have lapsed in their support. In September 1964 he implied that without adequate voluntary contributions he would be forced to one of three alternatives: the use of regular UN funds, withdrawal of the force, or non-reimbursement of claims by those members providing contingents for the force. In fact, only the third alternative--non-payment of bills--has been a feasible option. Payments to governments providing contingents have run over a year in arrears since 1967.

One awkward feature of the UN's search for funds for UNFICYP is the distinction, sometimes lost, between pledges and contributions. So as not to embarrass governments, U Thant's analyses of the UNFICYP financial status, as presented at the time of each renewal of the mandate and fund solicitation, have been in terms of pledges. The pledge figure is

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inflated 10 per cent or more by two factors: delayed or non-payment of pledges by a few countries, and downward adjustment of U.S. payments on the U.S. pledge. The U.S. pledge is pegged high with the understanding that a share of it depends upon contributions by other states. Thus, at the beginning of 1969, while the total pledged figure stood at \$89 million, over \$10.6 million had not yet been collected. Of this \$10.6 million in unpaid pledges, some \$3 million were owed by 9 members other than the U.S., and the remainder of \$7.6 million represented delayed payment (\$1 million) or adjustment downward (\$6.6 million) of the U.S. pledge. In terms of percentages as of January 1969, U.S. pledges were 45% of all pledges while U.S. payments were 42% of all payments.

Another awkward feature, which affects the cash position of the UNFICYP account, is the fact that contributions from contingent contributors, Cyprus and the U.K. are wholly or partially settled by offset against claims on the UN. Almost wholly offset are contributions through 1968 of \$582,600 from Cyprus, \$1,245,000 from Denmark, \$325,000 from Finland and \$1,900,000 from Sweden. U.K. pledges through 1968 totaled about \$20 million. Roughly half of the pledge for 1969, which should be about \$4 million if the pattern is followed, would be settled by offset against claims for U.K. logistical support.¹

Although complete details on the status of all pledges and contributions for UNFICYP are contained in Annex O, several interesting categories will be considered below: (all data as of 8 January 1969)

(1) Number of states making pledges or contributions:

1964	32
1965	35
1966	31
1967	30
1968	24

51 (Total number of contributors 1964-68)

¹ U.K. pledges for 1969 now appear to total only \$3 million.

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(2) Pledges/Contributions by Non-Member States:

Germany ¹	\$6,500,000
Korea	16,000
Switzerland	1,095,000
Vietnam	<u>4,000</u>

Total \$7,615,000

(3) NATO members pledging or contributing:
(all except Canada, France and Portugal)

Belgium	\$1,334,003
Denmark	1,245,000
Germany	6,500,000
Greece	6,850,000
Iceland	3,000
Italy	2,202,618
Luxembourg	45,000
Netherlands	921,000
Norway	1,134,352
Turkey	1,839,253
U.K.	20,220,476
U.S.	<u>40,100,000</u>

Total \$82,394,702

(4) Pledges/Contributions by UNFICYP Contingent Contributors (all except Canada)

Australia	\$1,159,875
Austria	680,000
Denmark	1,245,000
Finland	325,000
Ireland	50,000
New Zealand	42,000
Sweden	1,900,000
U.K.	<u>20,220,476</u>

Total \$25,622,351

¹ Germany had not contributed since December 1967, but on 23 September 1969 presented a check for \$1.5 million to the Secretary-General for the Cyprus account. Thus, the total German contribution rose to \$8 million (Press Release CYP/572, 24 September 1969)

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(5) Pledges/Contributions by:

<u>Communist States</u>	-	None	
<u>Latin America</u> ¹	-	Only Venezuela	\$ 3,000
<u>Arab League</u>	-	Only Lebanon	997
		Libya	30,000
		Morocco	<u>20,000</u>
		Total	\$53,997
<u>African States</u>	-	Botswana	\$ 500
	-	Congo (K)	20,000
	-	Ghana	11,667
	-	Ivory Coast	30,000
	-	Liberia	4,500
	-	Libya	30,000
	-	Malawi	5,590
	-	Mauretania	2,041
	-	Morocco	20,000
	-	Niger	2,041
	-	Nigeria	10,800
	-	Tanzania	7,000
	-	Zambia	<u>28,000</u>
		Total	\$172,139
<u>India</u> ² / <u>Pakistan</u>	-	India	-
	-	Pakistan	\$ 8,800
<u>Japan</u>	-		\$525,000
<u>Israel</u>	-		26,500

¹ Although Latin American individuals have played prominent roles on the Cyprus peacekeeping operation. A few names came easily to mind: Rolz-Bennet, Gallo Plaza, Bernardes, Osorio-Tafall. Jamaica (\$13,800) and Trinidad and Tobago (\$2,500) have supported the UNFICYP fund.

² Two of UNFICYP's commanders were Indians, Gyani and Thimayya. During the latter's period of command, UNFICYP reports listed an Indian contingent of 2 men, understood to have been personal aides to the commander.

QUESTIONS - HYPOTHESES - CONCLUSIONS

A. GENERAL

The UNFICYP experiences over six years of operation offer many points for study and analyses. It is the purpose of this chapter to set out the most important of these points, particularly concerning national support, and to examine in a speculative way what they mean for the future of peacekeeping. Further analyses of the main lessons of UNFICYP, in a more generalized context, will be found in the main Report (Volume II) of the study.

B. SIZE OF THE FORCE

British Brigadier A.J. Wilson, who served as Chief of Staff of UNFICYP for 15 months and as its Acting Commander for 6 months following General Thimayya's death, has expressed the view that UNFICYP had too many troops.¹ However, Wilson's overall remarks suggest that he thought the 7,000-man force was about right initially but that it should have been reduced rather quickly after the stabilizing effect of its introduction. This would appear to be a principle which at least ought to be addressed in any peacekeeping operation. If it is not addressed deliberately, the normal functioning of bureaucratic empire-building and the momentum of lead times connected with cyclical rotations will tend to make permanent a strength level which may no longer be needed, particularly in a multi-national force with diffused responsibilities and very tender national sensitivities.

Great care must be taken to ensure that the initial peacekeeping force is the right size and balanced. After its introduction, sizable reductions may be possible which would not only reduce costs but improve morale and performance. The operational-support ratio must be taken into account.

Progressive reductions in the size of a peacekeeping force, after a short initial period produces good results,

¹ A lecture given at the Royal United Services Institute, London, on 29 November 1967, RUSI Journal (May 1968), p. 121.

should be a definite policy goal. Not only a reduction in costs and an improvement in effectiveness are to be gained, but increased emphasis on peacemaking.

C. COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

The six-contingent force for UNFICYP has worked out as an ideally manageable arrangement. It does not strain the span of control, produces no awkward attachments or subordinations and fits very well into the local subdivisions of the area. The major contingents, other than the U.K. whose logistical role makes it a special case (see D. and E. below), have been able to phase down together from large battalion forces of 1,000 men each to small battalion forces of 400-500 men each without complicated redeployments and realignments.

Despite the points made earlier in the paper about national particularities (e.g. rations, supra, p. 439), UNFICYP is a remarkably homogeneous force. Its contingents are all North Europeans (Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders, by extraction) with far more similarity than difference in their standards and outlooks. Without inter-contingent tensions in the force, with a basic similarity of military procedures and standards among the contingents, with no complicated military operations to perform, and with effective leadership, the force has functioned well and cohesively.

The temptation to use the composition of a peacekeeping force as a means of solving political-level problems - e.g., by too many odd-sized contingents or wildly incompatible contingents - should be firmly resisted.

D. PARTICIPATION BY A SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBER

The presence of a British contingent in UNFICYP is at variance with what has over the years come to be one of the "standard" principles of UN peacekeeping. Yet, it has not seemed to bother anyone very much--even the Russians who do complain now and then about NATO member predominance in the force--and is generally justified as an understandable exception to the rule owing to special features of the case.

The British have had to walk a rather narrow line in the UNFICYP operation but have done so remarkably well. Stegenga

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points out that they had lost the confidence of the Cypriot communities and that the other contingents have gone out of their way to avoid too close association with the British contingent (e.g., Canadians repainted their vehicles and displayed maple-leaf emblems wherever possible; the Finns cycled 50 miles so as not to arrive at their destination in British Army trucks).¹ The British contingent was deployed as soon as possible to a quiet area of the island and remains there. All this seems, however, not particularly relevant to the participation of the U.K. as a permanent member of the Security Council but to the participation of the U.K. as the U.K.

It may be difficult to envisage a future situation in which circumstances would, as they did in Cyprus, make participation by a permanent member acceptable, but it is not impossible. Franco-phone Africa and the Persian Gulf, for example, are areas where, unlikely as it may be, a similar set of circumstances could converge. As and if the Super-Powers both begin increasingly to value stability over other goals, more such possible situations might develop.

Without attempting directly to overturn the principle of nonparticipation by Security Council permanent members, it does more good than harm to exploit the UNFICYP precedent to establish that exceptions can occur when all conditions are right without adversely affecting peacekeeping or world stability.

E. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BY A SINGLE MAJOR POWER

It is quite commonly said and generally accepted that UNFICYP has been the only major UN peacekeeping operation with proper logistical support. It has been the only one with an institutionalized arrangement for the provision of substantially all support by a single major power on behalf of the UN, to include the planning and overall management of the support. It has included such desirable features as rental of equipment (thus avoiding UN capital investments), contract maintenance, contract repair and utilities, a high level of equipment standardization, accurate forecasting and costing, and a prearranged roll-up scheme. The British

¹ Stegenga, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

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support system has operated very professionally. No one has suggested that its logistical support role has been used by the U.K. as a lever to push the UN in Cyprus toward U.K. political goals.

Complete dependence upon a single source of essential support (e.g. U.S. airlift in ONUC) risks making a UN peace-keeping operation vulnerable to undue influence or even negation. However, where this undesirable feature does not operate, sole source support, to include planning and management of support, on behalf of the UN is cost effective. Even in the standard UN-managed and operated support system, maximum advantage should be sought through application of the support techniques learned in UNFICYP.

F. CIVILIAN POLICE CONTINGENTS

Peacekeeping, particularly in an internal Cyprus-type dispute, bears perhaps greater similarity to the normal police functions in most people's minds than to the normal functions of military forces. The level of coercion seems a bit less, as do the expectations of violence. Police can even be given a sort of judicial/magisterial coloration not likely to be accorded so easily to a soldier. The "helpful policeman" image is easier to build and sustain than that of the "helpful soldier." Military policemen, as opposed to civilian policemen, cannot usually shake the soldier image. A police-to-police relationship with local law enforcement officials is likely to be more productive than a soldier-to-police one.

Civilian police contingents from Ghana and Nigeria took part in the Congo operation, and the latter, especially, were highly praised. The level of violence in the Congo, involving as it did brigade-size combat operations, overshadowed the police role and set a limit on its effectiveness in terms of the overall situation.

From the beginning, UNFICYP has employed about 175 civilian police from Australia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and, until mid-1967, New Zealand. Each of the 6 major military contingents also has contained a military police unit. UNCIVPOL from all accounts has been effective and useful to the force considerably beyond the ratio its strength bears to the total force. Its costs have not been out of line, even where full reimbursement of all costs is required.

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A civilian police component should be considered for all peacekeeping operations, particularly those involving an internal dispute situation. It should be highly professional, and under the control of the force commander who should have a police adviser.

G. ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS

The Cyprus situation quite obviously has been one in which a capability to prevent or scale down arms importation, smuggling or local manufacture would have been most important to the restoration of peaceful conditions. So also would have been capabilities to impose deconfrontation measures such as destruction of fortifications, buffer zones and the like.

No such capabilities were assigned to UNFICYP in its original mandate of 4 March 1964, and at least two attempts to add some of them to it following serious outbreaks of violence (September 1964 and December 1967) were unsuccessful.

Nonetheless, from the Secretary-General's periodic reports on UNFICYP as well as from almost all the accounts of observers and participants, it appears that UNFICYP, in a de facto sense, exercises a good many of these deconfrontation capabilities to at least a degree. The means are patience, persuasion and perseverance with just a faint aura of the possible use of force. These means are reinforced by a reluctance of the bulk of all factions in Cyprus to initiate open violence and especially to do so by firing on UN soldiers. But UNFICYP has had little effect on the importation of arms into Cyprus.

Measures to control arms in the area of operations should be a feature of most peacekeeping operations, especially those involving internal conflict. Unless authorized in the original mandate, it is very difficult for the peacekeeping force to establish such measures. Wherever possible, a basic authorization for such measures should be sought in any pre-mandate agreement between the parties and should be included in the initial mandate by the authorizing organ.

H. CONTINGENT COST DIFFERENTIALS

UNFICYP offers the most striking instance to date of contingent cost differentials in a peacekeeping force. This is because the force has been roughly split in half between

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the two possible extremes of direct contingent costs: zero for the British contingent at one extreme, and as much as \$600 per man per month at the other. It has taken about 60% of the total costs of the operation just to reimburse governments providing that costly half of the force for the services of their contingents.

Details on this problem of contingent cost differential are set out in the sections above dealing with each contingent, and are compiled in tabular form in Annex M.

In terms of the cost and dangers of other alternatives such as unilateral intervention, UN peacekeeping operations are bargains. Until the time arrives, if it ever does, when collective responsibility for peacekeeping costs can be reestablished, fund inadequacy threatens to be a factor limiting the peacekeeping option. For this, and other reasons having to do with relatively irrelevant points of principle,¹ a way of costing contingents which would not be so flagrantly disproportionate needs to be developed.


* * * * *

The Cyprus peacekeeping operation, of course, has not come to an end yet. It will be interesting, in light of the UNEF and ONUC experiences, to see just how it does wind up and what developments follow its departure from the island. There is a strong consensus that it has done a good job, that it has saved lives and suffering among the Cyprus population, that it has staved off a Greece-Turkey confrontation with all the adverse implications that would have, particularly for NATO, and that in its sixth year some faint signs point to growing stability and reduced tensions which just might make its withdrawal feasible in the not too distant future.

Whatever happens--even if the island erupts again in wide-spread violence--from the point of view of what a peacekeeping force is supposed to do and how it does it, UNFICYP has already made a full contribution. Its success from this point of view is clear.

¹ For example, why should Canada, which pays almost all of its own way in UNFICYP, also contribute funds, 60% of which would go to high-cost contingent countries, just as rich as Canada and just as dedicated to peacekeeping.

ANNEX A



7 March 1964

Dear Bob:

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on March 4, 1964, regarding the Cyprus situation, the United Nations has undertaken to assist in restoring peace and security in Cyprus. The Secretary General has been authorized to organize a United Nations peacekeeping force for Cyprus.

Some of the nations which are expected to contribute troops to that force may need airlift services to get to Cyprus since they do not have sufficient air transport capability of their own. As you know, the President has decided that it would be in the national interest for the United States to furnish troop airlift services for the UN Cyprus peacekeeping force to the extent necessary.

By virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of State by the President pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act, I have determined that furnishing such airlift assistance without requirement of reimbursement from the United Nations is in the national interest. Accordingly, I have authorized Ambassador Stevenson to advise the Secretary General that the United States will assist in the initial airlifting of troops for the UN peacekeeping force to the extent necessary and without requirement of reimbursement from the United Nations.

I understand that the Department of Defense is prepared to cover the cost of these air transport services either from existing or supplemental Department of Defense appropriations, as was the case with the initial air and surface lift provided to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East operation.

The Secretary General has also indicated that he would appreciate United States assistance in meeting other logistical support requirements of the UN peacekeeping force. No commitment is being made at this time, but I believe that we should be prepared in certain cases to respond affirmatively to specific requests from the UN. Our respective staffs should work out guidelines on the other types of assistance it would be necessary and desirable to furnish. Provision of such other assistance would also be in the national interest and therefore also be provided without reimbursement from the United Nations. The Department of Defense would not necessarily be expected to absorb the cost of such additional support assistance within its own appropriations. The internal United States financing would be included in the guidelines to be worked out.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense

/s/ Dean Rusk

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ANNEX C

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L)
The Director, Defense Supply Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Support of UN Military Activities in Cyprus

Within the scope of the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287.d.) the Secretary of State has written the Secretary of Defense advising him that the requirement to support the activities of the United Nations in Cyprus is within the National Interests (Encl. #1). The U.S. Ambassador to the UN has advised the Secretary General that the U.S. will contribute to the UN peacekeeping force for Cyprus by providing airlift and possibly some logistics support. It is the U.S. position that the U.S. will contribute initial airlift not within the capability of other participating nations and consider logistical support on a case by case basis.

It has been determined that the U.S. will respond only to UN requests which are approved by the Department of State. Cost of U.S. participation will be borne from U.S. resources. Airlift will be provided by the Department of Defense on a non-reimbursable basis pursuant to a determination made by the Secretary of State on March 7, 1964 under provisions of Executive Order 10206, dated January 1951. Where such airlift is furnished through the use of tactical aircraft (not a part of MATS airlift) the military service providing the airlift will absorb the costs within its currently available resources. To the extent MATS airlift must be used, costs will be charged to funds currently available to the Department of the Air Force under the Operation and Maintenance, Air Force appropriation.

Other military logistical support assistance which may be furnished by the Department of Defense pursuant to the terms of the March 7, 1964 determination will be provided to the U.N. on a

non-reimbursable basis from assets available to the military service or Defense Agency assigned action on each request for such support.

The Department of Defense would not necessarily be expected to absorb the cost of such additional support assistance within its own appropriations. The internal United States financing would be included in the guidelines to be worked out. However, unless a commitment is obtained prior to or concurrent with furnishing other logistical support that reimbursement to the Department of Defense will be made by some other government agency, the military service or Defense Agency should not assume that reimbursement will be made for support directed to be furnished the UN.

Each military service or Defense Agency furnishing airlift or other logistical support will maintain a record of the out-of-pocket costs incurred in order that (a) the total costs incurred by the Department of Defense incident to this undertaking can be determined, and (b) a decision can be made concerning the need for a supplemental appropriation should the costs incurred exceed the capability of any military service or Defense Agency to absorb them within available material and financial resources.

It is desired that the Department of Defense agencies be responsive rapidly to State-DOD approved requests from the UN for U.S. assistance. It is anticipated that requests for both services and materiel will originate in the UN, passed to the USUN delegation in New York and forwarded to the Department of State for political approval with simultaneously transmittal of information copies to the Department of Defense for initial screening similarly as was done in cases for the Congo. In order that expeditious action may be taken, the requests will normally be validated to DOD orally by Department of State representatives and subsequently confirmed on a periodic basis in writing to DOD.

It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop appropriate procedures to be approved by ASD (I&L) for receiving and acting upon these requests within the policy outlined above, and place the requirement for implementation on the appropriate Services or other DOD agency. The individual Service and separate Defense agencies are requested to take prompt action on JCS processed requests. All requests or portions thereof which are received by the JCS which are not within the policy should be referred to OSD for guidance and decision as to appropriate action.

Cyrus Vance
DEPUTY

Enclosure 1
/See Annex B/

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ANNEX D

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

27 March 1964

INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
The Director, Defense Supply Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Support of UN Military Activities in Cyprus

Reference(a): DepSecDef Memorandum, 13 March 1964, same subject.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense in Reference (a) requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop procedures to be approved by ASD (I&L) for receiving and acting upon UN requests for U.S. support of the Cyprus peacekeeping force. The approved procedures are attached for your information and appropriate action.

Requests from the United Nations will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis before approval and determination of appropriate response. In this review it will be necessary to evaluate the implications of sale versus loan and other considerations which might affect the conditions of transfer or issue.

The review will be made by this office, in cooperation with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Offices of Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ISA) and (Comptroller), and the Military Department or Defense Agency to be assigned action responsibility.

Attachment

Glenn V. Gibson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

OUTLINE PLAN, CONCEPT AND PROCEDURES FOR
US SUPPORT OF CYPRUS PEACEKEEPING FORCE

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been designated to direct the US military effort in support of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (PKF). The following paragraphs outline the concept of operations and plan.

2. Concept

a. The United States will not contribute military ground forces to the PKF. The initial requirement for US support will include airlift of personnel and accompanying supplies or equipment for those UN member countries which have agreed to provide military forces, and which are unable to provide or otherwise arrange for their own transportation. The United States may be called upon to supply logistical support and equipment. Each requirement, including airlift support, will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Items such as helmets, communications equipment, vehicles, helicopters and other materiel not readily available elsewhere may be required. In fulfillment of any requirements placed upon the United States, there may be instances where it will be necessary to use the resources of theater component commands to provide a timely response or in furtherance of economy effort.

b. Although the United Nations have authorized the PKF for a period of 90 days with extension subject to confirming action by the United Nations Security Council, a prolonged period of US support may occur, entailing the maintenance and provisioning of the PKF as well as the periodic rotation of personnel serving in Cyprus.

c. The following policy guidelines have been established:

(1) When airlift is furnished through the use of tactical aircraft, the military service providing the airlift will absorb the costs within resources currently available to that Service.

(2) To the extent that MATS airlift must be used in the absence of a tactical airlift capability, the costs will be charged to funds currently available to the Department of the Air Force under the Operation and Maintenance Air Force appropriation.

(3) Other military logistical support assistance which may be furnished by DOD agencies will be provided to the United Nations from assets available to the Military Service

or Defense agency assigned action on each request for such support. Unless a commitment has been made prior to or concurrent with furnishing other logistical support, the military service or Defense agency should not assume that reimbursement will be made.

d. Logistical support consisting of materiel resources other than airlift/sealift services will be accomplished in the following manner:

(1) Requests for materiel will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the Departments of State and Defense and issued to the designated agency of the United Nations only after appropriate approval. Major end items will be made available on a sale or loan basis as separately determined in each case. Consumable supplies will be made available on a reimbursement basis.

All equipment whether sold or loaned, and all supplies not consumed in the operation will be subject to recapture by the furnishing service if the economics of exercising such recapture privilege shows this to be in the best interest of the U.S.

(2) Major end items such as communications equipment, helicopters, vehicles, etc., generally will have a priority established for the UN support operation which is below that for positioned U.S. forces with Force Activity Designator II (FAD-II) priority but above that for Military Assistance Programs assigned FAD III or lower priority.

(3) Determination as to the treatment of U.S. property upon conclusion of operations by the PKF will be made on a case-by-case basis by the military service concerned. If disposition other than return to U.S. agencies is deemed appropriate, certain safeguarding provisions will apply to all property of U.S. origin. The ASD (I&L) will arrange for suitable guarantees by the designated UN agency in meeting this requirement to protect the U.S. national interest.

e. Action assignments for furnishing approved logistical support will be made only to military services or unified commands. These agencies shall take the necessary action, procurement, supply, airlift, sealift, etc., to execute the approved UN requests. Supply shall be effected through normal procedures, including placing requisitions on the Defense Supply Agency for materiel normally ordered through this source.

3. Financial Responsibilities

a. As indicated above, initial troop and accompanying supply and equipment airlift will be provided in support of the Cyprus PKF by the Department of Defense without reimbursement to the U.S. or Department of Defense.

b. Other logistical support may be furnished by the Department of Defense as approved by the State Department. It shall be the policy of DOD to request reimbursement for other logistical support, but in the absence of a determination prior to furnishing logistic support that reimbursement is to be forthcoming, the Military Service will provide the approved support from within its available materiel and financial resources on the assumption that reimbursement will not be provided.

c. Stock and Industrial Funds will be reimbursed for all supplies and services provided the U.N. Cyprus PKF even though reimbursement is not made to DOD, as follows:

(1) MATS troop airlift costs, including accompanying supplies and equipment, will be charged to funds currently available to the Department of the Air Force under the Operation and Maintenance A.F. appropriation.

(2) MSTS troop sealift costs including accompanying supplies and equipment will be chargeable to funds currently available to the Department of the Navy under the Operation and Maintenance, Navy appropriation.

(3) Stock funds will be reimbursed for all stock fund materiel furnished on approved logistical support requests from currently available military service appropriations properly chargeable for the same type of materiel supplied to their own forces. Packing, crating and handling costs on Defense Stock Fund materiel, however, will be charged to Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies funds available to the Defense Supply Agency.

d. Procurement action will be initiated as required to fill an approved logistic support request. Funds currently available to the Military Services that are properly chargeable for the category of materiel required will be used.

e. Repair, as may be required, of major end items recaptured upon termination of the U.N. Cyprus PKF operation will be charged to funds available under Military Service appropriations at the time the equipment is repaired.

f. Costs of transportation of materiel covered by approved logistical support requests will be charged to currently available Operation and Maintenance funds of the Military Service to which action is assigned.

g. The respective Services will maintain a record of the out-of-pocket costs incurred so that:

(1) The total costs incurred by the Department of Defense incident to this undertaking can be determined.

(2) A decision can be made concerning the need for a supplemental appropriation should the costs incurred exceed the capability of any military service or Defense agency to absorb such costs within available materiel and financial resources.

h. The record of out-of-pocket costs will be maintained to separately indicate, by appropriation account:

(1) Airlift costs, separately for MATS and tactical.

(a) Initial troop and accompanying supplies and equipment.

(b) Follow-on (rotation, augmentation and/or return) troop and accompanying supplies and equipment.

(2) Sealift costs, separately for MSTs and tactical.

(a) Initial troop and accompanying supplies and equipment.

(b) Follow-on (rotation, augmentation and/or return) troop and accompanying supplies and equipment.

(3) Materiel and supplies.

(4) Packing, crating, handling and transportation.

(5) Repair and rehabilitation of equipment.

(6) Other costs.

4. Channels of Communication. Requests for US military support will be channeled from the USUN Mission to the State Department, with information copies sent directly to ASD (I&L), ASD (ISA), ASD (COMP), JCS, CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE. The State Department will pass requests with recommended action to the ASD (I&L) who will review and coordinate as necessary with appropriate DOD components, thereafter transmitting to the OJCS indicating action to be taken. The Director, J-4, has been designated the central point of contact and coordinating agent for the Organization of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The appropriate director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insofar as practicable, will place the requirement on the appropriate military service or unified command. If at any time it is determined that the request seriously degrades the operational capability of US forces, the requirement will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequent recommendations forwarded to the ASD (I&L).

5. Responsibilities

a. Materiel - appropriate Service and the Defense Supply Agency to determine source from which shipment will be made.

b. The commanders of the unified commands will be prepared to furnish airlift on a five-day notice for the initial deployment of designated UN forces to Cyprus as directed by the JCS.

c. Prompt action in response to approved requests is essential.

d. Procedures and operating relationships for Department of Defense agencies are outlined in the paragraphs that follow.

6. Procedures and Relationships

a. OSD will perform the following:

(1) OASD (I&L)

- (a) Receive requests for U.S. military support upon approval by the State Department.
- (b) Review and coordinate as necessary to determine DOD action concerning requests.
- (c) Pass approved requests to the designated coordinating agency of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, J-4.
- (d) Provide additional coordination and points of contact as required.

(2) OASD (ISA)

- (a) On policy matters requiring DOD deviation from State Department approved requests, represent DOD in subsequent discussions with State Department.
- (b) Participate as appropriate with other DOD components in all policy actions.

- 2 Provide points of contact at the National Military Command Center or elsewhere as may be required.

(e) The Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs will:

- 1 Coordinate and make recommendations regarding use of Military Assistance Program resources.

- 2 Maintain points of contact as required.

c. The following tasks will be performed by the military services.

(1) Provide immediate notification to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to ASD (I&L), of those requests which they believe would seriously degrade operational support capabilities or which could be accomplished satisfactorily in a more economical or preferable manner.

(2) Coordinate with DOD agencies as required.

(3) Maintain points of contact as required.

(4) Maintain records of out-of-pocket costs as prescribed by paragraph 3.h. of resources committed or expended in response to requirements placed for support of the Cyprus PKF.

d. The following tasks will be performed by the commanders of the unified commands:

(1) Provide immediate notification to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD (I&L) of those requests which would seriously degrade operational capabilities, or which could be accomplished satisfactorily in a more economical or preferable manner.

(2) Coordinate as required.

(3) Maintain points of contact as required.

(3) OASD (Comptroller)

- (a) Coordinate within DOD as appropriate, concerning accounting for and financing approved requests for U.S. military resources.
- (c) Participate as appropriate with other DOD components in all policy actions.

b. The following tasks will be performed by the Organization of the Joint Chief of Staff:

(1) The Joint Staff will:

- (a) Receive and coordinate, as necessary, approved requests from OASD (I&L).
- (b) Act for the Joint Chief of Staff under the provisions of existing policy.
- (c) The Director, J-4, will:
 - 1 Disseminate information within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military services and to the appropriate commanders of unified commands on a timely basis.
 - 2 Respond, as the designated central coordinating agency, to approved requests for military materiel and logistic support.
 - 3 Forward approved transportation requirements to the appropriate Service or unified command. Forward approved materiel requirements to the appropriate Service.
 - 4 Collaborate with the J-3 and the Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs as required.
 - 5 Maintain points of contact with other agencies to insure coordinated and responsive action.

(d) The Director, J-3, will:

- 1 Place operational requirements upon the appropriate Service or unified command.

ANNEX E

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: USUN, NEW YORK

FROM: The Department of State (OIA)

SUBJECT: Initial payment of U. S. Voluntary Contribution to
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

REF: There is enclosed for transmittal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Treasury check in the amount of \$500,000 as the United States initial contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. This sum represents the first payment of the United States pledge to contribute up to \$2,000,000 in cash in response to the UN Secretary-General's appeal of March 7, 1964. This appeal was for voluntary cash contributions from member governments of \$6,000,000 toward the financing of the Force for a three month period.

In addition to the cash contribution we have agreed, and the Secretary-General should be informed (if he has not been), that on a case-by-case basis the U.S. is willing to consider supplying (without reimbursement from the UN) the initial airlift of troops and their equipment for the contingents where the UN is unable otherwise to obtain transport.

With respect to the U.S. contributions, the Mission is further requested to inform the UN that the U.S. would like to be kept advised of contributions received and anticipated from other Governments (whether in cash or kind). Further, that before additional U.S. cash contributions are made that the U.S. desires to be advised of and consulted concerning: 1) the standards or principles which are to guide the UN in determining the costs to be paid from the funds obtained through the voluntary contributions; and 2) the anticipated expenditures from this fund by category of expense and recipient.

The U.S. expects, and we understand that the UN agrees, that services and logistic support (other than the airlift referred to above) that may be requested from the U.S. for UNFICYP will be paid for by the UN on a reimbursement-billing basis, unless there should be a specific agreement to the contrary.

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ANNEX E

It is requested that USUN and UN acknowledge receipt of this check, and that a copy of text letter delivered to the UN be furnished the Department.

Enclosure:

U.S. Treasury Check No. 69,686,643
in the amount of \$500,000.

IO:CIA:RA Deitchman:

3-27-64

Clearance: UNP -
Mr. Buffum

UNCLASSIFIED

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ANNEX F

JT/gc
UK/UNFICYP/65-1
16 March 1965.

Dear Sir,

The United Nations requests the assistance of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for maintenance of the United Nations Force in Cyprus including Civilian Police as follows:

a) Rations

In accordance with the British scale, but adjusted to allow for any authorized deviations to that scale.

b) Petrol, Oil and Lubricants

As required for vehicles and other equipment.

c) Accommodation within the Sovereign Base Areas and Retained Sites

As requested; to include light, heat power, water, sewage and garbage disposal services.

d) Tentage and Accommodation Stores

In accordance with U.K. scales.

e) Vehicles

As required, within the limits as regards types and numbers, already notified to the United Nations.

f) Ammunition

Common-user calibres and types authorised for issue by the Force Commander. Any unexpended balances returned in satisfactory condition to British Depots to be credited to the United Nations.

g) Ordinance Stores

- (1) including controlled common-user equipments as required under the categories of Communications,

ANNEX F

Weapons, Defence Stores and Technical Stores,
but excluding vehicles (see (e) above).

- (ii) Expendables such as cleaning materials, paint and packaging materials.
- (iii) Spare Parts for common-user items, exclusive of spare parts for vehicles, reimbursement for which will be covered under (e) above.
- h) Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Services
Repair services for all electrical and mechanical equipment as required for the component units of the Force excluding vehicles, reimbursement for which will be covered under (e) above.
- i) Engineer Stores and Resources
Construction materials and other expendable stores required in support of the operations of the Force.
- j) Laundry Facilities
As required in accordance with British Standards.
- k) Medical Services
 - (i) Medical stores and medicines in accordance with British Scales.
 - (ii) Hospitalization as required.

It is understood that the United Kingdom will not be expected under this request to supply goods or services which are either:

- (a) not applicable to the needs of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, or
- (b) not stocked, or readily available, in the resources of the United Kingdom in Cyprus.

It is requested that all billings for the foregoing maintenance services be forwarded to UNFICYP for audit,

ANNEX F

certification where applicable and return to the appropriate United Kingdom authorities for submission through the United Kingdom's Delegation to this Headquarters.

It is further requested that all documentation and billings bear reference to this Letter of Assist.

It is agreed that no claims against the United Nations for reimbursement in respect of assistance under this Letter of Assist shall be raised in respect of the United Kingdom or the Canadian Contingents, the costs of which will be borne by their respective Governments. The United Nations does, however, accept responsibility for meeting the costs incurred by the United Kingdom under this Letter of Assist in respect of all other components of the Force, including Civilian Police and Canadian personnel serving at Headquarters of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and at the Nicosia Zone Headquarters.

The charges to be made in respect of the individual items or services are currently under negotiation between the appropriate United Kingdom authorities and representatives of the United Nations. They will take into account expenditure incurred by the United Kingdom including overheads, handling charges and the cost of movement.

The Chief Administrative Officer in Cyprus of the United Nations and an officer duly authorized by him for the purpose is responsible for authorizing on behalf of the United Nations the amount, nature and extent of all supplies and services required by the United Nations under this Letter of Assist.

The appropriate United Kingdom authorities to which reference is made in this Letter of Assist are:

- (i) as regards the United Kingdom Army - the Command Secretary in Cyprus;
- (ii) as regards the Royal Air Force - the Financial Adviser;
- (iii) as regards the Ministry of Public Building and Works - the Regional Administrative Officer.

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ANNEX F

This request for assistance is to be regarded as effective from 27 March 1964.

Sincerely yours,

United Kingdom Mission
to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue, 10th Floor
New York 22, N.Y.

UNFICYPAPPORTIONMENT OF COSTS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS AND THE UNITED NATIONSEXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTSEXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
UNITED NATIONSAUSTRIA

Police

All expenses
Airlift to Cyprus by commercial
airline

None

Hospital

All expenses, including:
Rental of hospital premises and
repairs thereto
Transportation costs

None

AUSTRALIA

Police

Local costs in Cyprus, including:
Accommodation
Food
Medical services
Transport
Cost of any additional equipment
found necessary after the arrival
of the police in Cyprus

Basic salaries
Overseas allowances
Travel outside Cyprus
Uniforms and equipment initially
brought to Cyprus
Compensation in the event of
death or injury of a Force
member

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY UNITED NATIONS	EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
<u>CANADA</u>	
Military	All costs of Canadian Contingent, including cost of transporting men and materials to Cyprus, except for what is shown under United Nations responsibility. Concert party of 15 to entertain troops.
Out-of-pocket expenses in respect of personnel of Headquarters Nicosia Zone, and Headquarters UNFICYP, namely: Special allowances Foreign allowances Maintenance support from British sources (estimated \$19,500 for 1st period) One-time costs: Purchase of 14 C11/2210 radio sets with 1st and 2nd line spare parts - \$60,000 Airlift-one special flight \$17,500 (Stores to Finnish Contingent Odn. - \$897.57)	
<u>DENMARK</u>	
Military & Police	None Danish Air Force flights are assumed not a United Nations financial responsibility.
<u>FINLAND</u>	
Military	None
All expenses, but presumably, as regards direct Government expenses, extra and extraordinary costs only.	

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
UNITED NATIONS

IRELAND

Military

Costs incurred outside of Ireland, including:

i) Transportation or Contingent to and from Cyprus

ii) All expenses arising in Cyprus, including:

Rations

Accommodations

Supply of vehicles and all expenses connected therewith

Cost of additional freight charges on any equipment sent

to Cyprus at United Nations request subsequent to the dispatch of the Contingent

Cost of repatriation of individuals

Cost of United Nations berets, badges, scarves and tropical uniforms (greens)

iii) Value of all Irish Government property expended or otherwise "written-off" as a result of service in Cyprus.

iv) The capitalized value of any pension or allowance or the amount of any gratuity awarded under the Irish Army Pension Acts together with any ex-gratia payments made in respect of death or disability attributed to service with UNFICYP.

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Costs incurred in Ireland, including

i) Regular pay and overseas allowances

ii) Cost of supplying:

Equipment

Clothing (incl. tropical walking-out dress)

Ration packs

In-flight rations

All other items which are required to be purchased to make Contingent ready for service.

iii) All other expenses arising in Ireland incidental to the preparation of the Contingent for service and its maintenance in Cyprus, including:

Cost of travelling and subsistence claims

Employment of substitutes

Replacement of personnel repatriated

Overtime of civilian staff
Postage, telephone, telex, etc.

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ANNEX G

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
UNITED NATIONS

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

IRELAND
(Cont'd)

Military v) Cost of official and private mail
vi) Miscellaneous: provision of mess facilities at UNFICYP Headquarters:- £ 1.80 for oficers and £ 0.8.6 for NCSs per week
Charges for casual meals at UNFICYP Headquarters.

NEW ZEALAND

Police Rations
Accommodation
Medical care
All operation costs within Cyprus including transport, communications
Other equipment which may be found essential after arrival
As from 28 June 1964 - overseas allowances
Death and disability awards

SWEDEN

Military All expenses, but presumably, as regards direct Government expenses, extra and extraordinary costs only.
Police All expenses
(Airlift costs billing - \$4,632.79)

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ANNEX G

Pay
Overseas allowances, up to 27 June 1964
Transport to Cyprus
Cost of uniforms, side arms and ammunition

None, but presumably Government will absorb such expenses as it has absorbed in connection with ONUC and UNEF operation.
None

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

All expenses of United Kingdom
Contingent

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
UNITED NATIONS

UNITED
KINGDOM

All "other-Contingents" support
expenses, which include expenses
under the following headings:
Rations (see also below)
Consumable Ordnance Stores (items
handled on a straight-sale basis)
Hire of Army vehicles and ordnance/
stores
Petrol, oil and lubricants
General stores
Civil labour
Barrack services (including gas
and solid fuel, electricity and
conservancy)
Medical
Laundry
Miscellaneous and contingencies
use of W.D. transport
Hired civilian transport
Courses of instruction
Post services
Engineer stores
Repairs to vehicles and equipment
Hiring of cold storage space in
Larnaca - (£.140 per month from 7
October 1964, for 3 months)

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY UNITED NATIONS

UNITED
KINGDOM
(Cont 'd)

Rates and Costs

1. In respect of consumable stores:
 - (a) 25% surcharge for departmental expenses and freight handling
 - (b) Resale can be arranged through normal United Kingdom auction procedures.
2. In respect of Hire Stores:
 - (a) Hire charge at a monthly rate of 1/34th of the cost of the item
 - (b) 25% surcharge for departmental expenses and freight handling.
3. In respect of United Kingdom stores returned by United Nations:
 - (a) Stores determined to have been subjected to fair wear and tear only:
 - 10% surcharge in value of the stores to cover extra costs of handling, inspecting, reconditioning and reprereserving.
 - (b) Stores which have been neglected, misused or damaged
 - United Nations to be charged with cost of repair, or if the item is beyond economical repair, to be disposed of by auction and net proceeds therefrom to be credited to United Nations and applied against the billing for the cost of the item.
 - (c) Stores abandoned by United Nations: Presumably full cost in the event of non-recovery, or, if recovery of such stores is to be carried out by Cyprus District, an appropriate charge will be raised to cover cost of such recovery, in addition, presumably, to costs arising under (a) or (b) above.
4. In respect of items suitable for rental from the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works:
 - Annual rental charge of 20% of catalogue value.

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY UNITED NATIONS

UNITED
KINGDOM
(Cont'd)

5. In respect of rations to meet special dietary requirements of non-British troops
Items held in stock or in the pipeline, at the time or discontinuance of the Force: Cost will be charged to the United Nations.

Daily rates for hire vehicles (inclusive of maintenance repair costs arising from wear and tear)

3-ton truck	£ 1.10.0	\$ 4.20	(\$126	per 30-day month	"
1-ton truck	£ 1.5.0	3.50	\$105	"	"
1/4-ton truck	£ 1.0.0	2.80	\$84	"	"
Staff car	£ 1.5.0	3.50	\$105	"	"
Water truck	£ 1.10.0	4.20	\$126	"	"
1-ton armored personnel carrier	£ 2.15.0	7.70	\$231	"	"
Ferret scout car	£ 5.10.0 (Provisional)	15.40	\$462	"	"
1/4-ton trailer	£ 0.4.0	.56	\$16.80	"	"
1-ton trailer (water)	£ 0.10.0	1.40	\$42.00	"	"

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ANNEX G

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
UNITED NATIONS

CYPRUS

Support services provided UNFICYP:

Car hire
Salaries and wages of civil
labour:
Gardeners and cleaners
Drivers
Telephonists
Accommodation (hiring of apart-
ments)
Ledra Palace
Cleaning materials
Stationery

EXPENSES TO BE BORNE BY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Such expenses as may be incurred
in implementation of Article 19
of the Status Agreement

Add civilian hospital supplies
Food supplies to refugees in
battle areas

Article 19: Premises of the Force:

The Cypriot Government shall provide without cost to the Force and in agreement with the Commander, such areas for headquarters, camps, or other premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfilment of the functions of the Force. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain Cypriot territory, they shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Commander, who alone may consent to the entry of officials to perform duties on such premises.

U N F I C Y P ANNEX H
Financial Arrangements and Reimbursements to
Governments

September 1968

I. Introduction

1. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established on 27 March 1964 in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 which recommended the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a period of three months. The mandate of the Force was subsequently extended for further periods, most recently by Council resolution 254 (1968) of 18 June 1968 which provided for an extension to 15 December 1968.

II. Financing of the Force

2. The method of financing UNFICYP was set out in resolution 186 (1964) of the Security Council and reaffirmed in its subsequent resolutions extending the mandate of the Force. In this connexion operative paragraph 6 of resolution 186 (1964) is quoted below:

"6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus; the Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;"

3. Accordingly, the costs of UNFICYP are being met by Governments providing Contingents, by the Government of Cyprus and by voluntary contributions received for that purpose.

4. Under the provisions of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) the Secretary-General has no authority to provide United Nations funds to meet the costs pertaining to the Force other than through voluntary contributions received for that purpose. Accordingly, the Regulations for UNFICYP issued on 25 April 1964 (ST/SGB/UNFICYP/1) provided, under paragraph 19, that "Financial administration of the Force shall be limited to the voluntary contributions in cash or in kind made available to the United Nations and shall be in accordance with the Financial Rules and Regulations of the United Nations and the procedures prescribed by the Secretary-General."

5. Subject to the availability of voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP account, the Secretary-General has undertaken on behalf of the Organization to reimburse governments providing

ANNEX H

military contingents or police units to the Force for such of their extra and extraordinary costs which they cannot bear at their own expense. The reimbursement commitments and other financial arrangements governing the participation of the respective military contingents and police units of the Force through 15 December 1968 are summarized below. While these may be reconsidered by participating governments in the event UNFICYP's mandate is extended beyond 15 December 1968 it is expected that reimbursement commitments by the United Nations would remain limited to the Governments' extra and extraordinary costs.

III. Financial arrangements with participating governments

6. AUSTRALIA - The financial arrangements relating to the Australian police contingent are those that were set out in the Permanent Representative's letter to the Secretary-General of 20 May 1964, namely:

- "1. The Australian Government is willing to assume the costs of basic salaries, overseas allowances, travel outside Cyprus, uniforms and equipment initially brought from Australia, and any compensation to the Australian police in the event of injury or death.
2. The Australian Government wishes the United Nations to bear the responsibility for local costs in Cyprus (accommodation, food, medical services, transport, etc.) including the costs of any additional equipment found necessary after the arrival of the police in Cyprus."

7. AUSTRIA - On 28 September 1967, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of Austria, a Supplemental Agreement was concluded between the United Nations and the Government of Austria, as contemplated in paragraph 13 of the Participating States Agreement, on expenses of the Austrian contingent in UNFICYP. This Supplemental Agreement sets out the United Nations position on the reimbursement of Austrian expenses as follows:

"... I (the Secretary-General) should like to confirm that, subject to the availability of funds in the UNFICYP account, the United Nations will refund to the Government of Austria all extra costs incurred by Austria by reason of the service of its contingents with UNFICYP in accordance with the principles approved by the General Assembly with respect to UNEF as enunciated in its resolutions 1151 (XII) and 1575 (XV) adopted by the General Assembly

ANNEX H

respectively on 22 November 1967 and 20 December 1960 and in conformity with the practice which has been followed to date with respect to the Austrian contingents with UNFICYP. Claims for extra costs submitted by the Austrian Government will be duly certified by the competent Austrian authorities on behalf of the Austrian Court of Accounts. It is my hope and expectation that all future claims will be promptly paid."

8. Prior to the conclusion of the above agreement the Austrian Government provided medical and police contingents to serve in UNFICYP on the understanding, which the United Nations accepted, that the United Nations will refund to the Austrian Government the costs it incurred in connection therewith, and that the United Nations would provide food and lodging for members of the contingents at United Nations expense. The approximate amount of the costs to be reimbursed to Austria were specified in the letters of the Permanent Representative of Austria conveying his Government's offer to provide these contingents, which included personnel costs as well as costs of special equipment necessary for service in Cyprus. The reimbursement claims received from the Austrian Government have been found to be on an extra-cost basis in conformity with the principles of reimbursement applicable to UNEF.

9. Canada - The Canadian contingent, as distinct from Canadian personnel on the Zone and Force Headquarters, served in UNFICYP for some time at no cost to the United Nations. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs in his Note dated 14 March 1964 reference the Permanent Representative's letter of 18 March 1964 (S/5614), informed the Secretary-General, inter alia, as follows:

"The Canadian Government has noted also the provisions of paragraph 6 of the resolution S/5575 concerning financial arrangements for the Force, namely 'All costs pertaining to it being met in a manner to be agreed upon by them by governments providing contingents and by the government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.'"

"The Canadian Government regards arrangements for financing of the United Nations Force as a departure from established practice and from what is desirable. The Canadian Government has consistently held that financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations should be the collective responsibility of the whole

ANNEX H

membership and that the United Nations cannot continue to carry on such operations unless satisfactory arrangements are made in accordance with that principle. Recognizing, however, that deployment of a United Nations force in Cyprus could not wait upon lengthy financial negotiations, the Canadian Government has decided to assume all costs of a Canadian Contingent for a three-month period as well as costs of transporting our men and our materials to Cyprus without prejudice to its established position of financing."

10. The participation of a Canadian Contingent in UNFICYP after 26 June 1966 was made subject to assumption by the United Nations of responsibility for the cost of direct local support of the Canadian contingent in Cyprus, theretofore borne by Canada at its own expense, the Canadian Government continuing to meet all other out-of-pocket expenses of maintaining its contingent in Cyprus. (Reference the Canadian Charge d' Affaires' note of 24 June 1966). According to the Canadian Mission, reference letter dated 16 January 1967, costs of extra rations for the Canadian contingent are being absorbed by Canada.

11. The participation of a Canadian contingent in UNFICYP after 26 December 1966 was made subject to the understanding that the United Nations will continue to be financially responsible for the cost of the local support of the Canadian contingent which it assumed in June 1966, and that the United Nations will reimburse Canada for the cost of the weekly RCAF airlift required to support the Canadian Contingent or, alternatively, for the cost of some item or items representing an approximately equivalent amount then being absorbed by Canada, and that the Canadian Government will absorb all other out-of-pocket expenses of maintaining its contingent in Cyprus. (Reference the Permanent Representative's note of 27 December 1966.)

12. The Canadian Government made a distinction between the costs of the Canadian Contingent and the costs of providing and maintaining the Zone Headquarters and the provision of personnel on Force Headquarters. The Permanent Representative of Canada in his note of 2 June 1964 informed the Secretary-General, inter alia, as follows:

"The Canadian Government's decisions to provide the Canadian component of Headquarters Nicosia Zone and personnel on the staff of Headquarters United Nations

ANNEX H

Force in Cyprus were taken subsequent to the decision to provide the Canadian contingent in Cyprus and were made at the request of the United Nations. The Zone Headquarters is organizationally distinct from the Canadian contingent, has a small staff element provided by other nations participating in the United Nations Force in Cyprus and has a specifically international role and responsibility. Headquarters United Nations Force in Cyprus is also distinct and is fully international in composition, role and responsibility. Canada, therefore, regards the Canadian elements both of Headquarters Nicosia Zone and of Headquarters United Nations Force in Cyprus as commitments separate from the Canadian contingent and takes the position that the policy announced by the Prime Minister on March 13, 1964, that Canada would assume all the costs of providing a Canadian contingent in Cyprus, does not apply to them. It is therefore the intention of the Canadian Government to recover from the United Nations the "out-of-pocket expenses" incurred in the provision of Canadian personnel for the Headquarters of the Nicosia Zone and for Force Headquarters in Cyprus. An estimate of these costs for the initial three month period of operation will be forwarded within the next few days."

13. In his letter of 5 June 1964 to the Controller, the Permanent Representative gave an estimate of the "out-of-pocket expenses" which the Canadian authorities believe was normally recoverable, made up of recurring costs in respect of special allowances, foreign allowances and maintenance support from British sources in Cyprus as well as one-time costs in respect of the purchase of fourteen radio sets with 1st and 2nd spare parts and costs of one special airlift. He added that some further out-of-pocket costs for support from Canadian sources of the Canadian component of Headquarters Nicosia Zone were probable, but that no estimate could be made of these at that time.

14. The Secretary-General in his note of 15 June 1964 agreed "to reimburse the Government of Canada claims for the "out-of-pocket expenses" incurred in the provision of Canadian personnel for the Headquarters of the Nicosia Zone and Force Headquarters in Cyprus.

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15. IRELAND - Initially the arrangement for the apportionment of the costs of the Irish Contingent between the Irish Government and UNFICYP was the one set out in the schedule annexed to the Permanent Representative's note of 12 June 1964, as follows:

A. EXPENDITURES TO BE BORNE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND

- (1) Pay and allowances of troops, including overseas allowances and the per diem allowance of 9/3d.
- (11) Cost of supplying equipment, clothing (including tropical walking-out dress), ration packs, in-flight rations and all other items which required to be purchased in order to make the contingent ready for service.
- (111) All other expenses arising in Ireland incidental to the preparation of the contingent for service and its maintenance in Cyprus, including the costs of travelling and subsistence claims, employment of substitutes, replacement of personnel repatriated, overtime of civilian staff, postage, telephone, telex, etc.

B. EXPENDITURES TO BE BORNE BY THE UNITED NATIONS

- (1) Transportation of contingent to and from Cyprus.
- (11) All expenses arising in Cyprus (e.g. rations, accommodation, supply of vehicles and all expenses connected therewith; cost of and freight charges on any equipment sent to Cyprus at United Nations request subsequent to the dispatch of the contingent; cost of United Nations berets, badges, scarves and tropical uniform (green)).
- (111) Value of all Irish Government property expended or otherwise "written off" as a result of service in Cyprus.
- (iv) The capitalised value of any pension or allowance or the amount of any gratuity awarded under the Irish Army Pensions Acts together with any ex gratia payments made in respect of death or disability attributed to service with UNFICYP.

ANNEX H

16. In view of the prolongation of the Cyprus operation and the heavy financial burden which it entailed, the Irish Government reconsidered the above arrangement. The Permanent Representative of Ireland in his note of 6 May 1965 informed the Secretary-General of the revised arrangement under which the expenditures shown above under sections A(ii) and A(iii) were to be borne by the United Nations for the period from the inception of UNFICYP.

17. Subsequently, the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of Ireland in his note of 29 July 1965 informed the Secretary-General that his Government would maintain an Irish Contingent until 26 December 1965 subject to the Secretary-General's agreement to reimburse Ireland for all the extra and extraordinary costs it incurred from the inception of the Force, including reimbursement of the cost of overseas allowances and per diem allowances paid to the Contingents.

18. Accordingly, the Irish Contingent is serving in UNFICYP on the understanding that Ireland would be reimbursed for all the Contingent's extra and extraordinary costs.

19. NEW ZEALAND - The Permanent Representative of New Zealand in his letter of 13 May 1964 informed the Secretary-General that the New Zealand Government was prepared to meet the cost of transporting the New Zealand police to Cyprus and of their pay and allowances, and would provide uniforms, sidearms and ammunition, and that the United Nations was to bear the cost of rations, accommodation, medical care and all Operation costs within Cyprus, including such items as transport and communications, and of the equipment which may be found essential after arrival. The Permanent Representative further stated that his Government reserved the right to reconsider the position in relation to the cost of overseas allowances in the light of experience, and reserved its position with respect to any claims for compensation that might arise in the event of death or injury of members of the police unit.

20. By his letter 1 July 1964 the Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General of the wishes of the New Zealand Government that the United Nations accept responsibility for the reimbursement of overseas allowances paid to the New Zealand police as from 28 June 1964.

ANNEX H

21. In his note of 5 April 1967 informing the Secretary-General of his Government's decision to withdraw the New Zealand police unit from UNFICYP on 26 June 1967, the Charge d'Affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand also informed the Secretary-General that his Government had decided not to exercise its right to claim reimbursement from the United Nations of overseas allowances paid to the police contingent as from 28 June 1964.

22. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES - DENMARK, FINLAND, SWEDEN - The financial arrangements under which Danish, Finnish and Swedish contingents serve in UNFICYP provide for the reimbursement by the United Nations of all extra and extraordinary costs of the respective Governments in accordance with the principles of reimbursement of the UNEF and ONUC operations. This arrangement was agreed upon at the meetings of October 1964 in Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm between representatives of the respective Government and United Nations Officials. Extra costs which the Nordic Government have indicated they will absorb at their own expense are as follows:

(a) Denmark:

Costs of SCACYF flights.

As from April 1966, "sundry expenses" covering among other things freight and travel expenses, medical expenses, welfare expenses, expenses incurred in Denmark in connection with the formation and winding up of the contingents (Mission letter of 6 December 1966 refers).

As from April 1966, expenses defrayed by the Danish authorities as compensation for accidents suffered by members of the Danish contingents (Mission note of 11 June 1968 refers).

As regards the police contingent, reimbursement is not requested in respect of its equipment since Danish Government has undertaken to defray all costs in connection with the establishment of the contingent (Mission Note of 1 December 1966 refers).

ANNEX H

(b) Finland:

Allowances "per diem" of certain personnel assigned to duties relating to UNFICYP.

(c) Sweden:

1. Costs of SCANAP flights
2. Staff contributions
3. Arrangements for staff, etc. (welfare)
4. Miscellaneous (mainly remuneration to administrative personnel and other expenditures in Sweden in connection with the organization of the contingents).
(Mission letter of 25 May 1965 refers).

As from January 1966, Sweden additionally assumed responsibility for the following costs:

1. Pay to civilian police
2. Costs for deputy's pay to professional personnel
3. Travel costs and allowances "per diem"
4. Medical expenditures (for after care, etc.).
(Mission letter of 2 May 1967 refers)

24. UNITED KINGDOM - The United Kingdom Government has agreed to meet all the costs of its contingents in UNFICYP. The United Kingdom authorities have indicated that under certain conditions third party claims involving members of the United Kingdom contingents would not be the United Kingdom's financial responsibility.

25. All logistical support, except that to the U.K. contingent, provided by the United Kingdom to the Force is on a reimbursable basis.

ANNEX I

No. 618-Res/67

28 September 1967

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 28 September 1967 concerning the Supplemental Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Austria on expenses with regard to the Austrian contingents in UNFICYP, which reads as follows:

"Sir,

"I have the honour to refer to the exchange of letters between the United Nations and your Government of 21 and 24 February 1966 constituting the agreement between the United Nations and Austria concerning the participation of the Austrian contingents in UNFICYP (hereinafter referred to as the 'Participating States Agreement') and particularly to the first sentence of paragraph 13 of my letter which states:

'Finally, I suggest that questions involving expenses should be dealt with in a supplemental agreement.'

"Pursuant to the desire of your Government that the Supplemental Agreement referred to above should be concluded, I should like to confirm that, subject to the availability of funds in the UNFICYP account, the United Nations will refund to the Government of Austria all extra costs incurred by Austria by reason of the service of its contingents with UNFICYP in accordance with the principles approved by the General Assembly with respect to UNEF as enunciated in its resolutions 1151 (XII) and 1575 (XV) adopted by the General Assembly respectively on 22 November 1957 and 20 December 1960 and in conformity with the practice which has been followed to date with respect to the Austrian contingents with UNFICYP. Claims for extra costs submitted by the Austrian Government will be duly certified by the competent Austrian authorities on behalf of the Austrian Court of Accounts. It is my hope and expectation that all future claims will be promptly paid.

"I propose that this letter and your reply should constitute the Supplemental Agreement concerning expenses envisaged in the first sentence of paragraph 13 of my letter of 21 February 1966 to which I have previously referred and should enter into force on the date of my

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ANNEX I

receipt of your reply. I also propose that any any dispute arising under this Supplemental Agreement should be settled in accordance with the procedures provided in paragraph 15 of my aforementioned letter.

"Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

"U Thant
"Secretary-General"

I have the honour to confirm that this letter has found the approval of my Government and that your letter and my reply should constitute the Supplemental Agreement concerning expenses envisaged in the first sentence of paragraph 13 of your letter of 21 February 1966 and should enter into force on the date of your receipt of my reply.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed)

Dr. Kurt Waldheim
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Austria
to the United Nations

The Secretary-General
of the United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

No.: 223/CCH/69

KOKKINI TRIMITHIA

13/3/1969

SUMMARISED HEALTH RETURN FOR THE YEAR 1968

- | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. WATER SUPPLIES | : SATISFACTORY |
| 2. FOOD SUPPLIES AND MESSING | : SATISFACTORY |
| 3. DISPOSAL OF WASTE | : SATISFACTORY |
| 4. ACCOMMODATION | : SATISFACTORY |
| 5. ABLUTION AND LAUNDRY FACILITIES | : SATISFACTORY |
| 6. SICKNESS | : SEE ANNEX A |
| 7. OTHER INTERESTS | : SEE BELOW |

a. The dental activity as shown under Annex A comprised:

2,477 individual sessions	191 X-rays
1,794 conservative treatments	940 prosthetic treatments
981 surface treatments	249 new manufactures and
84 root treatments	mendings
455 extractions	

Dental surgery: 127 operative extractions
 21 retinated teeth
 22 internal incisions
 5 fractures of the jaw bone
 4 cystectomies
 12 different surgical treatments

b. During the year 1968 the surgical activity comprised:

348 operations and intraventions
 323 plaster casts were applied.

c. During the year 5,006 X-rays had been carried out.

d. During the year 3,322 laboratory tests had been carried out

992 blood tests	46 blood sugar tests
1,259 urine tests	30 gastro tests
788 urethral smears	55 blood groupings
31 defecation tests	121 different tests

e. During the year 124 ECG examinations had been carried out.

(Sgd) B. Nussbaumer MD
 Colonel
 Cc / AFH

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ANNEX J

STATISTICS AUSTRIAN FIELD HOSPITAL
FOR THE YEAR - 1968

Contingent	Outpat new cases	Outpat Total	New Admis- sions	Number of days spent in hospital	Dental new patients	Lab tests
				6,296		
AUSCON	59	122	30		84	96
BRITCON	280	480	138		40	117
CANCON	268	431	116		19	97
DANCON	595	1,086	131		33	738
FINCON	166	329	99		177	257
IRCON	188	313	97		90	191
SWEDCON	206	315	112		14	132
CIVPOL	246	435	38		87	118
UNCIV	327	653	7		69	139
LOC PERS	102	325	1		20	33
TOTAL	2,437	4,489	769		633	1,918

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U N F I C Y P

ANNEX K

Payments made to Governments Supplying Troops/
Police or Facilities, as at 10 October 1968
(Expressed in thousands of US dollars)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Amount Paid</u>	<u>In Respect of</u>
Austria	1,422	Reimbursable costs of the medical and police contingents through June 1967.
Canada	1,274	Reimbursable costs of the Canadian Contingent and the Canadian H.Q. elements through September 1967.
Denmark	15,775	Reimbursable costs relating to pay and allowances of the military contingent through April 1967; reimbursable costs relating to equipment of the military contingent through October 1966; reimbursable costs relating to pay and allowances of the police contingent through October 1966; and other sundry reimbursable costs.
Finland	12,488	Reimbursable costs through June 1967.
Ireland	4,528	Reimbursable costs relating to pay and allowances through September 1967; and reimbursable costs relating to equipment through March 1967; and other sundry reimbursable costs.
Sweden	14,384	Reimbursable costs relating to pay and allowances of the military and police contingents through December 1966; reimbursable costs relating to equipment of the military contingent through September 1965; reimbursable costs relating to equipment of the police contingent through April 1965; and other sundry reimbursable costs.
United Kingdom	11,180	Logistics support provided to the Force, other than U.K. contingent, on a reimbursable basis, through March 1968.
	<u>61,051</u>	

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ANNEX L

<u>AL#</u>	<u>Amend- ment</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>UNFICYP</u>	<u>Request</u>
1		26 March 64		Airlift Swed. adv. party and equipment
2		1 April 64		Airlift main body Swed. troops and equip.
3		3 April 64		Airlift adv. party Fin. cont. and equip.
4		3 April 64		Airlift adv. party Irish cont. and equip.
5		7 April 64		Airlift 31 Aust. civ. police with baggage
	A	16 April 64		CANCEL AL/5
6		13 April 64		Airlift main body Irish troops with equip.
7		14 April 64		Airlift main body Fin. troops with equip.
	A	16 April 64		Airlift 280 addnl troops
	B	20 April 64		278 instead of 280
8		22 April 64		Airlift Aust. hospital unit
	A	4 May 64		Personnel and equip. not on initial lift
	B	6 May 64		Amendment in number of personnel
9		7 May 64		Airlift Dan. cont. with equipment
	A	14 May 64		Changed number of troops and equip. rqmts.
	B	19 May 64		Airlift 40 Dan. police
	C	21 May 64		CANCEL AL/9B
	D	29 May 64		Changed number of troops and equip. rqmts.
10		21 May 64		Airlift addnl Fin. troops
11		2 July 64		Rotate Swed. battalions in Cyprus
	A	8 July 64		Reduce troops 600 to 500
	B	10 July 64		Cover airlift of remaining 151 Swed.
12		10 July 64		Airlift addnl Irish personnel and equip.
	A	27 July 64		(detail rqmts)
13		25 Sept. 64		Rotation of Swed., Fin. and Irish troops
	A	30 Sept. 64		Changes Irish and Swed. rqmts.
	B	7 Oct. 64		Changes Fin. rqmts
	C	8 Oct. 64		Changes Irish rqmts
	D	12 Oct. 64		CANCEL request for Swed. airlift
	E	14 Oct. 64		Rotation of Fin. rear party
14		9 Nov. 64		Radio batt.
15		8 Jan. 65		100 ea. combat overalls and parkas
16		10 Feb. 65		200 rolls wire
17		25 Mar. 65		Rotation of Irish cont.
18		25 Mar. 65		Rotation of Danish cont.
	A	28 April 65		(detail rqmts)
19		NOT ISSUED		
20		12 Aug. 65		Spare parts for M-37 from Pisa
21		4 Nov. 65		9 M-37, 2 burners, etc.
22		13 Jan. 66		M-37 field range parts
	A	8 Feb. 66		CANCEL AL/22
23		2 Feb. 66		Radio batt.
24		7 Feb. 66		M-37 field range spare parts
25		27 Dec. 66		1,000 Radio batts. @ 150 per month
	No.1	19 April 67		Reduce to 80 per month
26		15 Nov. 67		1,100 Radio bats. @ 100 per month and continue AL/25

COMPARISON COST DATA

UNFICYP Contingents

<u>Contingent</u>	<u>Approx. Man-months through 1969</u>	<u>Est. direct cost to UN per man-month (Excluding transport & local support)</u> ¹	<u>Est. absorbed cost by contributor per man-month</u>
Australian CIV POL	3,000	\$ 0	\$600
Austrian Hosp and CIV POL	6,500	370	140
Canadian Mil	62,000	23	540
Danish Mil and CIV POL	53,800	500	52
Finnish Mil	48,000	400	40 (assumed)
Irish Mil	42,000	230	167
New Zealand CIV POL	760	0	600
Swedish Mil CIV POL	50,800	530	100 ²
U.K. Mil	<u>76,500</u>	0	118 ³
Total	343,360		
Total (excluding U.K.	266,860		

¹ Figures above in the direct-cost-to-UN columns include only those costs for which the contributing government is reimbursable. To arrive at an established all-conclusive cost to the UN per man-month, it is necessary to add the

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ANNEX M

COMPARISON COST DATA

UNFICYP Contingents

<u>Total Costs</u> <u>per man-</u> <u>month¹</u>	<u>Total Direct</u> <u>UN Cost ¹</u> <u>(\$1,000)</u>	<u>Total Absorbed</u> <u>Cost</u> <u>(\$1,000)</u>	<u>Total Direct</u> <u>and Absorbed</u> <u>Costs</u> <u>(\$1,000)</u>
\$600	\$ 0	\$ 1,800	\$ 1,800
510	2,400	900	3,300
563	1,400	33,500	34,900
552	26,900	2,800	29,700
440	19,200	1,900	21,100
397	9,700	7,000	16,700
600	0	456	456
630	26,900	5,100	32,000
118 ²	<u>0</u>	<u>9,000²</u>	<u>9,000²</u>
	\$86,500	\$62,456	\$148,956
	86,500	53,456	139,956

following averaged costs for:

- (1) local support furnished by the U.K. logistical system - \$50 per man-month except for the U.K. and Canadian Contingent
- (2) local support furnished by the UN logistical system - \$16 per man-month except for the U.K. contingent

(3) Transportation charges paid by the UN - \$30 per man-month, except for the U.K. and Canadian contingents and Australian and New Zealand Police. Total = \$96 or roughly \$100.

2 Absorbed costs assumed by Sweden appeared to more than double in 1969. The figure of \$100 per man-month used above would be an approximate 6 year average; see footnote supra, p. 485.

3 The absorbed cost figures for the U.K. do not appear at all comparable to those of other contingent contributors. A possible reason is set out supra, pp. 488-89. A figure of about \$400 per man-month for the U.K. absorbed costs would seem a reasonable one for comparison purposes. The U.K. figure in the final column above would on that basis be \$30,600,000.

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ANNEX O

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR UNFICYP SUPPORT
(\$1,000) (*-less than \$1,000)

<u>Contributor</u>	<u>1964</u>		<u>1965</u>		<u>1966</u>	
	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>
Australia	312	212	400	500	125	-
Austria	160	80	40	80	160	160
Belgium	221	221	601	241	241	601
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia	*	*	-	-	-	-
Congo (Kinshasa)	-	-	-	-	10	10
Cyprus ¹	280	61	-	24	43	238
Denmark ¹	225	75	300	375	240	195
Germany ¹	1,500	1,500	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Finland ¹	25	-	50	25	100	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	1,550	1,550	1,700	1,700	1,200	1,200
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	-	-	10	6	-	-
Ireland	-	-	50	-	-	50
Israel	10	10	-	-	10	10
Italy	250	-	422	536	542	136
Ivory Coast	10	10	20	10	-	10
Jamaica	-	-	2	2	4	2
Japan	200	200	100	100	100	100
Korea	13	13	3	3	-	-
Laos	-	-	-	-	1	-
Lebanon	-	-	1	1	-	-
Liberia	3	-	-	3	2	-
Libya	15	-	-	-	15	15
Luxembourg	10	10	20	20	10	10
Malawi	-	-	6	6	-	-
Malaysia	3	3	3	3	3	3
Malta	-	-	2	2	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-
Morocco	10	10	10	10	-	-
Nepal	*	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	333	333	428	428	160	160
New Zealand	42	42	-	-	-	-
Niger	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	3	3	5	5	3	3
Norway	159	159	254	254	240	240

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ANNEX O

<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>		<u>Total</u> <u>1964-1968</u>		<u>Due</u>
<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	
200	225	123	223	1,160	1,160	-
160	200	160	160	680	680	-
221	221	50	50	1,334	1,334	-
-	-	*	*	*	*	-
-	-	-	-	*	*	-
10	-	-	-	20	10	10
140	140	120	120	583	583	-
240	120	240	480	1,245	1,245	-
1,000	1,000	-	-	6,500	6,500	-
50	150	100	150	325	325	-
12	-	-	12	12	12	-
1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	6,850	6,850	-
2	2	1	1	3	3	-
4	8	4	-	18	14	4
-	-	-	-	50	50	-
7	5	-	2	27	27	-
628	810	360	-	2,202	1,482	720
-	-	-	-	30	30	-
2	4	6	6	14	14	-
-	-	125	125	525	525	-
-	-	-	-	16	16	-
*	2	-	-	2	2	-
-	-	-	-	1	1	-
-	-	-	-	5	3	2
-	-	-	15	30	30	-
5	5	-	-	45	45	-
-	-	-	-	6	6	-
-	-	-	-	9	9	-
-	-	-	-	2	2	-
-	-	2	2	2	2	-
-	-	-	-	20	20	-
-	-	-	-	*	-	*
-	-	-	-	921	921	-
-	-	-	-	42	42	-
2	2	-	-	2	2	-
-	-	-	-	11	11	-
240	240	241	241	1,134	1,134	-

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ANNEX O

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR UNFICYP SUPPORT
(\$1,000) (*-less than \$1,000)

<u>Contributor</u>	<u>1964</u>		<u>1965</u>		<u>1966</u>	
	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>
Pakistan	-	-	3	3	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	1	1
Sweden ¹	340	-	480	820	360	360
Switzerland	235	235	130	130	130	130
Thailand	-	-	3	-	-	-
Trinidad	2	2	-	-	-	-
Turkey	200	200	350	300	400	450
U.K. ¹	4,167	-	3,003	2,812	6,445	4,994
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S. ²	6,600	500	8,000	3,500	13,500	14,200
Venezuela	1	1	2	1	-	-
Vietnam	1	1	2	2	1	1
Zambia	-	-	8	4	8	-
TOTALS	16,881	5,431	18,407	13,904	26,053	25,281
Contributors (Paid or Pledged)	32		35		31	
Cost of UNFICYP (Annual)	14,907		13,125		19,895	
Cost of UNFICYP (Cumulative)	14,907		28,034		59,620 ⁴	

¹ Contributions by these countries are off-set in whole or part against their claims for reimbursement for support of UNFICYP.

² The U.S. throughout the 5 years, and the U.K. on occasion have adjusted the amount paid against their pledges based upon other contributions (see p. 502 of the text).

³ The 1968 cost for UNFICYP entered in the table is just over twice the actual expenditures. Since the UNFICYP account

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ANNEX O

<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>		<u>Total 1964-1968</u>		<u>Due</u>
<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Paid</u>	
3	3	3	3	9	9	-
1	1	1	1	2	2	-
*	*	1	1	2	2	-
360	-	360	360	1,900	1,540	360
400	200	200	400	1,095	1,095	-
-	-	-	-	3	-	3
-	-	-	-	2	2	-
590	590	300	300	1,840	1,840	-
3,005	1,882	3,600	6,800	20,220	16,488	3,705
7	7	-	-	7	7	-
4,000	5,900	8,000	9,000	40,100	25,000	7,000 ²
-	1	-	-	3	3	-
-	-	-	-	4	4	-
10	-	2	11	28	15	13
12,500	12,919	15,198	19,688	89,041	69,094	11,816
30		27		51		
20,353		18,454 ³				
79,973		98,427				

has in recent years fallen further in the red, it has become the practice to record in official UN accounts only those costs for which funds are available. In 1968 the costs which could be paid were \$9,049,932 but the total costs were \$18,445,000.

⁴ The apparent sharp use in UNFICYP costs in 1966 was caused mainly by the adjusting for under-estimated and under-reported costs for 1965.